"Countering Attack Sub Shortfalls"
(See E. Labs, pp. 46-50, September 2002 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Paul F Sullivan, U.S. Navy, Director, Submarine Warfare Division (CNO/N77)—Dr. Labs gives an excellent presentation of the SSN force recommendations laid out in the 1999 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) study and submarine force goals of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). With the SSN force at 54 submarines today, the Navy leadership is focused on achieving two objectives: first, obtaining and sustaining a Virginia (SSN-774)-class build rate of two per year as soon as possible; and second, refueling the remaining first-flight Los Angeles (SSN-688)class SSNs. Increasing the Virginia build rate will minimize the magnitude of the dip in SSN force level below the QDR minimum of 55, will put us on a path to stabilizing the SSN force for the long term, and will allow us to buy the Virginia class at a more economic rate. Refueling the first-flight Los Angeles-class SSNs will capitalize on their 12 to 15 years of remaining ship life to help sustain the force until the Virginia build rate takes affect. Providing the resources for these two objectives is the most important step our nation can take to deliver needed submarine capability today and in the future.
To help meet the combatant commanders' demand for SSNs (which increased by some 30% after 11 September 2001), both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet submarine type commanders are working to maximize efficiencies in today's force. One major initiative, as discussed by Dr. Labs, is homeporting three SSNs in Guam. The idea to forward base these ships originated in 1999/2000 from Vice Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Al Konetzni and his staff at Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, as an option to meet some of the unfilled demand for SSNs in the Pacific. The first SSN, the USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705), arrived in Guam in October 2002. The second, the USS San Francisco (SSN-711), will arrive this month, and the third (to be determined) will arrive in the first quarter of 2004. We expect a Guam-based SSN, once fully oriented and operational, to achieve twice (not three times, as stated in the article) the operational days of an SSN based out of the continental United States.
Dr. Labs makes an argument to station additional ships in Guam to further increase the operational benefit and close the gap toward recommendations of the CJCS study. Guam, however, represents the first time we will have forward-based SSNs (in more than 50 years of operating them), and our current three-ship effort is a pragmatic approach to test this initiative. It leverages a relatively low-cost opportunity while minimizing the risk of a large infrastructure investment that would be required to base more SSNs in Guam. The Navy is not justified in taking additional risks that might adversely affect the SSN force, and the Navy as a whole, until the full operational value of the initiative is determined and various costs and impacts that Dr. Labs identifies are better understood. Greater understanding will come as the three Guambased SSNs gain operational time over the next few years.
I also would like to address Dr. Labs's proposal for testing an SSN dual-crewing concept. On the surface, this proposal appears attractive, especially in light of past successes with dual-crewed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). SSBNs, however, were designed, conceived, and managed as dual-crew submarines from the beginning. Infrastructure ashore to execute dual crewing was part of the bill. Ballistic missile submarines have been successful dual-crew platforms for years, but many of the traits that enable dual crewing are not present in SSNs. For example, SSBNs have a more limited range of missions than SSNs, making it easier for the crews to maintain their operating skills by simulator training during off-crew periods. In addition, the stable operational patrol cycle for SSBNs (as compared to SSNs) allows us to "start slow" to ensure that each crew quickly and uniformly recovers at-sea operating proficiency. Finally, SSBNs and their maintenance and training infrastructures—from things as complex as the repair and spare parts support to things as simple as the size and make-up of the hatches—have been planned and built from the ground up to support more at-sea time for the ship. Similar specially designed infrastructures are not present for SSNs. As a result, many nontrivial maintenance and refurbishment issues associated with greater at-sea use of these platforms would arise.
Dual crewing is not easy. It works on board SSBNs because the platforms and their operations have been designed to allow dual crewing to succeed. In every area important to the success of dual crewing, SSNs diverge dramatically from SSBNs. As an officer who has commanded both a Los Angeles-class SSN and an Ohio (SSBN-726)-class SSBN, it is clear to me that dual crewing an SSN with the same degree of confidence in the ship's military readiness would be extremely challenging. As a result, it is far from apparent that the operational gain associated with dual-crewing SSNs outweighs the costs and risks
There is a middle ground, however. The conversion of the first four Ohio-class SSBNs to dual-crewed cruise-missile submarines (SSGNs) will give us important insight into the practicalities of dual crewing non-SSBNs. The SSGNs will have a broader range of missions than SSBNs, but not as broad as SSNs. The SSGNs will operate in environments more demanding than SSBNs, but not as demanding as SSNs. The SSGNs will have less stable operating cycles than SSBNs, but not as unstable as SSNs. And SSGNs, unlike SSNs, will be able to leverage much of the dual-crew Ohio-class infrastructure already paid for and in place for the ballistic missile submarines.
Submariners experienced with dual crewing SSBNs know that it will not be easy to make it successful for SSGNs; it will require innovation and a great deal of care and effort. We are rightly focused on SSGN as the next dual-crewing step for submarines, and, as always, we will watch other experiments (such as Sea Swap: crew swapping on destroyers bound for decommissioning) for transferable insights we can exploit.
"Reorganizing Defense"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 117-118, October 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Lawrence K. Zelvin, U.S. Navy—Norman Polmar reiterates a common misunderstanding about the relationship between the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NorthCom). In his last paragraph, Mr. Polmar states that "under the current reorganization with the abolishment of SpaceCom, NORAD becomes subordinate to NorthCom." This statement is incorrect.
The President's direction to U.S. combatant commands is administered through the Unified Command Plan. The Unified Command Plan specifically establishes the missions and geographic responsibilities among U.S. combatant commanders. Major revisions to the Unified Command Plan that took place on 1 October 2002 included:
- U.S. Northern Command was created to defend the United States and support military assistance to civil authorities.
- Joint Forces Command was refocused on transforming U.S. military forces, and geographic responsibilities shifted to Northern and European commands.
- U.S. Space Command and Strategic Command were merged into an expanded Strategic Command (StratCom), headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.
The roles and mission for NORAD are defined by a binational diplomatic note signed by both the United States and Canada called the NORAD agreement. This document assigns NORAD its missions of North American aerospace warning and control. The NORAD agreement is separate and distinct from the UCP, although some of NORAD's missions are very similar to NorthCom's. Since the United States and Canada have not agreed to any formal relationship between the commands, either through a new NORAD agreement or some other diplomatic note, NorthCom and NORAD remain two separate and distinct organizations with no senior/subordinate structure.
"Small Ships and Future Missions"
(See S. Kelley, pp. 42-45, September 2002; G. Galdorisi, pp. 14-16, November 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Philip G. Beierl, U.S. Navy, Officer in Charge, Joint Venture (HSV-XI)—The aluminum semiplaning catamaran hull of the Joint Venture is just one approach to the classic problem of minimizing wetted surface and "skin drag" to maximize speed. In addition to speed, the payoff of this lightweight catamaran hull form is that its deadweight capacity is proportionately high, and its wide beam supports a high-volume superstructure that can flexibly handle a wide variety of payloads. A quick look at some capabilities of the Joint Venture should give pause to Commander Kelley in his pessimistic view of the possibilities for small ships in the future:
- Top speed of 45 knots lightly loaded and of 39 knots fully loaded
- In just over six months, traveled 27,500 nautical miles at an average speed of nearly 30 knots, circumnavigating the globe, and successfully operating in a wide range of conditions from Norway in winter to the Persian Gulf in summer
- 750-ton (45% of full-load displacement) deadweight capacity flexibly distributed between fuel and payload depending on mission
- Range of about 3,000 nautical miles at 35 knots with a 200-ton payload
- Operates H-60 and H-46 helicopters from a large stable flight deck
- Launches and recovers multiple boats and unmanned vehicles as large as the 11meter rigid hull inflatable boat
- Carries up to 18 amphibious assault vehicles or 36 light armored vehicles and can on or offload at an austere port or causeway
Capabilities unheard of in conventional small high-speed military ships are being obtained today using inexpensive commercial off-the-shelf technology with a few military modifications. We have much to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of new high-speed ship designs and their applicability to specific missions, but we have good reason for optimism that they will form a vital component in a balanced naval force of the future.
"We Have the Craft for Littoral Warfare"
(See G. Worthington, pp. 128, October 2002 Proceedings)
"Streetfighter Cannot Do the Job"
(See R. Brawley, pp. 66-69, October 2002 Proceedings)
Scott C. Truver, Vice President, Center for Security and Strategies, Anteon Corporation—Rear Admiral Worthington should be pleased to learn that the LSC(X), the Office of Naval Research's experimental littoral support craft now referred to as "X-Craft," is just one of several prototype vessels being considered and evaluated for the concept design of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This is part of the Navy's effort to determine the best answer for its future need for focused-mission vessels for the littoral battle space. And, although Lieutenant Commander Brawley summarizes well the arguments for and against a focused-mission vessel, he is incorrect to characterize LCS as "Streetfighter."
Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski's concept of a small, fast, agile, and stealthy littoral warship may have been the springboard for the concept of LCS, but the actual design review for the LCS is deviating significantly from the Streetfighter concept. First, LCS might well be much larger than the small corvette-like craft that some championed as Streetfighter. LCS will be a platform for reconfigurable mission modules and will rely heavily on unmanned systems to conduct its focused missions of mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, or antisurface warfare against small, fast, armed boats in the littoral. The conjecture that LCS will be "expendable" is inaccurate and prejudicial to America's sons and daughters who will crew this future warship. It will, however, be much better suited for conducting operations against the asymmetric threats in these three warfare areas than larger multimission ships.
LCS is not a replacement for the Navy's multimission ships, but will complement them. Surface warfare's leaders explain that a "netted and distributed force" of DD(X), CG(X), and LCS warships, operating alongside Aegis cruisers and destroyers, will provide the naval and joint force commanders with a full range of combat capabilities to carry out critical tasks that undergird the new "Sea Power 21" vision. With its high speed, shallow draft, maneuverability, and modular characteristics, LCS will confront littoral threats that can deny access of U.S. forces to a given theater of operations. It will offer unique capabilities that no other platform can provide. Employing netted sensors and organic weapons for self-defense, LCS will break new ground for use of remotely employed sensors and delivery of weapons by a family of unmanned vehicles operating on, above, and below the ocean's surface. Its modular, focused-mission design will enable rapid insertion of new technology throughout the ship's service life.
The Navy is anxious to see the results of the X-craft experimentation and is reviewing the data from other efforts, too. The high-speed ferries Joint Venture (HSV-X1) and WestPac Express are encouraging, and the Navy is planning to lease HSV-X2. Lockheed Martin's Sea Slice, the Norwegian Navy's surface effect ship Skjold, the Swedish Navy's composite Visby, and the Royal Navy's trimaran Triton all are helping determine the "best of breed" that will enable the Navy to select the best platform for LCS.
The Navy plans to start building the first LCS, referred to as Flight 0, beginning in fiscal year 2005. It will be a real ship with a real mission. The Navy will develop the platform concurrently with the mission modules and the unmanned systems to get this versatile combatant into the fleet as quickly as possible.
In one sense, then, Commander Brawley was correct: "Streetfighter" cannot do the job because it was little more than an idea—albeit an important idea that has spawned the design, engineering, and acquisition of a real ship that will.
"Meteorology Must Play a Bigger Part in Planning"
(See Q. Donaldson pp. 68-69, November 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Robert L. Desh, U.S. Coast Guard—Being privileged to command the International Ice Patrol, one of the few (and perhaps only) Coast Guard units with significant in-house meteorology talent, I found Admiral Donaldson's article fascinating and wholly on the mark. While not challenged with delivering precision-guided weapons on-target, I enthusiastically echo the admiral's arguments concerning the importance of weather information in the planning and execution of any successful operation.
The Coast Guard is in the midst of an effort to upgrade the training and experience of the personnel manning its operations and command centers. This initiative is enhanced by several ongoing projects to improve technology and enhance both the quality and quantity of information and intelligence available to these vital command-and-control organizations. My worry is that we are not focusing enough effort on knowing what is happening environmentally both above and below the surface of the waters that make up the theater of operations.
As Admiral Donaldson points out, weather can affect operations in a host of different ways. An incredible array of environmental parameters must be considered during the planning and execution of a successful sortie—be it an air strike on an enemy target or a search-and-rescue mission at sea. In addition, when planning maritime search and rescue, law enforcement, security, or other typical Coast Guard operations, one also must know and understand tides, currents, and other oceanographic information that might influence the success or failure of the evolution. Just being able to "plug and chug" environmental data into computer models is not sufficient. Mission planners must be able to understand the source information and the impact of the numbers feeding the model. They must be able to recognize quickly those occasions when conditions and variables cause the output of the model to be wrong.
During my tour at the U.S. Coast Guard International Ice Patrol, I've been blessed with a talented cadre of oceanographers, meteorologists, and weather forecasters. I have become spoiled by this wealth of talent when conducting operational mission planning. Many years of Ice Patrol history have demonstrated the need to staff the unit with personnel who can understand the dynamic weather and ocean currents in "iceberg country"—the Grand Banks region of the North Atlantic. The Coast Guard wisely has ensured that the crew is made up of an appropriate mix of officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel with the necessary oceanography and meteorology backgrounds to meet the unique requirements of the mission. The ability of our Ice Reconnaissance Detachments deployed to Newfoundland and our operations center watchstanders to understand the environmental conditions in our area of responsibility is essential to success in protecting the North Atlantic mariner from the danger of iceberg collision. The skills needed to "think oceanographically," as well as gather and apply weather information, are the difference between mission success and failure.
For the most part, the weather and oceanographic information available in our operations center is no better than that accessible in most Coast Guard command centers. The difference is the training, expertise, and focus of the personnel applying the information.
The Coast Guard recently added a civilian billet to most of its area, district, and group command centers. This is a step in the right direction and undoubtedly will improve continuity and training greatly at these vital operational planning and control centers. The next necessary and logical step would be to include a military or civilian oceanographer billet in the mix, and at least one enlisted weather technician to the cadre.
"Searching for Relevance"
(See N. Ruenzel, pp. 56-58, October 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Robert G. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Strategic Analysis—Mr. Ruenzel makes some valid points and repeats some popular but mistaken notions about the reasons for the Coast Guard's perennial budget woes. Unfortunately, he ignores the fact that the Coast Guard was created by Congress for the purpose of furthering a number of public policy goals. This is made clear in the list of missions and duties spelled out in Title 14 (and elsewhere in law) and reaffirmed annually in the Coast Guard's budgets. The Coast Guard is not free to pick and choose its own missions.
Mr. Ruenzel's first recommendation is that the Coast Guard "shed nonessential chores," but he does not identify what he considers "nonessential." Mr. Ruenzel also fails to demonstrate any understanding of the linkages between the various missions or the implications of shedding a mission. The 1998 Interagency Task Force on the Coast Guard's Roles and Missions concluded that the then-current suite of Coast Guard missions and functions were necessary functions of a responsible federal government. If the Coast Guard did not do them, someone else would have to. Any responsibilities shifted to another agency would have to be accompanied by the requisite resources. The bottom-line dollar cost to the taxpayer theoretically would be zero, but the true cost to the nation, measured in lost synergy and diminished operational flexibility and capability, would be far greater. Recognizing this, the panel conchided that the Coast Guard was the best agency in government for the missions and functions in question. A few examples will illustrate these points.
From the tone of his article, I guess that marine safety and environmental protection might be on Mr. Ruenzel's "delete" list. The working relationships and industry expertise the Coast Guard built up in the course of its maritime and port safety regulatory roles, however, are vital as the service works to address homeland security vulnerabilities implicit in international shipping and critical port infrastructure. Similarly, the emergency response capability built up through the Coast Guard's environmental response mission has been recognized as an essential national capability for responding to chemical, biological, and radiological events. The aids-to-navigation (ATON) mission also is mentioned on occasion as a candidate for outsourcing. Previous studies, however, have shown privatization or outsourcing not to be cost-effective. Moreover, because our competent navigational aid system can be ignored for a while, the ATON fleet provides an internal surge capability that would be unavailable if the ATON program were outsourced or transferred to some other agency. Similar linkages, synergies, and flexibility benefits can be identified for every current Coast Guard mission and functional responsibility.
Mr. Ruenzel comments quite negatively, although generally correctly, on the recruiting line: "While other services spend their lives training for war, we spend our time saving lives and protecting the environment." This line is insulting to the other services in that it unfairly and inaccurately demeans their value to the nation. The line does, however, reflect an underlying reality that Mr. Ruenzel would ignore. That reality is best understood by considering the images inspired by the words "warrior" and "guardian." My mental image of a warrior is of one who stands prepared to give his or her life to protect the nation from external aggressors. The work is important—so important that unending readiness must be maintained by "training for war" that the warrior hopes will never come. A guardian, on the other hand, is one who stands ready to join the warrior on the battle field when necessary, but who, when not standing beside the warrior, does other important work for those in his or her care. For the Coast Guard, that other important work also protects American lives, whether by saving those in peril or by preventing the accidents that endanger lives. Guardians and warriors are both honorable and necessary members of society, but, while their roles are related and complementary, they are necessarily different. This is true for both Coast Guardsmen and National Guardsmen.
Finally, Mr. Ruenzel's premise that the Coast Guard has shied away from making its relevance known for too long has some historical merit. The immediate past commandant, Admiral James M. Loy, however, made it a priority to raise the Coast Guard's profile and perceived relevance at the policy level of government. As evidenced by recent press coverage of the maritime dimension of the homeland security problem, by the prominent mention of the Coast Guard in the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, by the Coast Guard's inclusion and place in the proposed Department of Homeland Security, by the growing list of assigned tasks in various Department of Defense/Department of Transportation and Navy/Coast Guard agreements, by unprecedented budget support, and by the Coast Guard's recognition as the lead federal agency in maritime homeland security, it would appear that Admiral Loy's efforts have paid off. The current commandant, Admiral Tom Collins, and other senior Coast Guard leaders are set to continue the work begun by Admiral Loy. Let's hope Admiral Collins is even more successful than his predecessor.
"Attack on the Cole: Medical Lessons Learned"
(See K. Hayashi, R. Bailey, C. Moser, B. Potter, pp. 46-51, July 2002 Proceedings)
Chief Steven Millican, U.S. Navy, Senior Medical Instructor, Afloat Training Group Mayport—The authors provide excellent insight surrounding the USS Cole (DDG67) tragedy. I would like to discuss the interdeployment training cycle (IDTC) basic phase medical training initiatives under way at Afloat Training Group Mayport (ATGM).
With the sweeping changes announced in the new Surface Force Training Manual (COMNAVSURFORINST 3502.1, 27 FEB 2002), ATGM has reinstituted the Total Ship Survivability Exercise of a decade ago. With the permission of the immediate superior in charge, ATGM can execute a comprehensive scenario on board ships, both in port and under way, with ATGM trainers filling the role of the integrated training team (ITT) and with the ship's ITT integrated into the ship normal condition III and condition I watch teams.
This scenario presents a great opportunity in the afloat medical training arena. In light of previous afloat tragedies, the need to be medically prepared for multiple injury situations has never been greater. A mass casualty scenario, in conjunction with mass conflagration, was developed and is being exercised on Mayport- and Pascagoula-based ships. The scenario creates a stressful situation, which requires immediate thinking and informed decision making by the entire crew, not just the two or three members of the medical staff.
ATGM does not just throw the ship's crew into the fire and evaluate their response. ATGM medical has developed a series of medical training team limited team trainers to increase the level of medical knowledge of each crewmember on board. First, a two-day intensive trainer on war wounds is given to the corpsman and the assigned stretcher bearers, with one day dedicated to patient transport. All stretcher bearers ride in the stretcher to ensure they understand the possible emotions their patients may experience during transport. Next, the trained stretcherbearers train the crew on war wounds. This increases stretcher bearer proficiency, and builds crew trust and confidence by showing them the competence of their stretcher bearers. After this, a 90-minute mass casualty training session is presented to personnel who occupy key command positions. This stimulates the crew and gets them to think through the mass casualty situation and tailor their mass casualty bill to maximize their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses. Also, it stresses that a mass casualty declaration is based on types and/or complexity of injuries not just the quantity of personnel casualties. Finally, three hours of all-hands war wound training is provided. This training is designed to get the crew's "hands dirty" with repetitive treatment of moulaged war wounds, as worn by their shipmates. Proficiency is gained through repetition.
During the nominal 13-week tailored ship's training availability, crews are given the tools and training for success, and then ATGM puts them to the test. A series of fully moulaged, minimally simulated medical exercises are conducted to evaluate the crew's medical knowledge based on a standard criteria. Each criteria exercise is executed at least once. As safety permits, the wounded are transported by stretchers. The mass casualty is the culminating event and is conducted from weapon impact to patient evacuation. All aspects are evaluated, including wound treatment, triage, reporting, and evacuation recommendations. The ship is engaged, and everybody gets to participate.
ATGM has recognized the need for increased training across the board and we are working aggressively to address the issues.
"Midget Sub Found at Pearl"
(See B. Burlingame, pp. 94-95, October 2002 Proceedings)
E. Tom Child—I visited the USS Ward (DD-139) on 7 December 1941 while she was replenishing depth charges at the West Loch Ammunition Depot. I could hardly believe the officer of the deck, Ensign F. W. Andrews, when he told me that his ship had sunk a Japanese submarine that morning within sight of Pearl Harbor, 70 minutes prior to the arrival of Japan's torpedo planes. The Ward's #1 gun fired and missed. Then the #3 gun hit the conning tower of the sub. The range was 50 yards and the depth of water was 1,200 feet.
Exactly 50 years after that day, on 7 December 1991, I happened to be with Kazuo Sakamaki in Fredericksburg, Texas, when he saw his I-24tou for the first time since he abandoned her near Bellows Field and became our first prisoner of war. As we walked around the submarine, he touched her several times, saying, "I did not remember her being so big."
The reason for my being at West Loch on 7 December is a short story. After my ship, the USS Cassin (DD-372), was destroyed, I searched for a way to get to sea. At the sub base, several PT boat skippers were roaring their engines as though they might do great things. I stepped aboard the closest one and asked if I might go along. The skipper, Lieutenant (junior grade) Harry Parker, asked what I could do. I told him I was a torpedo officer. He looked around and said: "My torpedo man is missing. Come with us."
As PT-22 moved across the harbor between Ford Island and the Navy Yard, we were showered with debris from the USS Shaw (DD-373) when her forward 5-inch magazine exploded. Parts of the ship went through our deck and into the engine room.
Early that afternoon, PT-22 was sent to West Loch to collect machine gun ammunition to share with other PT boats. While we waited for a rail car of ammo to be pulled from a bunker, I walked over to a nearby pier and asked permission to step aboard an old destroyer. That's when I visited with her officer of the deck and was amazed at what he told me.
A minor correction to your article—the Ward's projectile that went through the I20tou conning tower was fired from her #3 rifle but was a four-inch projectile.
"Chinese Military Faces Obstacles to Modernization"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 4-6, September 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Bolander, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—As much as I concur with the author's assertion that the leadership of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) will continue to defend its budget, I question his premise that the PLA has not undergone significant cuts over the past two decades.
Almost every source I have come across in my readings on the PLA report that major cuts to the "mass force" of the PLA began under Deng in the early 1980s and have continued for the past 20 years. This summer's Department of Defense annual report to Congress on the military power of the People's Republic of China stated, "China completed a 500,000-man force reduction in 2000 in an effort to streamline the force further and free up funding for modernization." Indeed, the announcement by China earlier this year of a 17.6% increase in its budget seems to reflect a definite commitment toward a qualitative reduction and quantitative improvement in the PLA.
Dr. Friedman's contention that the PLA will "continue to be a mass force employing small numbers of modern weapons" reinforces the misperception that little has changed in the PLA since China's 1979 drive toward modernization. Recent publications, such as Unrestricted Warfare, as well as China's purchase of major weapon systems indicate the PLA understands it can ill afford to remain a second-generation military and is taking significant steps to reform its armed forces.
Kudos to Dr. Friedman for highlighting China's continuing efforts against the Falun Gong. The PLA might be called on to protect the country from such domestic "threats." Its focus, however, is likely to be on continuing the reforms of the past 20 years.
"Eco Regs Endanger Combat Training
(See L. Rosenberg, pp. 63, November 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John M. Daziens, Naval Postgraduate School—Captain Rosenberg is correct in his assertion that the U.S. Navy and other U.S. armed forces must comply with the various environmental regulations of the land. Environmental impact statements (EIS) and environmental assessments soon will become as familiar as Judge Advocate General Manual investigations. But is this a bad thing?
I firmly agree with the Captain's statement that "the armed forces . . . have become excellent stewards of the public interest." We are frequent targets of environmental groups—partly because we do have our faults, but more likely because we are an easy target. The Department of Defense and Chief of Naval Operations environmental bureaus strive to advance environmental awareness, ecosystem preservation, and mitigation and remediation methods throughout the military. If anything, they're guilty of not increasing public awareness of their successes. As Captain Rosenberg illustrated, the military literally cleaned up its act in the early 1990s following President George Bush's Clean Water Act revisions. As early as 1978, hazardous material sites were being identified, investigated, and remediated under the Installation Restoration Program. "Ecosystem management" and "habitat preservation" have become buzzwords (or swear words).
Arguably, the Navy has many hazmat locations on the National Priorities List of "Superfund" sites. All have been targeted for environmental assessments, monitoring, and containment or remediation efforts. Compare this to the years of chaotic inspections and ineffectual cleanups plaguing many civilian Superfund sites. Every naval aviator who visited Seville Quarter in Pensacola walked right by such a site, where carcinogenic creosote byproducts threatened to leach into the sand and gravel aquifer serving 130,000 people. More than a decade of inspections and attempted cleanups followed after its initial risk assessment. DoD's actions deserve commendation, not condemnation.
Conservation is commonplace in today's Navy. Shipboard plastics programs, oil and waste water compliance, garbage and sewage dumping, and even command recycling programs are all environmental successes. These achievements are examples for the navies of the world, as well as for foreign and domestic corporations.
Environmental compliance also affects military exercises at sea. The Marine Mammal Protection Act limits mine explosion shock trials, fleet exercises in warning areas, ship and aircraft undersea warfare training on established acoustic ranges, testing of new sonar equipment, and even getting under way from port. Environmental groups have filed a suit halting deployment of the low frequency active sonar system, citing possible hazards to baleen whales. And every East Coast sailor is familiar with the Right Whale conservation plans that affect transits in and out of ports such as Mayport, Florida. Some concerns are valid, but many technical and engineering aspects escape the concerned citizens. These mitigation plans require awareness and education of both military personnel and the environmentalists.
But is training really suffering? Obstacles exist in the "real world" as well. Hospitals, residential infrastructures, and other humanitarian obstructions will hinder our forces during any military action. The Gulf War, Kosovo campaign, and operations in Afghanistan all illustrated Herculean efforts to reduce collateral damage. Can't we simulate these real-world problems using these ecosystem protection zones that infringe on our training grounds? If not, can't we mitigate any "takes"—defined under the Endangered Species Act as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" any listed species.
For the captain's beachfront tern nests, units could be limited to amphibious landing lanes—a real-world simulation against fortified and mined beaches. Training operations could be scheduled outside of breeding seasons. And if necessary, relocation of the endangered species could be authorized for mitigation purposes following an EIS review of the habitat and threat.
If training is impossible and national security is threatened, the armed forces can apply for an exemption waiver on a case-by-case basis. Attempting to ramrod a blanket exemption to environmental laws will only tarnish the Navy and Department of Defense's image to the environmental action groups and the public at large.
Metrics are needed, not conjecture and stories. Actual training days lost, for example, must be presented for review. Give our judge advocate generals the tools they need, and let them fight the legal battles. In the meantime, we are all "eco-warriors" by default.