Recognizing East Asia as a long-term U.S. interest, the recent Quadrennial Defense Review places great importance on combat-credible forward-deployed U.S. forces—and by implication, on the central role of naval forces such as the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63).
With the single-minded focus on terrorism and homeland security in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the 30 September release of the Bush administration's new defense strategy has drawn scant notice.
Known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the report normally is the focus of considerable attention and commentary. Before 11 September, defense experts around the world showed a great deal of interest in how the Bush administration would address such topics as the transformation of the U.S. military, whether it would continue to follow a strategy based on two major regional wars, the role of missile defense in U.S. strategy, whether greater strategic focus would be placed on Asia, and the weight China might be accorded in future U.S. strategy.
The QDR does address these issues, as well as others. It is short on the details about specific military programs that defense commentators love so well, but it nevertheless is very useful in detailing the overarching strategic concepts and worldview of the Department of Defense. Analyzing the report as it applies to East Asia confirms attention to the rise of China, the importance of allies, a desire for increased access for U.S. forces, the importance of having capable and militarily credible forces forward in the region, and the importance of East Asia as a long-term U.S. interest.
Through a combination of explicit and implicit judgments, the QDR reaffirms the central role naval forces play in this strategy. For those who appreciate that East Asia and its littoral are inherently maritime in nature, this is no great revelation. But for those who thought the Bush administration with its focus on transformation would somehow discover a magic formula that would surmount the realities of geography and time and distance, this may be a disappointment.
Importance of Allies
This is the point of departure for the strategy of the Bush administration. The vision of the United States' role, as spelled out in the QDR, relates global stability and confidence and hence economic prosperity to the network of alliances and friendships the United States maintains. This will come as no surprise to anyone who has followed the speeches of senior defense officials since the administration was inaugurated in January or, more tellingly, has watched the care the administration has taken in assembling the broadest possible antiterrorist coalition. Nonetheless, it is significant that the first of the four goals of U.S. defense strategy is "assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of purpose and its capacity to fulfill its security commitments."
Forward-Deployed Forces
Of direct interest to Japan and Korea, and by implication to the rest of East Asia, the QDR places great importance on forward-deployed U.S. forces. Of particular significance, the report indicates that forward forces must be capable of "swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement." This concept contrasts in important ways with how forces stationed in East Asia have been discussed in the past few years. Of late, much of the debate has focused more on what changes—meaning reductions—might result from a more peaceful Korean Peninsula. Although the QDR does not rule this out, its Asia focus clearly is broader than Korea, and is more oriented to ensuring what Navy spokesmen have called "combat credible" forces are kept in East Asia to deal with a full range of possible contingencies. Specifically, another of the four strategic goals of the United States is to "deter aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure."
Critical Areas
When the QDR discusses U.S. national interests, Asia receives particular attention in the list of regional areas "critical" to the United States. Among U.S. enduring national interests is the requirement to preclude hostile domination of critical areas, "particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral (defined as the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal), and the Middle East and Southwest Asia."
This formulation is interesting because it divides East Asia into Northeast Asia (which I take to mean Japan and Korea) and the littoral states between Japan and India.
This was done, I believe, to make certain that it was widely understood that the United States has important interests in Asia in addition to its Japanese and Korean allies. The characterization "East Asian littoral" includes Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia, as well as the South China Sea and key Indonesian international straits.
Choosing to define the littoral as a crucial area—as opposed to saying Southeast Asia, or Indochina, or saying nothing at all—suggests a carefully chosen formulation that geographically includes Taiwan while avoiding a definition that suggests U.S. critical interests include continental Asia. This formulation is implicit recognition of the de facto division of Asia into two "military spheres of influence." China is the dominant military power on the mainland, and the United States and its littoral allies hold sway in what might be termed maritime Asia.
The Bush administration clearly is concerned about the rise of China. Although it does not refer to China by name, the QDR holds that Asia is "gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition." The report goes on to conclude that maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task and, clearly implying China, holds that a "military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge." Aside from Japan, no East Asian country other than China fits this profile—and Japan, of course, is an ally not a competitor.
Favorable Balance of Military Power
To address this issue and preclude China—or anyone else for that matter—from dominating Northeast Asia or the East Asian littoral, the QDR says U.S defense strategy will focus on promoting security cooperation with friends and allies to create a "favorable balance of military power" to improve deterrence and prevent aggression and coercion. In fact, a principal objective for security cooperation (the term that evidently replaces "engagement" as a way to characterize military-to-military contacts between the United States and the countries of East Asia) will be to ensure access, interoperability with allies and friends, and intelligence cooperation. This is because there are so few U.S. bases in Asia and the distances are so vast. As a result, the report indicates, the United States will place a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements in the region.
Reading between the lines, this especially means airfields. As we witness once again, this time in Afghanistan, the U.S. way of war is heavily reliant on air power and air-breathing missiles to either do all the fighting or establish the conditions for success on the ground. The issue in East Asia is the absence of dependable air base access south of Kadena, Okinawa. Without access, employing our great national advantage in land-based air power is problematic, and makes reliance on sea-based air power essential in case of contingencies in the littoral area—particularly around Taiwan or in the South China Sea.
Capability-Based Planning
One of the central tenets of U.S. defense strategy is the shift to "capability-based planning." This concept is a needed and sensible corrective to the fixation the U.S. military has on Korea and Iraq as the only two planning scenarios for sizing U.S. force structure. This is not to say that deterring conflict in Korea will not continue to be a central mission for many of the U.S. forces in East Asia; but it also means more attention will be paid to potential future adversaries and to how those adversaries might fight.
Although the QDR does not name China specifically, it indicates that capability-based planning "means identifying capabilities needed to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare." Given that these operational concepts are among the central tenets of Chinese military doctrine, the capability-based planning approach as applied to Asia almost certainly will have China in mind—particularly as long as a Chinese attack on Taiwan cannot be ruled out.
Clearly, the authors of the QDR are concerned about the possibility that China, sometime in the future, could deny the United States access to its allies, friends, and interests in East Asia. This means that a continued strong alliance with Japan will be essential if the United States is to preserve a forward military capability in East Asia that "can swiftly defeat an adversary with only modest reinforcement" while sustaining a "favorable balance of military power" in East Asia.
Regionally Tailored Forces in East Asia
The QDR presents the concept that forward forces should be "regionally tailored" to the unique geography and mission requirements of each region. In practical terms, in East Asia this translates into sustaining deterrence in Korea while ensuring the existing continental-maritime military balance remains. In other words, ensuring that a continentally dominant China does not develop, unchecked, the ability to project power off the continent into what the QDR terms Northeast Asia and littoral Asia. Given the fact that China needs to cross open ocean to bring its formidable army to bear against Japan, or other allies and friends, including Taiwan, U.S. forces must be able to trump any attempts to do so.
In my judgment, this is a call for a combined U.S and allied military capability that is able to: (1) deter conflict in Korea, (2) defeat China's short- and medium-range ballistic missile force, currently the only credible way China has to project power, (3) deal with China's large submarine force, (4) maintain air superiority over the maritime approaches to Japan and Taiwan, and (5) strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait by being able to hold at risk targets of importance in China. There are other likely missions—such as peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, and disaster relief—but these are the most operationally demanding.
Overlaying this conceptual template with specifics listed in the QDR helps put the specifics in context. The QDR calls for an increase in aircraft carrier presence in the region (this improves regional access, air defense, and offensive strike operations), increased contingency stationing for the U.S. Air Force (the same), and the possibility that three or four for more surface combatants (good for antisubmarine warfare, air defense, cruise missile strikes, and eventually missile defense) and a yet to be converted Trident-class guided-missile submarine (SSGN, a capability for "stealthy" cruise missile strike) could be forward stationed in East Asia.
The QDR is not specific regarding where these additional forces might be stationed, but Japan and Guam, and perhaps Singapore, are the most likely possibilities. Along with the continued development of sea- and land-based missile defense systems to protect against short- and medium-range tactical ballistic missiles, the specific changes addressed in the QDR are directly relevant to either a Korean or Taiwan contingency while also contributing to the overall goal of maintaining a "favorable balance of military power in East Asia."
Does This Matter after 11 September?
Some defense experts suggest it is not worth the effort to read the QDR because much of it was written before 11 September. It is patently true that the war on terrorism has taken center stage in U.S. defense thinking, but that does not mean that other geostrategic realities and concerns somehow have been swept away. The "old" concerns remain—Korea, China's stance toward Taiwan, China's across the board military modernization—while new worries related to terrorism and the indirect effect of the war on terrorism are added. It is hard to see how a strategy fundamentally different from the one outlined in the QDR would better address this dangerous brew.
Admiral McDevitt is director, Center for Strategic Studies, at the CNA Corporation in Alexandria, Virginia.