After two and a half months of intensive operations in the Arabian Gulf the crew of the Lake Erie (CG-70) was well rested and ready for more. The reason was a work/watch rotation dubbed Blue/Gold.
As the USS Lake Erie (CG-70) transited outbound through the Strait of Hormuz on 5 November 1999, I reflected on our just completed stint in the Arabian Gulf. We had conducted maritime interception operations (MIOs), including the capture of seven noncompliant smugglers in the shallow waters of the northern Gulf. We had operated helicopters more than 12 hours a day almost every day under way. We were air warfare commander for a major strike into southern Iraq by Carrier Air Wing Two. We planned and executed the sea-control portion of a two-week exercise with Royal Saudi naval forces. And we had planned and conducted multinational MIO surge operations with Kuwaiti, Canadian, and New Zealand naval forces during which six smugglers were boarded and detained.
I was proud of but not surprised by the great performance of my ship and crew. We expect that. What amazed me was that, after two and a half months of intensive around-the-clock littoral operations, my crew was well rested, enthusiastic, and more combat ready than the day we entered the Gulf. Morale was sky high. Retention during the deployment was at 75% for first-term sailors and more than 90% for everyone else. Had the national interest required it, we could have reversed course and continued to operate in the Gulf indefinitely. The fatigue that is characteristic of most ships after a long period of intensive ops was notably absent in the Lake Erie because every man in the crew had had the opportunity for eight consecutive hours of sleep every day, regardless of the tempo of operations.
More combat readiness and more sleep? Those seemingly incompatible goals were achieved because of a revolutionary shipboard organization that we called Blue/Gold.
The Origins of Blue/Gold
The wardroom officers in the USS Reeves (CG-24) had questions. It was June 1987 and the Reeves was en route to a no-notice deployment to the Persian Gulf following the Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31). Was the attack deliberate? Why didn't the ship fire any weapons? What were the rules of engagement? The stream of questions barely slowed as Captain George Chappell entered the wardroom, but his first words shifted their focus. "Let's not waste time speculating on and second guessing what happened in the Stark. Our job is to ensure that the Reeves Ironmen are ready around the clock to deter potential aggressors and defend against all likely threats."
The challenge was daunting. Operations in the Gulf would entail continuous patrolling within ten minutes of Iranian airfields, often within visual range of cruise-missile-equipped Iranian warships and Revolutionary Guard boats. Iraqi Mirage aircraft continued to launch Exocet missiles at targets transiting the Gulf, and their B-6 Badger aircraft dropped bombs on offshore platforms. Both sides were mining international waters indiscriminately. We were not at war with either side in the Iran-Iraq conflict, but any potential adversary would readily perceive (or we would tell him) that the Reeves was ready and willing to use necessary force in self-defense.
The Reeves already had implemented captain's battle orders. By cataloging expected threats and analyzing engagement timelines, we developed two matrices—one for equipment readiness and one for watchstation manning. If a Mirage launched in Iraq and headed southeast and we were within its maximum range, we would set air weapons condition yellow and equipment would be aligned and watches manned in accordance with the matrices. If the Mirage approached the Reeves to within 50 nautical miles, air weapons condition red would be set and deconfliction calls would be made over agreed radio circuits. If expected responses were not received, general quarters would be set. Similar responses were practiced for other threats.
The Reeves entered the Persian Gulf wary but confident. A month later we were tired. Some of us were really tired—particularly those officers and enlisted flexing in response to threats who were the same people manning key positions in the many special evolutions that are required to sustain operations in the Gulf. For example, during Earnest Will operations to escort reflagged tankers to and from Kuwait, the Reeves first would transit the Strait of Hormuz outbound, which required the ship to be at general quarters while in the Iranian Silkworm envelope. A few hours later, general quarters would be set again for the inbound transit. Then, after transiting at best speed to Bahrain Bell, there was a long sea detail into the Sitrah fuel pier, three hours refueling alongside, and then a sea detail back out. Officers and crew who were on watch during the brief period between securing from general quarters and stationing the sea detail were on deck continuously for more than 24 hours. And those were the same key people (navigator, ops officer, engineer, operations specialists [OSs], fire controllmen, lookouts) whose performance would determine the ship's survival in a crisis. We found ourselves in the same quandary as the Stark. Do we flex those very tired people at 0200 because a Mirage has launched in Iraq or do we give them a few more hours of sleep?
Not flexing, at the risk of being unprepared to defend the ship, was unacceptable, but so was trying to defend the ship with people falling asleep at their consoles. Captain Chappell tasked the senior leaders in the ship to come up with a solution. During our first meeting, an obvious fact emerged. Only half of the crew was being worked to exhaustion. The other half, mostly day workers and junior personnel, were watching the movie every night and then hitting the rack for eight hours. We were not fully using all of the manpower available.
A second important observation was that port and starboard watches were not the problem. Many junior OSs, who were standing port and starboard six-hour watches, were getting plenty of sleep during their 12 hours not on watch because they were not assigned to special details nor were they flexed during periods of heightened readiness. The number of OSs on watch was more than adequate for a full Condition III watch. The Ship's Manning Document was predicated on having sufficient OSs to man three Condition III sections. As a result, each port and starboard section theoretically had 1.5 times the number of people required. Even with Navy Manning Plan reductions, the manpower available was 1.3 times the number of watch stations. The surplus was used to man special details, stand under-instruction watches for higher qualifications, perform maintenance, and conduct other routine tasks without the need to wake off-watch personnel. Why couldn't the same concept apply to the whole ship?
The answer was that it could, and we immediately started working on the organization we called Blue/Gold.
The crew was divided into two, 200-man teams. Surplus watch standers and the large number of non-watch standers who previously had been underutilized were used to fill the non-rating-specific jobs on all of the special details. Enough officers and crew were available to man a full Condition III watch and all of the positions on the sea-and-anchor, underway replenishment, and other special details. The only concern was whether the captain would agree to conduct special evolutions with a watch organization that was not the "first team." His response was an emphatic yes. He had no doubt that conducting an unrep with a well-rested main propulsion assistant as plant control officer was much safer than an unrep with an exhausted chief engineer. The same logic applied to every position.
Blue/Gold was implemented for the remainder of our deployment. The process was not without challenges, but with strong support from the senior leadership, we found solutions. The crisis atmosphere in the Gulf also helped, because the crew subordinated petty concerns to the larger goal of maintaining combat readiness in a potentially hostile environment. Having either the Blue or Gold team awake, in battle dress, and situationally aware around the clock gave the Reeves the capability to increase readiness to a fully manned Condition II watch without waking anyone. As a result, the tactical action officer never hesitated to man the additional watches at the first indication of a threat. Because the crew was well rested, the decision to man general quarters was based solely on threat assessment, not on a tortured balancing of combat readiness versus compassion for an exhausted crew.
That first attempt at a Blue/Gold organization worked well, but when the Reeves left to return to Yokosuka, sustained around-the-clock combat readiness no longer was required and Blue/Gold was relaxed in favor of a traditional four-section Condition IV watch organization. By the time the Reeves again deployed to the Gulf, a change of command and the turnover of most of the ship's senior leaders resulted in the abandonment of the Blue/Gold organization.
Test Two on the Cushing
The next test of the Blue/Gold organization was from June 1992 through September 1993, when I had command in the USS Cushing (DD-985). Blue/Gold was implemented on the transit from Pearl Harbor to Roosevelt Roads to participate in UNITAS 33-92. Although the ship would not be operating in a high-threat environment, I elected to train the way we would fight, and I also was convinced that Blue/Gold would provide many peacetime benefits. For example, the availability of half the crew 24 hours a day meant that a young officer of the deck always had additional manpower and more experienced officers he could call on if he needed help. Every other watch station had the same readily available resources. If an engineering officer on watch had evaporator problems at 0300, he had either the chief engineer or main propulsion assistant and several senior enlisted personnel on duty—but not on watch—who could investigate and advise him. Heat stress was never a problem. A Blue/Gold team always had sufficient personnel to rotate watch standers before they approached the physical heat exhaustion curve limit. The additional manpower also resulted in around-the-clock performance of training, maintenance, cleaning, and preservation.
Blue/Gold also facilitated defense against possible accidental threats. When we conducted over-the-horizon targeting exercises with foreign warships that had Exocet missiles loaded on board for the first time, the Cushing's tactical action officer set antiair warfare weapons condition red. Had an Exocet been fired accidentally, the Cushing was prepared to defend herself. The risk of an accidental firing was extremely low, but when additional watches can be manned by men already awake and on duty, why not be prepared?
An overarching benefit of Blue/Gold was the teamwork that developed. With core/flex and other schemes to ramp up readiness, the different ratings who man the watches usually rotate independently. For example, in the Reeves before Blue/Gold, tactical action officers were in three sections; CIC watch officers were in four sections; operations specialists were port/starboard; fire controllmen were in four sections, and so on. When the tactical action officer flexed to a higher readiness level, the manning was an arbitrary mix of various watch sections. In Blue/Gold, the same people worked and trained together, knew each other's strengths and weaknesses, and developed unspoken routines and other communications enhancements that are absent in random groupings or allstar teams.
The principle disadvantage of Blue/Gold in the Reeves was that some people did not adapt well to a six-on/six-off rotation. In the Cushing, I modified the routine to allow longer sleep periods at night; team turnover was at 0000, 0700, 1200, and 1700, which was an improvement. In addition, breaking off-time into two segments doubled overhead costs—twice as much time was spent turning over duties, dressing and undressing, making bunks, etc. Blue/Gold was great for combat readiness, training, and maintenance, and for those watch standers who previously had stood regular watches, plus special details, plus handled leadership and administrative duties, quality of life was improved significantly. But for those who previously had been day workers, quality of life was, in fact, much worse.
Fine-tuning the Organization
I knew when I received orders to the Lake Erie that I would use a Blue/Gold organization. The advantages were too great, and I was convinced that we could overcome the disadvantages. Having tried the 7/5/5/7 watch rotation in the Cushing, I considered many other variations to increase crew rest, but all of them had disadvantages (principally related to scheduling meals). I was being driven to 12/12 as the only workable alternative, but I feared that 12 hours might be too long a period of duty in a high-stress environment. I found the answer sitting across from me at the dinner table.
My wife, Jean, is an intensive care nurse. While I was preparing for command in the Lake Erie, she was working in the intensive care unit (ICU) at Massachusetts General Hospital—on 12-hour shifts. A large, high-tech ICU is very similar to a ship in harm's way. Periods of relative calm are interrupted by sudden crises. A stable patient starts to "crash" and progressively higher conditions of readiness are set. Starting at the low end, patient care may include occasional observation and remote monitoring of vital signs (warning white). The crisis progresses through increases in the number and capability of duty personnel on the scene (warning yellow, red) and culminates in emergency measures to avert death (general quarters), when all of the specialties in the hospital are brought to bear. Crises do not always advance to the emergency level. More often the team on duty is continuously flexing in response to changes in the patients' status. As in a ship, "watch qualifications" must be attained and the team leader must assign team members to tasks at hand.
When I asked Jean how well she and her colleagues tolerated the long shifts, she stated emphatically that a 12-hour shift was better for several reasons, all of which had analogies at sea. First, continuity of care (situational awareness) was enhanced, and a nurse was more apt to recognize trends in a patient's condition. Second, less time per day was spent briefing patient status to an oncoming shift (watch turnover). Third, fewer procedures (special evolutions) were interrupted by shift changes or, alternatively, resulted in the off-going shift staying late. If adequate rest time between shifts was available, fatigue while on duty was not a problem, even when the level of activity was intense.
Armed with the above data points, I resolved to implement Blue/Gold in Lake Erie using a 12-on/12-off team rotation. I assumed command in October 1998, and at a meeting of senior officers and chief petty officers, I explained the concept and tasked the group to divide the crew into two equal teams—each with the same number of personnel qualification standards (PQS)-qualified watch standers, equal enlisted-code distributions, and equal shares of technical skills (barbers, welders, cooks, etc.).
While the teams were being drafted, we established what a team would be expected to accomplish during its period of duty. My ultimate goal was to man a full Condition III watch in all warfare areas while simultaneously conducting two or more special evolutions. We decided early on that some evolutions never would be conducted simultaneously, for example, sea detail and underway replenishment. Having bounded the requirements, the next step was to build a matrix for manning each of the warfare areas at weapons conditions white, yellow, and red. By establishing the numbers and qualifications required on watch at various weapons conditions, the team leader could determine his notional pool of manpower available for special evolutions. I encouraged the dismantling of stovepipes—every man on the boat deck during launch and recovery operations did not have to be a first division seaman. My only rule was that every person would be final PQS qualified for any task assigned.
The teams were completed by Christmas, and we got under way for the composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX) in January using our new organization. As expected, team capabilities were limited by a lack of qualified personnel in some areas. For example, we had only one flight deck fire-fighting team because that team requires certification at fire-fighting school ashore. We would send a second team after COMPTUEX. Most other shortfalls were in areas where we had the capability to self-train.
By the end of the exercise, the Lake Erie could conduct all routine evolutions, except flight quarters, with either team. The teams rapidly gained confidence and flexibility as they developed the capability to look ahead at the planned evolutions in their next 12-hour duty periods and then, based on the extant threat, allocate the available manpower to watches, special evolutions, maintenance, training, cleaning, admin, etc. Each team was empowered to develop its own methods and to continuously seek better ways of conducting their duties.
The crew also discovered that they had regained control of a portion of their lives. During their 12 hours off duty, team members were free to do whatever they chose. Sleep deprivation was nonexistent. If a man shifted into gym gear for a workout, he did so knowing that he would not have to scramble back into uniform for an unexpected special detail. Afloat college education courses were fully subscribed and classes never were missed because of duties. Participation in enlisted surface warfare specialist training skyrocketed. Aerobic and martial arts groups started regular workouts. Morale soared. By the time we returned to Pearl Harbor, I knew Blue/Gold would be a success.
Blue/Gold's two cornerstone concepts are team building and flexibility. Teams are never mixed except at general quarters, and each performs all functions during its underway duty periods and also is responsible for half of the in-port duty. For example, Blue and Gold teams are each divided into four in-port duty sections. In home port, they stand an eight-section rotation. Overseas, the sections collapse into two Blue and two Gold, or if the threat increases, all of Blue or Gold will remain aboard. Either team can get the ship under way and fight, if necessary. Similarly, repair party personnel always work as teams. All of Repair Two is in Blue; all of Repair Three is in Gold. When those teams are divided into in-port sections, the in-port emergency team is manned by men who also work together at sea. If an in-port duty section requires augmentation, such as for preparations to get the ship under way, its own team members provide the manpower. Team members on the off-duty team do not have to report on board until liberty expires for all hands, regardless their rating. In other words, liberty does not expire early for all engineers, only for those on the team that will get the ship under way.
On a typical night under way in a core/flex organization, the crew awake at 0200 would include the core watch plus those watch standers who have been flexed in response to an external threat. In the Lake Erie, 190 crew are awake, fully dressed, situationally aware, and ready to respond 24 hours a day, every day, regardless of the threat. That number includes every rating in the ship. Ship's business is conducted around the clock. In addition to watches being manned, the ship's office, disbursing, supply support, barbershop, ship's store, repair shops, and maintenance work centers are functioning. A full repair party is awake. Two tactical action officers, 13 officers, and 15 chief petty officers are available to deal quickly with any emergent situation, whether it is an enemy threat or just a confusing shipping or navigation situation. The fatal flaw of core/flex is that the core team may have to wake people in the middle of the night to flex. Even when the captain's standing orders clearly require that he do so, the officer of the deck frequently will wait too long to call for help, sometimes with tragic results.
In the Lake Erie the senior officer in each team is responsible for adjusting both the number and the seniority of the watch standers as the situation requires. That officer frequently will acquaint himself with the situation on the bridge and in CIC and adjust the watch as needed. When the Lake Erie approached the Malacca Strait at 0330, for example, the Blue team leader progressively increased the number and experience of officers on the bridge and in CIC until, during the transit of the strait itself, five officers were on the bridge and his best-qualified shipping team was in CIC. He did that on his own initiative, without having to wake anyone.
Having the entire ship in Blue/Gold has had many side benefits. Before Blue/Gold, the ship's office had six desks and eight petty officers, all of whom worked a normal workday. The office was so crowded that only one customer at a time could conduct business and the rest had to stand in line in the passageway. In Blue/Gold, the office is open around the clock, and because only four petty officers are in each team, everyone has a desk and customers can come in the office and sit down. More work gets done and the customers are treated better. Similar benefits accrued in the repair division, where welding machines and other numerically limited tools were used more efficiently around the clock. The ship's force work list was reduced from more than 200 jobs to zero, and trouble calls were resolved immediately.
Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, requested that Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Naval Reserve Detachment 420 assign a manpower assessment team to embark in the Lake Erie, investigate the efficacy of Blue/Gold, and determine whether the concept is applicable in other ship classes. Although they reported aboard with a healthy skepticism, the assessment team concluded after two weeks of intensive study that Blue/Gold is extraordinarily effective and almost certainly applicable to most combatant classes.
After reviewing the results of the Blue/Gold study, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, endorsed the voluntary use of Blue/Gold in other Pacific Fleet ships and directed that the entire study and a how-to manual be published on the command's web site. Expertise in the implementation of Blue/Gold will migrate from the Lake Erie to the Afloat Training Group Pacific to provide interested ships with information and also to ensure that Afloat Training Group personnel are prepared to conduct training in a Blue/Gold environment. The Lake Erie and Afloat Training Group Pearl Harbor are working together on needed adjustments to basic inter-deployment training that the Lake Erie commenced in July 2000. Lessons learned will be compiled and distributed to other ships and afloat training groups.
As foreseen by Captain Chappell in 1987, the decision between having an exhausted operations officer on the bridge for every special detail or having an alert, well-rested operations officer half of the time and an alert, well-rested weapons officer the other half is a no-brainer. Blue/Gold reduces risk, increases combat readiness, improves maintenance and administration, and enhances quality of life afloat. I have slept soundly during my tour in the Lake Erie, knowing that I have had a well-trained, alert, and highly motivated team conducting the nation's business and keeping the ship secure every minute of the day. We should accept nothing less.
Captain Capello is commanding officer of the Lake Erie (CG-70).