This past April, the collision of the Chinese F-8 and U.S. Navy EP-3E surveillance aircraft—and the tense standoff between the two nations—dominated world headlines for more than two weeks. Politicians, scholars, and military leaders proposed widely divergent actions for the United States to take in dealing with the accident. When emotions ratcheted up in the 11 days that the EP-3E crew was detained in China, many called for suspension of military-to-military contacts between the two nations. Several commentators believed that China derived the most benefit from these contacts; its intransigence over release of the U.S. crew merely confirmed for them the one-sided nature of Sino-U.S. military-to-military relationships.
As members of the U.S. delegation for navy-to-navy talks with the People's Liberation Army (Navy) [PLAN] from 1998 to 2000, we believe this approach is extraordinarily shortsighted and counterproductive. The talks were vehicles for military representatives of the two nations to discuss issues related to safety and navigation at sea and in the air. While it is impossible to say that more talks could have prevented this latest incident, it is clear that failure to continue dialogue of this kind can only increase the probability of future incidents—and hence, increase Sino-U.S. tension.
Why Squadron Leader Wang Wei operated his aircraft in a manner that caused it to collide with the EP-3E may never be known, but some things are clear. Dramatic videos released by U.S. authorities show that Chinese pilots flew dangerously close to U.S. aircraft numerous times in the past. Many opined—perhaps correctly—that given such dangerous flying practices, it was only a matter of time before an accident occurred. Lost in accounts of the April collision were discussions about what additional procedures might have helped to prevent it. The EP-3E did its best to fly straight and level when approached by the Chinese aircraft. However, the two aircraft—which were operating close to each other in a highly charged political environment—did not share communications and signaling procedures that might have helped avert the accident.
In large part, the accident resulted from a lack of mutual operational procedures that both militaries could be comfortable with and practice regularly. The two nations have only infrequent opportunities to discuss these types of situations, resolve differences of understanding, and come to common ground on preventative measures. This is akin to the situation within naval aviation a generation ago. Prior to the advent of Naval Aviation Training and Operational Procedures Standardization (NATOPS), pilots were well trained and operationally experienced, but they had no codified procedures to govern the way in which they operated their aircraft. The universal acceptance of NATOPS reduced accidents dramatically. Was the United States on the right track regarding engagement with China's military prior to this accident? Might the accident have been prevented through more robust military-to-military talks?
Military-to-Military Engagement
The strategic underpinnings of the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China were built methodically during the past three decades. Beginning with President Richard M. Nixon's joint communiqué with Premier Chou En-lai in 1972 and continuing with subsequent joint communiqués in 1979 and 1982, the leaders of both nations agreed to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to reduce the danger of international military conflict.1 Building on the communiqués, both nations began a process of engagement. In the early 1990s, the Office of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs orchestrated exchanges under the auspices of an omnibus military-to-military engagement program.2 They were broad in scope and included:
- High-level visits by military officers
- Professional visits, such as those among war college instructors and students
- Visits by new flag and general officers under the U.S. Capstone Program
- Exchanges of professional military fellows
- Ship visits and consultation agreements
- Inviting Chinese naval officers to observe the biennial RIMPAC exercise and multinational conferences, such as the Pacific Naval Symposium
Engagement at multiple levels creates an environment for developing better mutual understanding. Within the overall military-to-military program, the only element that deals specifically with the complexities of naval units operating in close proximity at sea and in the air is the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA). It is a confidence-building measure aimed directly at maritime and aviation safety and development of safe operating procedures.
The MMCA process was set in motion by civilian and naval leaders of both nations because they recognized the importance of limiting potential for confrontation at sea. Negotiations began in Beijing and Washington in 1997, enabling President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin to announce their intentions during their summit meeting in November 1997. They agreed to hold annual meetings and convene frequent working groups to enhance military maritime safety between the two nations. Soon thereafter, in January 1998, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Chinese Minister of National Defense signed an "Agreement Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety." The preamble to the agreement states:
The Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, recognizing the principle contained in the three U.S.-Sino Joint Communiqués, the spirit of mutual respect, and the experience shared by professional mariners and airmen due to the common challenges they face in the maritime environment . . . recognizing the need to promote common understanding regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime and air forces when operating in accordance with international law, including the principles and regimes reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . . . have agreed to encourage and facilitate consultations between delegation . . . for the purpose of promoting common understandings regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime and air forces.3
This landmark agreement reflects realization at the highest levels of both governments that, as their maritime forces (navy and air force) begin to encounter each other with more regularity—in areas such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, where potential for misunderstanding and confrontation is high—the need to expand areas of cooperation and deal forthrightly with each other's differences is compelling.
The strategy for annual meetings was multifaceted. Annual MMCA meetings would create a positive climate of progress between the navies and maintain a long-term focus. Officers with operational experience could be brought together to discuss most likely scenarios for encounters at sea and procedures to ensure they would be managed professionally. Annual meetings were structured to facilitate this dialogue, gain insight to key issues, and lay initial groundwork for working groups to use in taking on specific operational issues. In subsequent meetings, both sides determined to make progress quickly in areas of common agreement—for example, how to apply international law to maritime encounters—while identifying and tabling differences that might require further study or higher level discussions, such as improper baselines and consequent territorial claims.
The first annual MMCA meeting was held in Beijing in July 1998; each delegation was led by a two-star flag officer. The delegations exchanged briefs on their national laws and regulations governing operations at sea and agreed to convene a series of working groups between subsequent annual meetings. An MMCA working group charter directed working groups to conduct discussions on numerous maritime navigation safety issues, including communications. The first MMCA working group met in San Diego in December 1998, with senior navy captains heading each delegation. The group discussed international communications standards, the law of the sea, and maritime safety and navigation—specifically, use of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972 ColRegs) as the standard for maritime communications at sea.
The second MMCA working group met in Qingdao, China, at the headquarters of China's North Sea Fleet in May 1999. It continued discussions begun the previous December and culminated in publication of the Study on Sino-U.S. Maritime Navigation Safety, Including Communications.4 This historic document stressed areas of agreement and emphasized extant international regulations that both parties were signatories to, including the 1972 ColRegs, The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), The International Code of Signals, and The Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunications Union. It is noteworthy that the "due regard" standards—in effect, defensive driving—outlined in the Chicago Convention were discussed during the MMCA; their recognition well could have prevented the EP-3E and F-8 accident.
Progress of the working groups in two successive meetings provided the momentum needed to schedule the second annual meeting at Honolulu, Hawaii, in August 1999. Unfortunately, accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by U.S. forces in May of that year strained relations between the two nations and caused the entire Sino-U.S. engagement program to be suspended.5 The Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair, restarted military contacts with a visit to China in March 2000. The MMCA was viewed as such an important pillar of the overall program that the working groups were reconvened in Beijing later that same month. The two working group delegations—essentially intact from the previous year—revalidated progress that had been made to that point and reviewed the study report drafted previously. Their efforts led to the second annual meeting, which was conducted in Honolulu, Hawaii, in May 2000.
During the second annual meeting, senior flag officers from both sides of the Pacific affirmed that the MMCA process provided useful guidance to their navies. As the final point of agreement on principles, the delegations agreed that MMCA will become a long-term operational focus of their navies and that the next set of working group meetings should continue advancing as before. When the next working group met at the Wusong Naval Station in Shanghai, China, in December 2000, it concentrated on communications between surface vessels within sight of each other and set the general agenda for meetings in 2001. Working groups were tasked to complete a study and make a report on "Sino-U.S. exploration and evaluation of the ways and means of communications between surface vessels at sea within sight of one another."
Although safety of flight ("due regard") was covered in the first round of talks, there has been no thorough discussion of air-to-air communications between the two militaries thus far. This stems from the consistently higher priority that both delegations have given to encounters between surface ships (as the most likely events) and the Chinese delegation's strong desire to move slowly and deliberately on each issue. Although some may expect that results must be attained quickly—i.e., the MMCA must prove its worth or be abandoned—such a view fails to take into account the enormous complexities of the many issues involved.
Because the MMCA process is just gaining traction within the U.S. armed forces, its functions and usefulness are not understood universally. In addition, the F-8 and EP-3E accident highlighted communications gaps among China's military, political, and diplomatic agencies. The "trickle-down time" is lengthy for matters agreed to in deliberations such as the MMCA. It takes time to train and practice for the exercise of protocols during routine encounters. The time lag between delegations signing agreements and pilots in Chinese squadrons receiving the modified procedures and training for intercepting U.S. surveillance aircraft could be measured in months at best—and years at worst. At this stage, the two nations still are practicing the most rudimentary communication standards between ships during port calls. These factors make it obvious that interrupting an orderly process such as that of the MMCA (or other military-to-military contacts with China) only will stretch timelines for agreements to reach the working level and change day-to-day actions of operational forces. Talks must be sustained over the long haul—regardless of the always unpredictable political climate.
Into the Future
Given often discordant relations between the United States and China over the past 50 years, and in light of the many issues over which the two nations diverge, the MMCA process represents a significant means for improving bilateral relations. Knowledgeable observers expect the PLAN to play an increasingly large role in the calculus of Chinese national security in the 21st century.6 Because MMCA is potentially the most valuable operator-to-operator exchange in Sino-U.S. military relations, the value of this continuing dialogue is difficult to overstate. Former U.S. Defense Attaché to China, Brigadier General Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Air Force, believes this aspect of military relations is essential to defusing contention and promoting cooperation between the two powerful nations.7
Military-to-military contact is a process that is as important as the product. It is a critical lynchpin in Sino-U.S. relations that the United States must continue—regardless of setbacks.
1. "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, February 28, 1972." (Also, see those of 1 January 1979 and 17 August 1982.) The 1972 communiqué was a milestone U.S. acknowledgement that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." In the 1979 communiqué on the "normalization" of diplomatic relations, the United States recognized "the Government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China." The 1982 communiqué included a U.S. pledge to limit arms sales to Taiwan and a promise by Beijing to seek peaceful reunification.
2. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) sets broad guidelines for the entire military-to-military engagement strategy between the United States and China. The elements of this bilateral military exchange program include defense policy visits, high-level visits, professional visits, confidence-building measures, and PLA participation in multinational fora. MMCA is a key element of the confidence-building measures.
3. "Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety," signed in Beijing, China, 19 January 1998.
4. "A Study on Sino-U.S. Maritime Navigation Safety, Including Communications" (MMCA Working Group document), May 1999.
5. Since the Belgrade accident and the F-8 incident are often linked in contemporary accounts, these should be distinguished as separate failures. The Chinese embassy was bombed inadvertently; i.e., the F-8 collision with the EP-3E resulted from poor judgment and procedural error.
6. For example, see The PLA Navy: Past, Present, and Future Prospects, The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA, 2000; and China Reconsiders Its National Security, The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA, 2000.
7. Interview with the U.S. Defense Attaché to China, Brigadier General Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Air Force, 29 March 2000. General Eikenberry was the defense attaché during an especially tumultuous time in the relationship between the two nations.