Sidebar: Marching toward Athens?
Joe Galloway, a soft-spoken, tough Irishman from Refugio, Texas, spent as much time in Vietnam reporting the war as just about anybody did fighting it—and then co-authored We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young. He believes that granting the media unfettered access is the best path if the service academies want to get their message to the society they are charged to defend. Galloway was a key participant at a recent seminar on the service academies sponsored by the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Naval Institute on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the U.S. Military Academy.
No one held back at the seminar, which took place 13–14 March 2002 at Cantigny, the Wheaton, Illinois, estate of the late Colonel Robert R. McCormick, former editor and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and no stranger to controversy. Discussions focused on what the service academies might be required to do if they are to maintain their relevance to the nation in the 21st century. Rick Atkinson of The Washington Post and author of The Long Gray Line commented on the gap between the military and the civilian society it serves: "I am 49. I don't know a single person my age or younger in The Wahington Post newsroom—an operation of about 750 people—who has been in the military." He pointed out another gap between some of the military and the media: "Army officers see encounters with the media as the sure path to destruction."
Lieutenant General Dan Christman, who retired from the Army last summer after serving as the Superintendent of the Military Academy, was describing efforts he made to get West Point's story to a new generation of Americans: "We brought in Rolling Stone, Parade, The New York Times, and Discovery TV in an attempt to show the inside of a service academy and to dispel some of these tremendous fantasies about what goes on here." What's the big deal? Consider that in an environment where some in the military view The Washington Post as too liberal, Rolling Stone is beyond the pale. So Christman was hanging it out a bit; not surprisingly, the article portrayed the Military Academy favorably.
Robert Lipsyte of The New York Times ("Question: Should the academies be playing big-time football? Comment: What makes them think they are?") and John Lehman, former secretary of the Navy ("Suck it up and join the Ivy League"), were responding to the debate over whether the three largest service academies should continue trying to compete at the Division IA level in football, a losing proposition for many years at Army and Navy, although the Air Force has done well. The Falcons' success both frustrates and encourages the Black Knights and the Midshipmen. The Coast Guard Academy's Bears go their own way in Division 3.
There was much discussion of a gap of some dimension between the military and society (in general), the military and the Congress, and a gap (perceived as much larger) between the military and the nation's "elite." This last remained an undefined category, but one vaguely sensed it as some combination of old-money, prep schools, Ivy League diplomas, summers in Maine or Martha's Vineyard, etc.
The gaps were attributed in varying degrees to the end of the draft; the emergence of the all-volunteer force; the lack of ROTC units at several of the nation's best universities—Yale, Harvard, and Stanford, among others; and a fundamental disinclination of Americans to serve absent some major threat. Thus far, the events of 11 September 2001 do not seem to qualify as such a threat.
Several panelists and participants at the seminar, most of whom had military backgrounds, characterized those on the other side of the gap as increasingly clueless regarding what it is like to stand in a chow line, replace a power-pack, or write backward on a piece of Plexiglas in a space lit by dim red lights. Fewer grandchildren and great-grandchildren of Tom Brokaw's Greatest Generation seem to feel any need to put on a uniform and visit places such as Grafenwoehr, Ft. Irwin, Mayport, Aviano, Ramstein, Diego Garcia, Camp Casey, 29 Palms, or Kodiak. Few could locate these places within a thousand miles . . . maybe within a hemisphere.
The select group of 40 speakers, panelists, and participants included former superintendents of the Military and Air Force Academies, two double-Pulitzer winners, an Emmy winner, former secretaries of the Navy and Army, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, a former and a serving Commandant of Cadets at the Coast Guard Academy, best-selling authors, a former athletic director at West Point, the serving Chairman of the Admissions Committee at West Point, and the coauthor of We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, released as a movie on 1 March.
Jim Hoagland, associate editor and chief foreign correspondent for The Washington Post and—along with Atkinson—a double-Pulitzer winner, gave the opening address and sketched a challenging world for service academy graduates, one in which they must understand the culture and context of Islam to the extent of appreciating the differences among sects and tribal factions.
"Security issues have moved to the very center of political discourse," Hoagland said. Europe has become a distant second-tier force militarily; thus, graduates will manage a vast military superiority and, in the wake of 9/11, might have to develop a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons.
Perspectives will matter: "We may think we're training four Georgian battalions to counter terrorism . . . but an advisor to President Edvard Shevardnadze told me that the training is actually about helping Georgia resist destabilization attempts by Moscow." In a political analogy, he invoked the old three-I strategy followed by Presidents seeking to ensure a second term: visit—and pay attention to—Israel, Italy, and Ireland if you want people who came from those countries to vote for you. In the wake of 9/11, however, President George Bush will be forced to deal with another three "I"s: Iraq, Iran, and India—and so will the military.
With the stage set, the discussion shifted to the right balance between academics (Athens) and military training (Sparta). Captain Bruce Stubbs, retired former Commandant of Cadets at the Coast Guard Academy, said that the "military program must be first among equals," but pointed out that his academy has no major in maritime policy; he said that the pendulum in New London had swung too far toward Athens. Dr. Charles Neimeyer, Academic Dean at the Naval War College, thought the mix at Annapolis about right, although he felt there are too many survey courses that lack depth and encouraged midshipmen to look for "school solutions" rather than innovative approaches. He sounded a theme that recurred throughout the seminar: The midshipmen are overscheduled and rarely have any time to reflect on or explore in depth a particular subject.
Lieutenant Colonel H. R. McMaster, commander of the 1st Battalion, 4th Cavalry, at Schweinfurt, Germany, and author of Dereliction of Duty, the best-selling history of Vietnam War policymaking, thought it possible to address both aspects. McMaster, who taught military history at West Point, said, "Cadets must think, lead, and act under conditions of great mental stress," as the first step in gaining an appreciation of what it is like to function in combat.
Even within Athens, there is tension between the technical side and the humanities, said Commander Ward Carroll, Director of the Company Officer Masters Program at the Naval Academy and recent author of Punk's War, a novel of naval aviation that addresses the challenges of military leadership in the post-Cold War era. He thinks it is important to remember where the academies lie along the continuum in overall officer development. Despite all the demands on cadets and midshipmen, "four years is plenty of time . . . if you recognize that this is the nascent stage of a military career." What is important is to ensure that the curriculum makes sense as one of the first steps along the road to becoming a senior officer, he said.
Ed Ruggero, West Pointer and author of Duty First: West Point and the Making of American Leaders, had spent time with a company tactical officer who devoted much time and thought to introducing cadets to decision making and consequences. A cadet company commander who got caught in the middle by granting reprieves to some disciplinary offenders but not to others got this advice: "Stand up in front of them and admit that you couldn't make the tough decision." The tactical officer had seen it coming but had let the scene play out to teach a lesson.
All agreed that it takes this kind of individual attention to produce the leaders the country expects. But are the best officers ready to spend three to five years away from their specialties to serve at the academies while their contemporaries continue to progress in the field and the fleet? Less and less often, according to retired Air Force Colonel William Berry, a professor of strategic studies at the Air Force Academy. "Teaching at the Air Force Academy may not be considered a feather in your cap," and as a result, the academy may be forced to hire more civilian instructors. [According to an Associated Press article in the 22 January 2002 edition of The Capital (Annapolis, Maryland), the Naval Academy is short 37 active-duty instructors. "We feel we're hanging on by our fingernails. . . . The trends are getting worse, not better," according to the academy's academic dean, retired Navy Rear Admiral William C. Miller. As causes, he cited reductions in military forces since the end of the Cold War and a lack of promotions for officers teaching at the academy. West Point recently terminated its 25-year-old faculty exchange program with Annapolis because the Naval Academy could not fill its military instructor slots at West Point on a one-for-one basis.]
Retired Army Brigadier General Dick Behrenhausen, a West Pointer and the president of the McCormick Tribune Foundation, recounted the changes that have occurred in the process of detailing officers to West Point over the years. He recalled that, when he was serving in the Pentagon assigning officers, Colonel Tom Griess, then head of the History Department at the Academy, would come to Washington to review the service records of potential instructors. Griess wanted only officers who ranked in the top 5% of their year group; further, Behrenhausen said, he got guarantees that the officers' names would appear on any intermediate or top-level school list for which they were eligible—even if they had not completed their tours at the academy—as an indication to all that duty at West Point did not hurt one's career. In fact, Behrenhausen said, "duty there was a springboard for your career."
Today, he said, when reporting seniors are required to rank officers in a forced distribution—so many at the top, in the middle, and at the bottom (even if most have exceptional records)—many officers at West Point for a three-year tour can expect their rankings to match their time on station: a "3-block" (bottom) the first year rising to a "1-block" (top) in their final year. "But we can fix this by giving them a special academic fitness report. Don't punish instructors," Behrenhausen said.
Louis Caldera, a West Pointer and former Secretary of the Army (1998-2001), provided a political perspective. While he described congressional support as "okay," he said that Congress was not willing to devote the resources required for the academies to compete with the best universities—perhaps because of a streak of populism within the organization that views the academies as "gold plated." The same streak of populism considers the cost of the academies excessive when compared with those of ROTC; pits reserves against regulars; and continues to devote considerable sums to each state's National Guard units. The real danger, he said, is that Congress will allow the academies to atrophy to the point that they will not attract the kind of candidates the country needs.
Today, some members of Congress do not fill their allotted nominations for the academies, he said; a few nominate no candidates at all. He expressed concern that some of these are minority members of Congress who, you would think, "would be falling all over themselves to publicize and give a full scholarship and an incredible leadership experience to a deserving young person in their district." But some of them do not, he said, and the academies must work harder to get the word out. Caldera acknowledged that congressional staffs are neither equipped nor manned to beat the bushes for candidates and often need assistance. Attendees who were more familiar with the much sought-after appointments of the 1950s were surprised by this situation.
Marine Major General Jarvis Lynch, an Annapolis graduate who commanded the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island prior to his retirement, commented that Congress probably was looking for Sparta at the academies and was disappointed not to find it. Caldera suggested that the academies need to market themselves better. Dr. Don Snider, a combat veteran of Vietnam now a civilian instructor at West Point, thought that the populism described by Caldera will become only more pronounced and that it is imperative that "we sell ourselves."
When the discussion shifted to retention problems, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Solis, a retired Marine and now the Marine Corps' Chief of Oral History, brought up a recent proposal to pay combat arms officers up to $100,000 for extending for a second tour. Caldera thought bonuses had their place but inevitably give rise to morale problems because of perceived inequities. Snider cited recurring findings that people leave the service because of job dissatisfaction; the key is leadership. "Only the best should command," he said, adding that the services should consider 360° evaluations to identify the best leaders. (The phrase "360° evaluation" means officers are rated by peers and subordinates as well as by superiors.)
The host of new missions that descended on the services in the wake of the Cold War, including peacekeeping and nation building, have disillusioned many young officers who joined for other reasons, said Brigadier General Charles Getz, another West Pointer with combat and special operations experience. "Too many deployments on these missions have overwhelmed them," he said. Colonel McMaster disagreed, citing his experience with a lieutenant running a town in Kosovo who reveled in the responsibilities that went with the job. Getz countered that the Kosovo experience was not that of Bosnia, an observation that elicited general agreement. Caldera said that such missions are going to continue.
Back to the gap in civil-military relations. "There always is a civilian-military gap," said Lehman, "Some of it is good, some of it is bad . . . it's bad if it gets too big." Atkinson thought that the "rift is out of kilter [and] there have been alarming signs in the past ten years." General discussion allowed as how the Clinton era was not a good one from which to draw many lessons on a civil-military gap. Berry cited statistics from a recent Triangle (University of North Carolina/North Carolina State/Duke) study indicating that many more service members today identify themselves as Republicans: 64% today to 33% just 25 years ago.
Citing his disappointment with the Military Academy's teaching on civil-military relations, Snider described a quiz in which 80% of the First Class (seniors) thought it okay for the military to insist on an exit strategy before committing troops to possible combat. In related areas, he found that ROTC cadets were more accepting of women and gays in the military. When it came to the proper response to a legal but unethical order, however, the academy cadets did better. Snider felt the academies have not educated their students on American society, civil-military relations, and, worse, have failed to inspire them.
Lehman focused on the major gap between "the elites and the rest of us." He pointed out that whereas the Yale Flying Club had provided much of the basis for naval aviation during World War I, that only 12 Yale graduates have entered the service since 1986. "This is a huge change." During a speech to 60 brothers at a "very conservative fraternity at the University of Pennsylvania [where he earned a PhD and his son is a student]," he found that not one had any intention of joining the service.
Major General Tom Wilkerson, an Annapolis graduate and former Commander, Marine Reserve Forces, saying that relations between civilians and the military seemed reasonable, asked Lehman what he considered an acceptable gap. Lehman said that the one he worries about is with the elite. One of the problems in getting more officers from these sources is that "the career military asks for too long a commitment—especially for aviation [eight to ten years after earning designation as an aviator].
Duty, Honor, Country . . . Football?
Despite Lipsyte's tongue-in-cheek comment, Army, Navy, and Air Force do play Division IA football on Saturday afternoons in the fall; Army is in Conference USA; Air Force is in the Western Athletic Conference; and Navy remains an independent. Coast Guard plays football in the Freedom Football Conference (Division 3). [Interestingly, Coast Guard will begin playing football in the Upstate Collegiate Athletic Association starting in the fall of 2004, along with Union, Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), Hobart, St. Lawrence, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Rochester, and the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point. "We like conferences that include schools with a similar approach to academics and athletics," Coast Guard Athletic Director Ray Cieplik said.]
Lieutenant General Bradley Hosmer, former Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, evaluated the effects of dropping down a notch on several issues—recruiting, revenue, cadet time, leadership training, and risks to integrity. He found that competing at the higher level was positive for recruiting and revenue and "a wash" for time and leadership. There is no question that playing major schools on national television helps "bait the hook" for many teenagers and brings in considerable revenue (and thus affords "substantial relief for taxpayers"), but he emphasized that sports at the academies are part of physical conditioning and leadership training and thus Congress should fund them as essential to their mission.
He saw no risks to integrity by remaining in IA, i.e., recruiting blue-chip athletes with substandard academic records, but he described himself as "very slightly in favor of fewer recruited athletes." [A recent study by the Air Force Personnel Center, published in the Colorado Springs Gazette earlier this year, found that the Air Force Academy granted academic waivers to 277 incoming cadets last summer—and that 165 of these were recruited athletes. There was no hard-and-fast definition of what the waivers actually amounted to in terms of SAT scores, etc. Without singling out athletes, the study concluded that cadets granted academic waivers were less likely to graduate, become pilots, move into critical high-technology jobs, or rise to top-echelon leadership positions.]
Hosmer also said he thought that the best size for the Air Force Academy was about 2,500 cadets (it is presently 4,000). [Vice Admiral John R. Ryan, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, recently stated that he would like to see an increase to 4,400 at Annapolis to fill a shortfall in Navy and Marine Corps officers.]
Colonel Al Vanderbush, former athletic director at West Point, and Major General Phil Monahan, who served as director of Football Operations at the University of Virginia and at Boston College, believe that Army and Navy can and should compete in Division IA. Vanderbush played on the 1958 Army team that went 9-0-1 and included Heisman Trophy winner Pete Dawkins and Bill Carpenter, the "Lonesome End." Both Dawkins and Carpenter became general officers. Monahan captained the Navy team that George Welsh quarterbacked—a team that went to the 1955 Sugar Bowl.
General Dave Palmer, former Superintendent of West Point, cited Army team records against IA teams over the past 30 years—"a losing record of lamentable performance," according to Palmer—and asked Vanderbush what might reverse that record. Vanderbush cited Palmer's own criteria for winning when he was the superintendent—coach, schedule, players, resources—and said, "We've got a new coach [Todd Berry]; we're in Conference USA; our players are okay; and our resources are improving." He said the academies should make any moves in concert and saw problems in that for Air Force. While Army and Navy conceivably could join the Ivy League or the Patriot League, Air Force has no comparable league nearby. Some participants smiled at this, which is understandable given Air Force's excellent record over the years, while others felt that Army and Navy could move independently of Air Force.
Monahan listed the major changes in college football over the years: television revenues, the rise of the National Football League, and the win-at-any-cost philosophy. Nevertheless, he said, Air Force has shown that it can be done. He also felt that academics might be loosened a bit on admissions requirements. Lehman allowed that "a losing season is okay but a losing tradition is not."
His conclusions: "You cannot recruit under the current restrictions. Suck it up and join the Ivy League." This prompted Christman to declare that "joining the Ivy League would be a terrible decision."
Wilkerson asked rhetorically how long it would take Army and Navy to turn things around and then called for a vote. The panel voted to remain IA while the participants voted overwhelmingly to haul the anchor/close the trails and head for the Ivy League. Yielding to the humor of the situation, the panel agreed to reconvene in 2007 to reconsider its position in light of what transpires on the gridiron over the next five years—then adjourned to the McCormick mansion for dinner.
Attracting the Right Candidates
"My enormous concern is that, if we don't improve [admissions], we will violate the fundamental Jeffersonian maxim of making the service academies representative of this great country—all regions and all walks of life."—Lieutenant General Dan Christman
General P. X. Kelley, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, chaired the panel concerned with attracting the right candidates to the academies. Kelley, who graduated from Villanova and now heads the American Battle Monuments Commission, observed that each academy has its own culture, a fact that influences recruitment and remains important in this era of joint operations.
Christman left the theory of admissions to others and concentrated on what he called the "practice" of the art. He pointed out that the academies can control to a degree some admissions problems, such as dispelling ignorance regarding their programs and recruiting more minorities, but that they have little control when it comes to congressional priorities and recruiting from elite high schools and prep schools.
Calling the failures of senators or representatives to fill their appointments "an outrage," he said that 18 congressman did not nominate a single candidate for the West Point Class of 2005 (which entered last summer). California is the biggest offender, according to Christman. The 18 included Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Representatives Maxine Waters (D-CA), Henry Waxman (D-CA), Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA), and Xavier Becerra (D-CA). According to the West Point admissions office, last year was the fourth in a row in which Roybal-Allard failed to nominate a candidate for West Point, although several members from her district are attending other service academies. [This year marks the fifth—a spokeswoman confirmed that Roybal-Allard did not nominate any candidate for the West Point Class of 2006, which enters this summer.]
[After the conference, I did some research. David Sandretti, Boxer's communications director, pointed out that candidates often apply to their representative as well as their senators, and that the senators may defer to the local congressman to put forth the nomination. Although this would seem to leave the senators' quota unfilled, Sandretti said that Senator Boxer maintains information on the academies on her web site and sends out press information on the academies to California high schools.
[Although Waters missed last year (one of her nominees had difficulty with the entrance requirements and another elected to attend a different institution), she nominated three candidates for the West Point Class of 2006, which enters this summer. Of all the senators and representatives I contacted regarding their nominations over the past several years, Congresswoman Waters was the only one who prepared a detailed record and personally contacted me. Her most successful nominees have been those with a family history of service in the armed forces; nominees without such a background frequently fall by the wayside when confronted with the realities of the demanding academy program, she told me over the telephone from California.
[Representative Luis Gutierrez (D-IL), on the other hand, apparently has not nominated anyone from his district to West Point for five years. Billy Weinberg, a spokesman for Representative Gutierrez, told me later that West Point's record of the congressman's nominating record is "inaccurate," but declined to elaborate.
[A spokesman for Representative James McDermott (D-WA) told me no one from the district had applied for the West Point Class of 2005, which turned out to be a common theme among several West Coast representatives. According to several spokesmen, many West Coast candidates are interested in the Air Force Academy. Christman alluded to this in his opening remarks when he commented on the lack of knowledge "west of the Mississippi" concerning West Point.]
What Christman described as a Byzantine application process has been simplified recently and this has encouraged some representatives to nominate their full quota of candidates; he cited Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, the District of Columbia's nonvoting delegate, as one who has taken advantage of the changes. [West Point's director of admissions told me that several state delegations have excellent bipartisan records when it comes to nominating qualified candidates: Virginia holds a statewide Academies Day, and the Texas delegation is quite active in encouraging applications, making sure that no nominating vacancy within the state goes unfilled.]
Marching toward Athens?
Dick Behrenhausen, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, was lobbing mortar rounds on the banks of the Severn River in Annapolis.
But he was not aiming at the Naval Academy, Army's traditional rival. This time the target was West Point—his own alma mater. In his view, the Military Academy is drifting away from the Spartan ideals that produced soldiers such as MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton and marching steadily toward the ivied walls of academe, an area in which the Military Academy cannot—and should not—compete if it hopes to retain the admiration of the American people and the support of the Congress.
His remarks came during a panel discussion on maintaining the service academies' relevance at the U.S. Naval Institute's 128th Annual Meeting and 12th Annapolis Seminar. Dr. Charles Neimeyer, Academic Dean at the Naval War College, moderated a panel that included Behrenhausen; Captain Arthur Athens, U.S. Naval Reserve, Commandant of Midshipmen at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy; Major General Murray; and Captain Bruce Stubbs. All but Athens had been at Cantigny in March.
Over the past 30 years, Behrenhausen said, West Point has changed its vision: from that of an academy—a place where special skills or subjects are taught—to that of a university—an institution of higher learning providing facilities for teaching and research and authorized to grant degrees. "In making these changes, it is rapidly losing its viability," he said. Behrenhausen focused on four areas:
- Academics—junior officers formerly spent only three years instructing, which kept West Point in touch with the Army as the bulk of the faculty turned over every three years; a cadre of permanent professors provided continuity. Today, as the academy pursues its quest for the holy grail of accreditation, a trend toward longer tours, more Ph.D.s, and more civilian instructors has reduced contact with the active Army.
- Admissions—the quest for the best and the brightest students has shifted to a quest for the "brightest." The admissions process now looks for candidates with high ACT/SAT scores and has deemphasized the value of service as team captain or class president or Eagle Scout—traditional indicators of leadership potential.
- Resources—DoD funding insufficient to maintain what the administration calls a "Margin of Excellence," flowing from the proliferation of academic programs that has led to reliance on private fund raising, even for necessities. West Point has not conducted a winter intramural program for five years because it lacks adequate gymnasium facilities.
- Intercollegiate Athletics—get into conferences to generate money; as a result, the academy is fielding "mediocre teams in nondescript conferences," doing absolutely nothing for the viability of West Point.
All of this has resulted in lower retention rates, which is hardly an attractive proposition for a Congress well aware that West Point graduates cost five times more than ROTC graduates do at service entry, he said.
Having lost the battle to the bean counters, Behrenhausen predicted, the Army eventually will be forced to close Ft. Leavenworth's Command and General Staff School and Carlisle Barracks's Army War College. What may happen then, he said, is that West Point will become the training academy for all officers of all grades; it will not, however, be a service academy or a university.
A more-optimistic Athens, paraphrasing the conclusion used by then-Colonel Victor Krulak as the rationale for the Marine Corps, said that the United States might not need the academies—but that it wants them. Athens, a Naval Academy graduate who served on active duty in the Marine Corps, said the nation expects them to produce leaders; serve as symbols of service heritage; and provide "springboards" for youths who might not otherwise have an opportunity to attend college.
As challenges facing the academies, he cited a nationwide high-school conduct and honor system gone askew, academy schedules so full that cadets and midshipmen have little time for reflection, and the tendency for some academy graduates to be a bit impressed with themselves.
Murray, also a Naval Academy graduate, said that recent experience in the Persian Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan demonstrates that the nation needs the corps of officers who are produced at the academies; the academies are today as relevant as they have been at any time in our history. Many of the highest-ranking officers in the Navy and Marine Corps are Naval Academy graduates, he said. Taking an approach different from Behrenhausen's—specifically the costs over a 20-year career and varying retention rates—Murray said that Academy graduates are a more cost-effective alternative than ROTC officers.
All indications are that consumers like the Naval Academy product, according to Murray. At Quantico, for example, the Marines consider Naval Academy graduates undergoing training as second lieutenants at The Basic School to be far superior to their contemporaries. He is convinced that Naval Academy training is what distinguishes its graduates, and believes that the Naval Academy is far more rigorous, academically and militarily, than when he graduated in 1968. Citing the Naval Academy's strategic vision as one sensitive to the need for change over time, he said the academy experience today does reflect the needs of the services.
Stubbs said that the Coast Guard Academy can sustain close scrutiny, but that it has not kept pace with the times. The Coast Guard is the nation's preeminent federal agency for executing the nation's ocean policy, but the Academy has no academic major in ocean policy and national maritime security studies to provide the required intellectual foundation for these operational missions. Instead, he said, the Academy is pursuing excellence in support missions such as civil engineering, which are increasingly attractive to outsourcing.
The Coast Guard Academy must graduate officers prepared to fulfill "a kluge of six different agencies": a maritime constabulary, an environmental protection agency, a life-saving service, a regulatory agency, a navigation service, and an armed service. "Yet, within the Coast Guard," he said, "there is no broad agreement on the service's essence. Is it humanitarianism, law enforcement, or military?" The academy's emphasis is on humanitarianism, he said. Reinforcing Behrenhausen's view, he said that the military mission should be "first among equals," but observed that the classroom now dominates the drill field at New London. Concern over accreditation has resulted in less focus on the military mission. Behrenhausen commented that Harvard does not care about accreditation: "Harvard sets its own standard—and the academies should do the same." He reflected that West Point did not award degrees until the mid-1930s, and that MacArthur et al. got theirs by mail long after they graduated.
Comments from the audience generally reinforced the view that the academies' primary mission is to produce military leaders, which prompted an observation from Behrenhausen: "We've got to win the [officer] quality and quantity battle or we will not get the resources [from Congress]. We can't make the case on academics." Murray acknowledged that there always would be tension between academia and the military but felt that Naval Academy leadership was committed to a careful approach to integrating the military with academics. An active-duty member of the audience reported mixed performance results from a very small sample of officers; when he recently ranked his 12 subordinates—which included three Academy graduates—the graduates ranked first, middle, and last. "At least there is diversity," he said. The same questioner also said he was disappointed to find no active-duty Naval Academy representation on the panel.
Neither West Point nor Annapolis wanted this subject on the agenda, Behrenhausen replied, "They're afraid of this dialogue . . . because the numbers are so poor and the gap has narrowed so dramatically between [academy] graduates and [ROTC/OCS] graduates. . . . Unless we do a dramatic turnaround in retaining service academy graduates . . . and these quantity graduates ascend to quality positions, we will not win the resource battle."
Athens said the academies have a big advantage over ROTC in that most of their faculty and coaching staff are "on board" with the mission of the institution in a closely integrated approach to producing officers. In contrast, he cited an unnamed civilian institution where the football coach had no interest in the ROTC program and some academics were not even aware that one existed at their university.
Noting that two members of the panel (Murray and Athens) had spent 26 weeks at The Basic School for Marine officers even after graduating from the Naval Academy, Behrenhausen asked rhetorically, "Why not send all ROTC graduates to West Point/Annapolis for 26 weeks of training?" thus reinforcing the role of the institutions.
On how the academies can win the battle of the bean counters and acquire the resources necessary to modernize, Murray cited the need for more military interaction with Capitol Hill, where fewer and fewer members have any military experience. Stubbs, recalling the debate at Cantigny, pointed out the need to close the gap between the military and the nation's elite.
Behrenhausen took the challenge, citing studies by Charles Moskos, distinguished military sociologist who teaches at Northwestern, where almost no one goes into the military, especially given the long service commitments popular with Congress. But when Moskos asked his students if they would buy into a 12-month program—3 months training and 9 months active duty—after which they would return to college with their final two years paid for, 30% said they were interested. "There's your elite . . . [but] we never think outside the box until it's too late," he concluded.
Open the Gates
"In retrospect, there was probably some truth about the treatment of women, and I would have benefited from understanding the world I was about to enter. However, I'd stand by the U.S. Navy's record of integrating women into the most challenging assignments. I'm glad that I had an opportunity to be part of these changes instead of an outsider bemoaning the problem. I would add that I have never been subject to discrimination since commissioning.
"I think my history teacher was a bit extreme in her characterization of a hawkish military mind-set. Sadly, my English teacher recognized that creativity is rare in an organization that values tradition as much as ours. She might have been right.
"When I accepted an appointment, I was the first student in at least 12 years to do so. I think it is notable that my high school has not had one appointee since 1988."
Young Americans often respond more to the visceral challenge of the Marine Corps: "Are you tough enough to join us?" than they do to other service recruiting pitches, said Navy Lieutenant Commander David Nystrom, special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations. This applies especially to those who have taken time to think about what they want from life, he added, and who are looking for a challenge.
Christman said that some first-rate Catholic high schools in large upper-Midwestern cities, which historically have sent many fine students to West Point, have become "violently anti-Army." Some faculty members have gone to Ft. Benning, Georgia, to protest against the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, which they refer to as the "School of the Assassins," Christman said, because of a belief that the school trains right-wing military units responsible for the deaths of priests and nuns in Central America. Not surprisingly, students at such institutions get little encouragement to attend West Point. Stubbs pointed out that the Department of Defense is not allowed to visit some high schools.
Steve Cohen, a Brown graduate who now heads P-3 Ventures, felt the academies do not reach out enough to students, particularly those at elite secondary schools. Cohen, who attended the Naval Academy but left after accruing what he describes as "the most demerits ever awarded in a single evening," recommended more personal contact with prep school headmasters, involving cadets and midshipmen in the selection process, recruiting transfer students, and going after a well-rounded class rather than just well-rounded individuals. Cohen authored "What the Academies Can Learn from the Ivies" in the July 1999 Proceedings and "A Modest Proposal" carried in the May/June 2000 Brown Alumni Monthly, which suggested what the Ivies can learn from the academies.
Citing a study at the University of Texas Medical School, he discussed what social scientists refer to as the "treatment effect" as opposed to the "selection effect." Basically, the effect that some institutions have on their students over a four-year course of study is far more significant in determining individual success at graduation than are selection criteria biased toward the higher SAT scores. What this suggests, he said, is that the academies can take a chance and recruit over a wider range of academic records. He then brought down the house by concluding: "In terms of yesterday's conversations about football, that might be very good news."
Joe Galloway, recently a special consultant to Secretary of State Colin Powell, led the roundtable discussion that summed up things. He made a case for national service. Acknowledging the changes that had occurred over the years—"When I was a boy everyone in our neighborhood had served"—he recommended that anyone who signed up for a four-year hitch should get a four-year scholarship to college; those opting for a two-year tour with the job corps or some modern version of the 1930s-era Civilian Conversation Corps should get two-year scholarships.
Then he put forth an intriguing idea: Send incoming plebes to boot camp/basic training instead of subjecting them to the traditional plebe summer at the academies. Doing this obviously would give the young candidates more insight into the troops they will lead, while eliminating some of the not-so-thinly veiled bias in the service against officers "who don't know what it's like to be an enlisted man." The issue of what to do with plebes who have prior enlisted service would have to be resolved; given that plebe summer is designed to be a shared experience for the entire class, this is not a trivial problem.
Colonel McMaster wanted the junior officers in his battalion to be able to spend a tour teaching at the Academy and still have a command career in the service. He is concerned that this is becoming increasingly difficult.
The reluctance of some to deal with the press came in for a good deal of discussion. Carol Mason, who served in the Naval Academy's Public Affairs Office from 1987 to 1991 and is now director of Member Services at the Naval Institute, called for the academies to grant more access to the media if they want their story on the street, which prompted Galloway to interject from the podium in his best Irish tones: "Open the gates." Major General Terry Murray, vice president of the Naval Academy Alumni Association and a former director of Marine Corps Public Affairs, joined them in stressing the importance of telling what is a very good story: "You can never be complacent." Lieutenant Colonel Carol Barkalow, a member of West Point's gender-breaking class of 1980 and author of In the Men's House, urged senior officers to get in front of the press.
General Kelley expressed his concerns regarding the drift of U.S. business to the ethical brink and beyond, citing its implications for new generations. Kelley worries that the youngsters the academies hope to recruit are getting the wrong signals in their formative years.
Noting the lack of official high-level participation at the seminar by the Naval Academy, Major General Lynch launched a broadside toward the banks of the Severn River: "I've learned about the Military Academy and the Air Force Academy, but I have learned nothing about my alma mater [the Naval Academy]. And I'd like that noted for the record." He said he knew Naval Academy officials were invited but declined to attend.
Thus ended, in Bob Lipsyte's words, a remarkable two days.
Lieutenant Colonel Greeley, a West Point graduate, served 21 years in the Marine Corps as an attack pilot. He later wrote for Aviation Week & Space Technology and was the senior technical editor for Proceedings and Naval History at the Naval Institute until he retired in 2000.