"Loyal Opposition Isn't Disloyal"
(See B. Fleming, p. 76, September 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Matthew Testermann, U.S. Navy, Political Science Department, U.S. Naval Academy—In his commentary on truth and loyalty, Dr. Fleming mistakes information for truth and popularity for loyalty. A better understanding of these terms and concepts may help to alleviate the sickness he feels toward the "moral smugness" of the military.
Most military officers are taught that information is not truth. Information can overwhelm a leader and hide the truth. Military history is replete with examples of misinterpreting information, relying on the wrong information, ignoring the right information, or simply not getting the needed information. Especially in the information age, one should be aware that information is not necessarily truth.
In ignoring this, Dr. Fleming misdiagnoses what he sees as the core problem in the military. He describes "the military's culture of denial to the public and the media." He argues that the media ask "What things are true?" No. The media seek information and when information is unavailable—be it because of a real cover-up, bureaucratic morass, or a simple lack of accurate information—the media level the charge of untruthfulness, lying, or deception. With the lightning speed of this information age, the media are quicker and more acerbically putting these shots across the bow of the military.
As for this cult of personality that Dr. Fleming has witnessed, I only ask for some examples. The examples that come to my mind are of leaders disciplined and dismissed for failures to seek the truth and to do what is right. As I write, the Marine Corps is proceeding with courts-martial for the V-22 maintenance cover-up. The commander of the USS Greeneville (SSN-772) was relieved of command. Even debate about Lieutenant Shane Osborne and the EP-3 crew centers on whether he did what was right, not whether we admire his persona. The military officers and enlisted personnel I know respect the leader who, in that rare opportunity to make a decision when life and death are hanging in the balance, makes the right choice. In Dr. Fleming's classes at the Naval Academy, you will find that midshipmen cheer for their charismatic classmate, but admiration and loyalty are reserved for those who do what they believe to be true. Dr. Fleming mislabels popularity as loyalty. Our military is sophisticated enough to know the difference.
Now, whether truth is the gold standard of academia—that is another commentary all together.
Michael McDaniel—Dr. Fleming rightly criticizes the Navy's lack of internal debate, but his rationale is dead wrong. The current "follow-the-party-line" mind-set in the military does not represent immutable truth, but is a facet of the usual problems that afflict any fighting service in peacetime.
In wartime, mistakes are common. Even the most skillful commanders botch things. Admiral William Halsey at Leyte Gulf, Napoleon at Waterloo, General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg—history is replete with examples. Peerless war fighting comes from minimizing errors and exploiting opportunities, not perfection. Admiral Halsey, Napoleon, and General Lee are respected not for their nonexistent perfection, but for their overall career average.
Peacetime, though, brings few opportunities to excel. Success comes to mean avoiding defeat, not winning victory. Successful wartime leaders usually fight this, supplying the rewards of victory to audacious young officers from their own personal stock, but the supply is limited. A long peace leaves an officer corps choked with people whose first instinct is to do nothing—because doing nothing is the safest option in a no-win world.
On top of this, there is the growing dishonesty throughout American society. Officers and civilians lie for the same reason—they have nothing to lose. In a zero-defect organization, lying does not increase the penalty for a failure, but does offer the opportunity for escape.
The situation isn't irreparable. First, the zero-defects mind-set must give way to a zero-character-defects mind-set. Run your ship aground as Admiral Chester Nimitz did, and you should receive extra instruction. Lie about it, and you should receive a court-martial. Second, opportunities must be made for peacetime victories. Innovative thinking—the lifeblood of Proceedings—must be rewarded. Admiral Nimitz failed his way to an admiral's flag because he failed while trying to innovate. The Navy needs to remember Admiral Nimitz and return to rewarding character and creativity even when they conflict with the official line.
Peacetime zero-risk, zero-defects commanders have one great flaw: they lose wars.
"Regaining the Trust"
(See S. Tangredi, pp. 38-41, May 2001; M. Junge, pp. 22-24, June 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy—In my May article, I use the recent controversy over the Mishap Board report on the MV-22 Osprey as an example of apparent growing distrust in naval leadership. Since that time, the media reported that the Marine Corps formally charged eight Marine Corps officers, including a general, with misconduct for "their alleged roles in falsifying maintenance records" of the aircraft.
No naval officer takes pleasure at seeing such an investigation conducted. Likewise, the individuals involved must be presumed innocent until all charges have been investigated and heard. However, it is a compliment to the Marine Corps as an institution that the Corps took such action. No matter the outcome of the formal proceedings, it rebuilds faith in accountability and honest leadership. Again, the Marine Corps has demonstrated its ability to lead the way in regaining the trust. I would rephrase the quote from the anonymous Mishap Board participants that appeared in The Washington Post to say: people who have been heroes all our lives are again our heroes.
"Want to Fix Retention? Start by Fixing TriCare"
(See B. Toti, p. 75, August 2001 Proceedings)
Commander Chip Laingen, U.S. Navy, Helicopter Training Squadron 8—Captain Bill Toti's sad commentary on the pitfalls of Tricare suggests two regrettable phenomena that exist in the Navy and Marine Corps today.
First, we have come to accept that some things are provided by agencies largely outside the control of the Department of the Navy—Tricare is managed ostensibly by the Department of Defense, but ultimately by Congress. Because of this, we have come to believe we are powerless to control these things. This is not acceptable in the case of Tricare. Our mission depends on quality people and their families, who rightly expect quality of service for their commitment. That makes Tricare the Navy's business, despite how the contract is written, and the most senior levels of the Department of the Navy, uniform and civilian alike, should be knocking on the doors of the Department of Defense and the Congress to tell them so.
Unfortunately, Tricare has perfected what Champus began. Real, palpable discontent exists for this substandard HMO, from the lowest ranks to the highest. Captain Toti's wife probably would have written a more colorful article—mine certainly would have. The problems go well beyond endless waits on the phone. These are just a sampling:
- Many sailors and Marines receive letters of indebtedness from providers who say it is their responsibility to pay bills that Tricare has ignored for months or even years. It is not, in fact, the service member's responsibility; it is the Navy's responsibility, through Tricare. A sailor has every right to expect that his or her spouse won't be harassed by collection agencies while on deployment.
- In some large cities, Navy spouses cannot find a single quality pediatrician to accept Tricare because this HMO lowballs even the minimum expected fees for most procedures.
- There are hospitals and practices that have refused to see Tricare patients because the HMO does not pay its bills in a timely manner, if at all. I have seen billing department employees roll their eyes upon hearing the word Tricare.
It is interesting to note that those of us who potentially will risk our lives to defend American values—including the freedom of choice—have no choice when it comes to our health care. The civilian secretary who worked with me in the Pentagon, a Department of the Navy employee, could choose from among 25 HMOs, simply because she did not wear a uniform. She has already "fired" one HMO and is happy with her new one.
Tricare also pushes Prime over Standard, and the administrative side of the system clearly favors those who select Prime. This is, in fact, a thinly disguised attempt to cut costs, and it further restricts our power to choose quality healthcare providers. And now, an overburdened Tricare system restricts our choice in another way, as Captain Toti illustrated well: if we can get through on the phone at all, we may not be able to choose the month in which our care will be provided.
The captain's frustrations highlight a second phenomenon: Tricare, arguably the lowest common denominator in HMOs, is indicative of what we have come to expect across the board in terms of our "quality of service." Can we attract the best and brightest when we have an organization that accepts substandard treatment on the most fundamental of issues? Of course not. We will instead attract people who have low expectations of themselves and those they serve.
That is unacceptable. There are those who say that wearing the uniform should not entitle us, or our families, to better care than those we defend. That is an outdated view of public service. We should not hesitate to be proud of the commitment we have made and the sacrifices we accept, and we should not hesitate to ask for the very best quality of service in return. As it stands now, we are well below the civilian standard for health care, which is low enough on its own.
All of this has been going on for years—to our families. It was only recently that those of us in uniform were told we are now Tricare customers. Depending on where we are stationed, many of us can no longer simply put on a uniform and stroll to the head of a line at the clinic of our choice. So perhaps there is a third phenomenon here: it may be that our recent passion for outsourcing anything not directly related to combat is having an unexpected positive impact when it comes to our health care. We are becoming more compassionate and empathetic spouses, able to relate to what they have been telling us for years—that they feel like "second-class citizens."
"Up, Up and Away"
(See C. Brown, pp. 36-40, August 2001; D. Cate, pp. 26-28, September 2001 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In addition to the Convair XFY-1 pictured and the Lockheed XFV-1 barely mentioned, the early 1950s also saw the testing of a jet-powered "pogo" created by the Ryan Company. This highly imaginative design was not a "tail-sitter," like the other two, but a "hanger." The craft literally hung by a large clip under its belly from a steel cable strung along the upper edge of a steel "wall." The wall was hinged at the lower end, and could be lowered to permit servicing the aircraft in the horizontal position. Takeoffs were accomplished simply by powering up and rising vertically until the clip cleared the cable. The real trick with all of these designs, of course, was landing successfully while using a rearview mirror to judge ground clearance. Skilled as naval aviators are, it seems a bit of a stretch to expect a pilot not only to keep a jet under control while backing down, but also to slip a clip over a cable attached to a steel wall rising from a ship also moving in three dimensions. One wonders why the thing ever got past the concept stage.
Colonel William W. Scheffler U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—I read Captain Brown's article on the history of vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) shipboard operations with great interest. Although the author made considerable effort to include all previous experiments, I was surprised that there was no mention of the deployment of VMA-331 on board the USS Nassau (LHA-4) during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As chief of staff for the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), I also embarked on board the Nassau. I had the opportunity to observe these operations firsthand. On 18 and 19 August 1990, the "Bumblebees" came on board with 20 AV-8 Bs. The remainder of the squadron's equipment and personnel were loaded at Morehead City and the Nassau sailed on the 20th. This contingency deployment without the benefit of any prior work-up period presented many operational challenges to the Nassau, VMA-331 and the staffs of Amphibious Group 2 and 4th MEB.
The ship and the squadron developed and executed an informal training plan that qualified the pilots and deck crew. The staffs were concerned with integrating the Bumblebees into their amphibious plans without sacrificing the other vital capabilities of the Nassau that would be critical to any amphibious operation. There were some who doubted that AV-8 operations could be integrated with other amphibious functions. Those doubts were put to rest during D-Day for the Sea Soldier 1 exercise in Oman (29 September5 October). At one point near midday, I stepped out on the bridge wing and observed an LCAC approaching the well deck from astern, while a CH-53 was being launched from the forward portion of the flight deck and an AV-8 was landing on the aft portion. The ability to conduct simultaneous AV-8, helo, and well-deck operations was a tribute to the innovative thinking and flexible training of all hands. The Nassau and VMA-331 continued to work on the challenges they faced to develop the tactics and procedures necessary to conduct sustained AV-8 operations.
Not the least of these challenges was handling and storage of ordnance. These Blue/Green efforts came to fruition when "Magic" flight conducted the combat strike by AV-8s launched from an amphibious platform on 20 February 1991. On 26 February, 56 AV-8 combat sorties were launched. Only poor weather around the targets prevented the launch of an additional 14 sorties. A more detailed account of VMA-331's deployment can be found in With Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, published in 1991 by the History and Museums Division of the Marine Corps Headquarters.
"Vieques: Get Over It"
(See J. Byron, p. 96, August 2001 Proceedings)
Major Terry Branstetter, U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Postgraduate School—I found Captain Byron's August piece on Vieques thought provoking. In his analysis of the Vieques debate, he draws on the positive aspect of the Vieques decision. However, while highlighting the merits of the decision he asserts, "Shifting to a new range is a small thing."
Perhaps the author has some recommendations. Nearly every live-fire training facility is under close environmental scrutiny, if not outright attack. The momentum lies with reducing the environmental and political impact of training, not expanding it.
I sincerely hope that a creative long-term solution can be achieved. I fear that if the Navy opts with Captain Byron's advice to "shift to a new range," we will only alienate a different segment of the American population. Worse still, if a Vieques replacement is not to be had, it will be service members paying the price for the merits of the Vieques decision.
Commander Bill Kovach, U.S. Navy—While I concur with Captain Byron's assessment that the Navy needs to "get over" the loss of Vieques and move on, I take exception to his assertion that senior military leaders think that obeying orders from civilian authority is optional. An environment where military leadership can disagree with decisions imposed on them and yet comply with those decisions is not necessarily unhealthy. The military does not live in a dogma indoctrinated society. If a member of our senior military leadership is opposed to a decision, that leader always has the option of stepping down. This has occurred on numerous occasions in our history.
The inference in Captain Byron's commentary that senior military leaders would "disobey" an order and continue using Vieques past the two-year limit is preposterous. Captain Byron has been a prolific and gifted contributor to Proceedings, but one of the recurring themes in his writings is that senior military leadership disdains civil authority. I find this to be untrue. My recommendation to Captain Byron is to "get over it!"
"Network-Centric Warfare Meets the Laws of the Navy"
(See S. Scarborough, pp. 30-33, May 2001; G. Nalepa, p. 14, June 2001; D. Inbody, J. Shannon, July 2001; J. Nugent, pp. 16-18, August 2001 Proceedings)
Commander John T Kuehn, U.S. Navy—I read Commander Scarborough's essay with great interest, having completed a tour on board the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) just over one year ago. As combat direction center officer I was fortunate to have a vantage point on the installation of IT-21 technology, the challenge of Y2K, and the operational employment of this technology during a six-month deployment. Her essay posed important questions about how the Navy as a culture will deal with the leadership challenges of the information revolution.
My Stennis experience leads me to two points. First, the mid-grade and senior leaders we have out there might be more innovative and accepting of change than it may appear at first blush. As an example, I give you Admiral Archie R. Clemins (then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet). He literally led the charge in putting the latest technology on our ship (and others) when Y2K fears might have caused the more timid to put off innovation. I will not try to pretend that institutional resistance or installation problems were not encountered. By the end of the cruise, however, many of the projected milestones had been met. We literally were forging ahead with established tactical action officer chat rooms, web-based updated data for on-line pulls, and a common operational picture on more than 400 workstations throughout the ship. Perhaps some dramatic license is appropriate—I have seen and been part of network-centric warfare and it is no longer the stuff of Power Point presentations but an operational fact.
Second, the populations on board these ships predominantly are folks whose entire intellectual memory falls within the information age of the Internet and personal computers. They bring a momentum all their own that sweeps all along the path to the future. More and more, I personally relied on junior enlisted and officer personnel to take a larger leadership role in solving the complex problems posed in attempting to make a myriad of nonintegrated IT systems work efficiently. Those above and below me did the same.
I agree with the author's thesis that this demands a more flexible mind-set, but the control is still there. What is really demanded of the new leader is more trust in his or her subordinates.
In closing, I believe Commander Scarborough's thesis once again illustrates the dichotomy between the almost mystical traditionalism of our Navy culture and the fierce independence and mission focus bred by the uniqueness of sea service. I believe this dichotomy represents a healthy tension that is and has been beneficial for sea-faring leaders past, present, and future. As a service and as leaders, we are where we need to be, with a capacity for innovation and change that is bred by the very nature of naval service.
"DD-21: Another Seawolf?"
(See D. Lewis, pp 54-57, August 2001 Proceedings)
Frederick J. Harris, Electric Boat Corporation, Vice President, Programs—Captain Lewis rightly has raised the storm warning flag to alert the Navy that it must have a strategy in place that will maintain affordability through the DDG51/DD-21 transition period. He makes the point that unlike the SSN-688/Seawolf transition period, the surface Navy has adequate warning of the current budgetary constraints that could jeopardize continuation of the DD-21 program as it proceeds to price itself out of the market.
I agree wholeheartedly with Captain Lewis's concern and hope that the DD-21 program capitalizes on lessons learned from the Seawolf program. We must continue to upgrade our fleet to minimize our vulnerability. Captain Lewis, however, fails to recognize the effective transition that is currently taking place in the submarine community as the Virginia (SSN-774) class emerges as the less costly follow-on to the Seawolf. The lead ship of this new class of attack submarines is beyond the "entering construction" time frame cited by Captain Lewis; it began construction in 1998, is now more than 50% complete, and is expected to be delivered to the Navy in June 2004, on schedule. In addition, SSN-774 will be delivered at a cost considerably less than Seawolf. This program performance is real and will keep the submarine community out of the "sandpit" that Captain Lewis considers home to this community.
Captain Lewis states that "no other major shipbuilding program of the past 20 years has been able to complete the transition from design to construction without significant changes in both cost and schedule." He further notes that "SSN-21 design costs increased 100% over initial estimates, and construction costs for the lead ship increased more than 50% before the ship was completed, excluding program cancellation costs." Captain Lewis concludes that "both the LPD17 and SSN-774 programs are facing similar problems today." Captain Lewis seems to not understand the success of the Virginia design and lead ship construction performance, which provides a model for the DD-21 program.
"Deepwater or Deep Trouble"
(See T. Robeck, pp. 73-74, August 2001 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral P M. Stillman, U.S. Coast Guard, Program Executive Officer Integrated Deepwater System—Mr. Hoback provided a plausible solution to the Coast Guard's need for a national-security cutter, but his proposal has drawbacks.
The key word in the phrase "Integrated Deepwater System" is the first one. Whatever the design and capabilities, the National Security Cutter must be fully integrated with the aircraft and vessels with which it will operate, both in the Coast Guard and the Navy. Furthermore, it must be fitted with an electronics and communications suite, which is also integrated. The National Security Cutter is but one piece that fits seamlessly into the remainder of the integrated deepwater system.
That's why the emphasis of Deepwater is on emerging and future technology, not existing technology—or in the case of Mr. Hoback's example, technology from the last generation. For example, Mr. Hoback presumes that future cutters will be required to accommodate HH-60 helicopters and existing weapon systems. Fitting pieces together in this fashion amounts to simple modifications rather than the integration of technology.
Deepwater begins with the end in mind. That end is defined in the performance requirements of the system. It is more than a simple refurbishment plan. It holds the potential to be a model for future acquisitions programs in the government. Balancing total ownership costs and performance of a well-conceived system of operational assets can bring great value to the fight as well as the taxpayer's pocket. And that is a transformational concept.
"It's Time to Think as One Navy"
(See M. Hagerott, pp. 58-61, August 2001 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—I regret that Commander Hagerott was not in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare in 1975-80 as part of a superb team that did, in fact, aggressively push land-attack conventional Tomahawk, supporting the joint program manager, Walt Locke. The commander even may have been assigned to the 1978-79 DDX Study that recommended the new battle group destroyer class, Arleigh Burke (DDG-51), be equipped with land-attack Tomahawk and the Aegis combat system. Also, he would have had the opportunity to support the development of the Vertical Launch System that accommodates both Tomahawks and Standard missiles in Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
But I think Commander Hagerott would have been dismayed had it been suggested that his support of Tomahawk was only to benefit the surface community. My experience, contrary to assertions in the article, is that the innovators and pushers in the warfare communities are sincerely dedicated to improving the capabilities of the entire Navy, although one always can debate whether the new capabilities they are advocating are the right ones.
The main recommendation in the article, that the seagoing officers should pursue two separate career tracks—a platform path and a warfare integrator path—is best sorted out by the active-duty leadership. However, is not warfare integration an inseparable part of the continuum of experience and development of officers trained in a specialty, e.g., air, surface, and submarines? I believe the present crop of sea-going flag officers, ashore and afloat, exemplifies and amply demonstrates this continuum. This is not to say that more education and experience in warfare integration are not needed.
Finally, I hope some day we can banish the lubberly term "platform," which may refer to anything from an oil rig to a satellite. Congress and the American people still think of their Navy mainly in terms of aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, not platforms. The challenge ahead will be to better integrate the operations of our ships, aircraft, and associated weapons and sensors, selectively using the net-centric tools of command and control, while retaining the necessary accountability.
"India's 12 Steps to a World-Class Navy"
(See T. Barnett, pp. 41-45, July 2001 Proceedings)
Dr. Robert A. Forczyk, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve—The author displays an amazing level of delusion and naiveté about the current Indian Navy. After viewing India's first International Fleet Review in February 2001, Dr. Barnett has developed a "simple" list of ways the Indian Navy can transform itself from a clunky, Cold War-era dinosaur into a modern, internationalist world-class navy. If one ignores the strategic and political context of India's Navy, then these 12 steps may seem rationale or even feasible.
Interestingly, there is not one word in the article about the nature of the current Hindu nationalist BJP government. There is no mention of the inherent racism and intolerance of the men who run the Indian government and military, or the attitudes they have toward globalization. Nor is there any mention of the three wars India has fought with Pakistan or the 1962 border war with China. Dr. Barnett simply asserts that the Indian Navy cannot improve until some amends are made to regional rivals and implies that defining national security in terms of bickering over "seemingly meaningless bits of land" is archaic. It is easy for an American academic to say, "you should just let bygones be bygones," but that does not work in the real world and there is no easy solution to thorny disputes such as Kashmir, where a Hindu army oppresses a predominantly Muslim province that does not want to be part of India. Pakistan and China are rivals of India for strong historical and strategic reasons that cannot be just brushed aside by globalization fantasies. Moreover, the BJP government has sought confrontation from the outset by conducting nuclear tests, developing intermediate-range missiles, and opposing any diplomatic solution for Kashmir.
Dr. Barnett seems to believe that globalization is the answer to the Indian Navy's future. He argues that if only the Indian fleet would redesign itself for internationalist peacekeeping missions, counternarcotics, and antipiracy operations, then it could evolve into a "world-class navy." The author then suggests that the Indian Navy could be "put to good use" by moving to "tackle environmental damage, rising ocean levels, and altered weather patterns." Let's just beat those swords into plowshares and the world will be fine, right Dr. Barnett?
Globalization, in the author's view, is an economic marvel that will transform the world and no sane person would want to be excluded from it. Dr. Barnett also suggests that the Wall Street and Pentagon leaderships diverge on perceptions of China and India, with the military men perceiving them as potential threats while the businessmen see them as potential financial partners. Implicitly, the military view is incorrect and there is just too much money to be made in China and India. Interestingly, Dr. Barnett's treatise on globalization fails to mention the potential perils of technology transfer to countries that are not very friendly toward the United States. Of course, in Dr. Barnett's globalization fantasy, we will all be one happy family and technology transfers will only be used for "good" uses such as the environment.
Globalization may indeed be good for promoting international trade, but it is not necessarily supportive of all U.S. national security goals, such as nonproliferation. Nor can Dr. Barnett understand the Indian Navy's attachment to purchasing sea-denial platforms, because he sees such a bright future for them as policemen and janitors of the world's oceans. In fact, the Indian Navy has been built up explicitly as a sea-denial force since 1971. As many Indian sources have argued, the only way a regional power can exercise an independent foreign policy is by inhibiting external intervention. India's nightmare is that in a future regional war, the United States would "tilt" toward Pakistan and coerce India into a cease-fire with foreign observers and diplomats complicating the situation as in the Mideast. The Indian Navy was designed as a shield of sorts against old-fashioned "gunboat diplomacy" because Indians have long been apprehensive of threats from the sea.
While the ability of the Indian Navy to inhibit U.S. naval intervention in a regional conflict is debatable, the rationale for a sea-denial force is pretty clear to Indian nationalists. They want no repeat of foreign fleets showing up uninvited in their waters and making demands, as happened so frequently in the colonial period. By attempting to substitute glib internationalist rhetoric for sound maritime strategy, Dr. Barnett shows that he doesn't have a clue about the Indian Navy or the fleets of any other would-be regional power. Whether the Indian Navy ever poses a regional challenge to the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean, the issues of that navy's strategic policies and procurement programs should be couched in military, not rhetorical or macroeconomic, terms.
Navies exist to deter and win wars, not to promote international agendas or alleviate global warming.
"Rumsfeld Team Retrieves Reins of Military Medicine"
(See T. Philpott, p. 90, August 2001 Proceedings)
EDITOR'S NOTE: The quote in the penultimate paragraph concerning the "terrible inefficiency" of military medicine attributed to Under Secretary David Chu should have been attributed to the unnamed Joint Staff official referenced earlier.
"Seeking Heroes"
(See N. Polmar, p. 184, May 2001; R. Lugar, pp. 14-16, June 2001; T. Buell, p. 21, July 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Robert C. Peniston, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In his column, Mr. Polmar takes issue with Senator Richard Lugar's bill to promote posthumously Admiral Raymond A. Spruance to the rank of fleet admiral. I have personal knowledge of what was perhaps the origin of the matter.
In the spring of 1957, I was privileged to serve as aide to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz when he came east to participate in Operation Remember to be held in New York City to honor heroes of World War II. He fell ill, however, and was unable to attend.
After his recovery, he asked me to arrange for him to call on several senior civilian and military officials in the Washington area, including the Honorable Carl Vinson, chairman, House Armed Service Committee, for the purpose of requesting that consideration be given to the promotion of Admiral Spruance to five-star rank.
The meeting took place in the chairman's office on 26 April 1957. As he was about to be announced, the admiral told me to come along so I could write a memorandum for file of the visit.
After a warm exchange of greetings, the admiral got right to the point. He asked that consideration be given to legislation that would promote Admiral Spruance to five-star rank. He pointed out that the passing of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King could be construed as leaving a vacancy in that rank. But more important, Admiral Spruance had performed the same tasks as Fleet Admiral William Halsey in the war in the Pacific, and there was little to choose between them save for some numbers in seniority. Further, Admiral Nimitz opined that he felt better when Admiral Spruance had the fleet because he believed he knew Admiral Spruance's mind better than he knew Admiral Halsey's.
Mr. Vinson listened intently and said that such certainly was a reasonable request but did not believe that pay for the rank would stand up. Admiral Nimitz said that pay was not the issue because Admiral Spruance had been amply compensated by Congress, but that he was making the request so that Admiral Spruance might receive the proper recognition for his services during the war.
The chairman closed out the visit, promising to look into the matter.
In April 1958, I visited Admiral Nimitz at his home in Berkeley, California, and asked if he had heard anything about the promotion. He had not.
In February 1982, my commentary in Proceedings brought forth a response by Admiral H. P. Smith. His commentary can be summed up as follows: At Admiral Halsey's funeral in August 1959, Admiral Nimitz represented President Dwight D. Eisenhower and afterward called on then-Vice Admiral Smith, the Chief of Naval Personnel. One of the things requested was for Admiral Smith to call on Mr. Vinson and "ask him if he would not now promote Admiral Spruance to Fleet Admiral."
Admiral Smith called and was invited to Mr. Vinson's office the next day. After a discussion, Mr. Vinson said, "We should, in the future, hold five-star ranks for our leaders in grave national emergency. So please present my deep respects to Admiral Nimitz and say that we must leave it like it is."
Maybe Senator Lugar's bill has a bit of the political tinge to it, but Admiral Nimitz's request did not. He wanted what he considered just recognition to be given to Admiral Spruance. His wish in the matter is good enough for me.
"Making Room for Risk"
(See J. Stavridis, pp. 32-36, September 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Terry Pierce, U.S. Navy—Rear Admiral Stavridis has provided the naval services an excellent overview of the disruptive innovation phenomenon and what mechanisms might prove useful in embracing it. From a theoretical view, I want to build on his article and offer some additional insights and caveats.
Innovation scholars credit Harvard Business Professor Clay Christensen with introducing the concept of disruptive technologies. An important part of Christensen's theory is the phenomenon of sustaining technologies. In Professor Christensen's view, disruptive and sustaining are the Ying and Yang of innovation. Sustaining innovations improve the performance of established warfighting methods along an established trajectory, which the service currently values. Disruptive innovations improve performance along a trajectory that traditionally has not been valued.
Why is this distinction important? Disruptive innovations are managed differently from sustaining ones. Of particular importance to the naval services, most technological advances are sustaining in nature.
Just because innovations are sustaining in nature, however, does not mean they will be easy to achieve or that they will have a small impact on war fighting. Continuous aim gunfire is an excellent example of sustaining innovation that increased gunfire by 3,000%. Even so, it took Lieutenant William Sims five years and the help of President Theodore Roosevelt to accomplish it. As Admiral Stavridis correctly points out, carrier aviation is an example of disruptive innovation. Few battleship admirals, except Admiral William Moffett, saw the value in using carrier air in any other role but spotting for naval gunfire.
One caveat in this discussion is not all radical technologies are disruptive innovations. For example, Admiral Stavridis posits that the radical electric-drive propulsion innovation is a coming disruptive technology. I would offer a different view.
Electric-drive propulsion, like the introduction of nuclear propulsion for submarines, is a classic sustaining innovation. Both electric-drive and nuclear propulsion innovations improve the performance an established warfighting method along an established trajectory, which the Navy values. For submarines, nuclear propulsion extended by an order of magnitude a submarine's ability to close and destroy a target by firing torpedoes. Likewise, electric-drive propulsion should enhance the way DD-21 fights, but it will not offer a new way to fight that the Navy does not currently value. The point, however, is that even though a new technology is sustaining in nature, it does not mean that it will not enhance warfighting enormously nor is it easy to achieve. It is critical that product champions who are advocating innovations recognize whether it is disruptive or sustaining because they are managed quite differently.
In sum, for those who are interested in the finer details of disruptive innovation, I strongly recommend perhaps the most influential article on innovation in the past decade (which also served as the key source document for Clay Christensen's disruptive work): Rebecca Henderson and Kim B. Clark, "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Existing Firms," in Administrative Science Quarterly, 1990.
Finally, I want to reemphasize one point Admiral Stavridis makes. Our opponents do not have the treasure to match our innovation developments. Instead, they most likely will behave similarly to the post-World War I German Army that looked for every opportunity to employ old and new technologies in disruptive ways.
Unless we begin to establish mechanisms for managing disruptive innovations we may well be on the receiving end of a technology advance that we developed, but our opponents have used in a disruptive way against us.