With possible military action against Iraq looming, members of Congress are discussing the need for President George W. Bush's administration to submit its aims and strategy to a war resolution vote. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's chairman, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), announced that the Senate wants to know the scenarios that are being considered and if our allies are being factored into the nation's war plans.
Although you can argue over the course the President has to take under the War Powers Act, Mr. Biden is correct in his premise that it is time for the United States to declare its objectives. Announcing the intent to take military action is probably correct as far as it goes, but that cannot be the desired outcome of U.S. strategy. As Carl von Clausewitz noted in his military classic, On War, when preparing for war, political leaders should never take the first step until they know their last. The time to declare a desired end state for Iraq is now—before we consider how best to use military tools to fashion and consolidate what essentially must be a political result.
History teaches us that the United States seldom had a comprehensive plan that represented a continuum from war termination through civil-military transition and into a welldefined end state. In the Gulf War, for example, the U.S.-led coalition conducted a superb military campaign that led to the defeat of a numerically superior foe. In less than 100 hours, coalition forces met their military objectives, foremost of which was the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. After combat operations ended, however, peace negotiations resulted in a postwar environment that left much to be desired.
Likewise, U.S. civilian and military authorities believed the hard-earned military success of the Afghanistan campaign could be consolidated in the postwar phase by the United Nations and assembled coalition allies. But the U.N. and our allies are not the best means of ensuring U.S. national interests are met. By chartering Afghanistan's postwar future in accordance with the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, the U.N. created a situation not unlike the Dayton Accords of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the ends—synergistic political-military efforts leading to the creation of a stable government—could not be achieved by the means. Before dropping the first bomb, we should have determined how we wanted postwar Afghanistan to look.
Some would say that airing our desired political end game offers the enemy an advantage. On the contrary, giving the Iraqi people a vision for life after Saddam Hussein will help us. The oppressed people of Iraq would be motivated to capitulate if our strategic goals include: economic support of infrastructure development, privatization, and agricultural development; advancement in terms of media reform, citizenship, and social programs; and a culturally sensitive approach to governance and the rule of law. At the same time, announcing a desired end state goes farther than providing a vision worth surrendering for—it provides our allies with a reason to join the effort (or at least, not oppose it). In the case of our staunch ally, Turkey, announcing our political goals could enable it to match its national security interests to strategic alternatives with respect to the Kurds. For Arab allies, the clearly articulated postwar vision will help allay fears that the United States is attempting to plant its flag in Baghdad.
The current mix of media opinions leads me to conclude that the desired goal of war with Iraq is to defeat its military and pave the way "for an Iraqi general with a following" who will establish a benign and enlightened post-Saddam regime. But this does not qualify as a plan. A better alternative is to set forth a multiyear road map that lays out a comprehensive design—one that encompasses a complete regime change that fosters political, legal, and economic reform. Such a map would assign responsibilities to U.S. and U.N. agencies, establish measures of effectiveness, and list the conditions to be achieved before moving on to the next task or phase.
If confronting Iraq is worth expending U.S. blood and treasure, it is worth establishing and articulating a desired political end state and a plan for the political consolidation of our military success. We must not take the first step until we have thought our strategy through to the last step.
Army Major Carstens is a Naval War College graduate and member of the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs. He commands a Special Forces company at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.