Transferring no-fly zone patrols from manned fighters to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would increase coverage time and intelligence collection, as well as reduce political and monetary costs and military risk. If the next generation of UAVs can live up to their promise—this artist's concept is for a ship-based unmanned combat aerial vehicle—their capabilities will be impressive.
The United States and Western coalition tactical air forces have conducted no-fly zone (NFZ) patrols in the sovereign airspace of two countries during the 1990s. Over Iraq, Operations Northern and Southern Watch sorties from bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and from U.S. Navy carriers in the Gulf keep Saddam Hussein from attacking portions of his own population. NATO fighters from Italy and carrier-based aircraft in the Adriatic police the skies of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Operation Joint Forge to prevent warring factions from using aircraft in the civil war in Bosnia.
After a combined 27 years of operations and hundreds of thousands of sorties, these three NFZ enforcement operations have had limited success. In 1992, Iraq lost two fighters to U.S. missiles. In early 1994, U.S. Air Force F-16s shot down four Bosnian Serb Galeb attack aircraft conducting weapon deliveries in Bosnia. However, there have been numerous violations by target-state helicopters, particularly over Bosnia, and in recent years by Iraqi fighters, who tend to violate the zone and scurry back to safety before patrolling fighters' missiles can be brought to bear.1 The Iraqi incursions into the zone are of little military value, but they allow Saddam to show that he stands up to the Western militaries and that they are powerless to stop him.
The United States also has incurred human and material losses. The 1994 shoot-down of two Black Hawk helicopters over the northern NFZ resulted in 24 deaths. Captain Scott O'Grady's F-16 was shot down by a Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile in June 1995. Each day the Iraqi military tries desperately to down a U.S. or British jet, and eventually it might succeed.2 The loss of just one fighter and aircrew would be a major problem for U.S. political and military policies in the region, particularly if the crew were captured. The political costs to the administration, domestic and international, likely would be high.
There is an alternative to manned patrols that will allow NFZ enforcement operations to continue while reducing political pressure, military risk, and costs.
The Promise of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Most defense professionals are familiar with the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Pioneer used during the Gulf War. Small, relatively cheap, and simple to operate from unimproved forward bases and battleship flight decks, UAVs brought real-time intelligence to local commanders. The past ten years have brought significant advances in UAV capabilities, and what is on the drawing board for introduction in the future is impressive.
Large UAVs of the future will fly at altitudes of 80,000-150,000 feet and remain aloft for weeks at a time. Launched and controlled from the United States (but carrier deployable), they will act as primary sensor and communications platforms. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) will carry not only an elaborate sensor suite capable of scanning 200-plus miles but also a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air weapons, even air-to-missile defensive weapons, albeit in payloads of only 1,000 pounds (including on-board sensors).3
Medium-sized UCAVs will have wingspans of 30-50 feet (comparable to most current fighter aircraft), be locally deployed (from surface combatants or land bases), and stay aloft for hours or days, operating from 5,000 to 45,000 feet while carrying a similar 1,000-pound payload. These UCAVs are envisioned as the principal tactical targeting and killing platforms. Small UCAVs of 6- to 8-foot wingspans also are deployable from surface combatants and will operate in the lower altitudes for several hours, seeing targets in urban canyons and under the weather in very high threat environments. Micro UAVs with wingspans of less than 12 inches will be deployed by individual soldiers or Marines to see around corners or into the next room. They also may serve as submunitions launched from UCAVs or be incorporated into existing weapon families to record bomb damage. In this tiered architecture, larger UCAVs will direct smaller ones in tasks ranging from direct attack to remote weapon guidance.
In the no-fly zone mission, a modest number of UCAVs could replace the many fighter formations currently on patrol. Launched from the United States, several large UCAVs would transit to their assigned zone, arriving on station in approximately 24 hours.4 Once in theater, they would establish contact with the local command, control, and communications network and begin weeks of constant patrolling inside the NFZ. Operating at ultra-high altitudes, they could collect intelligence in relative sanctuary, easily peering over the zone border to collect information inside the airspace of the target state. With this constant monitoring of airspace and communications, the commander could know the target state's intentions. For example, the UAV might aim its camera on an airfield where NFZ violations have originated in the past. It observes a fighter being readied for flight and watches it taxi and take off, tracking it with its on-board radar and collecting communications intelligence between the pilot and ground controllers. All of this is relayed to the NFZ commander in real time. Once airborne, the fighter is tracked, and if a violation occurs, the commander uses the information provided by the UAV to determine the nature of the violation and a possible response.
In the no-fly zone scenario it is not unthinkable to engage in deception and electronic interference against violator aircraft. The UAV could jam voice and radio-navigation communications between the violator and his base. Or using linguists assigned to the NFZ commander, the UAV could relay confusing orders to the pilot, canceling take-off clearance, ordering him to return to base, or warning him that he is being tracked and targeted. Only one's imagination limits the ways to make a poorly trained and likely nervous target-state pilot dwell on his own fears and confusion at the expense of mission accomplishment.
Another possibility is using the limited but precise combat capability of a UCAV. The no-fly zone commander, having noted a pattern of violations from a particular base, could dispatch a UCAV to watch as an enemy fighter is readied for launch. If intelligence indicated this fighter intended to violate the zone, with preapproval from the National Command Authorities (NCA), the commander could order the UCAV to send a precision weapon to destroy the fighter on the ground. Such a preemptive attack is an option the UCAV allows.
Large and medium UCAVs also will possess an air-to-air engagement capability beyond visual range. However, at this unprecedented level of automation, the danger of misidentifying and possibly downing a civilian aircraft might outweigh the benefits. Rules of engagement to prevent such a disaster probably would be so stringent as to prevent the commander from even considering this option. The potential of a UCAV/manned fighter engagement is worth developing, but it is unlikely to be employed soon.
The intelligence and 24-hour coverage provided by a UAV give the NFZ commander a tremendous ability to respond. Once manned patrols are stopped, it is likely the zone will be "tested" for coalition reaction. By observing these tests (violations) and recording enemy activity in great detail, the NFZ commander can make to the NCA a convincing argument to strike. Using manned combat aircraft launched from the United States, aircraft carriers, and foreign bases, along with cruise missiles and UCAVs, the operational commander could deliver a devastating one-time strike on the violator airfield. By destroying either the aircraft or the capacity of the airfield to conduct operations, he could be sure violations would stop because the enemy no longer would have the means to violate. Unlike coercive force, which must compel the enemy to back down, definitive force does not require cooperation and none is expected.5
In addition, without the huge military and political footprint associated with manned NFZ patrols, allied nations in the target-state region face fewer political problems, and the exposure of fighter crews to target-state defenses is eliminated. With one or more large UCAVs patrolling a zone 24 hours a day, remotely located monitors can better track target-state movements and provide increased communications and signals intelligence to the NFZ commander. This is not to suggest the complete disengagement of manned combat aircraft. The commanders of all three no-fly zones still must exhibit credible presence in the form of prompt and decisive airborne strike response. Today, sea- and land-based strike forces, deployed to a trouble spot within days or even hours, are responsive enough to strike a violator airfield if the NCA desires.
Another advantage of replacing the no fly zone fighter patrols with UAV patrols, especially over Iraq, is that it turns the temperature down. The tit-for-tat cycle of armed resistance/fighter response appears to have no end. The world community has tired of this, and former Western coalition partners are taking steps to warm relations with Iraq. Unilaterally ending the cycle would increase our stature throughout the world, especially in the Middle East, while keeping us actively engaged in defending our Gulf Cooperation Council friends from their powerful neighbors to the north. Added bonuses are that fighters are removed from the daily risk of loss over Iraq and the high operating tempos for men and machines are reduced.
In concert with UAV patrols, other tenets of network-centric warfare could be employed. If the UAV and other national sensors record a violation or a series of violations, for example, we could disrupt the enemy's integrated air defense system using a nonlethal electronic attack, such as inserting a computer virus. Electromagnetic pulse weapons might be used to disrupt enemy command, control, and communications or to render their fighters' electronics inoperative, preventing launch. Another possibility is to collect details on a particular base using a range of UAVs. Once the NFZ commander has detailed photographs of particular aircraft locations, maintenance facilities, and barracks compounds, and intelligence on enemy intentions, he "strikes" (with National Command Authorities' approval) with a pronouncement such as, "We know where your base is and that you will be using it to violate the NFZ tomorrow. We will strike these X targets to prevent you from doing so. You have X hours to evacuate." Such a statement might prevent violations from that base as the aircraft are dispersed and the base abandoned, but only until our bluff is called.
The use of UAVs and UCAVs in no-fly zone patrols also is an excellent test for the integration of these vehicles into likely combat operations. Manned airborne delivery of weapons probably will continue well into the 21st century, and manned fighters and UCAVs working together would add capability for future air commanders. No longer would they have to depend on pulses of power (today's coordinated air strikes) to accomplish their goals. Focused pulses of manned aircraft power in conjunction with a sustained UCAV "siege" over the entire area of responsibility would deny the enemy any opportunity to relax. No-fly zones could test and refine this theory of air warfare.
The Future of No-Fly Zones
Are no-fly zones as a means of postwar resolution enforcement here to stay? With the air forces that patrol them already paid for, and with the political benefit of not having to put boots on the ground, they are an attractive option for Western leaders. However, to enforce three zones effectively requires more fighter assets and supporting infrastructure than coalition forces can provide today.
In addition, the Gulf Cooperation Council nations see Western military presence in their nations as temporary. They do not want to build permanent facilities for open-ended Western operations that bring with them domestic and regional political criticism. They appreciate the no-fly zone and the buffer of protection it provides, but not the political costs of being viewed as Western puppets by some large and increasingly vocal segments of their populations.
The coalition should take the hint and reduce the NFZ footprint. It may be that we are destined to conduct patrols of northern and southern Iraq for the next few decades if it serves to prevent another invasion. The transfer of NFZ patrol from fighters to UAVs or UCAVs would increase our effectiveness and lower political and monetary costs. This natural evolution may make no-fly zones even more appealing to civilian and military leaders for future trouble spots.
Existing unmanned aerial vehicles are too few and too limited in capability to be used operationally as described here. However, if we procure the next generation of UAVs and UCAVs in sufficient number to allow for 24-hour coverage of areas of interest, commanders could patrol the no-fly zones more effectively, increase their intelligence collection capability, and remove dozens of manned fighters from this dangerous and politically unpopular patrol. This NFZ patrol option may become reality in the near future.
Commander Miller commanded VFA-105 and has participated in Operations Deny Flight, Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Fox, and Deliberate Forge. He received his master's degree in national security and strategic studies at the Naval War College in November 2000 and currently is assigned to to OPNav N512, Warfare Policy and Doctrine.
1. NFZs typically are patrolled by dozens of aircraft in dispersed formations, but only for short periods. It is not unusual to patrol for as little as 2 hours in 24, sometimes not at all. Far from a blanket to prevent any target-state violations, NFZ patrols display U.N. resolve, but once the aircraft on patrol return home, target-state air forces may fly with impunity, and because of NFZ predictability, they know patrol times. (back to article)
2. Most military aviators the author has spoken with agree on this matter. Senior leaders involved with NFZ patrol marvel that there have been no mechanical malfunctions or other operational mishaps causing an aircraft loss in one of these zones to date. (back to article)
3. Pat Yates, "A Tiered UCAV Architecture Based on (Mostly) Surface Combatants," brief to the Strategic Studies Group, 2 December 1999. (back to article)
4. A flight of 7,000 miles at 300 knots groundspeed. (back to article)
5. Capt. Robert C. Rubel, USN, "Campaign Thinking," in The Uses of Force, unpublished manuscript held at the Naval War College, Newport, RI. (back to article)