Network-centric warfare gives commanders the ability to operate along a continuum of command methods, from centralized to decentralized. Those commanders will make their choices in their combat information centers, such as this CIC of the future at the Naval Surface Warfare Center.
A cool wind blew off the coast of southern Spain. Two great fleets were only hours away from an immense naval battle. As sailors prepared their watch stations, the admiral slowly paced the deck in silent contemplation. "Lieutenant Pascal," he said, "amuse the Fleet with a signal." The signal was composed and, after a small revision, quickly run up the halyard. It was one of the most notable messages sent in naval history: "England Expects that Every Man will do his Duty." In the ensuing battle, only one other signal was sent ("close action"). These two signals comprised the total of the force communications for one of the most decisive and important battles ever fought at sea—the Battle of Trafalgar.
Communications have changed greatly since Admiral Horatio Nelson's great victory. Today, the Internet is transforming many facets of our lives. As advanced computer technology and networking spread throughout the world, those of us in uniform are witnesses to the tremendous effects of these forces. In 1995, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Owens foretold of an "emerging system of systems." This concept has evolved into network-centric warfare (NCW).
The development of this concept will affect the conduct of future military operations. Commanders today, however, still face the same challenge Nelson confronted in the early 1800s: what method of command and control will best allow the execution of missions using existing forces and communications technology? As in Nelson's day, commanders should not limit themselves to one method of command and control, but should tailor their method based on mission, forces, and available communications technology.
Command and control is the method by which commanders synchronize their forces to obtain a military objective. Planning an operation normally is a centralized process. The execution of the plan, however, can be either decentralized (with subordinate forces, armed with their commander's intent and a solid understanding of their role, executing the operation) or centralized (with the commander and his staff issuing specific orders to control the execution of the operation).
Two opposing views have emerged regarding the best command-and-control method to implement NCW. One side argues that the value of NCW lies in the increased knowledge of the battlefield now bestowed on individual war fighters at the tactical level. Thus, decentralized command and control should give forces an overwhelming advantage by allowing each individual war fighter to act on the information superiority provided by the network. Opposing this view is the belief that greatly expanded communications capabilities and improved battlespace knowledge will lead to more centralized command and control. "The likelihood that greater experience and knowledge will reside at higher command echelons," writes one NCW theorist, "would seem to argue for centralizing decision making and control to the fullest extent allowed by communications capacity."
Both of these views of NCW characterize command and control as an either/or proposition, when in fact both methods likely will—and must—be used.
Operational Factors
Throughout history commanders have selected their methods of command and control based on their ability to manage operational factors. Those in control of a small number of forces, operating within a geographically limited space, and with a moderate operational tempo, could use simple communications methods and basic doctrine to employ centralized command and control effectively. If the existing technology was incapable of managing the operational factors of time, space, and force, then a decentralized method was required to bridge the gap. There are four major factors generally used to measure the strengths and weaknesses of specific command-and-control methods:
- Information. Traditionally, centralized commands have had an information advantage over decentralized commands because of the numerous sources reporting to the centralized commander. At the tactical level, a decentralized command may have a more accurate local battlespace picture, but information regarding the operational or strategic picture often is lacking. In today's platform-oriented world, decentralized commands usually are limited to the information provided by their own sensors and a few additional outside sources. In contrast, centralized commands have the benefit of receiving information from subordinate commands and a host of other sources, providing the most complete information picture.
- Experience. This is crucial to operational commands for the proper employment of force and to minimize the risk of unwanted escalation. Centralized commands, because of their level of importance, normally are staffed by experienced senior personnel. Decentralized commands could have an advantage in experience, but normally this is not the case.
- Operational Tempo. Centralized commands' operational tempos may be too slow for specific military conflicts. Decentralized command and control often is used to increase the tempo of operations because in a decentralized situation there are fewer forces and a smaller battlespace to manage.
- Vulnerability to Debilitating Attack. Centralized commands are more vulnerable to debilitating attack because they often are unable to operate effectively once centralized direction is lost. In contrast, decentralized command has a very low vulnerability to debilitating attack because commanders are empowered to act without direction.
The Network-Centric Effect
How does network-centric warfare effect the outcomes of these traditional command-and-control relationships? The goal of the information grid in NCW is to provide all forces with a common battlespace picture. As this goal is reached, the information advantage held by centralized commands will be reduced. Factors that could prevent this from occurring include security requirements for highly classified information, and potential information overload.
Current security requirements may have to be altered if a common operating picture is to be used by all personnel connected to the network. If this is not possible, then the network could provide battlespace pictures whose accuracy and completeness is dependent on the users' security clearances. If this path is chosen, centralized commands, which normally have higher security clearances, would retain some information advantage.
Information overload could result if the network is used primarily for passing data instead of knowledge. If the information received by users requires processing, then the abundance of information provided by large numbers of sources likely will overwhelm processing capability. In this event, centralized commands, which normally have more analysts and greater processing power, would be better equipped to handle the data volume. Even so, the information age has seen tremendous leaps in the ability to network, process, and analyze information; the result will be that networking information eventually will level the information playing field between centralized and decentralized command-and-control methods.
Network-centric warfare will not affect experience directly; it will not turn newly qualified operators into grizzled and worldly veterans. Nonetheless, better information and improved battlespace knowledge, which the network will provide, should improve combat assessment and allow better force employment decisions to be made by less-experienced personnel. In this manner, NCW will tend to reduce the risk of improper force employment.
The primary benefit of decentralized command and control always has been the speed of action gained by allowing subordinate commands to act on their initiative. The NCW engagement grid would give a central command access to the same weapon systems as subordinate commands and allow it to act immediately on its decisions. The time previously required to generate and transmit messages directing operational or tactical actions would be eliminated, greatly increasing the operational tempo of centralized commands.
Certain networking effects likely will have similar influences on operational tempo for both methods of command and control. Reliance on network information could slow operational tempo because of "incoming traffic acting as a brake on decision-making." Likewise, information overload may overwhelm processing capabilities, also slowing operational tempo. Attempts at synchronization by centralized or decentralized commands likely will produce different results. Current NCW philosophy proposes that the combination of a rule set and shared awareness will allow decentralized units to self-synchronize, achieving "perhaps the ultimate in increased tempo and responsiveness." This method places a great deal of faith in the adequacy of the shared awareness and the rule set. In contrast, weapons-execute orders originating from a centralized system could ensure synchronization of effects while providing weapon-resource management.
While this may appear to give centralized command and control the edge in operational tempo, attempts by centralized commands to synchronize effects still will be limited by the relationship of the operational factors to communications capabilities. The overall effect of access to the engagement grid will be to equalize the differences between centralized and decentralized command and control.
Because NCW will be comprised of a "network of networks," an attack on a single network should not result in the incapacitation of the whole. It has yet to be established, however, that the network can eliminate every potential Achilles' heel. NCW may reduce the vulnerability of centralized command and control to debilitating attack, but decentralized command and control still will provide the greatest insurance against attack.
Commanders performing an assessment of these network-centric command-and-control methods most likely would choose the centralized option for operations of great risk that demand the most experienced decision makers. A much faster centralized operational tempo likely will increase the number of situations a centralized command could manage. The improved information picture for decentralized commands, however, also will expand the range of conflicts that can be handled by less-experienced commands. Future commanders will seek to minimize risk by establishing a command-and-control plan that adopts a number of methods based on the situation presented. A commander of a standing joint task force, for example, might implement decentralized command and control to the maximum extent possible, knowing his forces are thoroughly trained and understand their mission. A commander of an ad hoc joint task force, however, might retain a great deal of control until he is satisfied his forces are ready.
Our Cultural Bias
Throughout naval history, many disasters have befallen commanders who implemented centralized command and control at the wrong time. The British losses in the Battle of Jutland are a prime example. During that battle, the numerically superior British Grand Fleet was unable to achieve a decisive victory over the German High Seas Fleet. British Vice Admiral John Jellicoe attempted to overcentralize his forces—a doctrine incompatible with the existing communications and command-and-control technologies and the size of his forces. The result was 14 British ships sunk and 6,097 lives lost.
The idea of centralized command and control strikes foul with military personnel who have seen the disastrous results when local commanders are overruled, or tactically hindered, by superiors acting on incomplete information or inaccurate perceptions. "Don't tell me how to do the job, just tell me what you need accomplished" is a commonly heard phrase. Critics of centralized command and control also recall the memory of Nelson and his great victory at Trafalgar.
Although advanced doctrine for signal flags still was relatively new at the time of Trafalgar, it could have allowed Nelson to employ centralized command and control. But after evaluating the mission he had undertaken, the tactics he would use (i.e., cutting the enemy line with the British fleet split into two columns), the numbers of opposing forces he would engage (27 ships-of-the-line and 8 frigates), and knowing his commanders understood his intent, Nelson properly chose to employ decentralized command and control.
Nelson's subordinates' clear understanding of their commander's intent was crucial to his decision. Nelson had sailed and worked with many of his commanders for more than two years. He knew they would perform as he expected under challenging circumstances, and this enabled him to choose aggressive tactics with confidence that he would not need to employ additional signaling to aid his commanders. In today's world of hastily assembled joint task forces, commanders would be wise to consider Nelson's example before implementing decentralized command and control. Centralization might be the correct method to minimize risk until a commander is sure his subordinates understand his intent.
Nelson's stunning victory at Trafalgar and all other cases where decentralized command and control are successful are not repudiations of the centralized method, but examples of the skillful exploitation of proper training, experience, and doctrine. Likewise, the failures of past commanders who implemented centralized command and control do not mean centralization will not work in the future. Operational commanders must weigh carefully the risks and benefits of each method based on the situation and mission at hand. Network-centric warfare has the potential to allow commanders to operate along a continuum of command-and-control methods, from completely centralized to completely decentralized. Future commanders could use network-centric warfare to manage risk by altering their method of command and control as changes in the battlespace occur.
Commander Zimmerman recently graduated from the Naval War College, where he received the Navy League’s William S. Sims Award for academic excellence. Currently, he serves as executive officer of the Maryland’s (SSBN-738) gold crew.