After just a few minutes of conversation, you know you are in the presence of a warrior. His dialogue stresses people, weapon systems, and how to get hits on a target. He is reminiscent of Admiral William Sims, who was more concerned about achieving hits than a high rate of fire. There is no talk of politics or budget cycles, other than to point out that the present rate of consumption is high and the replacement of aging systems is becoming more critical.
The warrior is Admiral William "Fox" Fallon, the Navy's number-two admiral in the Pentagon. He assumed his present post as the 31 st Vice Chief of Naval Operations in October 2000. His background includes time in Vietnam in the late 1960s, command in Desert Storm in the early 1990s, and operations in Bosnia. During his career he often has been in command of combat forces, including an attack squadron, an air wing, a carrier battle group, and a fleet. Now he follows closely the activities in Afghanistan, relating to the aircrews using the modern munitions that have so revolutionized air warfare. He points out that during Desert Storm leaders calculated how many sorties it would take to kill a target. Now they discuss how many targets can be killed with one sortie.
One unique aspect of Admiral Fallon's qualifications is that he is not a Navy pilot; his designation is naval flight officer (NFO). As an NFO, almost all of his 5,000 hours in tactical aircraft and more than 1,300 carrier landings have been with someone else serving as pilot. He has been a specialist in weapon systems, charged with their proper operation to facilitate getting more hits on a target. Ironically, before 1969, shortly after he entered the Navy from the ROTC program at Villanova University, there was no way he could have attained senior rank.
Prior to that year, officers performing flight-crew duties in aircraft were titled naval aviation observers (NAOs). They had been in the ranks of naval aviation for years, starting in the open cockpits of floatplanes. Theirs was a mission of reconnaissance, part of the Navy's scouting force that located the enemy and then aided the fleet's gun batteries.
The laws governing command authority in the Navy were quite explicit. Although NAOs performed a key role in aviation missions, they were prohibited from commanding an aviation unit. They theoretically could command ships, but the facts of life were such that without aviation command experience, there was no way they could pass through the wickets of promotion and command a vessel.
At least two factors emerged to exert pressure for change. The first came as a result of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The key technical personnel in the B-29s that dropped the atomic bombs were Captain William Parsons and Commander Frederick Ashworth. Both held key positions at the Los Alamos Labs during the development of the bomb. General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, insisted on having a technical member in the bombing crew, someone who was familiar with the intimate details of the bomb itself. He termed these individuals "weaponeers." They held the authority to drop or not drop during the runs on the Japanese targets.
When the Navy developed its capability to drop nuclear weapons, particularly from carrier aircraft, initial plans called for having weaponeers in the delivery aircraft—people who knew the weapons but who also qualified to fly. These aviator weaponeers eventually were replaced in the mid-1950s with full-time NAOs trained in the details of the bombs and how to drop them. Although they were key personnel, they faced dead-end careers because they were prohibited from commanding flying squadrons.
The second factor was the Vietnam War. By the mid-1960s, weapon systems had become more complex. NAOs were operating sophisticated systems that had a vastly improved ability to hit targets. These flight crews proved their worth in combat innumerable times in the skies over North Vietnam. NAOs were performing many missions—not only in attack aircraft, but also in fighters, early warning and control aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, patrol aircraft, and in other roles requiring detailed knowledge of weapon systems. Their performance was magnificent, so much so that squadron and wing commanders became embarrassed. How could they face one of these talented NAOs when everyone knew theirs was a dead-end street? It was these flying squadron commanders who pleaded for a change in the law.
Finally, the leaders of naval aviation in the Pentagon decided to take action and made it legal for NAOs to command flying units. Congress readily approved, and the NAO designation was changed to naval flight officer. In the 1980s two officers reached the rank of vice admiral, one serving as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics and the other as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare. Admiral Fallon is the first NFO to reach four-star rank.
The Navy often is criticized for its dedication to the past and its resistance to change. In the case of naval flight officers, naval leaders moved out with courage and logic by rewarding leadership in the proper way.
Admiral Miller is the author of Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).