The Department of Defense has disclosed plans to change U.S. nuclear policy and to further reduce the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Revealed earlier this year by Defense officials, the policy reflects recommendations of the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review.
The new policy is part of the George W. Bush administration's defense policy goals, articulated in the current Quadrennial Defense Review:
- Assure allies and friends
- Dissuade competitors
- Deter aggressors
- Defeat enemies
The change marks a shift from Cold War nuclear policies, including the infamous concept of a U.S. nuclear forces "triad," a term apparently coined about 1970 by Major General Glenn Kent, a leading Air Force strategic planner, and quickly encouraged "throughout the Air Force to help explain the continuing need for a manned strategic bomber." A new concept is being proposed in which nuclear forces—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers—form a mini-triad within a broader structure.
A reduced U.S. nuclear arsenal will be augmented in the new triad by a national missile defense system and highly responsive conventional forces, all linked by upgraded command and control, intelligence, and planning activities (see Figure 1). At the same time, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be reduced from today's just more than 6,000 nuclear weapons to about 3,800 by 2007, and to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012.
Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch, in the briefing of the nuclear posture review in January, said many of the removed warheads would be kept in reserve as a "responsive force," able to be installed in missiles within weeks or months.
He went on to explain that the Nuclear Posture Review—mandated by Congress—reflects the current security environment. The Cold War, he said, provided in the Soviet Union "basically a known, single ideological opponent.... we relied not exclusively, but very heavily on our offensive nuclear forces, and we had a threat-based approach to nuclear planning. . . . the focus was on the Soviet Union, which of course is no longer with us, and because everything else was sort of a lesser included case—any other potential contingencies were lesser included cases."
Today, noted Assistant Secretary Crouch, the world situation is very different. Accordingly, the United States should deploy the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirement of the United States, its allies, and friends. In addition, the reductions will be achieved unilaterally, without the requirement for Cold War-style treaties. The reduction in nuclear weapons will place greater emphasis on highly responsive, advanced conventional weapons.
When the Cold War ended in 1991 the United States had approximately 20,000 nuclear weapons in service. President George Bush, on 27 September 1991, announced a massive cutback in U.S. nuclear weapons—tactical and strategic—a decision that led to the current 6,000 weapons. Most of these are strategic (see Table 1).
Of the current U.S. nuclear forces, four weapon systems will be kept in service through at least 2020 with life-extension programs:
- Minuteman III ICBMs
- Trident D-5 SLBMs
- B-52 Stratofortress bomber
- B-2 Snirit bomber
The new policy provides for studies of alternative follow-on programs. In this regard, there will be an acceleration of the Department of Energy's test readiness to support the development of advanced nuclear weapons. The last U.S. underground nuclear test occurred in 1992, and although the Bush administration will continue to adhere to a nuclear testing moratorium, it opposes ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Rather, Bush defense officials want a more flexible policy. Today it takes 24 to 36 months to prepare for a comprehensive nuclear weapons test. The Department of Energy and DoD will look into reducing that lead time.
At the White House, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters that President Bush has not ruled out conducting nuclear tests "to make sure the [weapons] stockpile, particularly as it is reduced, is reliable and safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so."
For the Air Force the new policy means withdrawal from the nuclear strike role of the B-1 Lancer bomber and dismantling the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs. The B-1 was counted as a nuclear strike aircraft under the SALT I agreement but not under SALT II. Following the effectiveness of the Northrop Grumman B-2 stealth bomber in long-range strikes in the Balkans and Afghanistan conflicts, there is a move under way to produce additional B-2s. Twenty-one B-2s were built; Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, says he would like to see 40 or 50. Of course, congressional delegations from the states that produce major B-2 components are advocating a reopening of the Northrop Grumman production lines.
The warhead loadout win be reduced in the remaining minuteman III ICBMs as well as in the Navy's Trident missiles.
For the Navy the new policy also endorses the conversion of four Trident strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) to Tomahawk cruise missile carriers (SSGNs). In the long run, there will be some further reduction in Trident submarines if the United States is to retain a mixed strategic force of ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers.
There was no mention in the unclassified version of the Nuclear Posture Review of nonstrategic nuclear forces. At this time, the United States is reported to have in reserve an estimated 325 nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missiles and 1,350 nuclear bombs of the B61 series.
Although almost 1,700 tactical/theater nuclear weapons are kept in reserve, as will be some of the warheads from strategic weapons that are being dismantled, the overall size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal continues to decline rapidly. Such a reduction certainly is justified in view of the changing international situation, the end of the Soviet Union as a superpower opponent, and the development of "brilliant" weapons, wherein stand-off range and accuracy can compensate for the destructive effects of nuclear weapons.