President George W. Bush wants to put in place the most significant increase in defense spending since the first Reagan administration: $379 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2003, a $48 billion increase. Considerable sums will go to prosecute the war against global terrorism, meet routine and emergency commitments, and bolster homeland-security needs. And there looks to be a funding component for future readiness and research and development (R&D) to usher in military transformation, a key plank in the President's campaign. But if the past proves to be prologue, much of the proposed budget will be chimerical.
The President's budget for FY 2003 increases funding for all the services. However, the Navy's budget increases are less than those of the others, especially in procurement. This bodes ill for tomorrow's fleet and brings into doubt the administration's understanding of the enduring value of naval forces in the 21st century—a quality that has been underscored dramatically by operations in Afghanistan.
With one exception—Air Force bombers operating initially from the United States and eventually from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—naval forces were the only U.S. military elements able to bring effective conventional force to bear within hours of the terrorist attacks and without concern for host-nation obstacles. Four months into Operation Enduring Freedom, the Navy and Marine Corps had accounted for more than half of the aircraft launched and cruise missiles used. They flew about 70% of the tactical sorties, and Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) [MEUs (SOC)] had captured key objectives, all from Arabian Gulf sea bases 400-900 miles away.
Last year, the continuing usefulness of sea bases—aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs)—was questioned in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). At one point during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a force of 6 CVBGs and 8 ARGs, versus today's 12 CVBGs and 12 ARGs, was debated. The remarkable striking power of sea-based forces, coupled with the operational flexibility demonstrated by the Kitty Hawk (CV-63)—which, instead of its normal air wing, embarked special operations forces for a variety of clandestine tasks—should have put to rest any doubts about the value of naval power in support of 21st-century joint operations. Nevertheless, the OSD jury is still out.
Smoke and Mirrors?
Even during the highly touted defense buildup of the early and mid-1980s, major increases usually were shifted to the out years of annual programs. (In the FY 1984 program, for example, projections for FY 1988 called for 28 surface warships alone.) But the good times lasted only six years; the 1986 budget was the last time (until 1999) that defense saw a real increase in spending compared to the previous year. Between 1986 and 1999, through Republican and Democratic presidencies, no matter which party controlled the Senate and House, defense total obligational authority declined in real terms by more than 40%. By way of comparison, the FY 1985 defense budget of $286.8 billion translates to $451.8 billion in 2002 dollars—16% more than the Bush administration's FY 2003 request.
From the post-Desert Storm "build-down" through base closures, roles and missions controversies, and various reviews, the U.S. military became an increasingly hollow force. Since 1991, the fleet has gotten smaller and the number of ships that deploy routinely with each battle group has decreased. During post-Cold War downsizing—from the planned 600-ship, 15-CVBG, 14-carrier air wing force of the mid-1980s to the current 318 ships and 12 CVBGs—the demand for deployed naval forces has increased. Operations since 2000 have been almost twice as frequent as during the height of the Cold War, with naval forces committed to some crisis or contingency once every four weeks on average. Because CVBGs and ARGs deploy with fewer warships than ten years ago, theater commanders have fewer assets to cover diverse commitments and occasionally must "time share." The Enterprise (CVN-65) CVBG already had started for home when word of the terrorist attacks caused her to turn back to the North Arabian Sea to support combat operations there.
Fewer assets have meant more underway time per unit. Increased operational tempo has resulted in additional wear and tear on ships, aircraft, and equipment, requiring more maintenance to be deferred because of insufficient resources. It is little wonder that, in one way or another, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vernon Clark's top priorities relate to readiness issues: manpower, current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and Navy-wide alignment.
Navy Department funding for FY 2003 has been pegged at $108.3 billion, including $24.9 billion for procurement and $12.5 billion in R&D. The Navy received the smallest increase of the three departments. The Air Force's increase was $12.7 billion; the Army's, $10 billion; and the Navy Department's, $9.5 billion. Figure 1 shows the implications for the Navy of the 1990s "funding holiday."
Dr. Truver is Group Vice President of National Security Studies at the Anteon Corporation in Arlington, Virginia.