Before the British invented the Enigma decoding device and began reading the other fellow's mail, the term intelligence—at the national level—called up a different idea than it does today. Earlier practitioners of intelligence sought to see the world through the eyes of their adversaries and international competitors, and understand their problems, opportunities, and pressures with sufficient fidelity to anticipate their moves.
The great practitioners could advise their statesmen of initiatives to shape or frustrate their adversary's actions in useful fashion. Their product was a shrewd appraisal of his goals and strategy and his likely reaction to initiatives being contemplated against him. Further, they knew an adversary's culture intimately, and their anticipations of his actions often were based on a steady stream of information, much—but not all—of which came from unclassified, open sources. Intelligence in this sense was inherently strategic and long term: the endless chess match among national leaders called the "Great Game." Although uncertain at times, it was correct often enough that it was the most important type of knowledge that leaders could hope to have.
With the advent of Enigma, British and U.S. intelligence practitioners gained a source of immediate, near-certain knowledge to enhance judgments of their adversaries at the state and battlefield levels. Their appraisals became increasingly certain—and therefore increasingly powerful. As the Cold War progressed, so did our ability to peek into the private chatter and backyards of our adversaries. Intelligence practice at the national level took on a different emphasis. As technical means improved, more attention was paid to what could be known for a fact. Expectations for intelligence changed. Efforts were turned increasingly to an extremely important aspect of the nuclear age: technical military capabilities.
By the 1980s, intelligence at the national level was shaped largely by the expectation that its greatest value had become short term and largely tactical, Within these confines, knowledge could be virtually certain. In contrast with intelligence of a century ago, it declined to draw culturally informed judgments about an adversary's worldview, strategy, and reactions to our moves. Short-term, tactical certainty was sufficient. Thus, the old fundamental appreciation of an adversary's culture and mindset faded in importance.
The current emphasis on using technical means to learn about terrorists no doubt carries with it the baggage of the unwritten assumptions of technical intelligence: short-term effect and the possibility of certain knowledge. But in a war against well-organized and dispersed terrorists, the most important knowledge we can have concerns their ultimate goals, strategy, and campaign plans—all of which are shaped by their cultures and views of the world. A deep understanding of an adversary's thinking can be a decisive advantage. It promotes strategies that can make the terrorists reveal themselves, cause their loyalists to defect, and eventually dry up their support base. This knowledge changes the hunt from looking for one needle in a thousand haystacks, to finding the needle in a single haystack. It is an intellectual endeavor, augmented by technical means. Without the human core, the product of all technical means has limited value and leaves us with too many strategic unknowns.
Consider the campaign against al Qaeda. The publicly visible part of it suggests our overpowering military strength and success in Afghanistan has led to the next stage of al Qaeda's global campaign and ours as well. On some fronts, al Qaeda is ahead—for example, in gaining support among Muslims around the world. Further, its recruitment and support base appears to be secure. In the next stage of the war, the military strength of the United States and its allies is likely to be far less influential. We will need insight to al Qaeda's strategic goals and priorities, likely operational concepts, and probable reactions to initiatives we might take. This understanding may be essential to hold al Qaeda in check while our long-term strategy works on the root causes that generate terrorism and secure the dedicated support of angry young men. With such insight, we might be able to curtail the conflict in only one generation.
The U.S. government should restore strategic, culturally profound intelligence appraisal as the foundation for shaping the current campaign against terrorism and national security policy in general. Understanding how the world looks through our adversaries' eyes is critical to shaping strategies and crafting campaigns that will ensure our preeminence across the international range of foreign, military, and economic affairs. As noted by Winston Churchill, a master of the Great Game, "Even the greatest tactician must take account of the enemy."
Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Hosmer, a fighter pilot, served as president of the National Defense University and superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He was a member of the Defense Science Board’s summer study on terrorism.