"After three years of study it was found that vaccination was the safest way to protect a highly mobile military against a threat of anthrax spores that are 99% lethal for unprotected persons."
". . . .Vaccinating service members with a shoddily produced vaccine with a poor record of effectiveness and [which] may be dangerous is neither good medical practice nor sound military strategy.
What's going on here? Dueling web sites and dissenting opinions! In part, this is nothing new. Service members frequently have been caught up in policy debates, medical and otherwise. There is, however, a new facet: the rise of the Internet as a communications medium that amplifies other leadership challenges, skepticism about government, the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories, the surge of issue activists, and the blurring of the line between fact and fiction, all occurring in a post-Cold War strategic situation where military needs are not as pressing. The environment for leadership is changing, and military leaders must change with it.
The Anthrax Debate
Anthrax is a highly lethal disease caused by bacteria and normally associated with plant-eating animals. Humans can be infected by direct contact with infected animals and animal products. Anthrax was weaponized about 50 years ago, and DoD believes about seven countries have anthrax as a biological weapon.
A vaccine against anthrax was developed about 40 years ago and has been in use since 1970 when it was licensed by the Food and Drug Administration. Annually, it is given to several thousand people who might be exposed to natural anthrax—veterinarians and people working with high-risk animal products.
In 1998, after a two-year review, the Secretary of Defense decided to inoculate service members against anthrax, beginning with those deploying to threat areas. His rationale was as follows1:
- Anthrax is highly lethal and likely to be used in future conflicts.2
- * Passive measures such as gas masks are useful but do not provide sufficient protection.
- * The vaccine is effective against all known strains of anthrax.
- The vaccine is safe, having been thoroughly tested. Acknowledged production problems are being fixed. Side effects are minor (sore arms, redness). There are no known fatalities from vaccination.
- Military and civilian society routinely inoculate against a variety of diseases. Failing to inoculate service members against a known threat would be irresponsible.
- From the beginning critics have raised questions. These criticisms cover a lot of ground because they come from many different sources3, but the main concerns are as follows:
- Anthrax has never been used in war and, even if used, is unlikely to be an effective weapon.
- Defensive measures like gas masks and antibiotics will provide sufficient protection.
- The vaccine is not effective against most strains of anthrax, especially bioengineered strains.
- The vaccine's long-term effects have not been adequately investigated.
- The vaccine's production facility is unsafe.
The impact of this debate is real. A few hundred service members have refused to take the vaccine and been disciplined. While representing only a small fraction of the total number inoculated, these "resistors" have received considerable media attention, magnified by antivaccination activists. For example:
- "A group of 23 sailors from a Norfolk-based aircraft carrier have refused to take anthrax shots ordered by the Pentagon, joining a small but growing number of servicemembers who have declined the inoculation. . . ." (Washington Post, 12 March 1999, www.washingtonpost.com)
- "A Marine has gone to federal court to seek a hardship discharge . . .[on account of] his mother [who] suffers severe anxiety, panic attacks and depression because she distrusted the anthrax vaccine. . . .eI'm not going to let the government shoot my son up with poison and take him from me,' she said." (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 21 November, 1999, post-gazette.com/regionstate/19991123anthrax5.asp)4
As a result the case against the vaccine has received wide attention. Congress has held hearings on the issue, and a few members have recommended that the vaccination program be made voluntary.
The Internet
The Internet has been the catalyst for this controversy. Once limited to the technologically sophisticated, Internet access is now as common as the telephone. Usage has risen from just 300,000 in 1990 to 4.8 million in 1995 to 60 million today, and is increasing by 2 million per month.5 Certainly the Internet has shaped the debate about anthrax vaccinations. "The Internet has brought the largest government agency to its knees," observed one Internet authority. "An Army of invisible detractors can keep the most powerful fighting machine in history on the defensive."6 Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre essentially agreed: "There's an awful lot of just absolute nothing but rumormongering [on the Net]."
The Web's openness is one of its most exciting qualities. Everything is there—the good, the bad, the interesting, and the mundane. Anyone can post anything. For a society that prizes the free flow of information and ideas, this is wonderful. The practical problem is that everything posted acquires a certain credibility just by being on the Web, clearly formatted and attractively presented. As a former Director of the National Security Agency once noted, "B.S. at the speed of light is still B.S."7
This unfiltered dissemination of information is new. Traditional communications media—like newspapers, magazines, and television—have certain standards about what they report. They may sometimes fail to meet these standards, but the standards about evidence, sources, and attribution are in place. There are no such standards for the Net. Further, if traditional communications media err, there are mechanisms for challenging them—letters-to-the-editor, ombudsmen, direct appeals to the editors. On the Net there is no presiding authority, no referee. Indeed, the problem of Net credibility has become serious enough that there are now sites dedicated to debunking net hoaxes.
The Navy and Marine Corps are wiring all bases for Internet access, with most offices already connected and even sailors aboard ship getting connected.8 This not only promises to transform our way of doing business but also opens all the benefits of cyberspace to sailors and Marines, an important recruiting incentive and quality-of-life enhancement for a networked generation. It also, however, exposes sailors and Marines to all the messages in cyberspace. A search done on "anthrax vaccine" will turn up all the official sites as well as all the resistor sites. In the past it was possible, but difficult, for antimilitary groups to reach service members directly, and in every conflict they tried. Senior officers remember the antimilitary activities outside base gates during the Vietnam War, and the Marine Corps archives contain antiwar leaflets given to troops headed for Nicaragua in the 1920s. Direct access, however, was difficult. Groups had to physically hand out pamphlets or take some other very direct, and visible, action. The Net goes around the traditional gatekeepers—base police, policy makers, department heads, NCOs, and petty officers. Groups can target service members on the Net without it being visible in the usual ways. There is a whole level of communications, like the barracks rumor mills, occurring below the level of the military leadership's visibility. The antivaccine movement delivered their message directly to service members and raised fears before the DoD realized it and fought back.
What happens on the Net is anonymous. People are known only by nicknames and cryptic e-mail addresses—"superdog" or "[email protected]." In traditional society, one could also maintain anonymity, but it took effort and was difficult. Now it is easy. People can hold conversations in chat rooms, explore Web sites, and exchange e-mail all without being known. Net posters are frequently anonymous as well. Some Web sites lack any attribution; others refer to obscure individuals or to vague organizations without any details except perhaps an e-mail address.
Speed and accessibility of information do not in themselves challenge military leadership. They do, however, facilitate and amplify certain social trends, such as distrust of government, that tend to undermine authority and that make military leadership more difficult.
Distrust of Government
The increasing distrust of government is a phenomenon that long has been recognized and that needs little elaboration. It is enough to say that in 1960 confidence in government was 75% while today it is 30%.9 Vietnam, Watergate, oil crises, environmental alarms, and presidential impeachments have taken their toll. In the military specifically, activists point to nuclear weapons testing on troops, combat forces exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam and the lingering mystery surrounding Gulf War disease as evidence that the government cannot be trusted.
Distrust of government can intensify a penchant for conspiracy theories. Although always present in the United States—suspicions about freemasons and the Catholic church were common in the 18th and 19th centuries--these have received a major boost in recent years, driven by various coverups: some real, others fanciful.
The Web abounds in conspiracy theories. Although Princess Diana and the CIA seem to have a special prominence here, the military is also a frequent subject. A few examples give a flavor for what is out there:
a "It is planned that the United States shall be permanently without an Army, Navy, and an Air Force. The Internal Security Forces that are to be assigned the duty of keeping order may or may not be U.S. citizens. Martial rule shall prevail throughout the United States." (www.libertygunrights.com)
a "'Operation Rain Dance' was set in motion by the Department of the Army, an Air Force Special Research Unit, and biomedics of the U.S. Navy. . . . SB-17 was a virus they were working on to target and kill only Native Americans. Do you remember the 7-9 Navaho Indians who died of mysterious circumstances? The experiment was a success." (flp.shout.net/pub/users/bigred/vol11)
Anthrax is no exception. There is dark talk of "medical experiments" and corporate conspiracies. The broader point is that for any controversial public issue there will spring from the fertile mind of some citizens the very darkest interpretation, and that view will be on the Net for all to see.
Activists
To gain a political foothold in a democracy, an issue needs a group of activists who will take the time and invest the resources to get visibility for that issue. Articulate and energetic individuals, such as Rachel Carson (Silent Spring) and Upton Sinclair (The Jungle), always have had an impact on the politics of specific issues. The Internet now facilitates this process. A Web site puts out information for the curious. Chat rooms build awareness and make converts.10 E-mail groups get people organized and activated. Chain e-mails act like petitions with each addressee signing on if he or she agrees and forwarding it to others.11 A recent example of this is Jody Williams and the effort to ban antipersonnel landmines. She built an international arms control movement in large part through the Internet (www.icbl.org). Indeed, there are Web sites dedicated to activism in general (www.berkshire.net/~ifas/activist). Anthrax too has its activists. Certain names keep popping up at "resistor" Web sites.12
The extreme version of activism is an inducement to hysteria. Activists have long known that publicizing mere "concerns" may not sufficiently energize an electorate, so they turn to more extreme measures. As a result many anti-anthrax vaccine Web sites contain extreme language: "human guinea pigs," "experimental drugs," and "poison." Even the scientific community is not immune. Though believing in the scientific method as an ideal, many scientists also hold strong political beliefs. As one scientist candidly stated,
On the one hand, as scientists, we are ethically bound to the scientific method, in effect promising to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but—which means we must include all the doubts, caveats, and ifs, ands, and buts. On the other hand we are human beings as well. . . . and like most people we'd like to see the world a better place. . . . To do that we need to get broad based support, to capture the public's imagination. . . . so we have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements, and make little mention of the doubts we have.13
Not surprisingly controversies have frequently erupted over "junk science"—the abuse of scientific evidence for political purposes (www.junkscience.com).
Hysteria, panic, and rebellion driven by rumor are nothing new. In 1789, the Great Fear gripped revolutionary France wherein thousands of peasants were convinced that angry mobs of Parisian revolutionaries were going to invade the countryside. In 1857, British native troops in India, the Sepoys, rebelled over rumors that the new Enfield cartridges were greased with pork fat (forbidden to Moslems) or cow fat (forbidden to Hindus) and that even touching them would make a trooper religiously unclean. What is new is the speed and reach that modern technology, especially the Internet and e-mail, bring to these fears, concerns and controversies.
The Challenge for Military Leadership
Politically, the Cold War spoiled the military. Certainly there were bitter debates about weapons, budgets, and policies. But underlying these debates was a shared and universal assumption that the dangers to the nation were great and immediate, the responsibilities of the military were immense and that, therefore, tinkering with military personnel policies was risky and best minimized. Today, although the world remains unstable and dangerous, the threats are less immediate to the average citizen. It is hard for Americans to imagine a really serious conflict such as Korea or Vietnam, to say nothing of a world war. The memories are instead of Desert Storm and Kosovo—apparently easy victories with few casualties. Anthrax and other threats seem abstract and unreal.
Further, fewer and fewer Americans have served in the military and therefore have a hard time seeing it as anything except an extension of their own civilian experience. As a result there seems little reason to compromise civilian standards for military necessity—whether regarding environmental laws, the role of homosexuals, or in this case, vaccination. Not only will this continue, it will become more acute as memories of the Cold War fade further. Military leaders will struggle to justify policies that require sacrifice in some dimension when the average citizen sees little need for compromise.
So what are military leaders to do? First, as long as a policy exists, leaders must firmly implement that policy. To do less invites anarchy. Resistors frequently complain, "I'm willing to face enemy fire, but I'm not willing to be a guinea pig in a medical experiment." One sympathizes with people facing the shock of the unexpected. Military history is full of examples where seasoned units broke in panic because of threat from an unexpected direction. But to sympathize is not to excuse. At commissioning and at every promotion an officer is charged "to observe and follow such orders and directions as may be given by the President of the United States of America or other superior officers. . . ." There is no fine print saying that a member will only be asked to do "a," "b," and "c" but not "d," "e," and "f".
More harshly, there is a question about courage and reliability. Once someone indicates that they will only obey only the orders they regard as justified, reasonable, and safe, they have indicated their unreliability. And where does it stop? However much they protest that it is just this one order, the precedent is set. It is a slippery slope until all orders are second-guessed.
Leaders have a special responsibility. In some instances officers refusing the shots encouraged their troops to also refuse shots. This literally is mutiny, defined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice as, "refusing, in concert with any other person, to obey orders. . . ." Calling such behavior mutiny is politically incorrect, the term being so harsh. Nevertheless, that is what the behavior is, and it cannot be tolerated.
Merely implementing policy is not enough. Leaders also must recognize the new challenges and take steps to ensure voluntary and willing compliance with orders.
The first requirement is for education at the unit level. What frustrated British drill sergeants during the French and Indian War still frustrates military leaders: it is not enough just to give American troops an order. A leader must explain why. Conversely, this is the U.S. military's great strength—intelligent compliance, not just blind obedience. For controversial issues like anthrax shots this means that a conscious educational effort will be necessary. The leadership needs to take direct action to explain why a policy is being implemented; the troops will not absorb this by osmosis. For anthrax vaccinations this is now belatedly under way. Having the ship's doctor or the battalion surgeon talk with the troops for an hour before every shot of the series may be all that is needed. But clearly an order from the chief or the gunny to "line up and get your shot, it's good for you" is not enough.
The second requirement is Net presence. Information campaigns in cyberspace are the same as campaigns in traditional media. They require a broad approach, persistence, rapid reaction, and credibility. Such campaigns begin by producing one's own Web sites. The DoD, in general, and the Navy, specifically, have very sophisticated Web sites and are now aggressively defending anthrax vaccination on the web. Further, the DoD has recognized that one site is not enough. An effective campaign requires using multiple sites. A search on "anthrax vaccination" now turns up a dozen DoD sites, which overwhelm "resistor" sites. It is like a traditional media campaign where putting out a single press release is not enough. Further, Net presence must be part of a broad approach employing traditional media, hot lines, brochures, and op-ed pieces, all of which the DoD is now doing, though belatedly. Persistence and rapid reaction mean that this is an extended campaign, not a single battle. The Web is no different from traditional media campaigns where unfavorable or inaccurate stories require immediate response. Sites are not constructed once for all time, like a book, but need to be updated frequently in response to the latest events. Finally, credibility is vital. There's no substitute for clear facts, scientific evidence and specific citations.
Another requirement is advance warning. The DoD has a fairly sophisticated process for keeping an eye on what the traditional media are saying. Every morning the Current News14 produces a compendium of major articles relating to national security. Public-affairs personnel participate in policy discussions and keep senior officials advised about media events and strategies. It is time to expand that effort to the Net. Whether this is part of "information operations" or "public affairs" is not important. What is important is to keep an eye on the Net and to react quickly to what is there. The first inkling of an unfavorable Net rumor should not be a newspaper headline.
Censorship is not an answer. It may be tempting to block access on government computers to dissident Web sites by using software filters. This is a hopeless task, like trying to control what books or newspapers the troops read. Which sites to block? It is impossible to separate "legitimate" policy discussion from "illegitimate" agitation and trying to do so will produce endless, and embarrassing, arguments. It is better to have rules about appropriate Web surfing during duty hours—and leave the policy at that.
Finally, there is the emotional aspect. In scientific arguments the discussions center around evidence, facts and logical inference. Without question these are important. But the emotional side also is valid. People want to feel supported, cared for, and valued. This should not be overlooked in the scientific debate.
This discussion has looked at the institution's side of this phenomenon. What about individuals who face a policy they find intolerable? What recourse do they have? Today, for some, it is the anthrax vaccination, but tomorrow, for others, it could be another Balkans intervention or gays serving openly in the military. In the course of their careers many officers will face policies they find unwise, unjust, or even abhorrent.
As difficult as it may be practically, resignation should not be dismissed. There is too minor a tradition in the U.S. armed forces of resigning on principal. Many officers, particularly senior officers, convince themselves that they can do more on the inside. At bottom, there is a deep arrogance in such a belief, because it implies that those coming after would not have the same ability or commitment. General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff 1964-1968, articulated this at the end of his life. When asked if he had any regrets about his career, he said he regretted not having resigned over the inept handling of the Vietnam War. "I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for the country if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back."15
For many servicemembers, however, the responsibilities of family, lingering doubts about the absolute correctness of their views, and the love of service make resignation an unacceptable option. For them there is still the option of speaking out through professional writing. Proceedings, along with other professional magazines, publishes article after article taking issue with some element of established policy—warfighting doctrine, procurement plans, personnel policies, the entire gamut of military concerns. Indeed, professional magazines would have no role without this ability to raise issues and disagree with existing policies. The discussions in Proceedings about the role of women in the naval services and the conduct of senior leadership, sparked in part by James Webb's sharp commentaries, show that even sensitive and politically incorrect topics can be discussed. For anthrax vaccination, as with other cutting-edge policy issues, there is a legitimate policy debate. Are the risk and effort of giving the vaccines, however small, worth the gain in protection? How really likely and effective is biological warfare? There must be avenues for servicemembers to discuss important issues.
There is, nevertheless, a unwritten rule about what is discussed "inside the family" and what is discussed outside. It is one thing for active-duty personnel to make arguments in professional magazines and to use their ranks in signing them. It is another to write op-ed pieces for the local paper. This kind of public advocacy is really lobbying and is best left to retirees and civilians.
If the anthrax situation was unique—the result of special circumstances unlikely to be repeated—then it would be of narrow and limited interest. But it is not. The conditions that brought this controversy forth—skepticism about government, the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories, the surge of issue activists, and the blurring of the line between fact and fiction—will go on. The Cold War consensus about the military will continue to fade. Most important, as the Internet becomes ever more accessible, it will bring on more controversies. They will become challenges for every military leader.
And this is a new kind of challenge—not visible in traditional ways, disseminated raw and unfiltered, sometimes going beyond data and facts. An effective response does not require a new kind of leadership but an extension of existing principles into a new realm.
Colonel Cancian is a reserve infantry officer currently assigned to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force staff training program at Quantico.
1. See the official Department of Defense site, www.anthrax.osd.mil. back to article
2. For discussion see LCDR Pietro Marghella, "December 7, 1999: The Second, Silent Attack on Pearl Harbor," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1999, pp. 60-65. back to article
3. For example, www.dissident.org, thinktwice.com, dallasnw.quick.com, www.gulfwarvets.com/anthrax.htm, marshealthnet.org/MGS/V5N2Anthrax, www.deizialoup.net/no2anthrax. back to article
4. The Marine was eventually granted a hardship discharge. back to article
5. onto.isoc.org/guest/zakon/internet/history. back to article
6. John Aravosis, an online expert with Wired Strategies. Cited in USA Today, 19 October 1999, p. 8D. back to article
7. Rear Admiral L.E. Jacoby, "Operational Intelligence: Lessons from the Cold War," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1999, p. 103. back to article
8. Through programs such as Navy-Marine Corps Intranet. See Admiral Archie Clemens, "It's More than E-mail," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2000, pp. 56-58. back to article
9. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data021599.htm. back to article
10. A ten-minute search on AOL revealed 7 chat rooms devoted to resisting anthrax vaccinations. back to article
11. In November 199, senior officials received such an e-mail petition protesting the anthrax vaccination policy, with 2500 "signatures" on it. back to article
12. What is interesting about these activists—and what might be a harbinger for the future—is that some of these activists seem to have left-wing credentials while others seem to have right-wing credentials. back to article
13. Stephen Schneider, cited by Jonathan Schell, "Our Fragile Earth," Discover, October 1989, p. 47. back to article
14. Also known as the Early Bird. back to article
15. Lewis Sorley, Honorable Warrior (Kansas:University of Kansas Press, 1998), p. 304. back to article