"Saving Naval Aviation"
(See S. Rowe, p. 30, September 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John Hood, U.S. Navy—Commander Rowe's article was right on the mark. Naval aviation has been in decline for nearly ten years. As an officer on the staff of Carrier Air Wing Three on the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) during Operation Desert Fox, I witnessed firsthand what a tremendous asset the carrier air wing can be. I also saw how much trouble we are in. To maintain a high degree of operational security, the first night of Desert Fox was a Navy show exclusively. It was a great feeling knowing that the only aircraft going feet dry that night were coming off the carrier. Unfortunately, we were limited to S-3 Vikings for mission tanking because we did not use Air Force tanker support that first night. Although the S-3 squadron, VS-22, performed superbly in the tanker role, it was stretched to the limit and were unable to perform other critical roles such as surface surveillance. Most significantly, without Air Force tankers the air wing was limited to striking targets well south of Baghdad. The days of 600-mile alpha-strikes have been over for some time. Now the Tomahawk is the Navy's only long-range power-projection tool. During the remaining three days of Desert Fox, we were slaves to Air Force tanker support. Each night, our entire air plan was written around Air Force tanker availability.
Desert Fox probably will be remembered as the last time a carrier conducted truly independent strike operations because today's carrier air wing cannot perform its power-projection mission without land-based support. With the retirement of the ES-3 in 1999, the carrier air wing lost its only organic electronic surveillance capability. With that capability went the Navy's ability to conduct air strikes exclusively from the carrier. In today's sophisticated threat environments, going feet dry without electronic surveillance support is a showstopper. For that support, the Navy now must rely on shore-based EP-3E and RC-135 aircraft. Like the EA-6Bs, these platforms are national assets in very high demand, and there is no guarantee they will be there when we need them. When the S-3 leaves the fleet in 2008, the Navy will lose one of the most versatile (and underrated) platforms ever produced, and more organic capability will slip away from the carrier.
As Commander Rowe points out, the key to a carrier battle group and its air wing is flexibility—the ability to conduct independent operations anywhere in the world with no outside support required. Battle group flexibility has decreased significantly with the retirement of the A-6 and ES-3. It will decline further when the S-3 is withdrawn from service. Senior leadership must address this hemorrhage of missions. A plan needs to be put in place to recover the core competencies we have lost or the future of carrier-based naval aviation will be in doubt. My biggest fear is that future presidents will no longer ask, "Where are the carriers?"—but instead will wonder, "Why do I need carriers?"
"The Credibility Crisis"
(See E. Donnelly, pp. 42-48, August 2000; T. Strother, p. 20, September 2000 Proceedings)
General Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—I was deeply disappointed by your decision to publish such a flawed article. There is a credibility issue here, but it is between the management of Proceedings and your readership.
The author's assertion that I "lobbied" Congress is flat wrong—unless one considers responding to written communications from a Senator or testifying before Congress to be "lobbying." Providing prompt and accurate information to members of Congress is a duty all senior officers accept as part of the confirmation process.
Let's simply review the facts. On National Missile Defense, the information given to Senator James M. Inhofe (R-OK) and others was provided in response to their requests, and was the judgment of all the Joint Chiefs based on the current National Intelligence Estimate—the best information available at the time. Similarly, the entire Joint Chiefs supported ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but only with the critical "safeguards" spelled out in the hearing but not mentioned in the article. Again, this information was given in response to congressional requests in an open hearing—hardly an event that could be labeled "lobbying."
According to the author, "American military tradition demands loyal execution of the president's orders but that does not justify activities such as this before congressional decisions are made." But the purpose of the CTBT hearing was to allow Congress to question all who had interests in the treaty before voting. That's precisely the way Congress is supposed to work.
Finally, I must correct the record regarding my comments before the Senate Armed Services Committee in October 1999. I firmly believed that the proposed 1.4% across-the-board cut in the defense budget would have had a "devastating" impact on our military forces, and I said so. I am proud that my candid testimony was instrumental in reducing the cut to less than 1 % and—more important—gaining congressional authority to distribute the reduction as we thought best rather than as a straight across-the-board slice in all accounts. As a result, we safeguarded about $3 billion for readiness, directly improving the training and warfighting capabilities of our great troops.
Readers of Proceedings deserve to know that the Joint Chiefs also have testified repeatedly before Congress about our concern over declining military readiness and shortfalls in the Pentagon's budget. As a direct result of the Chief's candor, we have received bipartisan support from the Congress and the Administration for the addition of $112 billion in the defense budget over the next five years. We also secured the largest pay raise in 18 years and fixed a retirement system that had been broken since 1986. Our work is far from complete, but we have clearly identified the problems and are actively working solutions. Perhaps Proceedings could spend more effort covering the real issues and less time publishing unsubstantiated accusations that do nothing to enhance its credibility.
"Plugging the JO Leak"
(See R. Halsey, pp. 50-52, September 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Runs Bowen, U.S. Coast Guard, Law Staff Supervisor, Maritime Law Enforcement School—This article articulated the perspective of the junior officer in perhaps the most well-reasoned argument I have yet read. As a member of the "failed" Coast Guard Academy Class of 1994 whose ranks have fled the service in droves, I've heard nearly every one of Lieutenant Halsey's points from one or another of my peers. I would expound on his comments about graduate school by adding that I know of at least one lieutenant who left because the Coast Guard would not allow him to attend his school of choice even if he paid the difference in tuition. But even that option is not much incentive when you consider the number of government agencies and corporations offering tuition reimbursement without the relatively long period of obligated service tacked onto the deal. Like many of the service's financial problems, the shortcomings of our advanced education program are an indication of our need to be more aggressive in obtaining funding.
"Why Play Survivor Benefit Plan Roulette?"
(See G. Morrison, pp. 80-83, July 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Richard L. Rodgers, U.S. Navy (Retired)—This article provides a refreshing look at a subject mostly ignored until retirement becomes imminent. Congratulations on shining some light into this corner! As a recently retired captain, I can verify that the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) seminar I attended covered in detail every aspect of finding a second career, veterans' benefits, and medical and dental options. A required decision at the exit was the choice of Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) options. The seminar was designed to discuss these options for two hours. The presentation, including questions, was condensed to an hour and ten minutes. It was presented by one of the Mutual Aid Society officers whose clear but unspoken message was, "The Survivor Benefit Plan is the best you can do and we can supplement it." The Social Security offset was covered by the invitation to "come by our offices and we can explain this in greater detail." Commercial alternatives were described as less comprehensive, less certain, and less desirable. The implied message was, "This is a very important decision that you will live with the rest of your life, and we know best what your needs are." To me, the standard Survivor Benefit Plan presentation was inadequate and insulting by its omissions.
I conducted a fair amount of research on my own and didn't like what I found. I ended up with a private plan much as described by Captain Morrison. Here are some questions that you should look at before you decide:
- Did you know that your SBP "payment" is not a transference of a portion of your retired pay to a fund managed by the government? In fact, the dollars in retired pay you give up for SBP are never appropriated. The plan promises to pay your surviving spouse, but does not promise to do so by leveraging any of your retired pay. That's even riskier than the Social Security fund.
- Did you know that according to the Department of Defense (DoD) actuary's reports to Congress, the SBP has been operating in the negative since 1996, when cumulative payments (sum of all years) exceeded cumulative cost to retirees? The amount negative in 1999 was $2.3 billion.
- At the current rate of outflow versus inflow, the negative will exceed $5 billion cumulative in 2002. How long do you think Congress will permit this before major intervention.
- Are you certain that SBP will remain intact for your surviving spouse? Did you once have the same confidence about medical benefits?
- Did you know that none of the life insurance companies capable of providing a protection plan like the SBP will charge you for 30 years of similar coverage?
- Do you have a working spouse? Did you know that your spouse's earned Social Security also is forfeited to provide for the offset? Why should the spouse sacrifice for your benefit?
I believe when we leave the service, we should return to the citizenry. The SBP tethers us and our spouses to a government program about which we know very little. More information is needed in TAP and I agree with the U.S. Senate, which noted on page 302 of the National Defense Authorization Act report for the 2001 fiscal year: "many times, during the TAP seminars, alternatives to SBP are excluded from presentation or exposure even though many in the retiring population might benefit from considering alternatives to SBP during pre-retirement processing." The expected DoD response to this annotation is that it requires no action, so nothing will change.
If you are retiring, you deserve more information about the SBP and should demand it. If it is not provided, write to your senator and complain that the DoD has not attended to the Senate's reasonable suggestion to satisfy your need for more information.
What about those already out there on the plan? Why won't the SBP allow escape? No other insurance plan forbids escape, and when you do leave, all others reimburse some level of your equity. This is hard for SBP to do when there is no equity.
Bravo Zulu to Captain Morrison for his article and thanks to Proceedings for starting the debate. Last question: why not privatize the whole thing?
"The Readiness Tango of 1998"
(See C. Harris, pp. 44-46, September 2000 Proceedings)
Major Rick McConoughey, Maryland Army National Guard—I am a recent graduate of the resident Command and General Staff Officers course. We had weekly guest speakers—most of whom were three- and four-star officers of all the services—who gave us their perspective on any topic they chose. A policy of "non-attribution" was in effect. In other words, we were warned that if we discussed anything the flag officers said outside of the auditorium and attributed their remarks to them, we could be disciplined for violating school policy. The purpose of the policy was to allow the flag officers to tell us what they really thought about things that concerned the services without fear of reprisal.
Not one of them had the courage to say anything but the party line. They did mention the challenges we all faced, but not one ever mentioned anything about conflict between the services or with the administration policy or with Congress. Only one, an Air Force brigadier general, even came close to being controversial. He adamantly opposed the incremental bombing campaign in Kosovo. But he had already put in his retirement paperwork. So if the Joint Chiefs of Staff can't be straight with a bunch of majors under the non-attribution policy, how could we expect them to be straight with Congress under the glare of television cameras?
"It's About Value"
(See H. Mauz, W. Gates, pp. 60-63, August 2000 Proceedings)
"Rethinking the Naval Postgraduate School"
(See J. Graham, pp. 46-49, July 2000; R. Thomas, p. 16, August 2000; S. Arthur, p. 29, September 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Janice M. Graham, U.S. Navy (Retired)—In their rebuttal to my article, Admiral Mauz and William Gates misrepresent my views in several places and draw incorrect inferences in others.
Nowhere in the article did I state (nor do I believe) that one graduate degree will serve the Navy Department about as well as any other. Nor did I state or infer that all officers—regardless of capability and future potential—be allowed to enroll in any graduate program without regard to the Navy's needs. There is no reason for the Navy to change its policy on officer eligibility and selection for graduate education simply because it changes education providers.
The statistics I cited on the cost of graduate education and officer utilization rates were taken from the most comprehensive study on the Navy's educational facilities to date. It was conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the calculations were based largely on numbers provided by the Navy—in fact, most were provided by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The description of CNA's analysis-and my use of it—as "superficial" is unsubstantiated and unjustified.
The utilization rates I cited were for the unrestricted line communities, as they were the focus of my article. Because war fighting is the raison d'etre of the unrestricted line, graduate education is called a subspecialty and is a secondary focus. It is not a valid comparison to factor in utilization rates for restricted line officers-—who have single specialties that support the Navy—with the utilization rates for the unrestricted line communities. Even when factoring in the utilization rates for the restricted line communities, CNA's analysis indicates that only one-third of all NPS-educated officers ever complete a payback tour that matches his or her exact subspecialty (CRM 9724, Jan. 1998, p. 111).
Admiral Mauz and Dr. Gates go on to describe as "flawed by unbalanced analysis, inadequate research, and preordained outcomes" the other recent studies that looked at alternative ways to provide graduate education at less cost. They then provide their own analysis, factoring in what they cite as the unique qualifications of NPS. This analysis claims that if the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) offered a graduate degree that was equivalent in quality to that which is offered at NPS, it would cost a phenomenal $570,500 per student. They conclude that all the studies in recent years have had a corrosive effect on the school and their hope is that these studies "have run their course."
There is good reason and adequate justification for conducting these studies as well as a study that the NPS leadership has vocally opposed—one to determine the costs and benefits of outsourcing or privatizing parts or all of NPS. Admiral Mauz and Dr. Gates write that I did not provide any references to support my statement that "initial forays to several top-tier private universities for the purpose of determining their interest in some type of partnership with NPS were most promising:" In fact, my statement was derived from conversations between members of the CNO Executive Panel and the leadership of three top-tier universities—all of whom expressed great interest in the possibility of having a campus in the Monterey Bay area and in obtaining further information on potential partnerships. This information was briefed to the CNO as well as to the then-superintendent of NPS, Rear Admiral Robert C. Chaplin. The NPS leadership has been adamantly opposed to conducting any study related to this issue. Therefore, the statements made by Admiral Mauz and Dr. Gates concerning the denial of endowment funds and tax financing for military students by civilian universities, and their notion that universities would enter into outsourcing or privatization agreements "out of a sense of public service, not as business opportunities," are unsubstantiated by research. In addition, there is no rational basis for assuming that universities would single out and discriminate against military personnel in their use of such funds.
The characteristics that Admiral Mauz and Dr. Gates cite as distinguishing NPS from civilian universities (and justifying the high cost-per-student ratio at the Naval Postgraduate School) are not so distinguishing. The "uniqueness" of NPS is a convenient—and frequently invoked—argument that has no basis in fact:
- Any officer can take refresher courses (most universities simply call them undergraduate courses) at any time to prepare for a graduate degree.
- Navy review of curricula for "military relevance" is not prohibited nor in any way affected merely because a civilian university is providing the education. For example, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Navy work hand-in-hand to structure the Naval Engineering Programs at MIT, a significant portion of which are classified. In this case, desired course and program changes are conducted on a continuous basis.
- Classified courses and briefings are provided today at a variety of universities, institutes, think tanks, and other sites. NPS has no unique infrastructure, laboratories, or capability to provide such courses.
- Defense experts at universities throughout the country teach military-relevant course material. Many of these experts also are employed by think tanks or the government (some are members of the military) and are intimately involved in current defense-related research. NPS has no unique capability to teach such material or to incorporate it into curricula. There is no factual basis to the authors' statement that "sending students to existing civilian programs would mean losing all focus on [Department of the Navy/ Department of Defense] issues unless the programs were augmented by Navy-funded material."
- If the Navy desires officers to take a heavier course load than the normal program offered at a particular university, or desires that every student write a thesis, there is nothing that prohibits the Navy from adding these into an officer's curriculum during the normal approval process (which, ironically, currently is controlled by NPS).
- The fact that a civilian university would conduct officer education in no way affects the ability of the Navy and other government agencies to sponsor research projects of interest. Civilian universities conduct vast amounts of government research today.
- There are military officers from the United States and other countries, National Guard and defense agency personnel, and huge numbers of foreign students attending many universities in this country today; this is not a characteristic unique to NPS.
Recently, the leadership of NPS has done what a university ought never to do: it exerted pressure to have me withdraw my article containing an opposing view, attempted to shut down debate by marginalizing individuals whose ideas and research results they dislike, and opposed feasibility studies that would look at alternatives and options for addressing well-documented problem areas. In the meantime, the situation at the Naval Postgraduate School remains the same—there is excess capacity because of budget cuts and a declining number of students, utilization rates are dismal, and the cost the Navy pays to send students to the Naval Postgraduate School is more than double what it pays to send students to several of the highest-rated universities in the country.
"Community War"
(See L. Seaquist, pp. 56-58, August 2000 Proceedings)
Captain John L. Byron, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Seaquist's focused analysis provoked several responses. One is that Admiral Bill Owens's revolution in military affairs is not the entire answer to the military's needs, but it's part of the answer. Force-on-force only works against force. If your adversary is a tricky bastard, then your counter better be more tricky.
Second is that the resource side of this is compelling. Figure out how much there will be for defense (no more than now and maybe much less) and fit everything into that kevlar sack.
Third, the revolution in business affairs is a critical element of progress, both because we need the savings it will produce and because it will replace the existing bureaucratic approach to defense spending with one geared to e-commerce velocities and adaptability. Modern global business has learned to move with the speed of the enemy, always adapting mission to reality and using change as fuel. In the existing service business, change is the enemy and formation speed is defined by the federal acquisition regulation, not the target.
Fourth, the constant direct criticisms of Clinton's execution of foreign policy from the Republicans and the oblique critique from serving military of all that the present administration has done with the military are off the mark and largely irrelevant. It hasn't turned out badly these last eight years, and it is not clear that others would have done better.
Critics offer the alternative of returning to the halcyon days of Desert Storm, but that also returns us to the legitimate criticisms of that conflict that Owens talks to in his book and to the primacy of the Powell/Weinberger Six-Tests doctrine that makes our military a sacred band of priests and our use of the military determined by conformance to dogma. I say we military are hired guns, we serve the political will of the people, and that expresses itself through the operation of constitutional authority exercised by those elected by the people. Quit whining, saddle up, and fight. If we stick with the Powell Doctrine, we force ourselves into a more-of the-same mode that won't work and that we will never afford.
Fifth, and most important, Owens is dead-nuts right in seeing this as a service-- culture/service-loyalty problem that will require radical rearrangement to resolve. I'm starting to think that the right approach is to define from scratch the best future service arrangements without regard to existing services and make this part of the dialogue.
Should the Marines transform into our primary land-war force? Do we need a submarine force or should we put it in cosmoline because it costs far more than it contributes now? Should the Navy become a fleet-in-being, with most of its assets devoted to ensuring that the Navy can rebuild more rapidly than a blue-water competitor can emerge? Should the Army likewise become a garrisoned and cadre force-in-being ready to build up and absorb draftees for the next big war but not play in these little ones? Do we need an Air Force or just military aviation seconded to the services that use it? Do we need a new high-tech service to move us forward in information technology, space exploitation, and data warfare?
I don't know what such a zero-based analysis would produce, but I bet it won't be the military services as we know them now. Unless the services can adapt and become optimized in the environment Seaquist describes, they and their cultures and loyalties are the biggest obstacles to effective future security.
I'm watching some really smart guys trying to mash the existing services into the future mold and to move the service leadership to at least an adequate response to the changed world. They are failing. Pigs can't fly and our beloved services cannot be other than they are. So get rid of them and reform. 0
"We Can't Afford to Leave the Media Alone"
(See K. Kalogiannis, p. 97, July 2000; R. Schenker, p. 14, September 2000 Proceedings)
Second Lieutenant Dan McSweeney, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Public Affairs Officer, Camp Lejeune—Kudos to Captain Kalogiannis. The captain is right on target in saying that "a media plan must be in place before a mission begins, and should be integrated into the overall operational plan at the outset." Perhaps the Marine Corps, having fought actively to justify its own existence more than once, understands this better than the other services. Still, more needs to be done to improve our understanding and handling of the media, both formally (in plans and education) and informally.
The media are not going anywhere. If anything, their presence will become greater as technology and population levels increase. At the risk of sounding naive, the military and the media are on the same side: we fight, they write. Both ensure our public and private liberties as Americans.
"Carrier Firepower: Realizing the Potential"
(See A. Jewell, M. Wigge, pp. 38-41, June 2000; J. Callaway, pp. 24-26, July 2000 Proceedings
Captain Charles N. Wilbur, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I was pleased to learn that a real-world exercise had been performed on board the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) to determine the actual requirements for providing ship/air wing weapon-delivery capabilities, but some of the reported conclusions for that surge demonstration are seriously flawed. Undoubtedly, weapons availability, including the ordnance assembly/fusing/handling process, is critical on the ship side of the firepower equation. This is not a new revelation.
Contrary to the authors' statement that "personnel were reallocated successfully during the Vietnam War," that sort of practice in fact exacerbated an already high personnel OpTempo and significantly contributed to acts of sabotage on board ship and the rebellion on board one carrier in San Diego. The use of yeomen or any other unqualified personnel to "routinely load ordnance on aircraft" is an extremely unsafe practice. Aircraft weapons are hazardous even when handled by trained ordnancemen; only their expertise and care prevent accidents. High tempo operations alone increases risks. Adding untrained hands to the equation invites disaster. As planning and estimating superintendent at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard during the major repairs to the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) after her chain reaction ordnance and aircraft explosive conflagration off Kahoolawe, Hawaii, in the early 1970s, I can attest to the severity of the damage initiated by a single malfunctioning or mishandled weapon. Contrary to reports released to the media, both ship and air wing were totally out of action for months.
Augmenting personnel may be appropriate in high tempo periods of limited duration using qualified Naval Reservists or others with appropriate training, but a determination should be made as to whether we simply need increased weapon-handling ability on our carriers. If so, this should be communicated now as a requirement to the program manager for future aircraft carriers before the designs for CVNX-1 and -2 are firmed up. We should be very concerned that the present pressures of limited manpower do not adversely effect the future carriers because it is never possible to properly accommodate an increased personnel complement after ship construction is complete.
The use of vertical replenishment (VertRep) to deliver pallets of ordnance to the flight deck between recovery and launch operations is dangerous unless those weapons are struck below to magazines—which certainly does not appear to be the practice that Ms. Jewell advocates and observed during the surge demonstration. Having quantities of weapons outside the magazines on the flight deck in this manner was the proximate cause of the USS Forrestal (CV-59) conflagration and total operational incapacitation off Vietnam. Safe handling and stowage of ordnance does take time. The only way to increase weapon availability during the surge operations proposed is to increase magazine and magazine elevator capacity. If such an increase is what the Navy needs, now is the time to ensure this requirement is incorporated into the carrier designs.
The authors are correct to observe that we are limited by our inventory of smart weapons, but extremely naive to expect any significant additional funds for advanced weapon procurement. The Navy makes its case for such funding annually, but we have been seriously short of advanced weapons for years. One procurement-limiting practice utilized by the Department of Defense during my active duty was to reduce the Navy's inventory objectives for various expensive weapons so that the program objective memorandum matched the quantities on hand or projected. We are woefully short of Tomahawks and other smart weapons today and it will take lots of additional money simply to replace recently expended ordnance, let alone increase the inventory objectives to the quantities that the authors and I would like to see.
It will indeed be good to improve the Navy firepower expertise at the unified combatant level, but it would be inadvisable to emphasize a surge capability that is dependent on augmentation for its execution. Better to ensure the commander knows our advertised, sustained capability—and for the Navy to do what it takes actually to be able to achieve that rate on a sustainable basis and on short notice.
"Stop Mandatory Anthrax Vaccinations—Now!"
(See Anonymous, pp. 100-101, March 2000; R. West, L. Balagurchik, G. Sargent, pp. 18-20, April 2000; C. Uhl, J. Bardouille, pp. 10-12, May 2000; S. Kelly, pp. 22-26, August 2000 Proceedings)
Dr. Craig Michael Uhl, former lieutenant, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—This letter is in response to Lieutenant Kelly's reply to the anonymous military officer. As a former Naval Medical Officer who resigned my commission rather than inject my Navy and Marine comrades with what I believe to be a contaminated vaccine, I must speak up. Lieutenant Kelly hinges his entire thesis on Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He states that he "knows of no service member, officer or enlisted, who has been punished for simply speaking out against the vaccine." I personally know several naval officers who have lost their security clearances as intelligence officers merely for sharing their feelings with their fellow officers regarding this issue; they were not even slated for vaccination, yet their careers were ruined.
Before Lieutenant Kelly shares his "own personal research," which will be found to be erroneous, I am gratified that he and his fellow comrades at a "major headquarters" have not fallen ill from this vaccine. This does not prove nor conclude that this vaccine is safe; it only suggests that the lot of vaccine that his "major headquarters" command received was free of contaminants. If he would take a look at Food and Drug Administration records from two audits performed in 1996 and 1998, he would find that serious failures of quality control were identified, including staphylococcus and other microorganisms during the anthrax vaccine filterization process, within a variety of lots. Some lots were indeed free of contaminants, others were not; this may explain areas of high reaction rates such as Dover Air Force Base.
These quality-control issues were of such concern to the Food and Drug Administration that requests to close the facility were delivered to the vaccine laboratory. Politics, congressional arm twisting, financial incentives, and the like were offered to create BioPort, which remains unqualified to produce useable vaccine, according to the FDA's congressional testimony. These facts can be garnered from public documents. As a physician and a military officer, I was compelled to seek the truth behind a military order I found questionable. I sought the truth and was alarmed by what I found.
Many military physicians joined the military not merely for medical student debt relief, but for patriotism and to give our medical talents back to our country and our fellow military active-duty and retired personnel and their families.
It was while serving as a destroyer squadron physician with the USS America (CV-66) battle group during the Bosnia conflict in 1995-1996 that I found my greatest pride in our military. It was there on the ships that I met the greatest sailors you could ever ask for. It also was there I learned that the only member of the crew required to set sail was the independent duty corpsman (IDC); not the commanding officer, executive officer, or any other member of the crew, but the senior enlisted corpsman (IDC) was required at all times to be on board while under way.
I realized then, as I understand now, that the medical oversight on our Navy ships is imperative and must not be compromised. It is the IDC who checks the water, food, and any other inoculum (vaccines, tuberculosis skin tests) or other health-related issue, and he is solely responsible to protect his fellow sailors and Marines. If we lose his oversight function, our country stands close to the edge of a military medical casualty resulting in needless morbidity and mortality.
This is what I believe is happening with the Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program (AVID). Shortly before I decided to resign my commission and leave the Navy, I heard from many of my old IDC friends from their surface deployments. I was appalled by what they told me. They were instructed to "look the other way" regarding any health reactions to this vaccine. Further, they were instructed to quell anyone wishing to file a VAERS form (the FDA/Centers for Disease Control required adverse-reaction form). The IDC's role as medical safety advocate for his fellow shipmates was being threatened by a naval community headstrong in "making this vaccination program work." Interestingly, I heard the same thing about TRICARE, months earlier from the Navy Surgeon General, Admiral Richard A. Nelson.
This was alarming and I could no longer remain in an organization that literally threw away its medical responsibility "to do no harm." Where were my fellow medical corps officers? I spoke out publicly on this issue in the Navy/Army/Air Force and Marine Times after finding no relief within my own chain of command and was tossed summarily in the career trashcan. I even was passed over for lieutenant commander; for a physician it is a relatively rare event, and one that I remain extremely proud of.
Sadly, it is this relative silence by our senior medical leaders that I find so disturbing. Not only are junior medical officers watching this silence in disbelief, but junior corpsmen are equally disturbed by our medical officers lack of health advocacy for our men and women in uniform.
Our medical leadership must begin to take on a variety of issues, including TRICARE, AVIP, defective chemical suits, heat exhaustion from improper hydration during fitness runs, and documented harassment of various kinds leading to deaths of soldiers, airmen, Marines, and sailors within a number of military bases throughout the world, including suicides far in excess of societal norms. They must serve not as "yes men and women" for our line community, but as our medical and safety advocates for the entire fleet, as does ship's IDC serves to protect the safety and medical well-being of his fellow shipmates.
Returning to Lieutenant Kelly's letter: Is the use of a contaminated substance as noted in FDA's own public records—which is to be forcibly injected in the arms of our men and women in uniform—a legal order as stated in Article 92? Would our fictitious IDC on the USS EverSail be held in violation of a legal order, if he prevented the ingestion of potato salad by his sailors, if he determined that refrigeration controls aboard his galley were not within specifications, and the likelihood of a severe gastrointestinal illness could result if they were allowed to eat it? What if his stand were against his commanding officer who insisted that they be allowed to "eat the stuff; it didn't make me sick?" I must believe that this IDC would be protected from legal retribution as his position as medical and safety advocate of that ship would supersede the insistence of a legal order by his CO.
This is what is missing in the Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program. Where have our military medical officers gone? Surely, they can read the same independent reports I have. To this day, research into the efficacy of this vaccine remains absent from peer review journals. Only the Army as agent for this program has cornered the market on research regarding this vaccine's usefulness or safety. This should be troubling to any physician, military or not. Please be an advocate for our troops, and be willing to risk your careers for the safety of our men and women in uniform. If our IDCs and our military physicians remain silent, we are heading toward a military medical catastrophe. I implore you to do the right thing.
"You Can't Handle the Truth!"
(See E. Wooldridge, pp. 66-70, April 2000; D. Porter, p. 18, May 2000; L. Bull, p. 28, June 2000; T. Smythe, p. 18, July 2000 Proceedings)
"A Tale of Two Cities"
(See E. Wooldridge, pp. 28-32, July 1999; J. Pollin, J. LaPlante, pp. 10-12, August 1999; J. Nathman, B. Lemkin, pp. 19-21, September 1999; C. Laingen, pp. 10-12, October 1999; A. Myers, pp. 14-16, November 1999; D. Porter, May 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Rolf Yvenge, U.S Navy—I'm a little tired. It's now 0230 and I'd had some nasty viral thing that the crew picked up before we got into Phuket, so I'm dragging still, just a bit. The all-nighter I pulled relieving the commanding officer (CO) on the bridge coming down the strait toward the left turn by Singapore probably brought it on for me. But the captain was fit that day and clear-eyed going through where the traffic was dense. I got the master chief to do messing and berthing and slept through the morning.
Tomorrow night I've got to call a couple of sets of parents to tell them their sons decided to stay in Phuket and continue their most excellent adventure without the support of the Navy. I'm pretty sure they are all right because we got fleeting glimpses of them in our search, and they told their pal they were going to find the island featured in some movie called The Beach. Did he want to come? "No," he told them.
He told me he was real sorry about his friends and I said it was okay. What else could I say to him, all of 19 years old and just as worried as I am?
I'm feeling a little blue because this is another homecoming trip and these are hard. Away half of a year, then going back and finding my kid has grown two inches and gotten twice as smart, my wife has a brand new interior dialogue, and everything is pretty much my fault. This is something like my 15th transit home as I start my 29th year of service. I'm topped out as a By-God-I-Can't-Believe-It Captain regular Navy.
So I'm feeling a little down about it all. CO is full of energy and has a lot of good ideas (I'm having trouble keeping track), the department heads think I'm both dumb and mean-spirited, the chiefs' mess has a pool on when I'm going to put in my papers and the ensigns all like to tell me their ages. I've got seven UA cases, a motorcycle maniac, a bad-check writer, and somebody who sassed the shore patrol. When I get home, we have an unfunded (virtual) phased maintenance availability, our port engineer moved to Hawaii, and I can't even get my friends to bite for the job. We do an off-load the day after leave and upkeep and the commodore has scheduled his change of command ten days after we get home.
So I pick up the June 2000 issue of Proceedings to read myself to sleep. But I find a darn good controversy instead. I read backward, as I often do, starting with Rear Admiral L. F. Bull's letter, back to David Porter's to Captain E. Tyler Wooldridge's second article, then go back a bit further and scrounge through the wardroom to see if I could find the first article, "A Tale of Two Cities."
I found it. Read it. To tell you the truth, I was wondering a bit why I was doing all this cruising around. I'm married to a captain who is the light of my life and we could pretty much head on down to Cabo and fish. I was saying to myself, "Who needs this, doing my third sea tour in a row and second deployment in two years? Who needs another frustrating interdeployment training cycle? And what's this crap that now I'm finally about to turn 50 and I still got to do the PRT and worse, pretend I like it because I'm the executive officer again?"
But doing all that reading made me feel a whole lot better. I would say I'm pumped now, ready to go. I would say I'm going to hum through minute inspections of all 138 toilets and 1,016 racks tomorrow. We'll meet the Phuket duo on the pier in Hong Kong and the CO will find a think-tank lieutenant to work on ideas. The supplemental will come through and the air boss will turn out to be a crackerjack PMA coordinator. I know I can bust "outstanding" (lower) if I could just keep my belt buckle from looking south.
Because, after all that reading, it came to me that as long as there are guys like E. Tyler Wooldridge doing the really important bitching, I can pretty much just worry about getting through the day. They got that covered. Thank goodness.
"Not in Our Submarines"
(See C. Trost, p. 2, September 2000 Proceedings)
Editor's Note: In the caption, the torpedo being readied for launch was identified as a Mark 42. It should have been labeled a Mark 48 torpedo.
Captain Gory Manning, U.S. Navy (Retired), Director, Women in the Military Project, Women's Research & Education Institute—I'm astonished by Admiral Trost's statement that "proponents of women in submarines say it's simply a case of removing 'some operational equipment' to make room for 'inexpensive' modifications." Admiral Trost can't be referring to either the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) or most other advocates of military women. I have heard nothing from these groups about removing operational equipment from submarines to attain a "fantasy-driven social-engineering experiment."
I have attended most of the briefings that the submarine community has provided for the DACOWITS on this issue. Submarine warfare representatives and DACOWITS members have agreed that women can perform all the duties involved in operating and fighting a submarine—that has never been at issue. Nor has the issue ever been placing women aboard submarines whatever the cost. Readiness has been the central concern of all parties to the discussion.
Since the days of Admiral Rickover, the submarine warfare community has insisted that the harsh demands of readiness and nuclear safety require them to have the pick of the Navy's best and brightest people. Over the past ten years, the number of people joining the Navy has gone down and the percentage of new officers and recruits who are women has risen to 18% in 1999. If the submarine community still requires the Navy's best and brightest, and if a growing percentage of these are women, it makes sense to investigate seriously the possibility of women serving aboard submarines.
The proponents are not asking that submarine service be opened to women whatever the cost; rather, they are asking that the Navy make a searching, sincere examination of the issue. Based on the briefings the submarine community has given the DACOWITS to date, I believe the Navy has made a compelling case, from the privacy perspective, that it would be difficult to accept women as crewmembers on current classes of attack submarines or to accept enlisted women on current Trident submarines, and the DACOWITS has not recommended that either of these things be attempted.
The DACOWITS has recommended that the Navy open Trident submarines to women officers. This is certainly doable, although it would impose severe career limitations on any women who chose it. The DACOWITS also has recommended that future classes of submarines—submarines that that could be in service for the next 40 or 50 years—be designed so that they could accommodate a crew composed of both men and women without forfeiting either operational capability or crew privacy. The Navy has declined to do so. This, I believe, represents a foolhardy loss of focus on future combat requirements.
"Bring the Marine Prowlers Home"
(See T. Hofer, pp. 33-36, August 2000; J. Cryer, pp. 21-22, September 2000 Proceedings)
Dr. Loren B. Thompson, Lexington Institute—Major Hofer provides important insights into the tug-of-war between regional commander-in-chiefs and Marine air-ground task-force commanders concerning who shall have primary claim to EA-6B Prowler electronic-warfare aircraft. He correctly identifies the main cause of the problem: a failure by defense planners to anticipate either the duration and intensity of overseas commitments or the importance of airborne electronic-warfare assets in prosecuting such contingencies.
There seems to be a growing realization among policymakers that they have mishandled modernization of electronic-warfare capabilities. Prowlers are being brought out of mothballs and refurbished; the next-generation ICAP-III architecture is being funded; an analysis of alternatives has begun to identify the airframe that will replace the Prowler; and an electronic warfare working group has been formed in Congress to give the issue its due. But there is no near-term solution to the shortfalls Major Hofer describes. Those only can be fixed by selecting the right solutions today for tomorrow's force and then making sure they get funded expeditiously.
In that regard, it isn't hard to see which airframe choice makes sense among the four he identifies at the end of his essay. V-22 won't work because it can't keep up with combat aircraft. Ditto unmanned aerial vehicles. The Joint Strike Fighter can keep up, but its stealth would be compromised by hanging emitters on the outside of the airframe. That leaves the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet as the only viable solution. The services can spend two years analyzing the issue to death, or they can recognize the obvious and get on with implementing it. I vote for moving out or the F/A-18G "Growler" now.
"Don't Make SWO the Default"
(See I. Scaliatine, pp.87-88, July 2000; T. Darcy, August 2000; T. Laurie, September 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John E. Ritenour, U.S. Navy (Retired)—We need to realize that not every officer attrited from the aviation or submarine training pipeline is an academic failure. Sometimes a previously undiscovered physical problem will present itself during training. This is especially common during flight school, when sinus trouble and difficulties with air sickness manifest themselves. There seems to me to be a prevailing attitude among the surface warfare officer (SWO) community that "if you didn't choose us first, then we don't want you." Do the authors truly feel that these officers are not worthy of the surface Navy because of physical conditions that often are beyond their control?
I found a mind-set in the surface warfare community toward Fallen Angels (i.e., aviation attrites) that can best be described as hostile; these are just some of the incidents that I was personally involved with or aware of:
- During my first-class midshipman training cruise, the commanding officer of the ship I was assigned to publicly apologized to me because my running mate (the junior officer I was paired with) was an aviation attrite—despite the fact that he was an excellent performer and a career-minded individual.
- During Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS), several instructors made comments about how they never would like to see another "Airedale or Submariner piece of human waste product" walk through the doors.
- When I reported to my first ship, my commanding officer remarked that he didn't like aviation attrites and thought they were useless.
- I fully and wholeheartedly support the authority and prerogatives of commanding officers. But at the same time I expect to be treated as a professional. I received a reserve commission in the Navy because of an administrative error. When the Naval Recruiting Command sent my regular commission to my ship, the commanding officer (CO) withheld it from me without informing me about it. I finally learned of it when the Naval Recruiting Command sent me a certified letter requesting acceptance or declination of my commission. If the CO didn't feel I was qualified to receive it, that is his call and I respect that. But what I did object to was the fact he did not deal with me in a professional (open and candid) manner. Comments made by both my CO and other surface warfare officers to the effect that aviators or those who wanted to be "weren't professional and never understood the full meaning of responsibility." I often wondered what the reaction of a carrier or aviation squadron CO would be upon hearing such remarks.
- A fellow officer had just completed his second division officer tour and was ready to report to department head school. The ship had a change of command, and three months later, the new CO recommended that he be dropped from department head school. When my friend inquired why, the CO said words to effect that "aviation attrites don't belong in my surface Navy."
I realize that not every surface warfare officer feels or acts in the manner that I have described above. Many of the surface warfare officers that I have met exemplified the motto "Surface Warfare—Professionals at Sea." I personally witnessed, however, enough lack of professionalism to understand why the surface warfare community is experiencing more than its share of difficulty, compared to the rest of Navy, in retaining experienced officers. Given my own experiences, unless things have changed dramatically, it is not possible for me to honestly recommend surface warfare as a career choice in the Navy.
There are a lot of good officers who were attrited from other communities for reasons beyond their control who would make excellent surface warfare officers, if provided with an opportunity to do so. But I feel as long as attitudes exemplified by "Don't Make SWO the Default" and by Lieutenant Laurie's comments remain entrenched in the surface warfare community, it will continue to be the default.
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Clark Jr, U.S. Air Force, Executive Officer, Navy Training Squadron VT-10—I would like to offer a different perspective on this subject. We train navigators and naval flight officers for three services and our allies. It is my opinion that Lieutenant Laurie takes too narrow a view by focusing on individual communities rather than the larger warfighting team. We all tend to identify with our own communities regardless of service, but pride in one's own warfighting specialty should not blind us from recognizing that we are part of a larger warfighting team.
Contrary to current opinion, not every naval flight officer or navigator candidate at VT 10 is embarking on his first career choice. Some were not selected or were attrited from pilot training. Others wanted a specialty dealing with computers or logistics. Regardless of their motivation, commissioning source, or prior experience, we insist only that they understand that they are officers first and aviators second. We require them to do their duty and apply themselves to their training. We ask them to focus on earning their wings and look forward to their contributions in our national defense as officers and warriors. Frankly, we don't care if surface warfare, submarines, or intelligence was their first choice as long as they qualified for training and are committed to doing their duty as the Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force saw fit to assign them.
Having counseled several young officers who are about to be removed from flight training, I'm most always impressed by their professionalism, dedication, and strength of character. They attrite for various reasons including physiological problems that cannot be overcome. To jump to the conclusion that officers who succeed in their commissioning program have little worth to the Navy and should wear a scarlet "P" for poor performer or wear a quad zero designator misses the mark. The taxpayers already invested much in these officer and we should endeavor to find a specialty where they can contribute to the fight. Of course we must screen the officers to ensure that they have the required aptitude for the specialty, and then judge them on their motivation and performance in the training program. It is the right thing to do for both the service and the officers. 0
"Get the Facts on the Anthrax Vaccine"
(See P. Marghella, G. Strawder, pp. 38-41, July 2000 Proceedings)
"Anthrax Vaccine Is Too Risky" (See E. Ross, p. 94, July 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Ernest J. Davis Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve, Infectious Disease/Tropical Medicine Specialist—I am an infectious disease specialist and a physician in the Naval Reserve. It is my opinion that although there have been far too many erroneous statements published in reputable journals regarding anthrax and the anthrax vaccine, Lieutenant Commander Marghella's article reported many accurate facts. It was of the quality and caliber that should be published in Proceedings.
The contribution by Ensign Ross was disturbing to me because there was at least one error. The second paragraph addresses the organism of anthrax as a virus. In reality, it is a bacterium. The fact that Ensign Ross describes this organism inaccurately deteriorates his argument if he is trying to inform the reader that the vaccine is too risky. This leaves some questions in the mind of the reader, and therefore detracts from the quality of the publication.