Peacetime military engagement, peace-support operations, low-intensity conflict, operations other than war, or whatever else we choose to call these nonwar operations will continue to be realities regardless of the rhetoric ricocheting around Washington. U.S. commitment to such operations is tied to our national interests, to our military's purpose and readiness, and to our nation's responsibility as a world leader. If we view military engagement only as landing craft assaulting Omaha Beach on D-Day, then our armed forces will have limited purpose in today's environment as a contributor to our national power.
Winning our nation's wars is without a doubt the military's first priority, but U.S. global interests will continue to demand a broad range of other types of engagements to prevent war. The issue is not do we, but how do we make these other engagements fit into our national strategy while maintaining the required readiness to win wars.
New Threats
Threats to our nation's welfare are numerous, and although they may not be as clear to us as were our enemies of World War II or the Cold War, they are real nonetheless. These threats are tied to our quality of life and economic and informational well-being, as well as to our commitment to alliances and to the pursuit of freedom around the world.
Yes, the United States is the world's undisputed military, information, and economic superpower, but this status is dependent on the global information and economic network. Failed countries, transnational criminal organizations, terrorism, ethnic intolerance, mass migrations, volatile international finance, and overdependency on shared commercial information produce conditions that, if not engaged with diplomacy and/or military response, can escalate and adversely affect our nation. Consider Russia, bursting at the seams with internal economic and political strife but still wielding massive nuclear capability—a world power partly controlled by international crime. Or China, whose mounting tensions with Taiwan and its neighbors challenge regional security. The Middle East continues to be a powder keg. Drug wars rage on in Colombia, Mexico, and Asia, and trafficking by organized crime, dependent on the U.S. market, has challenged our security at home.
Globalization has brought us closer together, but it also has made us more vulnerable. Our country's prosperity depends on free market economies, open trade routes, protected foreign investment, and the fiscal stability of trading partners. Instantaneous communications, the "CNN" factor, and the Internet bring immediate public awareness and pressure to crises. It is impossible to "hunker down" within our borders and disengaged ourselves from the rest of the world. The threats we face are ambiguous, multifaceted, and dangerous, and they are linked inextricably to our national interests.
Operational Reality
As the world's sole superpower, a member of the U.N. Security Council, the leader of NATO, and a symbol of freedom around the world, we must be a team player; we must be involved globally. But how much involvement? And how much military involvement? Commitment to war to help an ally is easy to understand and support. As Vice President Dick Cheney noted in a speech in Washington early this year, "Children everywhere—from Israel to England, from Brazil to Japan—know that, if their country is attacked, the U.S. will be there to help." To counter terrorism with a daring Delta Force rescue, to evacuate U.S. citizens with a Marine expeditionary force, to open commercial trade routes with a Navy battle group show of force, or to strike Saddam's Republican Guard found out of sector with Air Force strike aircraft are acceptable other-than-war operations. But to commit our armed forces to open-ended ambiguous operations with no clear ties to our national interests in places such as Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans is questionable to the American people and Congress. At issue in these peace-support operations (PSOs) is not only the national will to commit but also the legality of commitment—jus ad bellum (that the cause is just) as well as jus in bello (that actions taken are just).
National leaders have exchanged many words over our nation's need to commit to these PSOs. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice told the New York Times, "We don't need the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten." General Wesley Clark, while in command of NATO forces, said, "If you can make a difference, you should; the U.S. can, and should." In his book My American Journey, Colin Powell relates that Madeleine Albright once asked him, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" General Powell responded, "American GIs are not toy soldiers to be moved around on some game board."
Arguments continue to go back and forth, and include comments from foreign leaders. Retired Canadian Army Major General Lewis MacKenzie, who commanded the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia in 1990 and 1991, said in a spring 2000 Washington Post interview, "We middle powers should handle the peacekeeping duties while the U.S. maintains a deterrence force capable of fighting and winning a major war anywhere, anytime."
General MacKenzie is right about the United States being able to win wars, but seldom is it that clear-cut. What constitutes war today may not look like Desert Storm, the Korean War, or World War II. Is a cyber attack by a nonstate adversary from the safe haven of a fractured nation against the New York Stock Exchange, the air traffic control system in Europe, or the power grid in Moscow war? Was that fractured nation lost to insurgents, transnational criminals, or terrorists because of noninvolvement by the international community? Will the conflict in Kosovo be confined to that state, or is it just the first phase of a larger war that will spread through the Presevo Valley of Serbia and the mountains of northern Macedonia? Will the cause of the Kosovo Liberation Army disrupt the international trade route between Greece and Central Europe, topple the Macedonian government, or discourage foreign economic investment essential to the establishment of a free market economy in the region? Do we, should we, care? What would happen if we left as we did in Somalia or Haiti?
According to a 2000 U.N. report, here have been 54 peace-support operations set up by the United Nations since 1948. Of these, two-thirds have been established since Desert Storm. By the end of 2000, the United Nations still sponsored 15. These operations reached their peak in 1993 with 78,000 international peacekeepers deployed. By the end of 2000 there were 38,000 peacekeepers still at work around the globe. The reality is as Dag Hammarskjold once said, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it."
The United States must be involved to some extent, and not only from 15,000 feet. To have relevance and credibility you need boots on the ground. Unfortunately, we steer from large troop deployments, perceive there to be no tolerance for casualties, and have an excessive concern over collateral damage. This puts unnecessary pressure on field commanders with excessive force protection requirements and rules of engagement that are unrealistic for the environment. And once our forces are committed, we have trouble establishing a coherent exit strategy.
Readiness
Degradation of readiness is the usual argument for not getting our military involved in peace-support operations. Readiness is affected during these operations, but it also is enhanced. The current commander of U.S. forces in Kosovo noted that although some warfighting skills for larger units are degraded, overall the mission has sharpened the skills of the troops deployed.
The learning opportunities for junior leaders are tremendous. Troops learn to operate in uncertain, risky situations, carry live ammunition, patrol rugged terrain, use demolitions, operate their equipment, and gain experience working with allies and the people they support. Many U.S. Army units deployed on a six-month PSO from Germany actually conducted more combat training in a two-year period than like combat units in the United States. Most readiness issues are not the result of peace-support missions but of poor personnel management policies, worn out equipment, and underresourced training.
The Civil-Military Gap
Another challenge of peace-support operations is the task achievement gap between the military and nonmilitary components. The usual goals for a peace-support operation are to establish democratic governance, rule of law, and a free-market economy, and all elements participating in the operation are assigned tasks to support these goals. For the military, it is to create a secure environment in which the international community can operate. This is achieved rather quickly compared to, for example, the World Bank's or the U.N. High Commission for Rufugees' longer term tasks. As a result, the military is pushed to do more, which creates friction because these additional tasks are not in the military's mission statement, nor was it trained to conduct them. When adversaries are able to find and exploit these weaknesses in the seams of the international community, chaos results. Without a coordinated civil/military team effort the required political, economic, social, informational, and security objectives will never be reached. The media usually focus on the military, but the military is only a piece of the overall effort.
Making Peacetime Military Engagement Work
With the ongoing military strategy reviews and service transformation concepts, we have an excellent opportunity to shape our peacetime commitments so they not only provide assistance to those in need but also support our readiness for war. We can sharpen intervention criteria and commit our military in a prudent manner.
First, we should focus on peace enforcement (military combat operations conducted by U.N.-authorized forces in which combat power or threat of combat power is used to compel compliance) and not peacekeeping (noncombat military operations conducted by U.N.-authorized forces with the consent of all belligerent parties to monitor and facilitate an agreement). More peace-enforcement tasks crosswalk with combat operations than do peacekeeping tasks. This is important for readiness as well as for resourcing precious time for training.
Second, during force allocation conferences under U.N. or NATO pre-mission planning, the United States should concentrate on supporting the upfront portion of peace-enforcement operations, when our unmatched global reach and ability to conduct out-of-area operations are most needed. We have the responsive force, strategic deployment capability, logistical framework, and offensive organization to handle multiple threats. This is the type of response required for small-scale contingencies and for war; thus, focusing on the upfront portion of peace-enforcement operations will improve combat readiness.
Third, we should rotate our response forces out in three to six months, as the mission shifts from securing and stabilizing warring factions to infrastructure and nation building, and rotate in coalition forces focused on long-term peace-support operations. Our commitment at this time should shift to maintaining a civil-military presence: military police, engineers, civil and public affairs specialists, medical, legal, logistical, and psychological support personnel, intelligence, special forces, etc. These advisory/support forces made up of active and reserve units would benefit from experience on the ground with coalition forces, working in the local culture and using their technical skills. In Bosnia and in Kosovo, these forces were able to do things they could only simulate in training at home: information warfare, bridge building, treating gunshot wounds, operating detainee camps, and dealing with indigenous personnel, to name a few.
Constabulary Forces Aren't the Answer
To stop the perceived erosion of combat readiness and to close the civil-military gap, many advocate the creation of constabulary forces from a portion of our military. This approach has not proved successful in the past.
In 1950, U.S. constabulary troops were rushed from Japan to Korea to stop the North Korean offensive. Because their organization was not prepared for combat, they paid a terrible price. Any military force must be prepared to transition from one mission to another, and peace-support operations can transition to combat in minutes. Somalia went from a humanitarian assistance mission, to a peace-enforcement operation, to a combat operation overnight. Units must deploy to these operations combat ready.
Specialized constabulary units would be good for only one task—constabulary duty. As Army Historian Brigadier General John Brown points out, creating a constabulary force is a waste of resources and too big a risk.
Fourth, the United States should provide the rapid reaction reserve for contingencies and surge operations during peace-enforcement missions. Examples might include deploying airborne forces out of Italy for paradrop into Bosnia, light armored forces out of Germany for air-land operations in Kosovo, or a Marine expeditionary unit for amphibious operations in East Timor. Deployments would be rehearsed in theaters supporting peace-support operations, and our forces would gain from training under the various conditions of the region concerned. The U.N. or NATO peace force would benefit from the show of force, which would demonstrate international commitment and resolve.
Fifth, we need to help close the capability gap between military and nonmilitary entities by building a civilian auxiliary force trained and ready to assist in peace-support operations. This auxiliary force would be on call like our military reserves and would include police, judicial experts, city planners, and retired, experienced military and State Department personnel. On arrival, they would team with the international community to train local and coalition nonmilitary personnel working on institutional and infrastructure issues.
Sixth, if the United States commits, we must go in early, when we have the best chance to affect the crisis, before a human catastrophe occurs, and to shape the environment for the long-term commitment of the coalition force. As Henry Kissinger noted, "The early stages of a problem, when positions are still fluid and ambiguous, present the best opportunity for creative diplomacy." This holds true for the commitment of military force. It means employing all means available—not a gradual, piecemeal response that sacrifices initiative and momentum.
Seventh, we must enhance readiness while deployed. There are training opportunities on any operation, from marksmanship and medical tasks to squad live-fire maneuver. This requires an innovative, resourceful, and aggressive force and support from above, and it will be easier to accomplish if the force deploys with a slightly larger contingent so units and troops can be rotated from peace-enforcement duties to in-country training areas and back again. If the United States commits to a peacekeeping mission, we must insist on a concurrent readiness opportunity. For example, as part of our involvement in the Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai, in Egypt—where our battalions have rotated in and out for more than 18 years with little readiness benefit—we should demand a desert live-fire/maneuver opportunity for every deployed unit. This not only would provide desert warfare and live-fire and maneuver experience to our rotating units, but also would afford combined training opportunities with the Egyptians and Israelis—a more comprehensive deterrent than we present today.
Eighth, we must avoid developing a garrison mentality during peace-support operations. The United States should deploy and support the force as close to combat conditions as possible. We should not try to create a "little America" everywhere we go but should use these deployments to live and operate as we would in combat.
Ninth, we should optimize opportunities to test new concepts, organizations, equipment, and tactics and techniques. We could use peace-support operations to validate technological developments such as unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, intelligence-gathering equipment, nonlethal weapons, and rapid decisive operations. New capabilities in strategic air and sealift, use of prepositioned stock, and improved logistics packages could be vetted. Opportunities to pursue and modify new tactics and techniques regarding information warfare, operating in urban and other restricted terrain, and coalition/joint interoperability would be beneficial.
Be the Hunter, Not the Prey
Peace-support operations can enhance combat readiness if structured and supported properly. As a world leader, the United States must be active in shaping the environment to ensure our future well-being. We must tighten our belt on peace-support commitments, but when we do commit, we must go in prepared to succeed and to make a difference, and not waste our military's time with half-hearted efforts.
General Grange is executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation. During his 30 years of active service in the U.S. Army, he served as an aviator, infantryman, Ranger, Green Beret, and member of Delta Force. Prior to retirement, he was Commanding General of the First Infantry Division in Germany, which included operations in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. He is coauthor of Air-Mech-Strike: 3-Dimensional Phalanx (Turner, 2000). <table summary=">