Recent events have thrust unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into the national security debate. At least some of the resistance to them lies in a lack of understanding as to how they "work," especially when judged against assumptions that are valid for manned aircraft. However, the critical factor is that UAV development draws from scarce resources—in the zero-sum world of defense dollars, an increase in money spent on unmanned aviation reduces funding in other programs. Platform discussions are increasing in frequency and volume, but not every participant understands the basics of UAVs, their capabilities and limitations, and the most pressing requirements that will have to be satisfied to continue UAV evolution.
The EP-3E incident last spring exposed one of the acknowledged risks of manned reconnaissance. Public outrage seemed to be as much a function of the relationships among China, the United States, and the littoral of Southeast Asia as it was genuine concern for personnel vulnerability in manned aircraft. An unmanned vehicle on the same flight profile could have been shot down by the Chinese—or intentionally ditched by controllers—without personal hazard and equipment compromise. While the incident alerted the U.S. public to risks aviators have accepted for decades, employment of UAVs came into focus because the armed forces have the collective ability to develop platforms that would eliminate some of those risks in the future—without compromising the freedom to operate in international airspace.
Another aspect of the debate has been congealing since the Lightning Bug UAV was used for reconnaissance in the Vietnam War-the tactical feasibility of unmanned aircraft. In 1986, then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman decided to acquire the RQ-2 Pioneer UAV from Israel. The Pioneer distinguished itself in Operation Desert Storm and underwent a ten-year period of continuous deployments on Navy amphibious ships. During Operation Unified Endeavor in 1999, the Air Force successfully used its RQ- Predator to perform reconnaissance at the tactical and operational levels. In short, UAVs have become players in joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and reconnaissance planning. They have earned a role in future battle experiments, most of which assume their availability in force plans.
The UAVs are aircraft, but their employment deviates significantly from that of manned aircraft. Obviously, no aviator can maintain situational awareness without seat-of-the-pants sensory input. This has been a battle cry of sorts for those opposed to spending money on UAVs; however, such differences are surmountable. Highlighted here are key components of UAV use that will create a common vocabulary among decision makers, operators, and mission planners.
"Unmanned" Is Not "Uncontrolled"
There are fundamental human-factors differences between operating UAVs and flying manned aircraft. Many of them can be resolved with available technology and applied research. For example, the altimeter in an aircraft cockpit gives the pilot a numerical value for his altitude; that information—corroborated by his visual and tactile sensory processes and the external inputs of controllers—is critical to physically maneuvering the aircraft and avoiding collisions. The altimeter was designed as complementary to other pilot information sources, not as a stand-alone data provider for aircraft altitude control. That design is rooted in the assumption that a pilot will be present and capable of filtering and processing input. Without other sensor inputs, is that same altimeter output sufficient for an aircraft operator to maintain control while seated a hundred miles away? Probably not.
The UAV pilot requires altimeter input and additional external input to compensate for his absence from the vehicle. This underscores one of the most frequently cited drawbacks to UAV integration-no one is present to control the airframe safely and precisely. If studied and incorporated into design as completely as they are in programs for manned aviation, human factors in UAV operation will lead to applications of existing technology that can make UAVs operable in concert with manned aircraft. Broadband satellite access, better topography and environmental sensing tools, improved processing, and—most important—training can overcome sensory deficiencies. Unmanned aviation barely has passed the Wright brothers level of sophistication. Techniques and training will improve with time and resources. Situational awareness for the UAV operator is achievable, but it must be sought. A design-related epiphany will not occur in UAV development without a great deal of directed effort.
An issue related to increasing UAV pilot situational awareness lies in operator experience. To comply with International Civil Aviation Organization and Federal Aviation Agency regulations, UAV operators must be aviation designated. Currently, UAV pilots come to the program following exposure and qualification in manned aircraft. Nevertheless, there is a requirement to think more broadly to compensate for physical absence from the aircraft. Knowledge of the "big picture" is essential to UAV operations. Once a pilot becomes trained to rely on, say, an altimeter as the only available altitude input, his or her problem-solving pattern will reflect that and may hamper the ability to accept nontraditional inputs. Thus, the aircrew selection and training process is another important—and costly—task.
Airspace
Airspace coordination is a daunting challenge in unmanned aviation. The UAVs are generally—and appropriately—shunted to sole-use airspace as a risk management technique. As technology improves, they increasingly will be allowed to share parts of the sky with manned aircraft. To that end, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics has convened a professional committee to study air traffic management issues, including UAV airspace control. Solutions to airspace allocation and traffic management will come from a synchronized effort between civil and military aviation. Again, the answers will come at a resource cost.
Payload
Tactical aviation sprang originally from an appreciation of the advantage to be gained from aerial reconnaissance. In the U.S. Civil War, balloons carried observers who got birds-eye views of enemy force dispositions and then gave commanders assistance in determining when and where to strike. Reconnaissance—imagery specifically—has been the dominant sensor payload driver of UAVs as the family has blossomed. Future payloads will be limited only by imagination and by the ability to configure sensors to smaller aircraft. The UAV can be used to collect and relay signals, imagery (optical, radar, and infrared), measure the atmosphere, collect levels of radiation and chemical and biological agents, and perform other tasks in areas where it is unsafe to send manned aircraft.
Exploitability of data is a pressing payload design consideration. To compress and transmit digital imagery, it must be digitized. Consistent with the intent to reduce payload size and weight, older video and wet film payloads will be much less viable in future designs. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance doctrine will evolve as UAVs bridge the gaps between national sensor products and the short-fuzed time requirements of tactical commanders.
Basing
Land-based UAVs can be designed for various battlefield and airfield constraints, but other forms may have to be suited to sea platforms. The Navy and Marine Corps Fire Scout, a vertical takeoff tactical UAV under development, is a rotary aircraft for small ships and amphibious expeditionary forces. It trades speed and range for launch and recovery flexibility. (Subsequent UAVs may need to be carrier compatible, but aircraft design concerns are not prohibitive once the projected environment and required capabilities are determined.) Payloads can be tailored to a variety of missions; however, if basing platform and speed and range concerns are not meshed early in the acquisition phase, the vehicle will become a mediocre compromise of a variety of interests and will not be flexible enough for operational use.
The sea basing of UAVs will drive aircraft design and affect manning. If deployed on board Zumwalt (DD-21)-class guided missile destroyers, the Fire Scout would have a reduced manpower footprint of eight. Until a control system is developed to allow push-button control from launch to recovery, this is not feasible. A UAV is just like a manned aircraft from the standpoint of maintenance. Each requires sufficient personnel to conduct unscheduled maintenance in compliance with instructions. No platform exists—certainly no rotary-wing vehicle—that can deploy with only eight maintenance personnel. While that limitation will be difficult to work around, it is a reality even with the newest and most sophisticated aircraft
Command and Control
Any tactical control system must be capable of controlling organic UAVs and those of other units, services, and allied nations,
There are four identified levels of control, ranging from takeoff to landing (and everything in between) to simply receiving down-linked remote data. There is a system capable of this span of control in development, but the acquisition community is still wrestling with its "brains." If no exploitable information is produced, UAVs are not useful. The control system is the means to acquire that information, and it needs to be designed properly with a great deal of room for expansion.
Fielded UAVs
In the tactical regime, both the Army Hunter and the Navy and Marine Corps Pioneer (to be followed by Fire Scout) deliver four to five hours of endurance, a 15,000-foot ceiling, and speeds at or below 100 nautical miles per hour.
The Air Force Predator can fly much longer, but at similarly slow speeds. (The Navy has two of these vehicles.) Its family is undergoing adhoc experimentation with payloads that include antitank munitions and laser designation systems.
The 800-pound gorilla of UAVs is the Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk. This is different from both Pioneer and Predator in mission planning, command and control, and flight regime. It is a high-altitude aircraft that can perform numerous reconnaissance tasks, but it is not suitable for the acquisition of close-in tactical information.
Conclusions
To win the war against terrorists or enemy nations, the services must think outside the box. In that regard, the UAV will be integral to future force plans. Understanding its unique capabilities—and limitations—is the first step in employing it to maximum advantage. In considering UAV employment, planners must think beyond platforms and payloads to command and control, basing, piloting, and airspace management—and the multitude of intelligence tasks that can be performed.
Commadner Johnson is the commanding officer of Fleet Composite Squadron Six at Naval Air Station Norfolk, Virginia.