It's a different world. We now talk about force protection for home ports and other places that seemed safe only a couple of months ago. In spite of that, the Navy remains a forward-deployed force, and our most challenging force protection problem remains single ships in foreign ports. Protecting them is a demanding task, but the basic principles are the same as for other kinds of naval warfare.
The mission of force protection is to deter, detect, and defend against threats and mitigate attacks. Deterrence is preferred—difficult targets are unattractive targets. Attempted attacks should be detected and countered early.
The force protection mission is tough everywhere, but the foreign port environment is even more so. Ports are busy places, and port facilities can block views and hide attackers. Every port is full of innocent bystanders. Response times are very short.
Clear rules of engagement therefore are essential. These cannot substitute for training and judgment, but if force-- protection personnel are junior or part-time, commanders may need more detailed rules of engagement. Detailed rules are less flexible in application, but that is the tradeoff for using less-experienced people in demanding jobs. Even experienced watchstanders may need a set of preplanned responses. Watchstanders need to be able to tell everybody apart, especially at night or in bad weather. Maintaining thorough, well-distributed situational awareness is a significant challenge.
A seaward element addresses waterborne attackers. Waterborne units may be active (boats) or passive (barriers). Boats must be sturdy, quick, and well armed. Passive measures should include a mix of visible and less-visible deterrents.
Boat numbers are driven by geometry, maintenance, and crew considerations—and by the common police principle that patrols in dangerous neighborhoods are best done in pairs. If boats cannot get around the coverage area quickly, more boats might be needed, or there will be unavoidable gaps. Boat planning also must leave down time for boat repair and crews to rest. Seaward assets ashore should watch as well as engage, because their view usually is better than those in boats. Active assets could include fixed and roving sentries. Passive measures could include waterline lighting or barrier wire.
Landward-facing elements could include active measures such as sentries and entry control points. Passive measures might include barriers and lighting. Many people might have business on the waterfront, including with the protected vessels, but force protection must not unduly hinder whatever brought the protected vessel into port in the first place.
A command-and-control element coordinates the others and ties them to the world. All command-and-control elements connect sensors and shooters. Unlike at sea, however, sensors and shooters may be junior individuals who have to decide in seconds what to do about suspicious contacts. Good training, judgment, and rules of engagement help them make good decisions. The command-and-control system's role is to give personnel enough information to apply their rules of engagement and ensures that their actions are known to those around them.
Most warships have these three elements already. They have boats—but ones not built or crewed for this. They usually post sentries—but they might not be trained or armed to stop, say, a truck bomb. They have command-and-control systems—but these are designed for operations at sea. Even if ships can improvise force protection capabilities, they may not be able to sustain them for long.
Three principles should govern Navy force protection improvements:
- Don't settle for "close enough." Sailors are skilled improvisers, but the only acceptable goal is the right equipment, training, and (when necessary) augmentation.
- Don't reinvent the wheel. Our allies might have something to teach us in this area. The Naval Reserve and Coast Guard have well-tested port security forces. Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team platoons have extensive experience in defending fixed positions such as piers and ships. Naval history can help, too. Operation Stable Door defended five South Vietnamese ports; in World War II, an extensive harbor defense system protected domestic and forward bases. The fixed coast artillery component of this is obsolete, but boat and barrier tactics may not be. These are worth a look.
- Don't forget why we're there. The purpose of port visits is not to display our force protection skills, but to bring warships to places where the United States wants to be. Force protection is a part of risk management, but it does not trump everything else automatically.
With care and planning force protection overseas can be balanced with the Navy's other obligations. The terrorists win, if they force the Navy to remain at sea or at home.
Commander Thomas commanded Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 210 from 1997 to 2000.