Winner, International Navies Essay Contest
With the new global war on terrorism, Japan is coming to grips with Article 9 of its 1947 Constitution-which bars its armed forces from acts of "belligerency." What will be the fallout for Japan's foreign policy, now that Japanese warships are participating in Operation Enduring Freedom?
Passed into law by a vote of the Japanese Diet, the 1947 Constitution was an amendment to Japan's original 1889 Meiji Constitution. Article 9 was meant to prevent Japan from pursuing the same path of expansionism that it chose before and during World War II.
The English version of Article 9 reads, in whole: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of resolving international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
On its face, Article 9 seems to rule out the possession of any military forces by Japan. According to the Japanese government's interpretation, Japan has the same right of self- defense accorded to any other nation-state, and may maintain the smallest necessary defense capability to protect its sovereignty. Japan may not, however, construct weapons that are seen to exceed the scope of "exclusive defense," such as nuclear weapons or large aircraft carriers. This interpretation of Article 9 does not allow Japan to engage legally in collective defense. In other words, Japan may defend itself, but cannot use armed force to defend a third party against aggression.
Not everyone has agreed with this interpretation, and collective defense lies at the heart of the controversy. How far can Japan go under the existing interpretation of Article 9, especially with regard to providing support to U.S. military forces? Should Article 9 be revised to allow collective defense under certain circumstances? This is one of the most sensitive topics in Japan today, and however it is resolved, it may determine the extent to which Japan can be an effective partner for the United States in establishing security in East Asia.
The Grey Area
What happens if a situation arises in which Japan is not attacked directly, but there still are serious consequences for Japanese security? In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, and the United States and its coalition allies prepared to repel the aggression. Japan could not send military forces to participate in this campaign, but the United States hoped to receive noncombat support. Japan, however, provided hardly any airlift or sealift support and declined to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf until after hostilities were over.
In the end, the Japanese provided about $13 billion to help fund the coalition war effort, even establishing special taxes to raise this money, but its image was tarnished. Some Japanese did recognize the need to take a more assertive role in meeting this security challenge, but this was not the alliance's finest hour.
In 1994, suspicions that North Korea was producing nuclear weapons led to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Here was a situation that clearly affected Japanese security. Absent an armed attack against Japan itself, however, Japan's ability to support the United States during this crisis was, unfortunately, inadequate. Clearly, some changes needed to be made.
The New Guidelines
At the same time, Japan was reconsidering its own security requirements. In August 1993, a private group commissioned by then-Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa to study future Japanese security requirements released its final report. The U.S.-Japan security alliance would remain, it concluded, but Japan should place greater emphasis on multilateral security arrangements. This drew criticism from officials in both the United States and Japan, who believed the report indicated a downgrading of the bilateral alliance. The report's emphasis on multilateral security arrangements seemed to approach the participation in collective defense activities prohibited by Article 9. This was a sensitive point, especially considering that by the time the report was released, Japan's Prime Minister was Tomiichi Murayama of the Japan Socialist Party. Any suggestion of Japanese participation in collective defense never would have been approved by a Socialist prime minister.
The U.S. side also was active in considering the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In February 1995, the Department of Defense released the Nye Report (after then-Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye), which reaffirmed the importance of the alliance and set U.S. personnel strength in the Asia-Pacific region at 100,000. Concurrently, Assistant Secretary Nye established the Nye Initiative, which increased communication between U.S. and Japanese defense officials to help arrest what some perceived as a drifting apart.
These exchanges to some extent influenced Japan's National Defense Program Outline, a broad plan for Japan's overall security strategy after the Cold War. This outline, adopted in November 1995, reaffirmed the place of the U.S.-Japan alliance at the heart of Japan's security strategy. It also gave an overall plan for Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) levels for the post-Cold War world. The outline contained a clause stating that Japan would work in accordance with the U.S.-Japan alliance and support the United Nations when confronted by a situation near Japan that threatened Japanese security. Some in the Japanese government objected to this clause, on the ground that it hinted at the constitutionally forbidden collective defense. Nonetheless, it remains in the outline's Section 3.
In April 1996, the United States and Japan issued the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century. This declaration described areas in which the two nations would maintain or increase defense cooperation. It contained one particular item that attracted a great deal of attention in the months and years to follow—an agreement to review and revise the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines.
Although it would pass nearly unnoticed in the United States, the revision was a center of controversy in Japan and elsewhere in Northeast Asia. The original guidelines, issued in 1978, called for U.S.-Japan military cooperation in a wide range of areas. But as Operation Desert Storm and the 1994 Korean Peninsula crisis demonstrated, U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in areas not directly involving armed attack against Japan had to be improved. One problem was how to find ways for the United States and Japan to cooperate without violating Article 9's prohibition against collective defense.
The new guidelines, released in September 1997, spelled out measures for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in peacetime, in case of armed attack against Japan, and during "situations in areas surrounding Japan." It was this third case that proved so controversial. Japan could provide supplies such as food, fuel, and lubricants to U.S. forces, but could not provide weapons or ammunition, because this would cross the constitutional line and involve Japan directly in use of armed force. Japan also could transport these supplies by air, land, or sea, allow U.S. forces to use Japanese air and sea facilities, provide medical care for injured personnel, and assist in mine countermeasures operations at sea. For Japan to have a legal foundation to carry out these measures, the Japanese Diet passed the Situations in Surrounding Areas Law in May 1999. Simultaneously, the Self-Defense Forces Law and the U.S.-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement were modified to reflect the new guidelines.
On 21-22 December 2001, a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C patrol aircraft discovered a suspicious vessel in Japan's exclusive economic zone, about 80 nautical miles north-northwest of AmamiOshima island. The vessel did not appear to have much fishing equipment and closely resembled the North Korean special operations vessels that had violated Japanese waters in 1999. Japan Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA—the equivalent of the U.S. Coast Guard) cutters gave chase to the intruder, which was considered to be in violation of Japan's Fisheries Law by disregarding orders to halt for inspection and evading efforts to board and inspect the vessel. JMSA ships fired warning shots at the intruder; when she still did not halt, the Japanese ships fired into her stem and the bow, setting her afire. The intruder continued to flee until she was forced to halt by the JMSA cutters. The intruder was heading directly toward a group of Chinese fishing boats—if she had gone in among them, the JMSA could not have used their weapons for fear of hitting a Chinese boat—so the JMSA decided to halt the intruder. As the JMSA prepared to board the vessel, personnel on board the vessel opened fire with automatic weapons, hitting three cutters and injuring two JMSA personnel. The intruder's crew also fired rocket-propelled grenade rounds at the JMSA ships. The Inasa with 186 rounds from her forward gun mount, hitting the vessel, which sank several minutes later. It is not clear whether the intruder sank as a result of the Inasa's fire, or if she was deliberately scuttled by her crew.
Since this incident was handled as a law-enforcement matter and not as a military one (automatic weapons and rocket grenades aside), there is no direct connection to Article 9. This incident, however, does demonstrate the problem Japan faces of legal (and constitutional) restrictions on the use of force on the one hand, and the fact that it faces clear threats to its security, by states that do not have similar restrictions, on the other.
Time to Revise Article 9?
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Japanese government considered how it could support the inevitable U.S. retaliation. On 29 October 2001, the Japanese Diet passed three laws intended to increase Japanese security and allow the JSDF to support the U.S. war against terrorism. The first was the Terrorism Countermeasures Special Measures Law. This is based on the Situations in Surrounding Areas Law passed in 1999, and includes many of the same provisions for providing logistical support for U.S. military forces. One interesting change is that the JSDF is authorized to provide support, not only for U.S. forces, but also for the forces of other nations participating in the antiterrorism campaign.
The second law is a revision to the Self-Defense Forces Law that authorized JSDF forces to guard U.S. installations in Japan against terrorist attack. The third law is a revision to the Maritime Security Agency Law that allows the JMSA to use force to stop foreign ships committing crimes, or giving reasonable appearance of preparing to commit crimes, in Japanese waters.
The JMSDF has played a central role in supporting the U.S.-led war against terrorism. On 21 September 2001, the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and her battle group departed their base in Japan under heavy escort by JMSDF warships and JMSA cutters. After returning to Japan, the Kitty Hawk battle group went back to sea on 1 October, again escorted by Japanese ships as they departed. On 24 September, the Fort McHenry (LSD-43) departed her base in Japan, also under JMSDF escort.
On 8 November 2001, the JMSDF ships Kurama, Kirisame, and Hamana departed Japan. This group was followed on 25 November by a second group of three ships. These vessels, mostly underway replenishment vessels and escorts, have provided logistical support for the U.S. and allied antiterrorist campaign. This was the first "wartime" operation outside Japan by the JSDF since its inception in 1954. There was controversy over whether the second group of warships should have included an Aegis guided-missile destroyer, something the U.S. Navy had anticipated. The Japanese government decided not to deploy an Aegis destroyer, largely for domestic political reasons. Some in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party thought that an Aegis destroyer's inclusion might constitute Japanese involvement in the use of force by a third party (i.e., the United States), thus violating Article 9. On 3 December, JMSDF ships and Japan Air Self-Defense Force transport aircraft began logistical support for U.S. forces.
As might be expected, Article 9 was a consideration in the forming of Japanese policy to support the antiterrorist campaign. On 9 October, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said, "[The proposed antiterrorist support law] is within the framework of the present Constitution, but just barely. Anything beyond this, and we will have no choice but to deal with it by revising the Constitution." On 27 October, however, Prime Minister Koizumi said that no change to the interpretation of Article 9 was being considered.
What's Next?
Whatever the future holds, the U.S.-Japan alliance will be vital to U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific region, and both nations must work to resolve any potentially fractious issues. The debate on the constitutionality of ballistic missile defense, in particular, could become a key issue. It will be interesting to see how the Japanese decide to approach the issue of Article 9. The United States will watch, maybe even express views or encouragement, but ultimately the Japanese people should be left to decide the course their nation will take.
Mr. Cummings graduated from the University of Texas at Arlington in 1992 and attended the Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo from 1997 to 1999.