"Don't Ask—Don't Tell: Is It Working?" (See J. Kelly, p. 4, May 2000 Proceedings)
Charles M. Oakley—Captain Kelly thinks that sexual orientation ought to be a private matter. Does he advocate that professed heterosexuals keep their orientation private? In my last submarine, I was the only officer who did not have a picture of a wife or girlfriend hanging prominently in his stateroom. They were proud of their sexual orientation. When a classmate came back from a weekend with his wife, the entire class listened to stories of where they ate, and where they slept. Captain Kelly likely wears a wedding ring. Why does he flaunt his sexual orientation? Why is it only gay servicemembers must keep their orientation private? As an officer, I was expected to provide initial counseling to people having relationship problems. Why was I expected to deal with this private matter of sexual orientation? I had no one to turn to for my own relationship problems without risking my career.
When people say gays should keep their orientation private, they need to realize exactly what they are asking and be willing to keep their own sexual orientation private. After seven years of keeping my orientation private, I told my commanding officer that I was gay and was rewarded for my honesty and courage with an involuntary separation from the Navy.
And why should we keep our orientation private? Captain Kelly says it is because gay servicemembers make straight men uncomfortable. Why should the uneasiness of some straight servicemembers require us to hide our orientation and require the Navy to separate us from the service? There are lots of events in the military that make people uncomfortable, and you are taught how to deal with them. There are also procedures to be followed. If any sailor felt that any other sailor was making unwarranted sexual advances toward him, then the sexual harassment procedures should be followed. And these procedures would need no change at all. They already are written to be gender neutral.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) lists several specific sexual acts as violations. Why isn't it applied to straight behavior as well? I endured one long lunch on board a submarine while the executive officer regaled the wardroom with a graphic description of oral sex performed by his girlfriend. He was admitting in front of the entire wardroom to a violation of the UCMJ. He was not prosecuted. Homosexual relations should be judged by the same standards as heterosexual relations. They should be forbidden on ship, and prosecuted if force or a minor is involved. Homosexuals are not asking for special rights, only for rights equal to everyone else's.
The bottom line is that the military is paying a high price for not allowing gays to serve openly. The small number of servicemembers discharged for homosexuality does not include a much larger number of gay people who leave without being counted. If I had resigned, as the force judge advocate general recommended to me, I would not have been counted. I know of at least two other officers who chose to resign after their sexuality was revealed. I also know almost two dozen former servicemembers whose primary reason for leaving the service was because they did not want to live a lie by keeping their sexuality private. Is the Navy better off because we are no longer in the service? Are you paying a high a price to keep some servicemembers from being uncomfortable? Is the policy really working to provide the Navy the best people available?
"No Slap in the Face" (See A Duncan, pp. 448, April 2000; E. Beach, p. 20, May 2000 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Peter M. Hekman, Jr., 17.5. Navy (Retired)—I am sure that I am joined by many thousands of individuals who served in the nuclear navy when I express my thanks to the Naval Institute for publishing this article portraying the human side of Admiral Rickover. I am confident my experiences with Admiral Rickover extending over a span of more than 20 years are shared by many. Admiral Rickover was indeed one of the most human and understanding individuals that I have ever known. He did not demand perfection. He demanded one's best effort. And he expected the pure unvarnished truth. He maintained exceptionally complete records of his officers, and—at least in my case—ever failed to recognize a promotion, a new assignment, or other noteworthy event with a personal, often hand-written, congratulatory note and often a personal phone call.
I entered the nuclear navy in 1964 as a lieutenant—and as a draftee pulled out of a post-graduate education program, along with many others. Since commissioning in June of 1958, I already had served in four engineering assignments, two as department head in major conversions and new construction. Despite my best efforts in an interview to convince Admiral Rickover that I was not suited for "his program," he treated me with great cordiality and deference, asked about my family, and commented on my record and the fact he felt the Navy was in error to have turned down a prior application for submarine duty. He explained that he needed help, and informed me it was my duty to carry out my orders, which had been dated and issued three days before our interview without my knowledge. I realized that I had just met a remarkable individual.
Refusing to volunteer for submarines because I really didn't want another chief engineer tour, I was assigned to the plant in Idaho, during a time of major plant conversions. I still vividly recall the times Admiral Rickover would visit and stand in the engineering operating station while I had watch, simply to tally about plants and people-always asking if I had everything I needed. I later went off to be engineer officer of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and commanding officer of the USS Mississippi (CGN-40). Admiral Rickover's personal contacts and personal support continued.
Admittedly Admiral Rickover could sometimes wax profane. Once I made mention of the fact that the Admiral's profanity detracted from his message. Word of my comment got back to Admiral Rickover, and he never ever used a profane word in my presence again. On another occasion, after builder's trials, I insisted that the ship's main reduction gears be opened and thoroughly inspected because I believed they had not been timed properly during installation. This would cause a three-week delay in ship delivery, and someone would have to pay. The shipyard and the gear manufacturer insisted I was wrong. I took my case, in technical terms, directly to Admiral Rickover. He did not hesitate to support my position. Within minutes, however, he called the chief engineer of the shipyard and said, "Chet, please tell me what Hekman is talking about. I didn't understand a word he said about those gears." Fortunately, the inspection proved me to be correct.
In 1980, Admiral Rickover again personally entered my detailing process and insisted that I go back to Idaho, working directly for him as senior instructor at the Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course (SOSMRC). By this time, through numerous phone calls and personal discussions, we discovered our mutual interests in history and in education, and were exchanging books and papers. He told me that he had made a terrible error in establishing SOSMRC in the nuclear discipline and that this error affected the attitude of the students. He showed me some of the "hate letters" he had received, and stated that "Submariners don't know how to teach surface officers and aviators." He asked me to undo his error such that the senior officer students both learned in and enjoyed the SOSMRC experience, and that I had a free hand in doing so. He called at least weekly during my two years in Idaho to check the pulse of the student body and to reaffirm his support. We often discussed other matters, from current affairs to education to decisions that he had to make. On occasion I told him he was wrong, which would raise his ire and sometimes terminate the conversation. But he always called back to ask me to explain why I thought him to be wrong. And he always listened.
Admiral Rickover was relieved by Admiral Kinnaird McKee during my last Idaho tour, and I left Idaho after being promoted to flag rank. Going to the Pentagon, and then other assignments, I continued to exchange books and to call on Admiral Rickover in his final years, first at the Navy Yard office and, after he suffered a severe stroke, at his home. Even then, he insisted on telling me that I was wearing the wrong warfare insignia. It was his way of gently needling me about our conversations early in my career when he tried to convince me I should follow the underwater route, and my insistence in remaining on the surface, a resistance he somehow seemed to admire. Having lost my father suddenly, just after entering the nuclear program and in the first weeks of my first Idaho tour, Admiral Rickover acknowledged my loss and, I believe, truly tried to compensate for it. If so, he did a wonderful job of it. And I am sure I am not the only person Admiral Rickover treated more like a son than like just another naval officer. He was truly the most human of individuals. He showed compassion, trust and interest in me as an individual that goes well beyond that which I ever received from any other individual in my military career. I do miss him still.
This article also reminds me that some things in the Navy never change. The 1931 letter written by then-Lieutenant Rickover to his wife reporting what he had to go through with his commanding officer in the S-48 over the past year is nearly identical in phrase and content to several I received from my son only a few years ago while he served as a department head in one of our newest guided-missile destroyers. Admiral Rickover recognized his situation on the S-48 as a severe failure of leadership, a leadership problem the Navy has apparently yet to solve.
"Interview: James Webb" (See F Schultz, pp. 78-81, April 2000; J. Wise, p. 22, May 2000 Proceedings)
Robert F. Dorr—I am certain many in the naval community will greet Rules of Engagement as a superb motion picture. It treats the Marine Corps with great respect and accuracy.
There is much in the film that is worthy. There are three fine performances by actors portraying Marine officers (Samuel L. Jackson, Tommy Lee Jones, and Guy Pearce). The depiction of Marines and of military courtroom law is a serious attempt to get things right within the framework of an entertaining drama.
But Rules has the same fatal flaw that has become the standard tool in virtually every Hollywood thriller over the past decade or more. Remember another movie where Gene Hackman was pitted against a rogue boss in the National Security Agency? In order for Rules to work at any level, we are required to accept career government officials who are fundamentally dishonest. The story line, created by Webb but written by screenwriter Stephen Gaghan, relies on a National Security Advisor (played by Bruce Greenwood) being corrupt and an ambassador (Ben Kingsley) being a perjurer.
There is plenty more to strain our credulity (who could seriously expect Anne Archer to be married to Ben Kingsley?), but Rules is not a motion picture at all without Marines who are noble and diplomats who are bent. I watched this blockbuster wearing all three of my hats. First, I'm a military veteran (Air Force). Second, I'm an author of books, magazine articles, and a weekly column in Air Force Times, all dealing with military and naval topics. Finally, I'm a retired Foreign Service officer. I spent 27 years as a diplomat and once had my life saved by a Marine at an embassy overseas.
If I could ask Marine, author, and former Navy Secretary James Webb just one question about Rules of Engagement, it would be this: When so much attention was shown to accuracy about the Marine Corps (down to the proper use of the index finger on an M-16 rifle trigger-housing), why was it necessary to portray U.S. diplomats as any less patriotic than U.S. Marines?
"Breaking the Command Barrier" (See J. Andrews, pp. 70-73, February 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Drew York, U.S. Navy—I salute Commander Andrews on his fine article concerning the lack of senior aviators from the "support" communities in the air wing commander (CAG)/conventional carrier commanding officer/nuclear carrier commanding officer billets. I believe the perception of the title support hurts our chances as professional, talented officers and aviators within these squadrons to achieve these levels of command and promotion opportunities after the squadron commanding officer tour.
If it were not for the support communities, the F/A-18 Hornet would have problems making a 1+00 cycle without gas from the S-3 Viking, and would have suffered more losses in Bosnia and Iraq as a result of being shot down by surface-to-air missiles not being suppressed by the EA-6B Prowler. In addition, the F-14 Tomcat would have had problems getting headed in the direction of enemy fighters without the aid of the E-2C Hawkeye.
I am approaching the 14-year point of my career, completing my department head tour as a pilot in an EA-6B squadron, and I am electing to enter the civilian field partly because of the issues Commander Andrews raised in his article. Pilots and naval flight officers alike in the Prowler community within my peer group continually see outstanding COs in our squadrons get sent off to air operations, combat direction center, and other ship's company tours right after a three-year XO/CO sea tour, knowing full well we will never see them with stars on their shoulders since they lack a "pointy nose" background. I heard these same comments from 5-3 and E-2 aviators in my previous tour as an air wing landing signals officer. It is this lack of visibility in these ranks causing lieutenant commander aviators with more than 2,500 flight hours to leave the Navy and pursue other professions.
Despite this lack of flag officers from our community, the wing commodore and COs from the EA-6B community have taken a deficiency in airframes, and a shortage of parts and aviators, and turned this platform into a national asset. They deployed more than 25 airframes to the Kosovo conflict in record time with mostly volunteer aircrews, all the while maintaining a presence in the skies over Iraq. The flag officers and air wing commanders of today need to realize that there are Prowler, Hawkeye, and Viking squadron commanding officers who are more than capable of managing and leading a carrier air wing into combat, and the junior officers of today need to see that happen so they are motivated enough to stick around through tomorrow and have that opportunity.
I have completed three six-month deployments, four sets of work-ups, and two deployments in the expeditionary role. I have participated in Operations Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, Southern Watch, and Northern Watch. At the end of each of those deployments, the local flag officer came by the ready room to thank us for providing a national asset, the EA-6B, for the successful integration into multi-force combat operations, saving fighter/attack airframes and, more important, the bodies that pilot and operate them. It is time to start rewarding the leaders of these squadrons with carrier air wing and carrier command, and eventually to put stars on their shoulders.
By the way, the two EA-6B commanding officers slated for CAG billets in 1997 and 1999 indicated in the article's table were both originally A-6E aviators who had completed their department head tours in Intruders prior to transition from that community when it was decommissioned several years ago. We as Prowler aviators have seen just one EA-6B raised CAG in more than 25 years of airframe history.
"The Name Game" (See D. Bouchoux, pp. 110-111, March 2000 Proceedings)
"An Unmanned Revolution" (See P. McVety, pp. 88-92, March 2000 Proceedings)
The Honorable John Warner, United States Senate, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services—I read these two articles with great interest. Having been responsible for the process of naming U.S. Navy ships while in the Navy Secretariat, I commend Commander Bouchoux for his constructive and objective views. I agree that the name for CVN-77 should "evoke images of valor and a proud history."
I, together with Senator Daniel Inouye, introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 84 (S.Con.Res.84) on 24 February 2000 to recommend to the Commander-in-Chief that CVN-77 be named the USS Lexington, one of the names suggested in the article. What a coincidence of thought, for Bouchoux's views had not yet been published. Senator Inouye and I—both World War II veterans—-believe that the name Lexington, which has a strong connection to the history of the U.S. Navy, our nation, and our World War II veterans, would be a most appropriate name for this final ship of the class.
The name Lexington goes back to the first battle of the American Revolution, our first fight for freedom. Many U.S. Navy ships have proudly carried the name. The first ship to do so, a brigantine commanded by Captain John Barry, was placed in service in 1776 and fought valiantly in the American Revolution.
The two aircraft carriers to bear the name were integral to U.S. Navy carrier aviation for 70 years. The USS Lexington (CV-2) was authorized in 1922 and was instrumental in the development of .the naval aviation doctrine which proved so successful in the war in the Pacific. She was lost in 1942 at the Battle of Coral Sea. Upon orders from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the USS Lexington (CV-16) was commissioned in 1943, only months after the loss of CV 2, and went on to earn 11 battle stars in the Pacific campaign. She continued to serve the nation until removed from the Navy List of Ships in 1991. These two ships have cast their indelible mark on our naval heritage.
The principal reasons for selecting Lexington as the name for the last ship of the Nimitz (CVN-68)-class is to honor the men and women of our country's "Greatest Generation," a label created by Tom Brokaw in his best-selling book.
In World War II, more than 16 million men and women of this generation served in uniform and countless others mobilized the efforts on the home-front to lead the United States to victory in the last century's largest military conflict. The veterans of World War II now number fewer than 6 million and are dying at a rate of approximately 1,000 per day. I want to ensure the courage and sacrifices of this generation of Americans are not forgotten as they pass into history. Naming one of the most powerful warships in the world's forest Navy is a fitting tribute.
The article by Lieutenant Commander McVety offered a thoughtful discussion on the integration of unmanned air vehicles into the Navy of the future. It is my strong belief that we must leverage technological advances to provide our men and women in uniform with the most capable weaponry in a way that will minimize the risk to those deployed in harm's way. We have not adequately exploited the opportunities in the area of unmanned combat systems, both air and ground. In addition to many of the specific advantages for U.S. naval forces posed by McVety, other challenges suggest the need to integrate unmanned combat systems into the entire future U.S. force structure.
In our most recent offensive military operation in Kosovo, we carried out 78 days of round-the-clock operations and more than 38,000 combat sorties with no combat casualties. The American people are coming to expect—wrongly, I believe—that military operations can and should be casualty free. While we must understand that no military operation is without risk, limiting risk to our personnel is clearly an important goal and one of the most advantageous benefits of deploying unmanned combat system technologies.
Another factor is the ability to attract potential recruits. During the last several years, the military services have enacted aggressive recruiting campaigns. While we have worked to increase pay and benefits, surveys of military personnel indicate that money isn't the only factor that motivates an individual to join a service. By focusing our efforts on maximizing advanced technologies, we can appeal to the fascination in the high-tech field that has captivated today's young men and women, adding another incentive for them to serve.
Earlier this year, I proposed that the Congress and the administration work together to aggressively field unmanned combat systems in the air and on the ground. I believe it is reasonable to set this objective: within 10 years, one-third of our operational deep-strike aircraft will be unmanned, and within 15 years, one-third of our ground combat vehicles will also be unmanned. I intend to begin to fund this initiative this year by applying adequate research-and-development funds to these efforts.
I strongly feel that my responsibility as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee is to ensure the safety and the security of the American people by maintaining a strong and capable military while ensuring the welfare of our service members and their families. The development of unmanned combat systems for military use is integral to the security of our forces as we move ahead in the 21st century.
"It's Time for the Revolution" (See B. Ovens, pp. 90-93, April 2000; F. Hoffman, pp. 12-14, May 2000 Proceedings)
Chief Aviation Storekeeper Joe Lanham, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I agree with Admiral Owens: there are significant changes that should be made in the Defense Department to bring it in line to better serve the American people as well as the fighting forces. One central office and committee should formulate the Defense Department budget and speak for the requirements of all the services jointly. The whole procurement and material establishments of the four services should be consolidated into one organization, the Joint Forces Command should be more inclusive, and the training commands of all the services should be coordinated better.
There should be a Joint Material Command similar to the other unified commands and headed by a four star commander-in-chief or commander who would rotate from among the four services. He would be the only four-star officer in the establishment, and would report to the Joint Chiefs. The commanders of the Naval Air and Sea Systems Command, Naval Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and Naval Supply Systems Command, along with any other material organization commanders within the Navy would report to this new commander, as well as the commander of the Marine Corps material organization. The Army and Air Force Material Command Headquarters should be disestablished and all material related commands report to this new joint command.
Each military department should have two commands headed by a three-star officer and roughly an equal amount of commands headed by two- and one-star officers reporting to this new command. The officers who report directly to this new commander would also jointly report to their service chief. Depot-level maintenance of all the services would be the responsibility of this new command, as well as the testing and procuring of new weapons. Planning and budgeting for procurement of weapons and depot repairs would fall under the responsibility of this new command. There could be new subordinate joint commands established as needed. The Defense Logistic Agency would be brought under this new command. Research and development, along with testing and evaluating or new weapons, would be the responsibility of this new command. Each service material-related command would submit its budget for all its funds through this new Joint Material Command, which would submit a joint material budget for the whole Defense Department.
The Pacific Fleet Headquarters should be divided into two commands: the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Forces Pacific. The Third Fleet and all the Type Commands as well as the Fleet Marine Force would come under the Pacific Fleet Commander who would report to the Joint Forces Commander. This would bring all readiness training and Stateside forces under one command, he Joint Forces Command. The Pacific Fleet would then look like the Atlantic Fleet. The Seventh Fleet and all its support organizations would come under the Naval Forces Pacific Commander who would report to the CinC Pacific Command. One admiral could command both the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Forces Pacific if it is desirable to have a four-star Navy command within the Pacific Command.
The Commander Seventh Fleet could become the Commander Naval Forces Pacific if a three-star is desired and if the Army and Air Force change their commands to three stars. A Joint Training Command should be established. This should be commanded by a four-star officer who would report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each of the four services should have a three-star officer in charge of their training who would report to this new commander. The Army and the Air Force would have to make their training chiefs a three-star job, and the Marine Corps could use the Commanding General, Combat Development Command, for its representative since he oversees the training for the Corps. The Navy training chief is now a three star. Subordinate joint commands could be established to do particular training, or one military service could do the training in one area of expertise while another military service could perform the training for all services in another area. This would work for the reduction in overlapping of training efforts and better use of resources. The training chiefs of each service would report jointly to the service chief as well as this commander. The individual military services training chiefs would submit their budgets through this new commander who would submit the joint budget for all training.
"You Can't Handle the Truth!" (See E.T. Wooldridge, pp. 66-70, April 2000; D. Porter, p. 18, May 2000 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral L.F. Bull, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I would like to congratulate Proceedings for providing a forum for concerned people to expound their concerns about their versions of the truth. In my opinion, however, this is just part of the solution to getting back to a Navy that emphasizes by its actions the importance of being an effective fighting force, and deep-sixing the Navy that has immersed itself in being politically correct. Captain Wooldridge's article should be looked at with concern by senior Navy leaders, and with the same concern by anybody who has an ounce of influence on that senior Navy leadership.
A Navy selection board selected E. Tyler Wooldridge for captain based on his record of performance. It is my personal observation that only the very best commanders are selected for captain. When a captain in the U.S. Navy voices his concerns about what is happening in the Navy, he needs someone very senior outside his chain of command to either disprove his allegations or take immediate action. I suspect Captain Wooldridge tried the chain of command and it failed him, and he turned to Proceedings as a last resort.
Are those leading our young warriors cowards when it comes to standing up for the truth? Are our young men and women convinced their careers are inside the Beltway instead of at the tip of the spear? Are we making ludicrous decisions based on being politically correct instead of telling the truth? It doesn't fool anyone when an issue receives comments such as "Get on board," or "There will be no debate on this issue." What the person is saying is that the issue cannot stand debate because the truth will invalidate the whole issue.
Maybe Captain Wooldridge is wrong, but what is he isn't? If he is correct, shame on everyone who has stood by and let this great Navy of ours pay the price. Don't feed the men and women in the Navy with how great things are going, because they will know the difference. I heard someone say that they had no trouble finding anyone in the Navy who was ready to give his life for his country, but they couldn't find one person in higher leadership positions ready to get fired for his country. Has promotion overshadowed our self-respect?
Thanks you Proceedings for your support on all sides of the issue, and now it's time for some of those who read those articles to get busy. And Captain Wooldridge, this "ole has been" believes you!