The term "lightweight" rarely applies to anything involving the U.S. Marine Corps. But in this case, light weight—specifically with the Marmon-Herrington tank (offloading here in trials from a standard Navy 50-foot motor sailer)—was the name of the game. The author of the new Naval Institute Press book, Marines Under Armor, tells the strange tale of "the Marine Tank of 1936."
In the Marine Corps, "lightness" has become a credo of almost mythical proportions. Some precursors of this emerged with the formation of the first Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in the 1930s. Ship and landing-craft characteristics dictated minimal size for various weapons and equipment to be carried by the nascent landing force. This requirement shaped the procurement of the Marmon-Herrington light tank, dubbed the Marine Tank of 1936. In literature concerning armored vehicles, authors have dismissed the Marmon-Herrington as an experimental vehicle abandoned by the Corps by 1939. Such was not the case, however.
At the end of 1933, the FMF replaced the old Marine Corps Expeditionary Force—evidence that the Corps would focus on amphibious operations and base defense for the fleet. The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934) underscored the utility of tanks in future operations and called for their landing early in an assault. The Army light tank models, however, already had reached the ten-ton mark by the mid-1930s, and Navy cargo-handling gear available on most ships imposed a five-ton limit. Thus, the Corps moved to pursue independent development of a very light tank.
Initially, Marine Corps budgeting for the FMF permitted only the Quantico-based 1st Brigade to be outfitted in the first three years, and the West Coast 2d Brigade, based at San Diego, was to remain with just one infantry regiment on hand. Plans in 1934 programmed only a single tank company therefore, with 15 tanks. The tank envisioned at that time was a three-tonner, carrying a 1.1-inch automatic gun, or a 37-mm cannon, plus .30-caliber machine guns, armored to resist small arms and .50-caliber rounds and capable of speeds between 25 and 30 miles per hour.
Of course, such vehicles had yet to be developed, and these initial specifications carried a certain aspect of fantasy (i.e., a 37-mm gun on a three-ton chassis, with such protection as specified). At this point, however, the staff ruled out amphibious tanks for the Corps, because they could not handle the open seas expected three to six miles offshore. Instead, Navy lighters would be procured, presumably capable of 13 knots, fitted with bow ramps and three pairs of .30-caliber machine guns. Alas, such landing craft remained at the same level of fantasy as the light but well-armed tank.
Rapid decisions continued toward the creation of a Marine Corps tank arm in 1935. Even though no tanks were on hand, the Commandant, Major General John H. Russell, obtained Army approval for a Marine Corps officer to attend its tank course, then taught at Fort Benning, Georgia.4 Headquarters sent orders to Captain (later Brigadier General) Hartnoll J. Withers, a 1926 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who had enlisted in the Corps in 1920. Experienced from duty in Nicaragua and Haiti, he had just completed sea duty on the cruiser Chicago (CA-29). His crucial contributions to the Marine Corps tank arm qualify him in every sense as a pioneer in the field.
Finally, on 29 November 1935, General Russell directed his quartermaster to "initiate steps for the procurement of five (5) light fighting tanks."
The characteristics specified for the Marine Corps "light fighting tank" were as follows:
1. Medium weight [not more than 9,500 pounds] and two-man crew
2. Performance:
- Speed: 30 mph maximum, 20 mph sustained
- Range: 125 miles in 10 hours
- Turning: 18-foot diameter
- Ford 40 inches water
- Cross 50-inch trench, climb 22 inches, drop 48 inches vertical obstacle
3. Armament:
- two .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine guns with 2,000 and 500 rounds respectively of ammunition, or
- two .30-caliber and one 37-mm gun with 2,000 and 100 rounds of ammunition
4. Armor protection: 1/2 to 1/4 inch
The requirements proved highly optimistic for a combat vehicle on a mere 9,500-pound weight regime, and the resulting vehicle would provide endless headaches for the Corps, earning little benefit for the "lightness" it provided.
Although various firms and the Army's Ordnance Department received tenders for offer, the eventual successful bidder, the Marmon-Herrington Company of Indianapolis, already was demonstrating its candidate vehicle at Quantico on 6 December, barely a week after the Commandant had ordered procurement actions.
The Marmon-Herrington CTL-3 (combat tank, light) was a turretless, two-man tank employing the Lincoln V-12 engine and rubber-band track over a quadruple bogie-wheel suspension to move at a maximum speed of 33 miles per hour. Equipped with dual driving controls, it carried three ball mounts in the hull front for the intended weapons. It reflected the company's experience in truck manufacture (including many novel four-wheel-drive designs) as well as its understandably limited experience with armored vehicle design and production. For instance, the CTL-3 used a truck type air-boosted track locking system for steering. The tankers found it too weak and vulnerable to breakdown and requested a redesign that would incorporate a conventional controlled differential steering. The truck-type differential in the CTL was not handling the stresses generated by pivoting, compared to the lesser requirement of compensating for torque differences when a truck makes a normal turn. The company responded that the truck parts enabled the CTL to stay below the five-ton weight limit and that no other design would work, nor could a controlled differential simply be dropped into the present design.
Despite some reservations voiced by the Marines, the pilot CTL-3 managed to pass its tests, and the Navy contracting office accepted it on 5 June 1936 and ordered the remainder of the contract executed. The five CTL-3s arrived at Quantico on 22 February 1937, all equipped with machine guns. Not surprisingly, no CTL-3 ever carried a 37-mm cannon, and the obsolete model M1916 originally envisioned would have produced little of tactical value. Withers activated the 1st Tank Company, Ist Marine Brigade, on 1 March 1937, although it remained a mere platoon in terms of equipment and personnel for a considerable time. That summer, two more officers joined the company from the Fort Benning course, First Lieutenants Robert L. Denig Jr. (later Brigadier General) and Hector de Zayas (killed in action as a lieutenant colonel in 1944). Withers turned over command of the company to de Zayas in October and returned to the Marmon-Herrington plant as the inspector. The latter then prepared the company to take its five CTL-3s to the Caribbean for Fleet Exercise Number Four.
Only one prototype Navy landing craft served the exercise force, so the landing at Culebra Island proved an administrative matter of shuttling the five Marmon-Herringtons ashore. The platoon moved aggressively against the defenses, however, and routed the reserve as it arrived in trucks on the mock battlefield. During a second landing exercise, conducted at nearby Vieques Island, the tank platoon split to support both sides of the exercise. The landing force's tank lighter transported its tank to the beach with the initial assault wave, and it was credited with the neutralization and destruction of beach defenses in support of the assaulting infantry. The rest of the platoon, ashore with the defenders, later made a spirited counterattack, routing a company on foot and placing the entire landing in jeopardy. All concerned agreed that the tanks demonstrated "great possibilities" and that they could contribute mightily to every phase of the missions tested.
De Zayas remained critical of the CTL-3's performance, however, and his reports characterized it as unreliable and underpowered for cross-country maneuvering. Predictably, the two-man crew had difficulties handling three machine guns as well as their other crew duties. The absence of a turret left the vehicle vulnerable on the sides and rear. The company commander also noted that, since the Navy was able to lift the 21-ton tank lighter from the transport and place it in the sea, a heavier tank ought to be considered for landing-force use, especially some of the newer light tanks then entering service with the Army.
These and other criticisms of the CTL-3 scarcely interrupted the acquisitions plan, though, as the Corps already had contracted for a second platoon of tanks with Marmon-Herrington on 14 September. Engineering changes in this production run aimed at correcting design weaknesses but not the basic arrangements of the CTL-3. A Hercules engine and a strengthened suspension proved to be the major improvements. These tanks would be designated CTL-3A.
At the end of 1937, members of the Marine Corps Equipment Board saw no need to alter the existing plan, despite the diverse opinions already surfacing on the CTL-3 design. In its status report of that month, the board opined:
Tanks: Last February the Marine Corps purchased a number of light tanks which were designed exclusively for Marine Corps use and built by the Marmon-Herrington Company of Indianapolis. The particular distinguishing feature of this tank is its comparative lightness, being limited by specifications to not over five (5) tons weight which is considered to be the limit for handling by ordinary cargo carriers without special equipment. In order to stay within this weight requirement it was necessary to sacrifice to some degree features which would otherwise be desirable in a military tank. ...
Although being far from perfect at the present time it is believed that with the continued cooperation of the manufacturer and the continued valuable suggestions of the personnel of the Tank Company we will have a valuable weapon that is particularly adapted to Marine Corps requirements, which no other tank now in existence meets.
Additional tanks are now in the process of manufacture which it is believed will have considerable improvements over the present model. The Board has no reason to believe that these will be perfect either, as tanks are essentially mechanical monstrosities which contain within themselves many diametrically opposed features. The history of tank development since the World War indicates that it is largely a process of "trial and error" and fraught with considerable expense.
The board's optimistic forecast proved more than the CTL-3A could achieve. The pilot model failed its trials repeatedly. Marmon-Herrington engineers and management insisted that all failures would be rectified by refurbishing the pilot tank or implementing minor redesigns. They stipulated that the pilot proved to be a distinct improvement over the CTL-3. The tank committee of the equipment board, led by Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., remained adamant. To them, the failures—the shearing off of a road wheel after 121 miles on a road march, for example—seemed decisive. The board moved on 1 September 1938 to terminate the contract but allowed one last test to prove whether the defects could in fact be rectified.
The crucial retrial came at the contractor's expense. On 25 November, the Commandant notified the Bureau of Supply that he approved the recommendation of the board to accept the tank, despite its being 390 pounds overweight and its having failed to climb a 22-inch vertical concrete step (it did climb 18 inches). On 23 December, Marmon-Herrington received its contract for the five CTL-3A tanks.
The second platoon of tanks, all CTL-3A "improved" light tanks, entered Marine Corps service on 16 June 1939, more than two years after the 1st Tank Company stood up and just less than four years since Commandant Russell had ordered the initial procurement. But the tortuous establishment of the new armored fighting vehicle arm was only half over.
Colonel Shepherd already had begun to take steps to correct evident deficiencies in the tank program, both in concept and execution. His influence prompted the board to begin work on changing the Commandant's policy.
Shepherd related later how he accosted the Marine Corps staff:
I said, "Who wrote these specifications?" Well, I won't mention his name. I had previously made investigations that the booms on the transports, at least one or two of them were fifteen ton booms. I said, "why the hell do we have to have a five ton tank with a fifteen ton boom. Why don't you increase the weight of the tank to seven tons?" We can make a good tank weighing seven tons, but we can't get it down to five.
Colonel Shepherd urged the abandonment of the Marine tank policy in favor of standard Army machines.
It is the opinion of this [tank and motor transport] committee that any future tanks procured by the Marine Corps be purchased from the Army. The funds available to the [Army] Ordnance Corps for research, development and test, and their resources for production, are far superior to the mediocre facilities and limited funds of the Marine Corps for development of a special type vehicle manufactured by a civilian concern. Although the characteristics of the Army tank may not be ideal for landing operations, their many excellent features and assurity [sic] of procurement make their adoption by the Marine Corps desirable.
The pressure on the board mounted in 1939, for the full requirements of the two-brigade force had to be met, as the available manpower allowed the FMF to fill its ranks. The Marmon-Herrington "Marine Tank" was continuing to develop, but the Army tank program, based on key engineering developments accomplished in the 1930s, was progressing at astounding speed. Navy landing craft already existed in prototype and planning, which foresaw the handling of tanks in the 20-ton range.
Shepherd's appeal stuck, for perhaps the evidence had become too overwhelming. The staff memo to the Commandant proposed a moratorium on new tank purchases until the 1941 procurement plan. Noting that the second platoon of Marmon-Herringtons would reach Quantico in August, and no maneuvers would be held until the following winter, the Plans and Policy Division staff recommended deferring future acquisition, pending tests of new tanks, with more funds anticipated in 1941.
The 1st Tank Company, commanded by Captain Charles G. "Griffey" Meints and his executive officer, First Lieutenant [later Lieutenant General] William R. "Rip" Collins, both graduates of the 1938-39 tank course at Fort Benning, was to participate in Fleet Exercise Number Six. They would take both platoons of CTL-3 and -3A tanks as well as a single Army light tank, the new M2A4, which showed that it could operate from these landing craft quite well, although the suspension system proved vulnerable to saltwater, causing some consternation among the tankers. The newer model CTL-3A handled much better with a wider (10.5-inch) band track, proving that the Marmon-- Herrington engineers could improve as well.
The Commandant wanted to wait no longer to build that tank company, for the Marine Corps budget swelled with each congressional debate over defense readiness and the necessary expansion of forces in 1940. He instructed the president of the equipment board that experience indicated the need for improvements to light tanks since the last procurement. Anticipating funds for 18-20 new tanks, he requested specifications for these tanks by mid-April.
On 3 April 1940, the board sat in full-day session. It advocated buying improved Marmon-Herrington 12,500-pound tanks and a new, three-man turreted tank of 18,000 pounds. The operational concept provided for using the smaller tank for clearing the immediate beach area in an assault, with the heavier, more capable tank used for operations inland. General Holcomb signed the order that day.
This decision produced fast action. The Commandant ordered the quartermaster on 19 April to buy both types of tanks as soon as bids had been received. He also ordered modernization of the original platoon of CTL-3s to the new standard.
Events moved far too rapidly for normal peacetime planning, however. As the Battle of France ensued, and the British Army retreated from the European continent, the Commandant received a disturbing memo from his chief planner, Brigadier General Charles D. Barrett, the chief architect of the 1930s amphibious doctrine. Noting that the Corps had 10 Marmon-Herrington tanks in hand, 20 more on their way, and a further 5 of the new turreted nine-tonners on order, Barrett asserted that more urgent measures had become necessary.
First. The present war has demonstrated the great effectiveness of tanks, and the relative numbers of tanks to other arms has been greater than formerly thought desirable. Second. It seems probable that in a number of cases, that the FMF could land without opposition and would then be called upon to defend a relatively large area. In this event a fast striking force would constitute the best defense. Third. The possibility of being ordered on operations before new tanks can be built has been increased. In this case, Army tanks actually on hand would constitute the only supply. It is believed that Army tanks could be secured if the emergency were sufficiently great.
The equipment board recommended procurement of Army light tanks for the East and West Coast brigades as soon as possible. Tank companies assigned to those brigades would be required before any tank that had been recommended by the board could be developed. On 8 July 1940, the Secretary of the Navy requested 36 Army light tanks from the Secretary of the Army.
The East and West Coast brigades expanded to division-size organizations on 1 February 1941. As new regiments formed and an expansion of tank companies to battalions ensued, the old Marmon-Herrington tanks went to the division special troops with their newly designated scout companies, leaving the M2A4-equipped 3d and 4th Tank Companies as cadre for the new battalions. Both the 1st and 2d Scout Companies operated the rebuilt Marmon-Herrington CTL-3M tanks and the four-wheel M3A1 armored scout car.
The Commandant ordered M3 tanks in March 1941 to complete the requirement for the first two tank battalions, which were to operate three companies of light tanks and a fourth of Marmon-Herringtons. The new turretless CTL-6 pilot vehicle passed inspection in May. Curiously, the same armament of three machine guns, all .30-caliber, remained in separate ball mountings for the two-man crew to operate. The new three-man turreted tank, called the CTM-3TBD, carried two .50-caliber machine guns in the turret and retained the three machine guns in the front hull. New suspension designs resembled the M2A4 system. The new tanks proved to be overweight by 1,870 (CTL-6) and 2,680 (CTM-3TBD) pounds, but quibbling had subsided at this point.
After modifications to prevent accidental fires, headquarters shipped the CTL-6s and the turreted CTM-3TBDs to the two divisions in February and March 1942. But the battalion commanders apparently had convinced their division commanders about the futility of operating the Marmon-Herringtons in combat, and the tanks were taken out of the battalions in May and June.
The amphibious corps commanders then ordered the Marmon-Herringtons into the 1st and 2d Separate Tank Companies on the East and West Coasts. They were to deploy to Samoa with the 3d and 22d Marines to reinforce the garrison there. These new regiments and tank companies would replace the reinforced 7th and 8th Marines and allow those units to return to their divisions. The lst Separate Tank Company landed on Uvea in the Wallis Island group. The 2d Company remained in British Samoa with the 22d Marines, joined by the tank platoon, 1st Scout Company. Thus, almost the entire Marine Corps Marmon-Herrington tank inventory served its last days in support of the Samoa garrisons.
The separate tank companies operated them there until the companies returned to the United States with their regiments in March 1943. They left most of their tanks behind, dug in as pillboxes.
The amphibious requirements of 1934 caused Commandant Russell to include "light fighting tanks" in his list of components needed for the formation of the Fleet Marine Force and dedicated to the amphibious assault and defense of forward naval bases. The Corps' unique pursuit of a tankette in the 1930s stemmed from the limited view of beach defenses and the restricted capacity that ships and craft of the period displayed. In effect, the Marine Corps needed only enough of a tank to land, knock out opposing machine guns, then accompany the infantry inland to support a short-term operation. Here were the beginnings of "lightness" as a Marine Corps dogma.
Colonel Estes is the editor of Marine Officer’s Guide and Handbook for Marine NCOs, both published by the Naval Institute Press. A 1969 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he trained as a tank officer and retired from the Marine Corps in 1993.