Discussions about a widening "civilian-military gap" keep conjuring up fears of mutinous military leaders who disdain the culture and leadership of civilians. Much of the academic/literary chatter began with the widely read book Making the Corps. Author and military correspondent Thomas E. Ricks, an admirer of the Corps, worried in the final chapter about Marines who think their culture is superior to that of the civilian world.
Such concerns have escalated to alarmist proportions. At a series of East Coast academic seminars, speakers have obsessed about soldiers professing conservative views, displaying overt religiosity, writing speculative college essays about the legal ramifications of domestic military operations, and listening to Rush Limbaugh. Cannot a Chilean-style coup be far behind?
A few officers may express "misguided" opinions, but they usually resign. Junior officers may rock the boat by writing dissenting letters and articles for Proceedings, but these are not the people who formulate and execute policies at the Pentagon. At higher levels of command, it is difficult to find officers who fit the Dr. Strangelove stereotype.
Nevertheless, in a January 2000 Proceedings article, Sara Lister, former Army Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel, fretted about potential "militarism" among servicemen whose opinions are more conservative than prevailing civilian views. Ms. Lister, who became famous in 1997 for calling the Marines "extremist," took aim at former Secretary of the Navy James Webb and others who openly question the results of unprecedented gender integration in the armed forces.1
Lister seems to be suggesting that the duty of military personnel to follow orders is so absolute that criticism of personnel policy decisions made by civilian leaders is unprofessional at best and mutinous at worst. If the same standard were applied to Pentagon decisions about weapon systems, officers would have to remain silent about poorly designed equipment that needlessly complicates the job or makes the mission more dangerous.
Human beings are far less perfect and much more complex than military machines. Civilians empowered to set personnel policies, therefore, must be even more accountable—not less so. With such privilege comes the responsibility to hear and respect the views of military people who must live—or die—under their direction.
Attempts to censure informed, responsible criticism, or to deny obvious consequences of flawed policies, aggravate a problem far worse than the civilian-military gap—a widening credibility gap between Pentagon leaders and the troops they lead. Instead of dealing with that problem, some observers fixate on potential conspiracies, brought about by divergent political views among military people and civilians.
According to the "Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society," released by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies on 8 September 1999, high-ranking officers who identify themselves as Republicans outnumber Democrats eight to one (64%-8%, with 28% independent or other).
This compares to a companion survey of "civilian elites," 35% of whom described themselves as Democrat, 29% Republican, and 36% independent or other. In an interview with The New York Times, Professor Charles Stevenson of the National War College said it is "scary" to have "an officer corps so overwhelmingly Republican."2
But in view of the strong support that Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush gave to the armed forces, contrasted with President Bill Clinton's 1993 attempt to lift the ban on open homosexuals in the military, the big surprise is that anyone would be surprised. Of the selected Who's Who civilians polled, 55% said they wouldn't mind if homosexuals served in the military. But 76% of elite, upwardly mobile officers, who are more likely to understand what the issue is all about, said they were opposed.
This does not mean, however, that Republican-leaning, socially conservative officers are ready to revolt. To the contrary, for the past seven years, Pentagon leaders have been following politically charged orders—but not from Republicans. Beribboned officers have lobbied hard for the president's legislative agenda, even though uniformed people are supposed to implement policies, not make them.
In 1998, for example, members of the Senate were perturbed by the lobbying efforts of Army General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who actively opposed legislation promoting the speedy deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.3 In the same year, the Defense Department and service chiefs, with the exception of the Marine Corps, lobbied hard to defeat bipartisan legislation to repeal co-ed basic training.4
General Shelton also pushed for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was firmly rejected by the Senate in October 1999.5 American military tradition demands loyal execution of the president's orders, but that does not justify activities such as this before congressional decisions are made.
Even on the issue of military pay raises, service chiefs dutifully have carried water for the president. In a 1998 editorial, the Air Force Times criticized the brass for sending "minions to Capitol Hill to quietly scuttle [a] bigger pay raise. . . . National Security Committee aides complained that if they had gotten any support from the service chiefs, the bigger raise stood a good chance of passage. Even silence would have helped."6
The situation worsened on 26 October 1999, when General Shelton presented official testimony that a 1% across-the-board budget cut would be "devastating" for the military. The chairmen of both Senate and House Appropriations Committees, Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Representative C.W. Bill Young (R-FL), co-signed a letter that made an extraordinary point. Even with the proposed cut (adjusted later to slightly less than 1%) the Republican-endorsed defense budget was $2 billion higher than the amount previously requested by the president and endorsed by General Shelton.7
The controversy escalated two days later with a disturbing report in The Washington Post. Despite previous assurances about troop preparedness, two of the Army's ten combat divisions had been given classified "C-4" ratings, the lowest of four possible readiness grades. Neither the 10th Mountain Division based at Fort Drum, New York, nor the First Infantry headquartered in Germany would be able to participate in a "two major war" scenario. Half of their available troops currently are tied down in land-locked Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively.
The news was a devastating blow—not to the reputation of the units in question, but to the credibility of Pentagon leaders who were less than candid about the length and true costs of the open-ended Balkan deployments. When asked about General Shelton's duty to level with Congress on the defense budget issue, his spokesman, Navy Captain Stephen Pietropaoli, responded, "Candor can always come both ways." Equivocation such as this vitiates trust, which is essential for respect.
Even the greenest recruits know that politically sensitive realities are being downplayed or denied up and down the chain of command. Witness the 1997 gag order that Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness Louis Finch imposed on staff members to prevent publicity about negative field-trip reports.8
It is disturbing, but not surprising, that U.S. servicemen and women are losing confidence in the brass. A new study released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that only 35% of servicemen surveyed agreed with the statement: "When my service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it's true." Expressing concerns about political sensitivities, only 44% of junior officers expressed confidence that their own superiors "have the will to make the tough, sometimes unpopular decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the service."9
In 1997, Sara Lister told U.S. News and World Report that the Army is reluctant to publicly discuss physical strength and pregnancy issues, because in the past those subjects quickly became fodder for conservatives seeking to limit women's role.10
The same rationale apparently was followed in the preparation of a 1997 Rand Corporation report for the Department of Defense. A comparison of the draft and final versions of the report revealed that a number of candid statements made by interviewees in the field—servicemen and women who trusted that their views would be faithfully reported—were paraphrased, revised, or omitted all together. Quotable "sound bites" were added to burnish media perceptions and to euphemize certain controversial findings regarding pregnancy, interpersonal relationships, mandatory political correctness, and readiness.11
Truth, it seems, is the first casualty of social engineering. Dissembling is demoralizing, and it has tangible, negative consequences. A confidential survey done at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, which found a 58% increase in attrition among Army captains, reported startling denunciations of leadership. "Top-down loyalty doesn't exist," said a summary of the officers' comments. "Senior leaders will throw subordinates under the bus in a heartbeat to protect others or advance their careers."12
CSIS found many units with high morale and inspirational commanders, but confidence has been eroding for some time. Citing the Navy's three most recent personnel studies, CSIS found that in 1996, 63% of Navy officers and 41% of enlisted personnel were satisfied with overall Navy leadership. Two years later, respective percentages fell to 51% and 36%. Only 36% of those surveyed by CSIS in all services thought there was an atmosphere of trust between leaders and their subordinates.13
Overall findings further suggested significant dissatisfaction with declining standards of merit and excellence, overly taxing deployments, and missions that seem predicated on some goal other than preserving the national security of the United States. If these issues and declining confidence trends are contributing to personnel shortages, pay raises, benefits, and bonuses alone will not resolve the problem.
There is reason for concern about civilian "magic wand warriors," who keep advocating questionable "peace wars" such as Kosovo, despite the negative effects on readiness and morale. Members of Congress also can be a problem when they fail to understand military culture, including the need for personal conduct rules that are unlike anything in the civilian world.14
In 1993, however, bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress showed that they did understand the armed forces' need for special rules. The debate over homo-sexuals in the military, which Sara Lister bemoans as a failure of civilian control, was actually an example of responsible congressional oversight on personnel matters.
The story began shortly after the 1992 election, when President Bill Clinton moved quickly to fulfill promises to campaign contributors who expected him to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. Public opposition was spontaneous and overwhelming. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted the president's original, radical plan, but were present at Fort McNair when the president announced a compromise proposal dubbed "don't ask, don't tell."
During several days of hearings that followed, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees exercised their oversight responsibility by asking incisive questions about the president's plan. The Joint Chiefs, then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin, and then-General Counsel Jamie Gorelick gave candid answers that revealed serious flaws in the "don't ask, don't tell" concept, which was based on a convoluted idea: "Sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct."15
The members of Congress recognized an inherent inconsistency that could be easily exploited by activist lawyers challenging the policy in court: If homosexuality is not a disqualifying characteristic, how can the armed forces justify dismissal of a person who merely reveals the presence of such a characteristic?
Instead of codifying such an unworkable proposal, members of Congress rejected "don't ask, don't tell." Instead, they passed a law that adopted, almost word for word, constitutionally sound regulations that had been in effect since 1981—long before Clinton took office. The law and legislative history reaffirm the principle that homosexuality is incompatible with military service.16
Contrary to revisionist accounts, there is no way that a bipartisan, veto-proof majority would have passed a law making it "easier" for homosexuals to serve. Representative Steve Buyer (R-IN), current Chairman of the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, underscored the point in a 16 December 1999 memorandum: "Although some would assert that [the 1993 law] embodied the compromise now referred to as ‘Don't Ask, Don't Tell,' there is no evidence to suggest that the Congress believed the new law to be anything other than a continuation of a firm prohibition against military service for homosexuals that had been the historical policy."
Congress did allow the Pentagon to drop "the question" about homosexuality, which used to appear on military induction papers, but appropriate questions may be reinstated at any time. To give political cover to the president, Democrats with majority control also allowed the media to report, inaccurately, that Congress had approved the president's "don't ask, don't tell" proposal.
That legend persists to this day—especially since Defense Department enforcement regulations, identified as "the policy," continue to reflect the "don't ask, don't tell" concept that Congress had rejected. In 1996, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the law and the Clinton policy/regulations are inconsistent, and the Defense Department has engaged in "repeated mischaracterization of the statute itself."17
Lister's second major complaint about resistance in the ranks centers on unprecedented policy directives regarding women in the military. Disowning responsibility for her own actions while in office, she also scoffs at the notion that ". . . without ‘liberal' and ‘feminist' pressure from the Executive Branch, women would not be eligible to serve in combat or near-combat positions and there would not be so many women in the services."
Never mind that the Pentagon's tax-funded Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) routinely presses for career opportunities for women in or near previously closed combat units. The DACOWITS also promotes collateral policies such as gender-normed standards, co-ed basic training, and gender-based recruitment/promotion "goals," which are never called "quotas."
In making their recommendations, usually with unanimous votes, the mostly female and civilian members of the DACOWITS constantly disregard the views of military and civilian women who disagree with the feminist agenda. They also ignore the professional advice of experienced veterans in combat arms communities such as Special Forces, field artillery, and submarines.18
During her term as Assistant Army Secretary for Manpower and Personnel, Sara Lister was a powerful advocate of such policies. Her influence as a "driving force" was evident in a controversial Decision Memorandum signed by her close associate and boss, Army Secretary Togo West, Jr., on 1 June 1994.19
The West memorandum outlined sweeping mandates for reinstatement of co-ed basic training, plus assignments of women in or near previously closed combat units. The Center for Military Readiness was first to obtain and release a confidential copy of the nine-page document, which had been signed by Secretary West without the concurrence of General Gordon Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff.
General Sullivan, who was attending D-Day 50th anniversary observances at the time, "hit the roof" upon his return from Europe.20 During the ensuing uproar, the West memo was withdrawn. Several of its recommendations, including the reinstitution of co-ed basic training, were nonetheless implemented before the year was out.21
Two years later, sensational sex scandals broke out at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Evidence of gross misconduct subsequently was exposed at basic training facilities in all the services, except in the Marine Corps, which trains male and female recruits separately.22
In response to the debacle on their watch, Secretary West appointed the Senior Review Panel, overseen by Ms. Lister. The panel blamed just about everyone involved for "leadership" failures, but not high-ranking civilians who were making policy at the time. Recommended remedies included an extra week of sensitivity training, the cost of which was estimated by the Army Times to be roughly equivalent to the loss of three battalions worth of soldiers.23
Discipline problems resulting from gender integration in the military have occurred not because of uniformed women, but because of Pentagon appointees who disregard the power of sexuality and the weakness of human nature. "Leadership" alone cannot overcome the effect of housing and training policies that encourage indiscipline rather than discipline.
Civilians who try to redefine cohesion, or ignore the advice of military experts on its importance, do so at great risk. In 1993, the Army Research Institute ran a test of co-ed basic training that defined cohesion in civilianized terms, similar to the "solidarity and social intimacy" standard invoked by Ms. Lister. This is very different from the definition presented to the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces: "Unit members [must] become totally dependent on each other for the completion of their mission or survival; and group members must meet all standards of performance and behavior in order not to threaten group survival."24
By this standard, it appears that institutional cohesion is breaking down in two ways--horizontally, among members of small units, as well as vertically, up the chain of command. The CSIS survey found that only 36% of male and female respondents agreed that female personnel would pull their fair share of the load in combat or hazardous situations.25 This not a reflection of sexism, but honest concern about mission accomplishment and survival.
It does not help to stifle comments about the consequences of social change. The Navy's pregnancy policy, for example, prohibits negative comments about unplanned losses among female crewmembers, who are usually not replaced during a deployment.26 This is a problematic element of the Navy's overly generous pregnancy policy, which accommodates, subsidizes, and therefore encourages single parenthood.
Evacuations of female sailors from Navy ships for medical reasons, primarily pregnancy, occur at rates two and one-half times those of men.27 Despite medical and operational risks far greater than those on surface ships, some advocates are eager to impose similar problems on the submarine force.
In interviews with military chaplains and family counselors around the country, members of the 1999 Blair Commission on gender-integrated training learned that the need for food stamps primarily exists among single parents. In 1993 General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, directed that recruiters phase out the enlistment of married recruits, but a barrage of derogatory remarks from then-Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) forced the general to back down.
When viewed in this context, alarmist fears about the civilian-military gap really amount to something else: frustration with anyone who challenges the decisions of political appointees such as Ms. Lister, or questions the feminist "ungendered visions" that inspire social policies in the military. In the current debate, defenders of military culture are likely to face censure in uniform and censorship in the civilian world.
Civilian control of the military is an important principle, but it does not absolve Pentagon officials of accountability for policies made on their watch. Nor does it justify attempts to deny obvious problems. Dissembling by high-ranking leaders widens the credibility gap between themselves and the troops they command.
There are ways to narrow the gap. As recommended in the CSIS report, the senior service colleges should reinforce the "imperative of candor" within and outside the chain of command.28 More important, the next Commander-in-Chief also must restore sound priorities in all policy-making areas, and request complete honesty about the consequences of recent social change. For the sake of national security, that should be an order.
Ms. Donnelly, a former member of the 1992 Presidential Commission, is President of the Center for Military Readiness, an independent public policy organization that specializes in military personnel issues.
1. Lister also named Desert Storm veteran Dr. John Hillen, Naval War College Professor Mackubin Thomas Owens, Anita K. Blair, former Chairman of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, and this author, who is pleased to be included in such distinguished company. back to article
2. Adam Clymer, "Sharp Divergence Found in Views of Military," New York Times, 9 Sept. 1999, p. A-15. back to article
3. Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-OK), News Release, "Inhofe Disagrees with Joint Chiefs on Missile Defense Policy," 26 Aug. 1998. Also Sen. Bob Smith, (R-NH), "Joint Chiefs Go AWOL in Defense Debate," Wall Street Journal, 29 Sept. 1998. back to article
4. Rowan Scarborough, "Army Liaison Accused of Pressuring Hill on Vote," Washington Times, 31 Aug. 1998, p. A-1. back to article
5. Helen Dewar and Roberto Suro, "Senate Conservatives to Demand Vote on Test Ban Treaty," Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1999, p. A-9. back to article
6. Editorial, "Is this Leadership?" Air Force Times, 28 June 1998. back to article
7. Rowan Scarborough, "General Raises Ire of GOP Leaders," Washington Times, 8 Nov. 1999, p. A-1. back to article
8. George C. Wilson, "Conduct Unbecoming a Bureaucrat," Army Times, 1 Sept. 1997. back to article
9. "American Military Culture in the 21st Century," released February 2000, Chapter 6, Table 6.5, p. 72. back to article
10. Richard Newman, "Army Sex Ed 101," U. S. News and World Report, 11 Aug. 1997, p. 52. back to article
11. "New Opportunities for Women: Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale," released 21 October 1997, and analyzed in CMR Notes, Oct.-Nov. 1997. back to article
12. Thomas E. Ricks, "Younger Officers Quit at Fast Clip," Washington Post, 17 April 2000, p. A-1. back to article
13. Navy Personnel Surveys 1996, 1997, 1998: John Kantor and Murray Olmstead, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, noted in part by CSIS on Chapter 4, p. 45, and Table 6.5, p. 72. back to article
14. Early in 1997, Air Force Lt. Kelly Flinn was about to be court martialed for lying about an adulterous affair with the husband of an enlisted woman. A professional public relations firm successfully portrayed Flinn as a "victim" of "antiquated" rules. Staffers for Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall panicked, especially when Sen. Lott told them to "get real." As the public relations campaign escalated, it was left to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Fogleman, during a Senate hearing, to explain why Lt. Flinn should have been held accountable for her dishonesty and insubordination. Lt. Flinn was allowed to leave with a general discharge, and Gen. Fogleman, who was criticized in some quarters for defending the code of military justice, resigned early. back to article
15. Secretary of Defense News Release, No. 605-93, 22 December 1993. President Clinton announced general outlines of his proposal on 19 July 1993, which formed the basis for the Defense Department's congressional testimony and subsequent "don't ask, don't tell" policy/regulations. Current training manuals include a modified version of this statement, not the actual law or an accurate summary of it. back to article
16. See P.L. 103 - 160, Section 654, Title 10, U.S. Code, posted on the CMR website, <www.cmrlink.org>. Also Senate Report 103-112, pp. 263-297, 27 July 1993, and House Report 103-200, pp. 287-290, 30 July 1993. back to article
17. Thomasson v. Perry, 1995, 80 F.3d 915 (Fourth Circuit, 1996). back to article
18. In 1999, the DACOWITS unanimously recommended that women be assigned to submarines, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) field artillery, and special operations helicopters, similar to the ones shot down in Somalia. back to article
19. Paulette V. Walker, "Bad Feelings Linger Over Women's Policy," Army Times, 25 July 1994, p. 2. back to article
20. Eric Schmitt, "Generals Oppose Combat by Women," New York Times, 17 June 1994, p. A-1. Among other things, the West memorandum recommended that co-ed basic training be reinstated, and that women be assigned to combat engineer positions and air cavalry helicopters, MLRS units, and special operations helicopters. Phrases such as "career opportunity" were used ten times, but references to military requirements were conspicuously absent. back to article
21. The 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Services was informed by the Army that a five-year test of co-ed basic training was ended in 1982. Women were suffering too many injuries, and the men were not being challenged enough. See Finding 2.1.5, p. C-78, Commission Report, 15 Nov., 1992, currently published under the title Women in Combat, Brassey's, ISBN No. 0-02-881091-0. back to article
22. Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Basic Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense, 16 Dec. 1997, pp. 14-15. back to article
23. Senior Review Panel Report, released on 11 Sept. 1997, and news report by Sean D. Naylor, "Values Instruction to be Added to Basic Training," Army Times, 22 Sept. 1997, p. 4. back to article
24. Finding 2.5.1, p. C-80, Presidential Commission Report, 15 Nov., 1992. back to article
25. Chapter 3, p. 27. back to article
26. SECNAV Instruction 1000, ASN (M&RA), DoN Policy on Pregnancy, 6 Feb. 1995, (4.1). back to article
27. Rowan Scarborough, "Dropout Rate High for Women on Ships," Washington Times, p. A-1. back to article
28. Chapter 7, p. 80, and Colonel Joseph L. Collins, U.S. Army (Retired), "American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century," Army, March 2000, p.17. back to article