By Commander George Bonsall, U. S. Navy
The base realignment and closure process resulted in the combination of naval aviation’s premier tactics schools into one entity, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at Fallon, Nevada. The Navy Fighter Weapons School (NFWS or Top Gun), Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School (CAEWWS or Top Dome), and Naval Strike Warfare Center (NSWC or Strike “U”) have been consolidated under a rear admiral. Other aviation commands also are being brought into the fold at NSAWC so that all aviation tactics are within the air combat training continuum. NSAWC is one of the few Navy commands where tactics are an all-consuming passion.
While in command of the USS Sentry (MCM-3), I screened for commander. Given the opportunity, I would have stayed a few more years. Unfortunately, I had my “ticket,” and it was time to get out of the way. I knew it was time to negotiate orders for that career-enhancing billet that would add to my portfolio and ensure my continued career progression. I assumed this meant a high-visibility job somewhere inside the D.C. Beltway. I thought I might have a chance to work for some hard-charging fellow surface warfare officer (SWO) in some sweet joint billet.
I called my detailer with confidence—it was time to play tough with my former classmate at the vocational technical school on the Severn River, who now had my fate in his hands. We had tipped one or two during those days of youthful exuberance, and surely he would hook me up. He hooked me all right. He played me like a rainbow trout on a light fly line. “George, what were you hoping for?” he asked.
“Come on, [name withheld to protect the forked-tongue dog.] You know I want D.C. It’s close to family for my wife and kids, and I haven’t been there yet. It’s my turn. We’ve been west of the Mississippi for five years. Hook me up.”
There came that dreadful pause before, “Well . . . we have other, eh, plans for you.” Having been in four previous jobs with Tomahawk experience, I knew my fate was sealed as soon as he said, “Fallon.” So, after breaking the news to CinCHome, we were off to the quaint, little town of Fallon, Nevada, where I would be a black shoe in a brown shoe world.
Thanks for the detail, Mike (oops). It was one of the most rewarding experiences of my career, professionally and personally. I love tactics, and NSAWC is all about tactics. The focus is on aviation, but the essence is the hunt, or ordnance on target. Working with aviators is fun, on the job and off. It’s no more or less fun than working with surface warriors, but fun all the same. After two years in the high desert, I learned tons about strike warfare and our aviator brethren’s approach to the profession. I hope that some of my lessons might be cause for discussion in wardrooms and ready rooms, and that some of my recommendations will be considered for implementation.
Intraservice and Interservice Rivalry
Competition is a good thing according to many economists. It is capitalism at its best. Whenever I attended joint conferences, however, I was reminded of the benefits of unity of command, or at least unity of effort. Briefers and panel members from our sister services rarely depart from the party line. Most Navy officers see this as a weakness. Somewhere in the back of our minds, we are Perry opening Japan or Spruance at Midway. Men and women of action, we do not ask for rudder orders. We give them. That approach may work well in a screen formation, but it can be professionally embarrassing in joint forums.
I became NSAWC’s lead in time critical/sensitive strike/targeting (TC/SS/T) while the Department of Defense was struggling to apply lessons learned from Kosovo. I attended two or three conferences a month in this area for about nine months. Many of those conferences were joint, or at least had joint participants. Invariably, the other services would have briefings by two or three commands, each of which said the same thing using the same terminology with minor changes that accentuated their commands’ roles. Invariably, the Navy would have three officers, one from each major line community, who offered three different viewpoints, two of which were diametrically opposed. While the Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO’s) focus on alignment and the establishment of OPNAV N70 (Warfare Integration and Assessment Division) may be improving this situation, it still exists. Attendees often asked me what the Navy’s actual position was with regard to an issue. Having one service offer three different points often confuses issues and delays solutions to technical and doctrinal problems.
My foray into the world of joint conferences and seminars led me to two other related observations. First, there are too many elephants with no clear distinction at times as to which elephant is in charge. My new acronym (TC/SS/T) is typical of the associated problems. Some preferred the term time critical strike, some time sensitive targeting, and some time critical targeting—all referring to the same basic problem. Differences in terminology, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures affect our ability to get the most out of our joint force. Certainly, some amount of friction is a good thing. Too much slows progress.
A second observation is that the transformation may have a disproportionate number of civilian contractors involved. This is not to say that their intellectual capital and other resources are not necessary. It is a matter of objectives. The typical contractor supporting experimentation must make a profit for its own survival. I was involved in three fleet battle experiments while at NSAWC. Often it appeared that the experiments were more a series of advertisements. Advertisements, like friction, can be a good thing. Advertisements at the expense of progress and fresh ideas are not. I observed and received reports that the ideas of line officers fresh from operational experience were ignored at times because they did not fit within the limitations of the equipment provided by the contractors. The participation by contractors in predecision conferences and seminars can lead to inefficiencies in system development. Transformation will require cooperation with industry, but the driving force should be operational needs developed by operating forces.
Centers of Excellence
The establishment of centers of excellence for the development of doctrine, tactics, and various other reasons is a beautiful idea. Placing a two-star admiral in charge of one is brilliant. While at NSAWC, I was the assistant plans, programs, and tactics officer. My boss was moved to the front office, and I became the boss for about half of my two years. My department was the remnants of the Naval Strike Warfare Center. A black shoe was now in charge of the Navy’s premier center for developing strike tactics and advising the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) on strike weapons programs. Fear not, my “pointy-nose” friends, I was well supervised and air-wing training was directed by the deputy.
I was in a position to observe the influence of NSAWC. I briefed or prepared briefs for many four- and three-star officers from each of the armed forces and for Congressional delegations. Many of the briefs and papers I helped develop found their way to the “Hill.” I do not believe that surface warfare’s equivalent, the Surface Warfare Development Group, or the submarine community’s Tactical Development Squadron have the same access. The ideas of naval aviation’s tacticians find their way into important places unfettered by budgeting constraints.
NSAWC’s first major hurdle as a new command was to combine three clearly independent schools under one command. I arrived early in NSAWC’s life in 1999. There was not as much cross-pollination as one would expect. The independent identities and pride of the three schools are inspiring. Heck, they made a movie of one of them.
By the time I left, however, Top Gun instructors were participating regularly in air-wing training, the primary mission of Strike “U”. Air wing instructors were flying “red air hops” for Top Gun. The carrier airborne early warning weapons school and I conspired on a variety of issues to ensure coherent, well-researched approaches to issues. Slowly but surely, the other naval aviation tactical schools are falling under NSAWC for standardization within the air combat training continuum. Would it not be advantageous and practical for the Surface Warfare Officers School, the Surface Warfare Development Group, the Aegis Training and Readiness Center, the Fleet Combat Training Centers, and others to fall under the same boss, focused on tactics? The organizational hurdles would be significant, but the efficiencies would benefit our training and tactics development.
It is time to establish the Surface Warfare Center of Excellence (SWCE) on par with NSAWC. A two-star admiral would attract quality officers and provide a single point of contact for other communities and services. Given information technology and some travel money, a small staff of officers could oversee the work of the other activities without busting the budget. The SWCE would report to OPNAV, or Commander, Atlantic Fleet, as principle advisor on surface warfare tactics, their implications, and on programmatic issues. The Naval Warfare Development Center accomplishes much of this at the operational level but rarely works at the tactical level. The SWCE could oversee a surface warfare combat training continuum.
Tactics versus Leadership
Naval aviation officers concentrate on tactics and airmanship as junior officers. Junior surface warriors concentrate on leadership and seamanship. This may have to do with the nature of aircrews employing fighter jets individually while destroyer captains employ ships with more than 300 crewmembers. It is the nature of the beast. Both communities, however, might benefit by looking at how the other trains junior officers.
At the most, I had two enlisted yeomen working for me. When tasked with drafting an enlisted evaluation, predepartment head aviators in my department looked at me as if I had gone insane. Of course, my surface warfare and submarine lieutenants assigned the same task returned a properly formatted, well-documented drafts that hit all the salient points and even were completed using the NavFit 98 software.
I sent one of my aviators to the required intermediate leadership course before he detached for his department head job in a strike-fighter squadron. He returned full of excitement, for he had never entertained many of the concepts presented. He also had never had enlisted personnel work directly for him during his first squadron tour. I believe that lieutenant commander might be a tad bit late to start learning the leadership skills—including the administrivia—necessary to train, retain, and advance a technically competent force.
As a nuclear cruiser division officer, I was lucky to have the opportunity to qualify and complete most of a Mediterranean deployment as a tactical action officer (TAO) and force weapons coordinator. Unfortunately, it is common for surface warfare officers to complete their initial sea tours without a similar experience. During the TAO portion of department head school, some are learning the basics instead of refreshing and refining their skills. A basic warfare qualification and experience should be required for all junior officers. Engineering is important, but the tactical employment of the platform accomplishes the mission.
Tactical Training
I have served in five wardrooms. A classic situation might unfold as follows.
The captain asks, “XO, wardroom training is scheduled tomorrow. What’s the topic this week? Wanna make sure we’re thinking tactically.”
“Dunno Captain,” the executive officer says. “I’ll find out.” Ten minutes later, he says “SWO, what’s the topic for wardroom training this week? Captain wants something tactical.”
“Right XO, it’s eh . . . errhh . . . oh yeah, it’s antiship cruise missiles by the ummm, Commo, yeah, yeah, the Commo. It’s gonna be great.”
Ten minutes later, the senior watch officer is telling the communications officer, “Commo, I know you’re in the middle of your inventory, but I need you to give wardroom training on antiship missiles . . . tomorrow at 1000. It better be good.”
Naval aviation has developed a better approach. The air combat training continuum consists of three primary elements. The first is weapons tactics instructors (WTIs). All aviation communities have developed curriculum to train and qualify WTIs. The WTI system takes training the trainers to a whole new level. Only the best of the best are chosen to attend the intense and thorough courses of instruction. WTIs fill key instructor billets in squadrons and type wing weapons schools and weapons training units. Naval aviation has made a tremendous investment in the training of its WTIs. NSAWC oversees all WTI production in the Navy, and its ties to OPNAV, systems commands, industry, and fleet and joint commands ensure that instructors are current in all tactics areas.
Two more elements complement the WTI system. The air combat weapons and tactics syllabus is tied directly to the training and readiness matrix, a close equivalent to the surface force training manual. It provides the framework for unit-level training and sets standards for tactical proficiency and combat readiness. The syllabus is supported by the air combat online system, which provides training material, automated training records, and interactive courseware over a secure network. Curricula materials can be kept up to date at all times. Squadron WTIs can modify training material as necessary based on the needs of the unit, and training preparation time is reduced significantly.
Curricula standardized by the proposed SWCE would benefit the tactical training of all surface warfare officers. Formal courses of instruction are outstanding, but it is not possible to send each SWO to all formal schools. Recent revisions to the Surface Warfare Officer Division Officer Course will put more of the onus of individual training on ship’s company. The department head course of instruction could be modified to produce the first surface warfare WTIs (see sidebar, pages 36-37).
Maintenance
In naval aviation, nonaviators handle much of the maintenance burden that SWOs take on themselves. Fleet fighter and strike fighter squadrons have two to four dedicated maintenance professionals who provide full-time focus in ordnance, maintenance planning, and material control. They have officers who do nothing but maintenance to ensure that safe, mission-capable aircraft are available to meet operational needs. The maintenance officer in a fleet squadron is an aviator, and the quality assurance officer also usually is an aviator. As with ships and submarines, the commanding officer still is responsible for everything.
“Do It Yourself” has its place, especially at sea, where there is no one to turn to for help. We might, however, free time for tactical training and, well, liberty, if we had more officers and civilians dedicated to maintenance and logistics—the equivalent of naval aviation’s “ground pounders.” If I had a port engineer dedicated to my ship, instead of shared, I would have more time for tactics. If the intermediate maintenance and depot-level activities had more people dedicated to managing and ensuring the work was done correctly, I would have more time for tactics. If a repair parts expediter were assigned from ashore to support me directly, I would have more time for tactics.
Bonuses
Naval aviation has the bonus system right. We must do everything in our power to show our people that we value them. I had 35 aviators in my department—some who stayed and some who returned to the civilian sector. None stayed expressly because of the bonus. Therefore, the retention argument for bonuses may or may not be valid. Without exception, however, all those who stayed ensured that their bonus paperwork was squared away.
The surface community has taken a step in the right direction with surface warfare officer continuation pay for department heads and the surface warfare critical skills retention bonus for lieutenant commanders. As these bonuses have slowly been approved, we have paid the same peer group additional bonuses as it advances. As a result, lieutenant commander department heads may get paid more than their executive officers or their commanding officers.
Clearly, the next step is some form of additional pay for commanding officers commensurate with the position. Aviator commanders that return to sea duty receive a bonus of $15,000 a year, whether they are going to command or staff. Commanding officers of ships receive a paltry $100 per month command responsibility pay, an amount unchanged for some time. All commanding officers, regardless of community, receive this $100 bonus. In addition, post-aviation command commanders and captains on sea duty get the $15,000—surface officers in command also should get the bonus. Those who might believe that I have a personal stake in this should realize that my command tour will be well behind me before such a bonus could be enacted. It simply seems like the right thing to do. Arguably the toughest job in the Navy, excepting a Navy spouse of course, is command afloat and it should include significant financial rewards commensurate with the risk and responsibility.
Work Ethic
All three Navy line communities have an amazing “Can Do” spirit. It is one of the reasons that this profession is so rewarding. We may kid each other about aviators sleeping during general quarters or the SWO perversion of sleep deprivation, but when needed, our ships and aircraft will be on station, ready to answer the call. In my time at Fallon, I observed that naval aviation is filled with dedicated and talented officers, who will ensure that their crews are trained, plans are solid, and aircraft and ordnance ready. Ordnance will be delivered on time and on target.