To answer this question, we must look at two areas: war fighting and peacetime requirements.
To fight a war—and win—we must evaluate the enemy and determine which submarine capabilities we will need to field and at what levels. Going to battle against a foe with an insignificant naval force and no submarines is quite different from going against one that has a large inventory of top-end diesel or nuclear-powered submarines. Depending on the situation, U.S. attack submarines (SSNs) could be called on to conduct antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare (cruise missile attack), mine laying and detection, special forces insertion, surveillance, indication and warning (I&W), or battle group support. We then can develop scenarios based on world politics and military might and extrapolate them into the future, determining requirements for a large-scale wartime scenario or two that would include significant U.S. support. If we can meet these "best guess" requirements, we also can meet any other smaller contingency that comes up.
In peacetime today, the submarine force is sized by taking the critical requirements levied by all commanders and deciding which ones we can do. Other complicated factors go into the equation—such as the percentage of time a submarine is at sea (operating tempo), the percentage of time a submarine is away from home port (home-port tempo), maintenance periods, and port visits—but the requirements that are done on deployments are the ones that size the force. Submarines provide forward presence for surveillance, I&W, engagement with allies, fleet exercises, battle group support, and contingencies response. Some missions have the utmost urgency, others are lower in scope, but their total numbers have increased dramatically as the world order has transformed. The Cold War Force was sized for war. It could handle most peacetime requirements. That no longer is true.
The submarine cycle has three basic parts:
- Deployment
- Pre-Overseas Movement (POM) workup
- Interdeployment Training Cycle (IDTC)
With a few exceptions, deployments are six months long. The POM workup consists of crew at-sea and in-port training for deployment, maintenance and modernization to the submarine, and certification for deployment—generally about six months long. The IDTC takes up the rest of the cycle, nominally about a year. Most of the lower priority but still very important requirements, such as crew proficiency, services for other platforms, inspections, exercises, and midshipmen operations, get done during the IDTC. Keep in mind that the crew also needs to spend some time at home. The Chief of Naval Operations' home-port tempo requirement is 50% over a five-year period. Therefore, in a two-year cycle, if a submarine is gone for a six-month deployment it can be away from home port for a total of only six of the remaining 18 months. This is a simplistic look, and there is some leeway, but to protect the crews and their families and to conserve nuclear fuel over the life of the ship, submarines can be away from home port for only a third of their non-deployed time.
Based on what we have seen over the past ten years and projections for an even less stable world, with threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and territorial disputes, there is significant work to be done to protect U.S. national interests. The nuclear-powered attack submarine can do that—but only if we have enough of them.
1997: The Year of Living Dangerously
The Pacific Submarine Force provided submarines to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf regions at a satisfactory rate until about mid-1997. On average, six or more submarines were deployed to those regions from Pacific home ports all year long—enough to conduct many of the missions, exercises, and other requirements put on the force.
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was in such a hurry to realize the peace dividend that we didn't stop to think what the new world order would be like. We downsized at a rapid rate. Unfortunately, while we were busy inactivating submarines, the requirements for submarine operations started to climb. By 1997, the Pacific Submarine Force was asset limited, meaning there were not enough submarines to do the most critical jobs assigned to them, and we had to start turning down important missions and could not support our own war plans.
It was at this point that our ability to satisfy security demands began to ebb. This decline continues today, and it will get worse as the submarine force shrinks further.
Where Do We Stand Now?
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) completed in May 1997 stated that the number of attack submarines should be reduced to 50, pending further Joint Chiefs of Staff study of peacetime requirements. That decision—based on fiscal goals and a downsizing mind-set—resulted in an aggressive inactivation schedule for attack submarines. To reduce the number of SSNs as quickly as possible and because it was less expensive to inactivate a ship than to refuel and modernize it, 11 Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines were decommissioned at their refueling points--in other words, at the midpoint of their service lives.
The Joint Chiefs study directed by the QDR was to have been completed in September 1998. A full budget cycle and many inactivated submarines later, it finally is done. It shows conclusively that more than 50 SSNs are needed for the projected threats of 2015. In fact, it shows that 68 SSNs are the minimum required just to accomplish critical national security requirements. Of those, 41 are needed in the Pacific Force to counter the threat in the Asia-Pacific region. It is important to note this does not include routine or less important requirements, which were left on the cutting room floor. There is no fat in these results. This is what the nation needs.
How Do We Fix It?
We cannot reverse what has been done, but we can fill some gaps. In the past five years we have thrown away about 165 years of Los Angeles-class service life. Seven additional SSNs are on the chopping block in the next few years, and they represent 107 years of submarine life. These platforms can be refueled to stop the number slide. In addition, conversion of the four oldest Trident submarines to strike and special operations platforms may provide some relief.
The only long-term solution is to build the new Virginia (SSN-21) class at a rate at least double what currently is authorized.
Today's peacetime attack submarine force faces twice the requirements as it did prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall with half the number of platforms. The math just does not work out. Doubling the requirements while halving the number of attack submarines leaves U.S. national security at risk. President Thomas Jefferson and President Ronald Reagan both stated, "When the American people know all the facts they always do the right thing." It is time to do the right thing.
Admiral Konetzni is Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.