Capitalizing on the flexibility and mobility of their headquarters on board the Mount Whitney (JCC-20), the staff of NATO's Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic, stands ready to respond to alliance tasking.
Legendary Chinese strategist Sun Tzu observed, "Speed is the essence of war." Though simple, this maxim still rings true today. In modern operations, just like in ancient battles, time is very much of the essence. Indeed, with the ever-present threats of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic cleansing, political and economic instability, and the sudden, unexpected turns of Mother Nature, time could be an operational commander's first—and worst—enemy. Able to respond with little or no notice, the staff of Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic (CSFL), embarked on board the Mount Whitney (JCC-20), can help neutralize that enemy.
The Mount Whitney already is at a very short tether to sail. Provided she is not undergoing extended maintenance and that certain information systems and augmentees are made available, the ship and staff could deploy with about seven days warning. Given sufficient political will, that departure even could be accelerated to as little as 72 hours.
The staff is ready for such a calling. CSFL routinely trains and operates as a team throughout numerous joint and combined exercises annually. In addition, as a parent headquarters, the staff does not have NATO regional responsibilities to hand over, and contingency plans for the rapid transfer of U.S. Second Fleet duties already are in place. It would require only the embarkation of 50 or so critical augmentees to provide a comprehensive short-term planning and command capability during transit to the crisis area, with the main staff augmentation of 350 personnel embarking at any available port en route. This means that CSFL can transit in an operational mode, establishing sufficient command and control of all assigned forces well before the Mount Whitney arrives on station.
Another factor contributing to CSFL's high readiness is that it has a fully functional NATO command-and-control information infrastructure on board the flagship. A declared NATO asset, the Mount Whitney's sophisticated communications suite has been progressively upgraded to meet the requirements of both joint and combined command at the operational level. NATO information systems on board include the maritime command-and-control information system, initial combined air operations center capability, wide area network, NATO initial data transfer system, and the integrated voice switching network. CSFL also routinely conducts video teleconferencing over NATO channels.
CSFL staff technicians also can switch traditionally U.S. systems over to NATO on little or no notice. In preparation for Exercise Unified Spirit 2000 in October, for example, they converted the joint operations center on board from its normal 80% U.S. Navy configuration to a 75% NATO arrangement in less than a week. And with most of the equipment needed to make the change on board permanently, the transition is now easier and faster. It takes just the 30-second changeout of a simple hard drive to convert a U.S. secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNet) machine into a NATO initial data transfer system one. And CSFL does it all the time.
All of this—the integrated staff, its ability to deploy rapidly, and the infrastructure resident in the Mount Whitney—makes it possible to reduce response time in a crisis radically. In fact, CSFL's ability to deploy, plan, and augment simultaneously actually compresses time because the activation phase overlaps deployment, which overlaps the opening of the theater. Employing a sea-based combined joint task force headquarters helps make time a far weaker foe.
Politically Pliable
A second advantage of the sea-based combined joint task force is its political flexibility. Early deployment of CSFL can demonstrate NATO's capability to intervene prior to an actual commitment by all the nations to do so. Should active intervention not be agreed on, it is relatively easy to redeploy a sea-based command platform without loss of face. And if and when the decision to intervene is made, the sea-based headquarters can enter and operate in theater for prolonged periods virtually free of political constraints from regional nations. Without such political complications, that headquarters can keep its options open—from signaling political resolve and acting as a deterrent to preparing for active coercion or humanitarian assistance.
A land-based headquarters is not as nimble. The deployment of an in-country staff requires much advance work and host-nation negotiation. Adequate spaces, force protection, and building security must be accounted for; contracts for services must be let, the headquarters must be constructed, and time must be allotted for personnel to flow in. Just the physical movement of the staff requires predesignated travel routes, airports and railheads, logistics facilities, and local support.
In addition, the arrival of a land-based headquarters inevitably signals a much harsher—and perhaps more permanent—military footprint than do ships at sea. There is no disguising their numbers, their defensive posture, or even their equipment. And boots on the ground often translates publicly to a more aggressive stance.
When this is what the coalition desires—to signal unequivocal presence and resolve—the land-based headquarters certainly serves well. But where subtlety and political elasticity are key, the sea-based combined joint task force headquarters clearly is a great option.
Militarily Flexible
Because of its mobility and its ability to be tailored for operations of varying size and intensity, the sea-based combined joint task force headquarters provides decision makers with an incredibly flexible military tool. Not only can the Mount Whitney be under way in a matter of hours, but she also can move freely within a given theater of operations. The ship's sophisticated communications suite means that she need not be precariously close to the coastline to provide command and control. And although the combined joint task force commander acts primarily through subordinate component commander headquarters, there may be times when direct command of theater troops, including the theater reserve, may be necessary. In such cases, the flagship's mobility will be especially beneficial.
Unlike their land-based counterparts, the Mount Whitney and her embarked staff can move across strategic boundaries as well, permitting CSFL to work readily for either strategic commander. In the upcoming NATO exercise Strong Resolve '02, for example, the staff will plan and conduct a crisis response operation in Poland under the strategic command of Supreme Allied Command Atlantic and then later chop to Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
This freedom of movement is a force multiplier and enhances CSFL's ability to conduct a broad range of missions. Though optimized for crisis response, the staff can effectively command traditional military operations, up to and including outright hostilities. Arriving quickly on scene, the sea-based headquarters can take command of enabling and reaction forces, conduct maritime intercept operations, establish both air and sea exclusion zones, monitor embargo restrictions, and coordinate the planning and operations of all coalition forces in theater—air, ground, or maritime.
Dependent on the scenario, command elements of some component headquarters also may be embarked in the flagship. This is particularly useful for distant operations with little or no available host-nation support or when the entry environment is not permissive. There are spaces set aside for the combined joint forces land component commander (CJFLCC) and combined joint forces air component commander (CJFACC), as well as limited room for elements of the combined joint forces special operations and psychological operations component commanders and others. Command elements of components would have to maintain a reach-back capability until their main headquarters could be established in theater, but the flagship provides a place to begin planning. CSFL practices this arrangement on a regular basis. During U.S. joint task force and NATO exercises the CJFLCC, CJFACC, and combined joint forces maritime component commander have been collocated aboard.
This arrangement eventually may prove untenable for the CJFLCC; once ground forces are introduced in great number they are better led from ashore. The sea-based combined joint task force headquarters is not—nor has it ever been—intended to replace its ground-based counterparts. For many operations, there simply is no substitute for having a headquarters in theater, but the sea-based variant can complement the former and in those cases where a more permanent presence is desired, provide an interim planning and coordination capability until such can be established.
For the CJFACC, however, the Mount Whitney provides a viable, secure, and technologically advanced alternative from which to work. The component commander's spaces on board can accommodate a staff of some 150 personnel and include the breadth of the ship's national and NATO command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C41) systems. When fully operational, an embarked CJFACC can generate 300-500 sorties per day.
One of the big advantages is the ship's area air defense control system (AADC). AADC is an advanced planning and execution tool that provides the operational commander a near-real-time view of the battle space by fusing data from existing sensor sources, such as tactical data links and theater sensors. Significant improvements in automation mean fewer staff are required to perform these roles, and what used to take days and hours to plan and execute now takes minutes. The system even has a built-in wargaming capability that subjects an air defense plan to a simulation test against possible enemy courses of action and provides the commander a quantitative analysis of the plan's effectiveness.
The AADC installation aboard the Mount Whitney is one of only two deployed prototype systems developed by the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University and has been used during numerous exercises and fleet battle experiments with resounding success. It is the most advanced air defense planning and display system of its kind anywhere in the world.
Critics might argue that being embarked aboard ship severely limits the CJFAAC's ability to lead an air campaign of any magnitude. A full-fledged CJFACC ashore, after all, can handle sorties in excess of 2,500 daily. In addition, for long-reach inland strikes, rapid battle damage assessment, and overall situational awareness, there is no substitute for "being there." These are valid arguments, but to execute those 2,500 sorties, a land-based CJFACC would require almost as many people. And it would be heavily reliant on host-nation or regional nation support. For modest air campaign planning or for those instances when host-nation support lags, the sea-based CJFACC is a viable alternative. At minimum, it gives the CJFACC a venue through which a liaison group can be placed afloat to coordinate and deconflict efforts with the other components.
Another idea involves splitting the CJFACC, embarking the core command element afloat and keeping the reach-back support functions ashore. It is a notion still in the early stage of development, but it demonstrates the unique flexibility of the sea-based combined joint task force headquarters model.
Organic Sustainment and Force Protection
Having a force ready and on station means little if that force cannot be sustained and protected. The same is true of the headquarters. Operational sustainment and force protection offer a headquarters staff a certain staying power, and in military operations today, where deployment length often is unknown at the outset, that ability to persevere in theater can make all the difference to coalition unity and credibility. Here again, the sea-based combined joint task force headquarters holds advantage. With its maritime nature—mobility, afloat logistics, and minimal footprint ashore—it possesses organic sustainment and force protection capabilities.
Logistics long has been considered a critical operational function. It furnishes, to paraphrase one military strategist, the "stage management" for the drama that is war. But coalition operations have added a new dimension, bringing into view the challenges of logistics on a multi-national scale. In his article "NATO's Bold New Concept," Lieutenant Colonel Charles Barry put the issue into perspective: "Combined joint task force logistical support will be one of the greatest challenges for an alliance that has known only interior lines of communication, fixed bases, and a wealth of host nation support," he writes. "NATO's infrastructure, logistics planning, and support must meet rapid deployments, long and potentially unsecured lines of communication, and bare base operations."
It is with regard to the latter—rapid deployment, unsecured lines of communication, and bare base operations—that a sea-based combined joint task force headquarters has no peer. Thanks to afloat logistics, CSFL can operate for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support. Maritime underway replenishment ensures that needed equipment, stores, and staples are not a limiting factor for prolonged presence. To be sure, there are several elements of the sea-based headquarters that must be placed ashore, such as the multinational joint logistics center, the allied press information center, and the civil-military cooperation center. These will require some host-nation infrastructure support, particularly with regard to office space, transportation, and security. But their overall footprint is considerably smaller than that of the headquarters itself, and afloat logistics also can be employed to help mitigate some of those support requirements placed on the host nation.
The fact that the headquarters is at sea also provides a modicum of force protection for the command element. Should a missile threat arise from ashore, the flagship can move out of harm's way. Such is not the case with land-based headquarters, which are anchored ashore and must take broad and sweeping measures to provide for security. In addition, the headquarters flagship can be sheltered readily under the protection of a maritime task group without materially compromising either party's missions or tasks.
Some may argue that as a high-value asset, the Mount Whitney surely will be the first target for opposition forces and that because of this constant threat, the flagship will have to be moved farther and farther away, losing effectiveness. Nothing could be less true. Far from being weaknesses, the ship's escorts and her mobility are real and tangible strengths. Thanks to her sophisticated technology, the Mount Whitney can offer command and control regardless of where she is, and while the protection of assigned forces always will be a concern to the sea-based combined joint task force commander, the need to protect his headquarters need not preoccupy him. Aboard the flagship, it will not.
The Road Ahead
Two principal milestones mark implementation of NATO's combined joint task force concept: initial operating capability (IOC) in September 2002 and final operational capability (FOC) scheduled for 2004. By IOC, CSFL must attain and maintain the required high readiness posture, and FOC is dependent on the procurement of deployable communications modules, support units, and an augmentee training program.
Attaining IOC is CSFL's focus. Using a tailored exercise program that began with Strong Resolve '98, the staff has been developing the structures, procedures, and capabilities required to command at the operational level. For example, a crisis establishment manning document totaling more than 500 billets has been created, as have clear and concise standing operating procedures for a combined joint task force headquarters built around the CSFL core staff. Given to any augmentee, the standing operating procedures comprehensively outline the functions, roles, and objectives of each component and support area.
Next March, the Mount Whitney will deploy to the Baltic with a combined joint task force commander embarked to command a NATO-led peace-support operation in support of Strong Resolve '02. It will be the largest and most complex NATO exercise in history, and it also will provide the opportunity for CSFL to validate our efforts and achieve IOC.
Ultimate success for the combined joint task force concept, argues Lieutenant Colonel Barry, "depends upon innovative thinking and a serious commitment to adapt." He is right on the mark, of course. An initiative this bold and sweeping will require a shift in the way NATO nations look at deploying their forces. At CSFL, the staff has taken this approach to refining the sea-based variant.
The sea-based combined joint task force headquarters may not be the only answer to modern problems, but it certainly may prove a leading one. Highly responsive, politically and militarily flexible, and already well on its way to implementation, the sea-based combined joint task force headquarters concept offers a viable and tangible option for decision makers. In the right circumstances, it can and should be NATO's first tool of choice. As that versatile tool, CSFL is ready now to answer the alliance's call.
Admiral Mullen is Commander, Second Fleet/Striking Fleet Atlantic.