As U.S. defense policy shifts focus to the Asia Pacific region, the armed services need new strategic arrangements. Integrated deployments with close allies could lead the way.
Built on the foundation of common security interests and objectives, deployment integration is a multilateral framework through which the United States and its closest allies are better able to achieve political goals with limited resources. It is a framework that allows groups of nations to assume shared responsibility for security objectives in an area of common strategic interest by joining allied military units in a forward-deployed arrangement of limited duration.
At the strategic level, the mature concept is envisaged as a multilateral security arrangement that transcends the traditional definition of collective defense and security. At the operational and tactical level, deployment integration is a forward-deployed arrangement that fully integrates—from command and control to operational employment—a subordinate allied component into the organizational structure of a larger allied command for limited periods.
The conceptual model used to illustrate deployment integration is U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fighter attack aviation, framed in the context of a standing U.S. commitment to maintain the forward-deployed presence of three operational USMC F/A-18 squadrons (36 aircraft) in Japan.
The Strategic Setting
Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld signaled his intention to pursue major changes in U.S. strategic thinking including a reorientation of defense policy that has been geared toward keeping the peace in Europe and deterring the Soviet Union. With China becoming more powerful and Russia less so, the Asia Pacific region now is the most likely theater of major U.S. military operations. Chief among U.S. security concerns are China's intentions as a 21st-century military and economic power. Other Asia Pacific flash points include the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, where historical distrust and territorial disputes linger. Separatist movements across the Indonesian archipelago also undermine stability in the region and pose a threat to the vital flow of world commerce through strategic choke points. These crises also are of concern to Australia, where growing economic links and an increased stake in Asian security issues are more fully realized.
In December 2000, the Australian government released a defense white paper abandoning the "fortress Australia" mentality in recognition of the need to become a partner in the broader span of Asia Pacific regional affairs. In reassessing its defense role, the government made formal its determination to take a more active security role in the Asia Pacific region. Validating a shift in policy that Australia initially laid out in the 1997 strategic review, the new defense posture makes it a priority for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to support the nation's "wider interests and objectives by being able to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond the immediate neighborhood." Herein lies the genesis of USMC-RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration—an idea that grows out of the mutual benefit derived from increased defense cooperation and improved allied interoperability.
Security Pluralism
The conceptual model of USMC-RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration may have fundamental appeal from U.S. and Australian military perspectives, but how does it stack up against the political realities of the Asia Pacific region?
At the strategic level, deployment integration parallels 21st-century security pluralism. By exploiting this parallel relationship, political obstacles could be transformed to practical opportunities. Defined in the 1998 U.S. Department of Defense East Asia Strategy Report, security pluralism refers to an array of cooperative and complementary frameworks in which nations seek to address their security concerns through the establishment of bilateral and multilateral relationships and dialogue. Accordingly, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCinCPac), is committed to developing a more effective security structure in the Asia Pacific region—one that is grounded in a network of overlapping and interlocking security relationships. This collective approach has at its root the ability for nonbilateral treaty partners to work together. According to Admiral Blair, the key is to leverage bilateral relationships (e.g., United States-Japan/United States-Australia) into multilateral relationships (e.g., United States-Australia-Japan).
In the span of one year, events in the Asia Pacific region effected a change in attitudes that ten years of diplomacy could not. In the early 1990s, the United States tried to encourage a shift from bilateral to multilateral military exercises, but this was met with Asian resistance. Then came the crisis in East Timor, which Admiral Blair contends made countries in the region increasingly receptive to multilateral military exercises. The policy brakes that prevented a more collective security approach came off after the situation in East Timor provided military officers in the region rationale to better argue the case with their ministers. Today, USCinCPac is on track to achieve a major milestone that effects a more collective, integrated approach to security in the Asia Pacific region. This will be accomplished through a new generation of regional exercises called Team Challenge, which started this year.5
The USMC-RAAF model of deployment integration offers a viable mechanism by which the larger concept of security pluralism can be advanced. The subtle shift from a balance of power mind-set to security pluralism—from an attitude of confrontation to an attitude of cooperation—already is-under way. As the notion of security pluralism gains momentum in the region, the political constraints associated with deployment integration should diminish proportionately.
The Japan Factor
Notwithstanding the common security linkage to the United States, Australia and Japan are natural trans-Pacific friends and, thereby, feasible partners in supporting the advancement of deployment integration. With closely aligned foreign and trade policies, each country welcomes a more active role for the other in the region. Indeed, the 1997 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper states that Japan is likely to become a more important defense partner of Australia as it works, within the framework of the U.S. alliance, to assume greater responsibility for its own security and to develop closer defense links within the region. It is in this context that deployment integration is presented as a United States-Australia-Japan security grouping; however, there are political constraints.
Boiled down, the complexities associated with hosting USMC-RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration in Japan center on Asia's historical distrust of Japan and the Japanese Constitution. The memory of Japanese aggression in the first half of the 20th century was the basis for the Article 9 clause in Japan's Constitution renouncing the right to collective self-defense (except under strict constraints of the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty). The impact, in terms of deployment integration, is that foreign military aircraft are not permitted on Japanese soil. It also means that foreign exchange personnel do not qualify as members of the U.S. force when deployed to Japan. Because the United States has no power to grant status of forces agreement (SOFA) status and thus authorize entry to Japan, the critical first step in progressing toward deployment integration is to reach some agreement by which RAAF exchange personnel are granted special status akin to SOFA.
Since 1992 there has been an incremental dilution of Article 9. Tokyo accelerated its move away from unilateral pacifism after North Korea's launch of a ballistic missile into Japanese air space during August 1998. The dramatic security policy changes that have occurred since then set a precedent that offers promise for future deployment of foreign exchange personnel to Japan. Notwithstanding short-term resolution of this issue, "legal" changes to Tokyo's security policy may be imminent. On 21 January 2000, the Japanese Parliament announced that it was set to begin a formal review of its Constitution. Another major development was the election of Junichiro Koizumi to prime minister, particularly because Mr. Koizumi campaigned on a platform that included calls for revisions to Article 9.
Policymakers should note one more development that occurred during July 1998, when six RAAF F/A-18s remained overnight at Yakota Air Base, Japan, en route to Alaska for Exercise Cope Thunder. This was the first time that Australian fighter aircraft had landed in Japan since the Korean War, and the fact that it happened without incident or any negative publicity is significant. This provides policymakers in the United States, Australia, and Japan a point of departure for discussing a cooperative arrangement that allows the RAAF to conduct limited F/A-18 flight activity from U.S. air bases in Japan.
China Politics
While some political constraints to USMC-RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration would center on the states that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their distrust of Japan, policymakers are likely to be most sensitive to the perceptions of Chinese officials. Washington and Canberra are acutely aware that as China's economy and military stature grow so will its impact on the security and politics of the region and the world.
That said, no matter how deployment integration is packaged, it is certain to provoke China's real or feigned concerns about containment. At work would be the fear that the United States is trying to contain China through military alliances. The Chinese reaction would be similar to that in 1996, when strengthened U.S. ties with Japan and Australia were seen as a threat to the People's Republic of China. The state-run media in Beijing described the joint security declarations as the United States "using these two anchors [Japan and Australia] as the claws of a crab in a strategic pincer movement aimed at China from the north and the south."
Contrary to Beijing's perceptions, the United States and Australia have rejected the old balance-of-power mentality and actively support China taking its rightful place as a world power (e.g., ascension to the World Trade Organization). Even so, Beijing continues to send conflicting signals as to what its intentions may be in places such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. At the present time, however, alarm over Chinese intentions is mitigated by the dictum in national security circles that intent does not necessarily equate to threat unless it is backed by military capability. Following this line of reasoning, if Washington and Canberra have the benefit of knowing their own intent, and if that intent is to take the lead in building multilateral security structures that are in the collective interest, then U.S. and Australian officials ought to recognize the greater good and act accordingly.
If there were any risk in pursuing deployment integration, it would be in missing the opportunity to proceed now. If Beijing's intentions in the region are benign, it will denounce any United States-Australia-Japan security group publicly, perhaps concede privately that a multilateral security structure guards against the remilitarization of Japan and U.S. unilateralism, and continue to develop its military capability. If Beijing's intentions are less than benign, it will denounce any United States-Australia-Japan security group publicly and continue to develop its military capability. On the other hand, if the United States and Australia take no action in pursuing this initiative, Beijing will denounce nothing and still continue to build its military capability.
The common denominator in each scenario is that China always will do what it considers to be in its own best interest. Meanwhile, Washington and Canberra will have done nothing to mitigate risk.
Whether China's long-range intent is benign or otherwise, its military and economic influence will grow in the region. As Chinese influence grows, so will its menu of countermeasures to perceived threats. In 15 years, Beijing's countermeasures will carry considerably more weight and could be more threatening than the mere rhetoric it puts out today.
Financial Considerations
Political sensitivities dictate that progress toward a USMC-RAAF F/A-18 integrated arrangement be pursued in an open and deliberate fashion. Fundamental to success is an incremental confidence-building process, executed through a crawl-walk-run approach. Presupposing this type of implementation strategy, the financial aspect of USMC-RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is discussed in terms of what will be required during each phase.
It is noteworthy that the most costly investment toward deployment integration already has occurred. In 1998, the Australian government approved funding for the Hornet upgrade (HUG) program. HUG is synonymous with Engineering Change Proposal 583 (ECP-583), which bridges the modernization gap to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for Marine FIA-18 "A" model aircraft. HUG will ensure that Australian F/A-18As are relevant and capable in the full range of operations through the remaining life of the weapon system.
Crawl:1-3 Years
To advance deployment integration, a letter of agreement or something akin to a SOFA that allows RAAF exchange personnel to forward deploy with Marine F/A-18 squadrons is required. Whether organized under the auspices of the existing Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation or some type of U.N. SOFA arrangement, it should be a U.S.-sponsored/Australian-supported diplomatic initiative with Japan. The forum for any U.S.-Australian discussion related to the SOFA exists in the Australia-United States Ministerial (AUSMin) talks that occur each year.
By granting SOFA to RAAF exchange personnel and thus qualifying them as members of the Marine F/A-18 units that deploy to Japan, the government of Japan would be taking a logical and benign step toward normalizing its security policy. The experience that RAAF pilots gain from operating with forward-deployed Marine units would be a vital building block to any future integration of Australian tactical aircraft into the Pacific theater of operation.
Walk: 4-8 Years
The central objective in baby-stepping toward an integrated deployment is the establishment of a functional USMC-RAAF F/A-18 unit exchange program. However, before that can happen, Australian F/A-18s must establish a level of flight activity from U.S. air bases in Japan. Because Australia is a U.N. command member country, this could occur under the auspices of U.N. command-- sanctioned activity. Yakota Air Base and Kadena Air Base are possible locations for such activity because Australian C-130, P-3, and KB-707 aircraft already conduct U.N. command-related familiarization training from these bases. The introduction of limited F/A-18 flight activity could coincide with RAAF F/A-18 transits to and from Alaska, where the Cope Thunder exercise series occurs annually.
After Australian F/A-18s have established a suitable level of flight activity from bases in Japan, further confidence-building measures could be introduced. The USMC's unilateral Southern Frontier exercise at RAAF Base Tindal could be leveraged into a reciprocal unit exchange between elements of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) at Iwakuni and elements of the RAAF's Tactical Fighter Group. Southern Frontier is an annual exercise during which each of the three squadrons at Iwakuni rotate through RAAF Base Tindal for three to four weeks of low-altitude training. The F/A-18 exchange could develop annually, from a two- to four-week arrangement to a more robust exchange that spans the entire three-month period of MAG-12's air-to-ground training in Northern Australia. The USMC-RAAF F/A-18 exchange could be modeled after Gold Eagle-a functioning infantry company unit exchange that is hosted annually in Hawaii by the 3d Marines and in Queensland by the Australian Army's 3rd Brigade.
Run: 9 Years
Sometime after the establishment of a functional and mature unit exchange, transition from the walk to the run phase may occur. If circumstances dictate that the USMC-- RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment must be activated, then U.S. responsibility-sharing policy may be applied. Articulated in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, this policy states that the cornerstone of effective alliance relationships is the fair and equitable sharing of mutual security responsibilities, and the proper balancing of costs and benefits. The 1998 legislation acknowledged that each country's contribution to security is a mix of political, military, and economic elements. It is this type of quid pro quo logic that underlies the financial dimension of deployment integration.
Conclusion
The USMC-RAAF F/A-18 model illustrates the larger concept of deployment integration. That said, it could be surmised that the 2001 AUSMin talks broke ground in deployment integration when the United States backed an Australian plan for three-way talks to encourage Japan to take a more active role in regional affairs. What immediately comes to mind is the crawl phase of implementation and the essential first steps toward development of a USMC-RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability. When USMC-RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is studied in the context of rising security pluralism in Asia Pacific, the art of the possible unfolds. When it is deliberated in terms of how allied partners and friends prepare now for an uncertain future, it is a plan to avoid strategic surprise.
Major Gackle is the operations officer at Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39, Camp Pendleton, California. He was an exchange officer with No. 3 Squadron with RAAF Base Williamton, Australia, from 1996 to 1999.