The time that has elapsed since the 11 September attack on the United States provides some perspective. It now appears that Osama bin Laden intended the attack as catalytic. His medium-term goal apparently is to extend a Taliban-style rule (with himself as emir) over Saudi Arabia and, presumably, Pakistan. He clearly lacks the force to conquer these countries; however, he seems to imagine that his adherents would happily overthrow the local governments should they be excited into a holy war. The precondition for that would be for the United States to be, or to appear to be, at war with the Muslim world. In that case, governments allied with the United States would be guilty of treason against Islam and therefore would be ripe for destruction. Indeed, Osama presumably wants to ignite a wider war between the West and the Muslim world. The particularly sadistic method used in the 11 September attack may, then, be seen as a calculated attempt to cause a disproportionate U.S. reaction, such as a nuclear attack against Afghanistan, which could be advertised in the Muslim world as proof of U.S. intent to destroy it. Apparently U.S. attempts to secure justice for Muslims, for example in Bosnia and in Kosovo, have had little or no impact on public opinion in many Muslim countries. Rather, bin Laden builds on a long-established sense of victimization at the hands of the West, going back to the Crusades of the Middle Ages. That is why President George Bush so quickly withdrew his characterization of the fight against terrorism as a crusade: the word has a very different, and unpleasant, meaning in the Muslim world.
This catalytic-attack analysis carries a chilling implication. After 11 September, the U.S. government adopted a very careful attitude, blaming only the terrorists and specifically avoiding placing any blame on Muslims as a whole. From bin Laden's perspective, it refused to take the bait. Bin Laden may feel his attack was not outrageous enough to snap U.S. patience and bring on the sort of apocalyptic war he imagines he wants. Reportedly, bin Laden's experience of the world outside Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan is limited, and he probably has little idea of just how devastating an all-out attack against Afghanistan might be. For example, he presumably is unaware that in their own war the Soviets felt limited by larger Cold War considerations—which would not apply to retaliation now. Nor, probably, does he want to admit (or realize) just how much the Afghan resistance benefited from Western assistance, which included not only weaponry but also crucial intelligence. On the other hand, bin Laden is almost certainly correct that few if any Muslim governments could accede to such an all-out assault, and that the attack, even if successful, probably would eject the United States from the Muslim world.
If this analysis is correct, then bin Laden's view probably will be that an even more outrageous attack is needed. Whether he or his friends can carry out such an attack remains to be seen. It is natural for our own security organizations, which failed to predict the attacks, to characterize them as brilliantly sophisticated; otherwise they look even worse. However, for all their horrific impact, the attacks were not so very difficult to carry out, given the poor pre-attack state of domestic air security. It remains to be seen, for example, whether the attackers even needed confederates at the airports to get their knives onto the airplanes they hijacked. They did need some fairly basic knowledge of aircraft, but it seems they felt quite insecure. Computer flight simulators, which can be bought for a few dollars, probably would have taught them most of what they needed; why go to flight schools? Someone had to know that airliners are tracked over most U.S. airspace using transponders, and that these devices can be turned off from the cockpit, but even that is not particularly sophisticated knowledge. The hijackers did enjoy a considerable measure of luck in that all of their airplanes took off within a few minutes of each other. Had the usual delays been at work, one of the attacks might have occurred before the other airliners even took off. All U.S. airliners might then have been grounded, sparing the other targets and the other passengers. There may, then, have been sophisticated planning involving networks of sleeper agents, but the entire gruesome attack also may have been the work of a very few agents. Does bin Laden have hundreds or thousands who want the chance to die, or does he have only a few dozen fanatics?
All of this having been said, the United States is carrying out the obvious response in destroying bin Laden and his protectors, preferably in some way which does not ignite a pan-Islamic war. U.S. policy-makers seem, appropriately, to have fastened on the opposition to the current Taliban government in Afghanistan as the most likely vehicle. The Taliban are perceived in Afghanistan as an occupation government, backed mainly by bin Laden's Arab fighters (bin Laden reportedly cannot speak any Afghan language). The same history often quoted to suggest the foolishness of a massive U.S. military push into Afghanistan can be read to suggest that the future of any such foreign invader government is bleak, particularly if its enemies can count on outside support—as the opponents of the Taliban now can. Probably the most valuable assistance the United States can supply is a combination of reconnaissance and heavy artillery in the form of air and missile strikes against tactical targets nominated by the forces fighting the Taliban. They, in turn, may be glad to help U.S. or other special forces gain access to bin Laden and his troops.
The attacks of 11 September have generally been interpreted as terrorism conducted by a non-national entity. However, to the extent that bin Laden and the Taliban seem to be virtually identical, it may be more reasonable to describe the attack as unconventional warfare by the de facto government of Afghanistan. In that case, the destruction of that government would seem to be an entirely legitimate response. After the United States and the Britain made their initial assault, a spokesman for bin Laden's organization claimed that the terrorism would never end. Given the extent of the initial attack on the United States, it is by no means clear that further attacks would have been precluded had the United States not acted. Given the elaborate preparations required for the 11 September assaults, one might conclude that the destruction of the states that sponsored these attacks would in fact end the problem. As evidence, the wave of terrorist assaults which swept Europe during the 1970s and 1980s essentially ended when the states which had sponsored them—the Soviet Union and its satellites—ceased to do so.
What navies offer, above all, is independent operation. U.S. warships are mobile pieces of U.S. territory, and they have the endurance to remain abroad for weeks or months at a time—without having to ask permission. Much of the U.S. effort over the past weeks has gone into building and maintaining a coalition. The coalition is essential if the challenge to bin Laden and his associates is to be mounted overland; there is no seaborne route to Afghanistan. However, reliance on other countries gives their governments a veto. We are seeing exactly that process at work both in Pakistan and in Saudi Arabia. In both places enough of the population has strong anti-Western attitudes that the government fears overthrow if it backs the United States too strongly. In both cases, too, the government relies on some of the antiAmerican groups for vital internal support. Forcing these countries to choose between the United States or bin Laden may be fatally counterproductive.
If, on the other hand, the United States can do part of the job without obvious assistance, then local governments face a much easier task. Since they lack any veto over our actions, they can help us at a much lower cost. That was the case, for example, during the Gulf War when the Saudis found that the U.S. Navy would provide a measure of defense against Iraqi attack whether or not they admitted U.S. troops into their kingdom.
The U.S. Navy already offers independent means of launching long-range missile strikes from the sea. Sailings of some U.S. carriers with reduced air wings suggest that there may also be an ability to insert special forces at long range, without moving them across any country's border. That might be extremely valuable in securing support from, for example, Pakistan. This is not to say that long-range operations from a carrier would be anything like as efficient as shorter-range ones from a nearby airport or air base, but rather that a U.S. ability to operate without permission gains support from potential coalition partners. If no such capability exists, then this crisis may be a good indication of how important it would be.
Press reports suggest that the Saudis are extremely unwilling to permit air operations from their country, for fear of exciting civil unrest. The U.S. Air Force recently completed a major air base in Saudi Arabia, and it is valuable as a means of coordinating air operations over very large areas. There has been speculation that even though attacks will not be mounted from the new base, it still will be used for coordination. Would it be too much to suggest that a seaborne command center would be preferable? What would the United States do if the Saudis were to demand that the new command center be vacated for the duration of an operation it could not wholeheartedly support?
At the time of this writing, there were reports that bin Laden was moving his operation to Somalia; presumably he is too aware that the Taliban may be on the point of collapse, and that whoever replaced them would kill him because his alien troops are the main prop of that regime. If the reports are true, they suggest that bin Laden is blissfully unaware that Somalia, unlike Afghanistan, is accessible to the world's foremost sea power, which would not really have to pull any punches in its attacks for fear of losing vital coalition assistance.