On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. In the months that followed, tensions slowly escalated, culminating in the Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait. After the invasion, the U. N. Security Council passed Resolution 661, which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Imports and exports of all items except food and medical and humanitarian supplies were barred. Resolution 665 was passed shortly thereafter, providing for maritime enforcement via a multinational interception force. Following the war the sanctions continued, and were marked by an increased tempo of operations in 1994—caused by a rise in Iraqi smuggling activities. Later, when Iraq refused to submit to weapons inspections mandated by additional U.N. resolutions, an aerial bombing campaign commenced.
Over time, these deterrent operations have become increasingly tinted with an American hue. At present, our military faces many challenges—including personnel shortages and an unclear mission focus—and has forces with inadequate resources spread too thinly around the globe. Nowhere are these difficulties more evident than in the political and financial quagmire of Iraq.
In a recent two-month period of intense maritime interdiction operations (MIO) against merchant vessels transiting to and from Iraq, multinational interception forces confiscated more than $4 million worth of oil and illegal dates. More than 500 queries were conducted, resulting in 140 suspect-vessel inspections, 14 of which were non-compliant (the suspect vessel tried to escape). These 14 boardings comprised 10% of all such actions taken since 1994. Among the U.S. Navy forces participating in this "surge" were a Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruiser, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer, a Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer, and an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate. This represented one of the most successful periods in the ten-year history of enforcing sanctions against Iraq.
Projected over a year, these results would yield a paltry $24 million in confiscated or diverted Iraqi products. Compared with the nearly $11 billion Saddam Hussein will take in this year with the "Oil-for-Food" program,1 interdiction operations hardly account for a drop in the proverbial oil drum. More than nine years after the Gulf War and six years since maritime interdiction operations commenced in earnest, Saddam is still in power, Iraq has still not allowed U. N. weapons inspectors to conduct a satisfactory assessment, and multinational forces continue to shell out millions in support of an ongoing air campaign that seems to have lost whatever effectiveness it once may have had.
Finally, the cost to U.S. taxpayers to maintain forces at their current levels is nothing short of astronomical. With more than 7,000 troops and five to ten warships in theater, the burden on a force already stretched to the breaking point-by recruiting difficulties and low retention rates—must be considered when determining the wisdom of continuing our present operational tempo.
So what can we do about Iraq and Saddam Hussein? Should sanctions continue? What about the air campaign? Can we achieve our stated goal of "containing" Saddam's regime? Has our increased presence brought about regional stability?
The Sanctions Factor
Despite a few peaks of moderate success, sanctions have had little effect on their intended target, Saddam Hussein. His personal standard of living has improved, considering the 48 new palaces (highlighted by an extraordinary new lakeside resort) he has constructed since the end of the Gulf War.2 His power within Iraq remains at prewar levels. By weathering nearly a decade of sanctions and bombings, Saddam has earned a measure of tolerance, if not respect, from some neighboring Arab countries—a few of which are in favor of lifting sanctions. Though extremely costly in terms of investment versus return, the United Nations in general and the United States in particular can ill- afford the loss of face that would result were we to lift sanctions against Iraq completely, especially considering the disappointing results achieved thus far. Nor can we continue to throw our newest, most capable warships at a mission that favors simplicity, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness over sheer brute strength.
This is where our fleet of 13 Cyclone (PC-1)-class patrol craft comes into play. Just one of these versatile platforms—with its two SEAL raiding craft and rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB)—can conduct a myriad of MIO tasks, including queries and initial boarding of noncompliant vessels. Their shallow draft, speed, and maneuverability make them ideal for this environment. Operational deception effectiveness would increase by leaps and bounds with the addition of PCs to the MIO team. Their small size, non-unique emitters, and basic silhouette combine to make them stealthy platforms. The capabilities they bring to the field would enable two of them to replace a Spruance-class destroyer, of which two typically remain on station in the Arabian Gulf. The downside is the loss of two helicopters, but since the PCs most likely would be operating in concert with a frigate, the frigate's two helos would offset the loss. By alternating the four patrol craft between MIO surge and actual boarding operations in the Comisky holding area, mission accomplishment would continue unabated, while the cost reduction associated with supporting four 35-sailor crews—instead of more than 600 sailors in two destroyers—would be significant.
Another option would be to replace the Aegis destroyer with an additional guided-missile frigate. This would double the number of available helicopters and decrease operating costs significantly, while freeing a valuable Aegis asset for more a appropriate mission elsewhere. Though the Iraqi land-based missile threat is a real concern, the chance of their actually launching an effective strike against one of our warships is minute. Should they attempt such an attack, the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate's defensive capabilities are more than adequate. An impartial cost-versus-risk assessment in this comparison clearly comes down in favor of the FFG.
By incorporating these two proposals into our MIO scheme, we would reduce the number of sailors in theater by about 560. An Arleigh Burke and two Spruance-class destroyers would be released for strike, antisubmarine warfare, or other missions. Cyclone-class patrol craft could be forward deployed, much in the same manner as minesweepers have been, cutting costs still further while improving in-theater readiness. Regular crew swaps would reduce the length of deployments, while simultaneously providing improved training. The result of these measures would be fewer deployed sailors, enhanced morale, and improvements in retention—with no adverse affect on mission accomplishment.
The Bombing Factor
Richard Haas, a former member of the Bush administration, recently commented that "when a great power acts, its military force must be seen as menacing. Using little bits and pieces of military force tends to be counterproductive because it becomes part of the background noise." This is an excellent description of exactly what has happened with our air campaign over Iraq. The constant bombing apparently has become just "background noise"—at least to Saddam. There is no easily defined mission, no scoreboard by which to measure success or failure—just flying and more flying, bombs and more bombs. The net effect on Saddam? Negligible. A total of 28,000 missions have been flown, resulting in only 450 targets hit. One has to assume, knowing the proficiency of our pilots, that this ratio stems from a shortage of feasible targets. We need to determine how long we will continue risking our pilots and aircraft for a cause where more than 98% of missions flown are fruitless. It's time for us to count the costs of this seemingly purposeless strategy. It also may be time to end what has become an "all-American show," with U.S. troops accounting for 7,058 of the 8,474 total.
Even a 50% reduction in forces making up Operations Southern and Northern Watch would result in 3,500 fewer troops, fewer aircraft at risk, and a dramatic decline in associated costs. And if this across-the-board cut is not possible because of the high percentage of troops embarked in the on-station aircraft carrier, a similar reduction in number of missions flown would have a comparable effect, while simultaneously allowing us to meet mission objectives.
The Containment Factor
Containment of Saddam Hussein's regime has been one of our publicly stated goals since the imposition of sanctions. In order to attain this, however, our long-term strategies have included more than just air strikes and interdiction. Internal opposition also plays an important role. General Anthony Zinni, until recently commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, has commented that Iraqi opposition groups "are very fragmented" and that he did not "see an opposition group that has the viability to overthrow Saddam at this point." In question also is the resilience and heart of the Iraqi people. They, unlike their president, have been put on edge by the constant bombings at the hands of allied forces. Furthermore, Saddam himself has imposed additional, unnecessary hardships on his people by means of his selfish, inhumane policies. For example, despite a 50% increase in oil revenues, Iraq has increased by just 16% the amount earmarked for food purchases. Despite infant malnutrition, Iraq has spent less than 40% of the $25 million that has been set aside for nutritional supplies, and recently went 18 months without ordering a single nutritional supplement. While high-ranking Iraqi government officials are driving Mercedes and receiving extra food rations and monthly stipends totaling thousands of dollars, most Iraqi citizens are forced to live on less than $3.50 a month.
The Clinton administration recently approved $97 million to help Iraqi opposition groups unite. While some are supportive of the non-lethal assistance, Representative Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, called the administration's approach "lethargic." The initial meeting of these factions, held in the Sheraton New York in November 1999, was disorganized and fractious. No matter how well trained and organized the opposition groups become, it is difficult to imagine an uprising from an insurgent force strong enough to withstand Saddam's 400,000-man army. What is easy to conceive is that the Iraqi people—having become mentally, physically, and emotionally fatigued by the endless allied attacks and the merciless rule of President Hussein—may give up hope of a better life and resign themselves to their servile existence. After all, enduring nearly a decade of sanctions, bombings, and threats from the rest of the world has resulted in little, if any, improvement in their daily lives.
Are we really containing Saddam's regime? In the short term, perhaps. But the truth of the matter is he has rebuilt a significant portion of his military. His control over every aspect of the Iraqi government appears to be complete, much like that of a puppet master. By remaining stubbornly resistant to the attacks, threats, and sanctions of the outside world, Saddam has created an aura of invincibility, gaining at least a measure of passive support among some leaders in the Arab community. Despite the wavering level of commitment to continuing sanctions by some Gulf states, we must be firm in demanding Iraq's full compliance with all provisions of applicable resolutions before we ever consider lifting sanctions. No matter what their effectiveness, sanctions remain a valuable tool with which to prevent neighboring Arab countries from commiserating with Saddam. Our allies in the Arab community desperately need our example of steadfast dedication and commitment to keeping Saddam Hussein in check.
The Regional Stability Factor
While our presence has not led to the successful ouster of Saddam from power, for the past nine years U.S. military forces and international sanctions have deterred his external aggression successfully. Since our persistent bombing campaign and MIO surge approach have produced mediocre results, perhaps our best chance for winning this conflict is the demonstration of a silent, patient resolve. With Saddam's lust for conflict, a reserved, low-key strategy may well become the "burr beneath his saddle" that pushes him to the point of a frustrated carelessness and causes him to make a mistake that brings about his expulsion from power.
In the meantime, we should take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our "Iraqi investment," while retaining the forces required for a constant presence. Our air campaign and MIO maneuvers should continue, but on a smaller, more proportionate scale. Cost and risk reductions are imperative for support of the long-term commitment needed to maintain stability in the Gulf region while wearing down the resolve of Saddam Hussein. By taking steps similar to those proposed here, we can assert ourselves as a permanent force—not only in the Arabian Gulf, but wherever conflicts may arise across the globe.
Senior Chief Lanham is the operations department’s leading chief petty officer on board the USS John Hancock (DD-981).