When terrorists attacked the Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000, they put out of action hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military hardware for a year. Such new threats to warships demand new approaches to fighting in the littorals; smaller, more-agile Streetfighters will meet this need.
The U.S. Navy must decide what ship types it must develop to influence world events in a new century with new adversaries. The current fleet of destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, and submarines will continue to maintain control of the open seas, project power inland, and, perhaps soon, provide theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) from the sea. These platforms, however, are not well suited to prosecuting war in the littoral zone.
The terrorist attack on the Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000 demonstrated the kind of threats to which our forces are especially vulnerable. The port of Aden had many of the same dangers as any other hostile coastline: small boats with uncertain motives, hazards to navigation, the potential for attacks from land, and restricted waters. The Cole was and is well-equipped to defend against sophisticated attacks and to wage war while on the open ocean, but defending against threats such as a Boston Whaler with a mounted machine gun remains a problem for her and similar ships. Attacks from small camouflaged craft are difficult to defend against especially during operations other than war. The best solution is to keep high-value targets out of harm's way. Reintroducing the small combatant in the guise of the Streetfighter, ideally suited to warfare in the littorals and capable of protecting larger assets in dangerous waters, will help bring tactical stability back to the fleet.
The instability of the fleet is particularly apparent when studying the evolving roles of our Aegis-equipped ships. Theater ballistic missile defense from the sea will alter the value of these vessels. When the Aegis fleet is given a TBMD capability, these ships will become capital ships; in other words, they will become strategic assets. If a destroyer positioned off the coast of California can defend Los Angeles and San Francisco against a rogue-nation missile attack, that destroyer becomes just as important strategically as an aircraft carrier.
In addition, if new ship construction goes as planned, the Navy will have approximately 85 Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers in the fleet by 2007. The standard formula dictates that for sustained operations only one-third of those ships can be deployed at any one time. That makes for approximately 27 ships on station. If these ships were deployed in a strategic role to intercept ballistic missiles, a simplified version of their deployment might resemble the following: three on each coast of the United States, one near Japan and South Korea, and one each near Taiwan, northern Europe, the Mediterranean, Israel, and the Persian Gulf. That means 12 of 27 deployed Aegis ships would have permanent and inflexible obligations; the remaining 15 then would be divided among 8 or 10 carrier battle groups and any surface action groups. Spread so thinly, which of these incredibly important assets would be risked in the littorals to support an amphibious landing or any other operation? This scenario is remarkably similar to a dilemma Great Britain faced early in the 20th century.
During World War I, Britain's fleet was dangerously unbalanced in favor of the capital ship, the dreadnought. Although Britain held a numerical superiority in capital ships over Germany, the admiralty's greatest fear was that if it risked its dreadnoughts in support of tactical missions along the German coastline, that superiority could be squandered in small-unit engagements. If superiority was lost, Britain risked losing control of the vital sea-lanes between North America and the continent. The solution to this dilemma, after the Battle of Jutland, was to keep the dreadnoughts out of harm's way, but to keep them always in a position to threaten the German High Seas Fleet. What the Royal Navy lost by this decision was the opportunity to hit the enemy strategically—through a series of tactical operations—along Germany's coast. Britain also gave up the opportunity to prevent German U-boats from sallying at will into the Atlantic.
To avoid a similar mistake, today's U.S. Navy must have a balanced fleet that includes vessels that can fight tactical as well as strategic battles in the littorals and in the open ocean.
A study conducted recently by the Marine Corps determined that "of sixty-nine countries examined which may demand U.S. involvement, forty-one of the countries have active ... insurgencies, drug wars, civil wars, severe instability, or a regional war in progress." The majority of our future conflicts likely will call for low-intensity, high-impact solutions delivered from forces close enough to distinguish friend from foe. This requires a small-combatant presence in the littorals.
The Streetfighter, a catch-all phrase embracing a range of small, inexpensive, and lightly crewed ship concepts, meets this need. Streetfighter encompasses a variety of designs that meet the functional capabilities required for fighting low-tech or high-tech foes, primarily in the littorals but also on the high seas. The Navy has viewed the acquisition of small patrol craft with suspicion. In the past, small ships lacked the ability to defend themselves adequately and to deliver sufficient firepower to execute significant Navy missions. Recent technological advances in hull forms, weapon systems, and interconnectivity, however, suggest a shift in this paradigm.
It now is possible to envision a fleet of small Streetfighter vessels operating with total interconnectivity with variable weapon modules (i.e., each Streetfighter loaded with weapons designed for its particular mission—antisubmarine warfare, gunfire support, etc.). The effect would be five or six low-cost ships in a network with all the firepower of a larger ship such as an Aegis destroyer—but lacking the center of vulnerability that makes such large ships incapable of defending themselves effectively in constricted waters.
The following features will help Streetfighters restore tactical stability to the fleet in the littoral environment:
- Low Cost/Low Manning—The Navy can shield its major assets while accomplishing missions in the littorals and other areas by using relatively (in terms of potential casualties, monetary cost, and strategic value) inexpensive ships.
- Cooperative Engagement Capability—Emerging networking technologies will allow swarming Streetfighters to share information and weapon capabilities, enabling them to operate as a single unit. In addition to basic common self-defense weapons, each boat in the swarm will carry a different weapon module, providing for flexible deployment, concentration of firepower, and decentralized vulnerability.
- Low Operational Vulnerability—One hit put the Cole out of action. If a small squadron of Streetfighters had been attacked instead of the Cole, only one ship of the group would have been damaged, and only one aspect of total mission capability would have been lost. The rest of the Streetfighters could have continued the operation.
Reevaluation of current and future threats is imperative for the Navy's success in the littorals and for the balancing of the fleet. Networking technology has introduced a revolution in military affairs that the Navy cannot ignore. So far, however, the opportunities offered by this new technology have outstripped the imagination and ability of Navy decision makers to comprehend and exploit the moment. Disasters such as the attack on the Cole have revealed a growing imbalance in the composition of the fleet that could put it in strategic peril. The Streetfighter is a viable response.
Lieutenant Arthur served on board two ships home-ported in Sasebo, Japan, and as a U.N. peacekeeper in the Western Sahara. He was writing screenplays in Los Angeles before 11 September 2001. He was recalled to active duty and is assigned to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.