Army General Douglas MacArthur has been acclaimed for his ceremonial speeches. At the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1962, he lauded "Duty, Honor, Country." In Congress, after his 1951 dismissal as Supreme Allied Commander in Korea by President Harry S Truman, he intoned "old soldiers never die—they just fade away." One comparatively unknown piece of his oratory persuaded superiors who initially disagreed with him, when he addressed a small group, including two Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) members flown from Washington to oppose his proposed amphibious landing of Marines at Inchon on 15 September 1950.
For the U.S. Army, the early weeks of the Korean War were disastrous. Despite increasing numbers and air superiority, U.S. troops were forced into a perimeter around Pusan, a dire situation. MacArthur foresaw that an Inchon landing would strike the rear of North Korean People's Army (NKPA) troops surrounding Pusan, cut their supply lines south, and liberate Seoul. In other circumstances, that assault might be "standard Army doctrine for peninsular warfare, wherein an overextended enemy force, lacking air and sea power, becomes ever more vulnerable on its flanks." But Inchon was anathema in Washington and among several knowledgeable officers in the Far East.
During a fact-finding mission, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins met with MacArthur on 13 July and heard about Inchon. Before returning to Washington, Collins heard disheartening words from the Far East expert on amphibious operations, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle. One of MacArthur's staff officers, Colonel Donald H. Galloway, sketched out his boss's plan for Inchon; and after conducting a preliminary study, Doyle said, "Don, if you think a plan like that would work, you ought to have your head examined." Marine historians claim only that "Inchon was probably the least desirable" of landing sites because of an exceedingly high 32-foot tidal range, narrow channels alternately becoming mud flats, currents close to landing craft speed, little room to maneuver around sunken or disabled vessels, and no beaches. Smaller landing craft needed engines to keep bows against 12- to 14-foot-high seawalls, which Marines scaled on makeshift wooden ladders. With barely two to three hours of high tide, larger tank landing craft (LSTs), drawing 14 feet, would be stranded on mud flats until the next high tide; and because of insufficient numbers, 37 rusty LSTs smelling of fish and urine were leased with some crew members from the Japanese merchant service. As Commander Arlie Capps of Doyle's staff said, "We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap—and Inchon had 'em all"—or as Commander Monroe Kelly elaborated, "Make up a list of amphibious 'don'ts,' and you have an exact description of the Inchon operation."
The Joint Chiefs "grew increasingly worried" that MacArthur might "bite off more than the United States could chew." Truman knew Collins had "serious misgivings" about Inchon; and the JCS wanted to "scrutinize" the proposal before endorsing it to a president who doubted MacArthur's "mental stability." Meeting with Truman on 10 August, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman insisted the JCS "would have to pass on his plans" and "determine more precisely what was taking place." Actually, Collins and Sherman went to Tokyo to deter MacArthur from Inchon. On 21 August, Sherman told Navy and Marine commanders in Yokosuka that he "would support Doyle in his opposition to Inchon and his proposal to land in a more practical area farther south." And Defense Secretary Louis Johnson testified before Congress that Collins "did not favor Inchon and went over to try to argue General MacArthur out of it."7 MacArthur recalled their "actual purpose" as "not so much to discuss as to dissuade" in "a strategic conference to debate the problem."
MacArthur's 23 August Tokyo meeting with Collins and Sherman began at 1730 in the conference room of his Dai Ichi Building headquarters. Although several members of MacArthur's staff also were present, Admiral Doyle came to avert seeming disaster. Earlier, he had confronted General Edward Almond (MacArthur's Chief of Staff) and insisted that the Supreme Commander was "oblivious of the enormous technical hazards" and should be "briefed on exactly what the Inchon landing involved." Almond retorted in a "most dictatorial manner" that "the general is not interested in details." Arguing that MacArthur "must be made aware of the details," Doyle got his briefing on the meeting agenda. So after Almond "sketched the big picture" for Collins and Sherman, Doyle took his turn. For 80 minutes, while MacArthur smoked his pipe, Doyle brought in eight staff members, one by one, from Almond's adjoining office, and they detailed Inchon's obstacles. Then, Doyle uttered his final appeal: "General, I have not been asked nor have I volunteered my opinion about this landing. If I were asked, however, the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible."
MacArthur had his cue. With "obvious dramatics," "consummate skill," and "deep resonance of an accomplished actor," his "Churchillian oration" was a "soliloquy which no one present would ever forget" and "oratory such as the world seldom sees save from the orchestra seats of a theatre." As Marine colonel and author Robert Debs Heinl observed, however, "the conference room had no tape recorder.... We shall never know exactly what the General said .... The several versions (including his own, in his Reminiscences) are at odds. But everyone who heard him that evening ... agrees that his 45-minute reply, extemporaneous, without a note, was one of the compelling declarations of his career."
Doyle's briefing caused Collins immediately to suggest landing farther south at Kunsan (with a beach), a site Sherman quickly "seconded." MacArthur began speaking:
Admiral, in all my years of military service, that is the finest briefing I have ever received. Commander [sic], you have taught me all I had ever dreamed of knowing about tides. Do you know, in World War I they got our divisions to Europe through submarine-infested seas? I have a deep admiration for the Navy. From the humiliation of Bataan, the Navy brought us back. I never thought the day would come, that the Navy would be unable to support the Army in its operations.
Petulance is discernible. Although torpedo patrol boats enabled his escape from Corregidor in World War II, MacArthur felt the Navy "failed" to bring him supplies and reinforcements during the fall of the Philippines. For his Reminiscences, MacArthur is less petulant:
The Navy's objections as to tides, hydrography, terrain, and physical handicaps are indeed substantial and pertinent. But they are not insuperable. My confidence in the Navy is complete, and in fact I seem to have more confidence in the Navy than the Navy has in itself. The Navy's rich experience in staging numerous amphibious landings under my command in the Pacific during the late war, frequently under somewhat similar difficulties, leaves me with little doubt on that score.
Either version, however, appealed to Sherman's pride.
MacArthur used different appeals for Collins, who deemed Inchon too far from Pusan for a link-up with General Walton Walker's troops there. Perhaps sharing Army apprehension about amphibious landings against defended positions, Collins thought the Marines were used better to defend the perimeter. So, MacArthur countered from credibility as "past master" of "the amphibious end run" in World War II, whereby the strongest Japanese Southwest Pacific bases were bypassed to "wither on the vine" rather than be taken by bloody assault, such as the Marines experienced at Tarawa (which MacArthur deplored)." Admitting Kunsan "would eliminate many of the hazards of Inchon," MacArthur explained why landing there "would be largely ineffective and indecisive."
It would be an attempted envelopment which would not envelop. It would not sever or destroy the enemy's supply lines or distribution center, and therefore would serve little purpose. It would be a "short envelopment," and nothing in war is more futile. Better no flank movement than one such as this. The only result would be a hook-up with Walker's troops on his left. It would be better to send the troops directly to Walker... In other words, this would simply be sending more troops to help Walker "hang on.". . . No decision can be reached by defensive action in Walker's perimeter. To fight frontally in a breakthrough from Pusan will be bloody and indecisive.
Supporting evidence was unneeded, and MacArthur's confidence is suggested by accounts indicating he also said, "We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them" (suggestive of being too imperious, those words are deleted from his Reminiscences text).
Persuading Collins about "surprise" was a different matter. MacArthur claimed that:
The bulk of the Reds are committed around Walker's defense perimeter. The enemy, I am convinced, has failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense. The very arguments you have made as to the impracticabilities involved will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise. For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt.
But security was "sadly lacking." Tokyo press club reporters nicknamed the forthcoming assault "Operation Common Knowledge." A North Korean spy was captured with operational plans a week before the landing, and Marines newly arrived in Japan for reloading on assault transports—but not yet briefed about their destination—"returned from bordellos to report that the news was all over town: Inchon."
To prove how "surprise is the most vital element for success in war," MacArthur provided only this evidence:
The Marquis de Montcalm believed in 1759 that it was impossible for an armed force to scale the precipitous river banks south of the then walled city of Quebec, and therefore concentrated his formidable defenses along the more vulnerable banks north of the city. But General James Wolfe and a small force did indeed come up the St. Lawrence River and scale those heights. On the Plains of Abraham, Wolfe won a stunning victory that was made possible almost entirely by surprise. Thus he captured Quebec and in effect ended the French and Indian War. Like Montcalm, the North Koreans would regard an Inchon landing as impossible. Like Wolfe, I could take them by surprise.
This example is quoted or paraphrased consistently. Marine historians cite the "precept" of Wolfe's victory at Quebec "made possible by audacity in overcoming natural obstacles that the enemy regarded as insurmountable." Being "favorably impressed" and "spellbound" by MacArthur's "brilliant exposition," Collins also quoted those words: "The very reasons we cited for not landing at Inchon would tend to ensure surprise. 'For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt.' As Wolfe did at Quebec, he would land where the enemy would think it impossible and, with the consequent surprise, gain a decisive victory." Nevertheless, Collins later realized "the main point that was missing in this briefing—though neither Admiral Sherman nor I focused on it at the time—had to do with the strength of the enemy in the Inchon area and his ability to concentrate there quickly."' MacArthur's other arguments suggest why Collins agreed to an assault predicated upon audacity.
MacArthur emphasized casualties: "The only alternative to a stroke such as I propose will be the continuation of the savage sacrifice we are making at Pusan. ... Are you content to let our troops stay in that bloody perimeter like beef cattle in the slaughterhouse? Who will take the responsibility for such a tragedy? Certainly, I will not.... I can almost hear the ticking of the secand hand of destiny. We must act now or we will die." Heeding that appeal, Collins later quoted MacArthur as saying that Inchon "will save 100,000 lives." Moreover, "the prestige of the Western world hangs in the balance."
Oriental millions are watching the outcome. It is plainly apparent that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest. The test is not in Berlin or Vienna, in London, Paris or Washington. It is here and now—it is along the Naktong River in South Korea. We have joined the issue on the battlefield. Actually, we here fight Europe's war with arms, while there it is still confined to words. If we lose the war to Communism in Asia, the fate of Europe will be gravely jeopardized. Win it and Europe will probably be saved from war and stay free. Make the wrong decision here—the fatal decision of inertia—and we will be done.
While the world watched, the United States was being humiliated by Asians who General William Dean predicted in early July "would bolt at the sight of American uniforms." So Collins yielded, for "upon our return to Washington Sherman and I briefed the other Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. After reviewing our reports, the JCS on August 28 sent MacArthur a conditional approval of his plans."
Different arguments influenced Sherman, whose objections to Inchon, as MacArthur surmised in 1956, "were largely animated by a sense of duty which necessitated the presentation in their most naked form of all professional difficulties and objections which could be foreseen." After all, "most of the naval and Marine experts who examined the problem of a west coast amphibious assault held that all of General MacArthur's objectives could be achieved by landing at other places which offered fewer natural hazards than Inchon." During Doyle's briefing, a point was made that "enemy shore batteries could completely command the dead-end channel" into Inchon, whereupon Sherman interrupted boldly: "I wouldn't hesitate to take a ship up there." This prompted MacArthur's exclamation: "Spoken like a Farragut!" Likely resenting Sherman's reversal about Inchon, Doyle muttered, "Spoken like a John Wayne." Yet an issue larger than pride was apparent to Sherman.
For an ostensible age of atomic war, the Air Force received major budgetary support under Truman. The Navy had "its back to the wall, while the Marine Corps was literally fighting for existence." Because JCS Chairman General Omar Bradley testified to Congress in 1949 that "large-scale amphibious operations . . . will never occur again," Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cut "fat out of the Armed Forces" with "most of his trimming on the Navy and Marines." Moreover, Truman's "long and petty distrust of the Navy and its admirals" complemented belief that "the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's."27 MacArthur need not prove to Sherman what the Navy could do, but Sherman could prove to Washington what the Navy and its Marines could do. So despite reservations expressed to Admiral C. Turner Joy the day after hearing the meeting, Sherman rose at MacArthur's conclusion and said, "Thank you. A great voice in a great cause."28 Along with defeating North Korea, success at Inchon could restore Navy and Marine Corps prestige and ensure their stronger position in the U.S. defense establishment.
Sherman might not have gone along with his JCS counterpart, however, had two Marine generals in Tokyo participated that evening: Generals Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. (Commander Fleet Marine Forces Pacific) and Oliver P. Smith (commanding the newly arriving 1st Marine Division for Inchon). Although he helped MacArthur obtain JCS authorization for bringing the division to Korea, Shepherd opposed its use at Inchon, "where a landing would be the most difficult you can imagine." Smith, upon arrival in Tokyo on 22 August, first learned about Inchon during a 20-minute meeting with Doyle and "wasn't very happy with it." Within two hours, Smith met Almond and voiced "objections to Inchon as a landing site." Calling him "son," Almond "annoyed" Smith by saying "this amphibious stuff is just a mechanical option," causing the Marine to perceive "a complete lack of understanding at GHQ concerning the manner in which amphibious operations were mounted out." Almond then "briefed" MacArthur in private before leading Smith into MacArthur's office. The Supreme Commander tried converting Smith by saying, "The landing of the Marines at Inchon will be decisive. It will win the war and the status of the Marine Corps should never again be in doubt."
Both Smith and Shepherd were excluded from the pivotal deliberations. As Almond explained, "If General Shepherd was not present... on 23 August it was not through any design on the part of General MacArthur or anybody else.... As far as General Smith's being present is concerned, General Smith had many duties.... The fact that he was not at the conference on 23 August may have been a matter of his availability. After all, General Smith was not required at this conference .... [His] function as landing force commander was that of carrying out the decision of the overall commander." But if they had been there, either Marine might have provided the persuasive example of why Inchon should not be attempted: Tarawa.
"Mechanical difficulties" at Tarawa caused one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. The "high cost in American lives was ... a profound shock not only to the people back home but also to the planners of the invasion; every subsequent move in the drive across the central Pacific was to be made with the mistakes of Tarawa in mind."
Marines remember. While being briefed about Inchon by his regimental commanding officer, Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, then-Major Edwin Simmons recalled: "We were looking at each other apprehensively.... It looked like Tarawa revisited." After first seeing the map of Inchon, Marine Colonel Ray Murray exclaimed: "For God's sake, what do they think they're doing?" On 23 August, Smith and Shepherd could invoke that example if asked or simply through their presence, so patent were the parallels. Although neither man landed at Tarawa, their professional peers did. The "ritual of military memory" about carnage has a "special vividness," impelling a "moral obligation" to tell others of what they experienced so that they can avoid the same mistakes in "subsequent military policy." With Smith and Shepherd excluded, "Terrible Tarawa" could not counteract "Quebec." On 15 September 1950, Marines landed at Inchon.
Despite bad weather from typhoon Kezia, technical difficulties, and reliance upon reservists called hastily to active duty, Inchon proved "one of the easiest landings" in modern warfare. Proceeding "more or less as designed," the assault was "a daring and brave conception, brilliantly executed and worthy of study as a precedent of amphibious excellence."" MacArthur's summary report was truthful: "Events of the past two weeks have been decisive.... A successful frontal attack and envelopment has completely changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the North Korean army has been broken and their scattered forces are being liquidated." Militarily, Inchon succeeded because of expertise lauded by initial opponents of Inchon. Smith said "we had the knowhow"; Doyle wrote "because of their many years of specialized training in amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, only the United States Marines had the requisite know-how to formulate these plans within the limited time available and to execute these plans flawlessly without additional training or rehearsal." Inchon happened, however, in part because MacArthur's oratory on 23 August 1950 counteracted Doyle's staff briefing and the previous judgments of Collins and Sherman. This one speech thereby may have helped save the U.S. Marine Corps.