First Lieutenant H. J. "Hog Jaw" Smith, commander of Dog Company, 5th Marines, gazed down from a ridgeline overlooking the Inchon-Seoul Highway and surveyed the terrain. After assaulting Inchon Harbor the day before and advancing six miles inland, his company had halted 300 yards short of Ascom City for the evening. Unbeknownst to him, Dog Company and other elements of the Ist Marine Division would destroy a North Korean People's Army (NKPA) tank-- infantry column at dawn the next day.
Afterward, one Marine called it a "turkey shoot." Two hundred enemy infantry and six T-34 tanks were taken out. A single Marine was slightly wounded in the leg. The destruction wrought seemed a classic demonstration of massed firepower—and that it was. But the Marines did not merely outgun the enemy. They outsmarted and outmaneuvered him. A careful analysis of the action reveals that the Marines inflicted maximum damage on the enemy at minimal cost by applying the Marine Corps warfighting concepts of the main effort, commander's intent, risk versus gain, and combined arms=
Main Effort
. . . our primary bid for victory.
The road out of Ascom City snaked through a narrow pass, bending southwesterly toward Inchon. From his vantage point atop the ridgeline, Lieutenant Smith could see that the bend in the road was the perfect spot to block the highway and—if the opportunity presented itself—to ambush the enemy. He decided to focus the bulk of his combat power at the bend; where he expected the enemy and where the terrain best favored the defenders. He attached a machine gun section and a 2.36-inch rocket launcher (bazooka) team to his 2d Platoon and directed its commander, Second Lieutenant Lee R. Howard, to take up a blocking position at the outskirts of Ascom City. Lieutenant Smith thus designated the 2d Platoon as his main effort.
Commander's Intent
Understanding the intent of our commander allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander's desires.
The NKPA s primary source of strength was T-34 tanks. Its "center of gravity" consisted of concentrating tanks together with dismounted infantry. Lieutenant Smith knew that knocking out tank concentrations would cripple any attack. But how to accomplish that? He identified two enemy critical vulnerabilities that he could exploit to attack the enemy's center of gravity. He would use terrain by putting Lieutenant Howard and the 2d Platoon on the knoll at the entrance to Ascom City. And he told Lieutenant Howard to attack the T-34s from behind, where their armor plating was weakest. This was how the Dog Company commander conveyed his intent. In doing so, he left his subordinate commander room to "exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from the original plan when the unforeseen occurs."
Lieutenant Howard did not need to be reminded how to fight T-34 tanks; he had learned how to do it the hard way along the Naktong River earlier in the war. Nonetheless, he took his company commander's intent to heart and positioned his platoon on the reverse side of the knoll. He set a listening post 40 yards down the road toward Ascom City. Private First Class Doug Koch was at that listening post on the evening of 16 September. "It was just starting to get light [on 17 September]," recalled Koch. "I took a look down the road toward Ascom City; I could see the outlines of some Communist T-34s.... I watched six tanks and about 200 North Koreans go by—some riding, some walking.... Luckily for me, the guys in the platoon on the hill also let them pass without firing a shot. After they turned the curve south of us,
... the Marine tanks down the road, our recoilless rifles, and the entire battalion opened up."
Combined Arms
. . . the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another.
Confusion reigned during the violent clash that ensued after the enemy passed Koch's position. There was debate afterward over which Marine units had inflicted the greatest amount of damage. Of what actually happened in the heat of battle, this much is certain:
- Corporal Oley J. Douglas slid down from the 2d Platoon's position and fired his 2.36-inch bazooka from 75 yards away at the rear of the lead T-34 tank. He killed that tank and disabled another.
- Private First Class Walter C. Monegan Jr. (attached to Fox Company, 1st Marines) fired his 3.5-inch bazooka at a range of less than 50 yards. He scored a direct hit, then killed the only surviving crewman with his carbine as he attempted to escape through the hatch of the burning tank.
- Second Lieutenant Charles M. Jones's platoon of 75-mm recoilless rifles (AntiTank Company, 5th Marines) massed fires on the North Koreans at a range of 500 yards.
- First Lieutenant William D. Pomeroy's M-26 Pershings (1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion) fired 45 high velocity 90-mm shells at the North Koreans in five minutes at a range of 600 yards.
- Second Lieutenant James E. Harrell's 3.5-inch bazookamen (Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines) massed fires on the North Koreans from positions 500 yards away.
This was not just effective use of supporting arms—it was superb use of combined arms. The Marines coordinated the fires of every weapon at their disposal to shatter the enemy physically and psychologically. The North Korean force walked into a no-win situation as soon as it rounded the bend and passed the 2d Platoon's position. They could not turn back, for that would have exposed them to direct fire from Howard's platoon; they could not move forward, for that would have moved them closer to the Marines' recoilless rifles, Pershing tanks, and 3.5-inch bazookas; nor could they have maneuvered off the highway to avoid the Marines altogether.
Risk Versus Gain
Greater potential gain often requires greater risk. The practice of concentrating combat power toward the main effort necessitates the willingness to accept prudent risk elsewhere.
There was an element of risk in Lieutenant Smith's decision to establish a temporary defensive position in depth instead of a combat outpost. Smith broke off more than one-third of his combat power and positioned it 300 yards away from the rest of his company. Had the NKPA commander been able to deploy infantry on the ridgelines beyond Ascom City and establish a base of fire for his advancing tank-infantry column, he could have offset his disadvantage in terrain and turned the tables on Lieutenant Howard.
Even more risky was Lieutenant Howard's decision to defend from the reverse side of the knoll. He could have defended from either of two positions: the approach side, which offered a clear view down the highway into the city (and from which 2d Platoon could have engaged the enemy at greater range), or the reverse slope. His commander's intent—Hog Jaw Smith's bid to act decisively—moved Howard to opt for the reverse slope. From there, he could better support his company commander's intent and fully exploit the enemy's critical vulnerabilities: terrain and the vulnerable segment of armor plating at the back of T-34 tanks. He chose to defend from the backside of the knoll and allow the enemy to pass his position and advance within 300 yards of friendly lines. Lieutenant Howard consented to a greater degree of risk that yielded an exceptional gain.
Conclusions
Maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity.
There is danger in applying modern doctrine to past battles, because often it is easy to see whatever you want to see. Of course, we know that Lieutenants Smith and Howard did not carry copies of Warfighting in their packs. Yet they undoubtedly possessed the intangibles described in the epigraph above. Neither officer expected to see enemy tanks at dawn on 17 September, but both had prepared for the unexpected.
Lieutenant Smith estimated the situation, identified the enemy's center of gravity, and picked out the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. Lieutenant Howard, to his credit, took full advantage of the terrain and had the discipline and boldness to allow the tanks to pass before opening fire so he could inflict more damage.
Blessed by excellent leadership, the combat-hardened Marines outside Ascom City followed age-old maneuver warfare principles—regardless of doctrinal terminology at the time. Dog Company and its supporting units brought their combat power to bear at the point of their choosing and achieved decisive results.
Captain Kopets is a combat engineer. He recently completed an assignment with the 6th Engineer Support Battalion and is now attending Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia.