"Publisher's Page"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 2, October 2001 Proceedings)
Stephane C. Audrand—As a foreign member of the U.S. Naval Institute, I would like to send a message from over the ocean to my fellow American members. It is difficult to express with words what I felt after the cowardly sneak attack of 11 September. The United States was hit on its soil, its people slaughtered, its concrete and abstract symbols stabbed. Moreover, my fears soon were confirmed as I learned that several members of the Naval Institute were among the dreadful number of victims.
My first thoughts are for the families of those who died. I offer them my deepest sympathy and simple faithfulness. Dan Shanower, Gerald F. DeConto, Patrick Dunn, Joseph J. Pycior, and Robert A. Shlegel shall not be forgotten. And though
I never met any of those men, I know that we had a lot in common as members of the Institute. I know that these men did not die in vain: their deaths are both tragedies and a warning that must be heard not only by the United Sates but by all the democracies.
To my fellow members, to those who will wage the current war, and to the American people at large, I wish courage, steadfastness, and fortitude. As a simple citizen of democratic France and as a friend of the United States, I also was attacked on that day, although not physically. The values in which I believe—democracy, freedom, and justice—were tainted by the blood of the innocents who perished.
President George Bush was right: we are at war, and the democracies are in danger. Although some in Europe perhaps will be against that fact, I know that the time has come for our countries to unite against this peril. In unity lies strength.
It is not a question of whether or not the foreign policy of one country or another is good or not. The terrorists attacked the United States because it exists. They would attack any democracy for that reason. No matter how we may behave, our mere existence is the true reason for the attacks. This is a new form of totalitarianism, waving the flag of chaos, intolerance, and hatred against liberty.
I have full confidence that the American people will not fail or flag, and I know that the United States will remain a powerful beacon in the coming storm. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: the motto of France is a set of common values that we share with the United States. As an individual, I will remain steadfast to those values. As a member of the Naval Institute, I will remain loyal to my fellow members and their families. And as a friend of America, I will remain true to its people. On 11 September, we were all Americans.
September 11
Dr. Craig Michael Uhl—The enemy is no longer over there somewhere, but here among us, and I believe that our citizens must be armed with the greatest possible doses about acts of terrorism, whether hey be chemical, biological, or nuclear. I contend that we must have detection devices that would be worn on our persons to afford our citizens and military members knowledge that we have been exposed to such agents so that prompt medical treatment can be provided upon entry into the emergency medical system.
Vaccines such as a new anthrax vaccine must be created using recombinant technology, which will pass stringent FDA standards, unlike the present 1960s-era technology. The current vaccine has continued to fail FDA standards because of a number of contaminants and inadequate manufacturing guidelines. The current vaccine at Bioport remains unsafe for our military and is not approved for civilian use.
We remain the greatest country in the world, and we must be prepared, not afraid. We need to be armed with the best technology and treatment modalities, not those of decades past. It is truly a time for pursuit of scientific discovery, not a retreat to old technologies to find a quick fix. I have no doubt that we are up to the task.
Commander Robert W. Selle, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—While eminently correct and laudable, the sight of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and her nine-ship carrier battle group—comprising 14,000 personnel—departing Norfolk for the Middle East and events unknown gives rise to new tactical and strategic considerations. Our President speaks of a long, protracted struggle, a war of will and mind in which we will meet violence with patient justice. The emphasis is to be on the longer term.
What better time to reactivate immediately the battleships Iowa (BB-61) and Wisconsin (BB-64) now that they have been returned to the Naval Vessel Register and are once again mobilization assets? The need for naval gunfire support continues and, despite many exceedingly costly failed attempts, nothing comes close to the stated requirements of the Marine Corps or the Navy. Only the battleship's 16-inch guns provide the all-weather, every-day support to neutralize and soften enemy shores and to deny enemy corridors of advance and reinforcement. To this capability must be added the state-of-the-art advances in shooting smaller caliber ammunition (11 -- and 13-inch rounds) from the 16-inch chambers. To date, extended ranges of 75 to 100 miles have been attained.
The Iowa and the Wisconsin can be brought back in less than one year if we are determined to do so. They are a gift to us from a previous generation and we can use them in this era of war on terrorism and unsettled peace.
"UAVs Hold Promise for No-Fly Zone Enforcement"
(See K. Miller, pp. 38-41, September 2001 Proceedings)
Major Eric T. Chase, U.S. Marine Corps—This article provides a provocative look at the potential use of future unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but additional clarification and context on the subject of UAVs are required. The context in which Commander Miller discussed "future" UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) leads the reader to believe these systems will be the next generation of UAVs. In his conclusion, the author states that "if we procure the next generation of UAVs and UCAVs in sufficient number to allow for 24-hour coverage of areas of interest, commanders could patrol the no-fly zones more effectively, increase their intelligence collection capability, and remove dozens of manned fighters from this dangerous and politically unpopular patrol." This is far from the case.
Commander Miller states that "the past ten years have brought significant advances in UAV capabilities, and what is on the drawing board for introduction in the future is impressive." The author goes on to describe several different "future" UAVs, citing Pat Yates' brief to the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (SSG) XVIII as the source of his information. For clarification, Mr. Yates was on the SSG group roster for both the 1999 SSG report "Sea Strike: Attacking Targets from the Sea" and its 2000 successor, "Naval Power Forward." These SSG studies generated not only revolutionary naval warfare concepts for the year 2030 and beyond, but also provided critical paths necessary for achievement of these concepts.
Following these descriptions, Commander Miller then proceeds to theorize how future UAVs could change the way we conduct operations today. It is at this point that the author confuses science fiction with reality. As outlined in the SSG reports, UAVs such as those described most likely are three generations from current technology. Acquired as an interim system solution in the mid-80s, Pioneer is still the Navy's only operational UAV. While current state-of-the-art UAVs such as Global Hawk and Helios have achieved remarkable milestones for unmanned aviation, neither of these systems possesses all the technologies required to fulfill the SSG's UAV vision.
The next generation of Navy UAVs will be surveillance platforms/systems with the technologies that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research are demonstrating in the UCAV-N Advanced Technology Program. The second generation of Navy UAVs will be the unmanned strike assets that replace the F/A-18E/F. The generation that Commander Miller speaks of will be the generation that the Secretary of the Navy Gordon England indirectly referred to when he stated that the Joint Strike Fighter would be the last manned combat aircraft that the Navy buys.
"Homeland Security Is a Coast Guard Mission"
(See S. Flynn, pp. 72-75, October 2001 Proceedings)
Commander Michael R. Adams, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—If Commander Flynn's piece represents current Coast Guard thinking on terrorist attacks within the United States, the service is overlooking a more realistic threat.
The hypothetical delivery of a biological or chemical weapon by a container that arrives from sea and subsequently is detonated in Chicago tells a tale of sophisticated weapons, complex transport, and remote activation. That sort of technothriller thinking ignores reality. Timothy McVeigh rented a truck and filled it with stuff from a hardware store. The hijackers of 11 September bought tickets and two-dollar knives. The USS Cole (DDG67) nearly was destroyed by a couple of guys in a small boat.
It does not take a criminally creative mind to envision a number of ways in which low-tech actions from recreational vessels could seriously impede or even cripple major U.S. ports. While the Coast Guard has implemented some restrictions on commercial waterborne traffic since 11 September, it has imposed almost none on recreational vessels.
Perhaps the Coast Guard believes, as one senior active-duty officer told me, that controlling recreational boats is a problem "too big to get your hands around." Putting any problem into this category means it will never get solved. Since 11 September, the Federal Aviation Administration has imposed increased restrictions on general aviation without eliminating private air transportation. Perhaps it is time for the Coast Guard to take a cue from its Department of Transportation brethren.
"Making Room for Risk"
(See J. Starvridis, p. 32 September 2001; T. Pierce, p. 31, October 2001 Proceedings)
R. A. LeFande, Director, Centre For Defense Reinvention—Rear Admiral Stavridis's taste for disruptive technologies is encouraging, but his examples and prescriptions suggest that he should be directing his pleas for openness and reform toward his colleagues on the Chief of Naval Operations staff and the risk-averse acquisition folks. The Office of Naval Research's funding of Nobel laureates before they were made famous may have more to do with the breadth of their net than their preferences for disruption. Similarly, the examples from the private sector benefit from hindsight and an equal or greater number of losers or misestimates of the market potential could be cited, starting with the irrational enthusiasm of the Internet bubble. The biggest gap associated with potentially disruptive technologies is between the speed and agility with which potential adversaries can adapt the latest commercial-off-the-- shelf (COTS) components and concepts for use against us and the increasingly viscous budget/acquisition process.
The electric ship was old news by the time of World War I and it was COTS by the time of World War II. The gap between survivable wireless communication capacity and our minimum warfighting requirement is wider now than it was in Marconi's day; the vision of autonomous vehicles, sensors, or fighters was the stuff of pulp fiction between the wars and today they're becoming irrelevant faster than they can become reality. The 11 September wake-up call that occurred halfway through this writing showed how easy it is to be disruptive without developing any technology. The evil-doers hid in plain sight for years until it was time to act while we dreamt of space-umbrellas, information dominance, and other short cuts to security without human cost or inconvenience.
Disruptive technology is neither a means nor an end in itself, and efforts to work around the clumsy requirements, budget, and acquisition process will not add to our security until we learn to envision how our weaknesses could be exploited, and to prepare against all possible threats, no matter how apparently improbable.
The lessons of business—and current events—are that innovations are more likely to be exploited by the agile follower, and that peace-time cost-effectiveness is a poor guide to security.
Rather than seeking to add more shortcuts which will add to the background clutter without refocusing resources or increasing agility, we should strike at the risk-averse acquisition process and demand that the folks with their hands on the checkbook admit discussion of extreme possibilities and invest in the necessary preparations.
"It's Not Your Father's Hornet"
(See P. Finneran, J. Lockard, pp. 80-83, October 2001 Proceedings)
"Jointness Is Killing Naval Innovation"
(See T. Pierce, p. 68, October 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Tom Ehrhard, U.S. Air Force—It is terribly ironic that this article on the Hornet appears in the same issue as an article in which the author decries the Navy's inability to develop disruptive technologies. The Super Hornet could have been Exhibit #1—it represents last generation technology (e.g., the airframe is vintage 1970s and the active electronically scanned radar cannot be integrated into the first four years' worth of Super Hornets) and is the very embodiment of a system that sustains the status quo even as it threatens to plunge naval aviation into strategic irrelevance.
Although disruptive aviation technologies have entered our armed services in the form of stealth and UAVs, those innovations seem to be a bridge too far for a Navy hampered by the "first among equals" status of the naval aviation community. Whereas its dominant status within the naval heirarchy has stimulated some innovation among subservient Navy subgroups, the Super Hornet stands as a monument to naval aviation's incrementalism and of its creeping obsolescence borne of complacency. Even as anti-access threats grow, the naval aviation community persists in achieving ever smaller marginal gains for ever more money, none of which addresses the increasing vulnerability of the carrier or the requirement to operate inland in the face of tomorrow's lethal air defense environments. To make matters worse, naval aviation plans to turn the Super Hornet into a $65 million dollar tanker, or a jammer that will barely affect today's most modern digital signal-processing air-defense radars. The Navy is left with a fighter that can only conduct carrier defense against at-sea aircraft threats that don't exist—reminiscent of Captain Pierce's characterization of the Maginot Line. The Boeing authors conclude with great hyperbole, "The Super Hornet will be the cornerstone of the Navy's carrier aviation in the 21st century." Rather than adding strategic or operational value in line with its expense, Super Hornet will become the solid foundation upon which future "failure to innovate" studies will be built.
In his article, Captain Pierce fails to convince that jointness is killing naval innovation. Rather than confront the primary internal obstruction to naval innovation—the long dominance and complacency of naval aviation—he instead looks outside the naval services to public law—in this case, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The most glaring omission in his argument is the failure to establish a linkage between naval officers serving in joint billets and their lack of influence on their own services. Exactly how does that happen? While the individuals he mentions as being innovative surely were, was the supporting cast so weak that their absence caused lapses? Specifically, which of the Marine Commandants or Chiefs of Naval Operations since 1986 would the author pinpoint as being "second best" to the joint officers in the senior ranks?
Furthermore, he mentions the Navy's Strategic Studies Group (SSG) as being a source of disruptive innovation. None of their products challenged the Navy's World War II-era carrier battle group centrism. Instead, the SSGs dutifully promoted non-disruptive and entirely "sustaining" ideas that allowed the Navy to justify its current force structure even though the environment had changed. The author also fails to make the connection between jointness and the Navy's failure to innovate, mischaracterizing Owen Cote's brilliant and ground-breaking dissertation as somehow blaming jointness when in fact he pointed directly at interservice log-rolling borne of the perceived need to minimize civilian intervention. Finally, if we are to believe the overweening power of jointness to restrict naval innovation, just how does the author believe his business-oriented prescriptions might overcome that apparently monumental, civilian-induced brake on the Navy and Marine Corps? In the final analysis, it all comes off as highly xenophobic—and troubling. One of the most pernicious diseases afflicting an institution stuck in the past is the talent for blaming outside forces when in fact the blame lies within. As warfare becomes demonstrably more joint in nature and new threats loom on the horizon, the Navy would do well to reject the instinct to blame outsiders for its increasing anachronisms and get down to the business of challenging the internal sources of resistance to change.
Commander James J. Tritten, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Pierce has authored an extremely thought-provoking article that deserves our full consideration and careful analysis. His article also contains the seeds of an alternative solution to the ills and evils of jointness.
Captain Pierce claims that there has been "an increase in the number of bright officers serving out of the Navy and on the Joint Staff." We could and probably should assume that these bright officers have been educated by the Navy or are otherwise experienced to represent the Navy to the joint "monster" in the creation of various joint concepts for the future and doctrine for the here and now. If joint concepts and doctrine are faulty, then should we assume that these bright Navy officers were outmaneuvered and unable to steer the joint steamroller toward smashing out-of-date concepts such as methodical warfare and advocating disruptive innovative concepts?
To ensure that the joint "tyrant" does not get it wrong. we need our bright Navy officers placed in positions where they can influence the development of joint concepts and doctrine. We also need these bright officers to be able to articulate how navies operate today. Captain Pierce documents examples of fine Navy officers who know how to articulate how we could operate in a future of their choice, but he does not document the other side of the doctrinal coin, the necessity to write current doctrine.
Doctrine development has two fundamental roles. First, we need to know how we intend to operate today. One does not need to be disruptive or innovative in this effort, unless one thinks it is disruptive or innovative actually to write how we intend to operate today. All one needs to do for this first role is to be accurate—doctrine documents how we intend to operate today, not how someone thinks we ought to operate tomorrow. The U.S. Navy has a solid history of writing such doctrine in 1920s- 1940s, making changes to that written doctrine even as we won World War II.
The other role is akin to that of the Monty Python "Ministry of Silly Walks" where anyone can apply for a grant to develop an alternative way of walking. Good doctrine for the here and now establish credibility for developing concepts for the future. When developing a new concept. we can start in at least two places. Captain Pierce argues that since the joint "fiend" is apparently incapable of delivering other than obsolete doctrine. then the Navy itself must take on the job of producing disruptive innovation.
Disruptive innovation really needs to involve only a few good thinkers and a few good listeners who are empowered to protect mavericks, sort out the good from the bad, and take action We do not need a fleet full of disruptive innovators, On the other hand, we do need a fleet that is filled with professionals who know their doctrine and know when to depart from doctrine.
Is there not at least one alternative possible—bright Navy officers (who know their doctrine) serving (in joint staff will make positive contributions to the joint "brute" by producing disruptive innovation in conjunction with bright officers from other services (who also know their doctrine)? And does not that alternative exist in the form of U.S. Joint Forces Command? Moreover. isn't that the process that we are supposed to follow in the creation of concepts?
Captain Pierce seems to imply that unless the Navy comes up with the innovation, it is not likely to be the right one. Is it possible that the joint "beast," under the proper circumstances, will be able to go beyond what a single service can develop? Is that not the basis of teamwork in the Navy where all the warfare communities work together to develop Navy-wide concepts and doctrine? In a world where all campaigns and operations are inherently joint, why is it not proper to expect the joint "reprobate" to develop joint futures? Is that not an acceptable alternative to having each service develop their own version of a joint future—or is Captain Pierce serious when he says that the effects of jointness can be mitigated?
Jointness is here to stay. We have joint warfare fully developed at the national, theater commander-in-chief and joint force commander levels The Navy has excellent written tactics, techniques, and procedures. We just need to develop the linkages between these two solid bookends. The Navy shortly will begin to develop joint doctrine for the joint force maritime component commander. By documenting how we already operate today at this operational level, we can then move on to more advanced, and perhaps even disruptive innovations for tomorrow.
The Navy alone cannot meet all of the national security challenges of the nation. Operating as a member of the joint team, it must make its contributions. The nation, the joint force commanders, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of the other uniformed services are counting on those contributions. If the Navy fails to meet these challenges, then the service has failed the nation.
"Sea Lance Ensures Access to the Littorals"
(See R. Harvey, p, 96, October 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Frank Mulcahy, U.S. Navy—The Sea Lance concept clearly has promise in littoral warfare, not only in terms of draft and size, but in enhanced flexibility with the towable grid deployment module (GDM). The option of speed versus firepower is valuable, especially given the uncertain situations that these ships may encounter.
Leaving the GDM without propulsion may be a mistake. Balancing cost with capability always is a concern, but consider the options that a self-propelled unit would provide a commander. Today's technology enables the module to be operated remotely, so once in an area, the Sea Lance can detach the GDM and operate with speed while maintaining control of the GDM's firepower and location. If a parent Sea Lance is destroyed, another Sea Lance can tow its own GDM while controlling another.
A remotely operated GDM may be deployed within range of shore-based antiship missile sites while the parent Sea Lance remains safely out of range. In decoy mode, one or two GDMs may be headed in one direction as a probe or diversion (they share the same hull as the Sea Lance) while the main squadron sets a trap. Finally, a self-propelled unit would save valuable time after an action if it could be closing a parent Sea Lance during recovery.
The GDM doesn't have to be fast to do all this, either. A powerplant of two small diesels (or a single diesel with electric drive) that achieves 12-15 knots would provide decent mobility and keep down both weight and cost. If we can provide a commander with a multitude of tactical options at minimal cost, why not do it?
David Byrd—I am not a naval architect or sea combat expert by any means and I am sure the authors have thought out the concept to a great degree. However, there are a few points raised by the article that could use clarification.
The authors state "Sea Lances are survivable and can avoid hits by missiles, torpedoes, and mines." However, I see no support for the statement or inherent characteristics of the design that make them difficult to target or destroy through those means, save possibly stealth characteristics providing resistant to missile radars. All things being equal, the survivability of a small combatant is going to be much lower than a larger one once it gets hit by a given weapon. Mine avoidance is a good concept, but because the purpose of this ship is to enter the littorals and drop its cargo, how long can it really hang around dodging mines while trying to complete its mission?
Another impracticality seems to be crew size, however fashionable of late it may be to lightly crew naval combat vessels. The authors state that the Sea Lance will have detection capability to the horizon or beyond for missiles, aircraft, and surface combatants. I believe it would take at least three crewmembers to operate the electromagnetic and acoustic detection systems and the relevant weapons systems. Assuming 24/7 operations, that is at least six people or at least half the crew. An engineering/propulsion watch of two and a bridge watch of two on two shifts total another eight. That is a crew of 14 and there is no commanding officer, towline, or mission specialist, or anyone else. Unless the Sea Lance is a day cruiser, the 13-person crew size does not seem reasonable if it is to fully use its design capabilities.
"Coast Guard Has Outgrown Transportation"
(See B. Stubbs, p. 6, October 2001 Proceedings)
Paul L. Dragone—My thanks for this fine commentary on why the Coast Guard no longer is a fit in the Department of Transportation. The fact is the Coast Guard should never have been stuck there in the first place. Most of us Treasury Department Coast Guard veterans were shocked and insulted by the transfer to Transportation. Being a part of Treasury provided us a measure of respectability and authority, something Transportation could never provide. At last year's local Armed Forces Day lunch, I had the opportunity to ask some active-duty Coast Guard personnel, officer and enlisted, why they were part of Transportation and how they felt about it. Not one person could come up with a good reason or a positive feeling. And this is after 33 years as part of Transportation.
With the myriad of duties assigned to the Coast Guard, we seem to have forgotten that above all it is a military organization and should be treated as such. Locating it in the National Homeland Security Agency is certainly better than being cast adrift in Transportation. If the Homeland Security Agency cannot provide the military environment that the Coast Guard needs and deserves, then that agency will continue to shortchange our nation's first military seagoing service.
"Book Review: John Adams"
(See J. Hattendorf, pp. 82-84, September 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Bruce A. Gustin III, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was startled to read that the leadership of John Adams resulted in the purchase and arming of the first ships for the Continental Navy on 20 October 1775 and that this date is celebrated as the Navy's birthday. The local newspaper notes that the Navy's birthday will be celebrated on 27 October, while an advertisement on page 15 of the September Proceedings refers to 13 October 1775 as the "Navy's founding date."
Permit me to add a brief historical note to this confusion. The U.S. Navy came into existence shortly after the Declaration of Independence. It was on 13 October 1775 that the Continental Congress, after much persuasion by John Adams, finally authorized the purchase of two national cruisers to intercept shipping involved in supplying the British Army. These ships were badly built and fitted, insufficiently manned, and poorly equipped—but they were the beginning of our armed maritime force. The Navy's birthday has been celebrated on 13 October ever since it was officially declared as such by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in 1972.
So what are we celebrating on 27 October? Shortly after World War I, the Navy League of the United States sponsored the designation of 27 October as Navy Day for an annual recognition of the naval service. 27 October also is the birth date of President Theodore Roosevelt, who served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the closing years of the 19th century and did much to prepare our Navy for the Spanish-American War.