Canada's Navy: The First Century
Marc Milner. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 310 pp. Photos. Notes. Bib. Index. $45.00 ($40.50).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Ian D. H. Wood, Canadian Navy
In this fine book, Marc Milner has provided a thorough historical account of Canada's navy during its first century. With the birth of the navy only in 1910, scholarship on the service's history is a very recent phenomenon. In previous articles, Milner has stated that Canada's naval history has been poorly integrated into the wider maritime history of the country. He also has asserted that the brevity and unique nature of Canada's maritime history has profoundly shaped its historiography.
In order to deal with these challenges, Milner has produced a skillful synthesis of the ever-growing body of literature on Canada's navy. His thorough account has drawn on virtually all of the scholarly works produced to date by Canadian maritime historians, and also on an exhaustive set of archival documents and oral histories. His list of acknowledgements is evidence of the spirit of academic cooperation that exists between Canadian naval historians, which allowed Milner to produce such a fine work.
The book is divided into three parts. It begins by describing the challenges that were faced during the creation of the navy and the subsequent lean years of existence for the "orphan service" during the period leading up to the commencement of World War II. Next, the book chronicles the difficulties faced by Canada's naval and political leaders as they attempted to build a suitable fleet and define its national role through World War II and into the early part of the Cold War. Finally, Milner describes the efforts made to secure a proper place for the navy within the confusing international affairs of the last half of the 20th century.
In general, the book reflects the author's particular interest in "the relationship between the navy and the nation." Milner's work also highlights many examples of both operational leadership and technical innovation in order to show, as he puts it, the "Canadian penchant for doing more with less, a trait that has proven both a source of pride and a bane to Canadian service personnel." The title of the epilogue, "Finishing Strong," suggests that this Canadian naval spirit has served the navy very well in spite of the many difficulties it has faced in its first century.
When Milner is critical of individuals and their actions he does so in a very evenhanded and balanced manner. His detailed use of oral histories and personally conducted interviews with past and present naval leaders has given his work credibility. Also, the author's account of Canadian naval wartime successes and failures is very frank and unforgiving, avoiding the anecdotal and, at times, heroic style shown in some previous Canadian works. Milner's keen insight into the events of the last 20 years reveals that in this period of massive fiscal restraint, the new "operational art" of Canada's naval leaders has been politically savvy more than anything else. He gives credit where it is due, to the admirals and their staffs who have worked so hard to keep Canada's Navy—albeit small—operationally effective and technically sound. This book should serve as an excellent fixing point for Canada's navy, as it navigates into its second century.
A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: An Investigative History
Patrick Tyler. New York: Public Affairs, 1999. 476 pp. Photos. Notes. Index. $27.50 ($24.75).
What is the true picture of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States? To some it is pandas and ping-pong, or Deng Xiaoping in a ten-gallon hat, or Chairman Mao toasting President Nixon. To others it is Ambassador James Sasser peering through the shattered door of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing after the riots that followed the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In truth, this turbulent relationship is all of these, and more. Until recently, however, there was no popular account of how this relationship developed.
A Great Wall, Patrick Tyler's ambitious retelling of the last three decades of Sino-American relations, is a masterful work of research and reportage, as well as a fascinating read. Tyler, a former Beijing correspondent of the New York Times, drew liberally on recently declassified U.S. government documents and conducted interviews with some 200 key American and Chinese officials. As Tyler told Brian Lamb of C-SPAN in October 1999, he wrote A Great Wall not only because he "saw a need for this history," but also because he was worried that the issue of Taiwan might cause the United States to be dragged again into a military confrontation with China.
In his book, Tyler depicts each government as conducting diplomatic negotiations with a weather eye to domestic political concerns. Altruism and ideology are tinged with pragmatism and Realpolitik. But Tyler makes it clear that China is not a mirror image of the United States. Jiang Zemin and his colleagues on the Politburo are Chinese oligarchs, not simply politicians and technocrats. They will seek agreements with Washington that are in their own interest, and that may be antithetical to those of the U.S. leadership. As Tyler concludes his book, he observes that "No one can predict whether China will, on its own, turn hostile in the future." He clearly advocates that the United States should seek the best possible outcome, rather than contributing to the worst.
It is worth noting that A Great Wall has its share of critics. Jimmy Carter recently called Tyler's version of his administration's effort to normalize relations with China "a grossly biased and distorted account." Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski used the term "fictionalized history" to describe excerpts from A Great Wall that appeared in the September/October 1999 issue of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, A Great Wall does contain some erroneous information. For example, Tyler states that the Chinese F-8 Finback fighter aircraft is "based on the Soviet MIG-21" (p. 338), when in fact it is the F-7 Fishbed fighter which is a MiG-21 derivative.
Nonetheless, A Great Wall is a valiant and mostly successful attempt to present a difficult and complex subject in an entertaining and highly readable fashion. For those seeking a bit more sober and reflective commentary on the same three decades of Sino-American relations, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton by James Mann (Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) is highly recommended. Either book should be required reading for those who want to understand Chinese perceptions of the United States.
Poland's Navy, 1918-1945
Michael A. Peszke. New York: Hippocrene, 1999. 222 pp. Photos. Bib. Index. $29-95 ($26.95).
Reviewed by John Dunn
Even though wiped off the map of Europe in 1939, Poland played an important role in the Allies' victory during World War 11. Coalescing around a government-in-exile, Polish ground, air, and naval units fought on nearly every front of the European theater. Since the 1970s, Michael Peszke has produced numerous articles about this story. His new work is a significant contribution to the history of the war, providing a detailed look at the Polish Navy before and during the war.
Poland's Navy covers a wide array of naval, diplomatic, and political issues. There is a brief introduction dealing with maritime traditions, followed by a useful chapter on naval development between 1920-1939. Here the reader comes across the severe challenges facing Poland—a poor nation attempting not only to build a fleet from scratch, but also ports and other support infrastructure.
Peszke gives an account of naval warfare during the German invasion of September 1939. It is well done, especially with regard to Polish efforts at submarine and mine warfare. While clearly a defeat, this resulted from overwhelming odds and insufficient air power, rather than from poor leadership or morale.
This was evident in the large number of personnel and ships that escaped the Kriegsmarine and continued the fight from British and French ports. The Poles never accepted defeat and reorganized; by 1940 they again contributed to the Allied war effort. Indeed, this part of the story represents the bulk of the work.
Readers learn how Polish submarines, destroyers, and light surface craft interacted with the Royal Navy. Peszke surveys a wide array of operations—some mundane, and others excessively dangerous. Some interesting details emerge, like the use of Polish destroyers to patrol the Irish coast in 1939-1940, since their transgression of Irish waters was less likely to agitate Irish-American voters. Also intriguing is the story of Polish feluccas employed in clandestine operations off the coasts of France and Spain.
Throughout, Peszke informs on political and diplomatic events that slowly worked against the interests of Poland. These went from bad to worse, as Joseph Stalin and his massive army became invaluable to Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Reaching a nadir in 1946, Polish veterans—some among the first to resist Nazi aggression—were refused a place in London's victory parade.
Considering the lack of English language sources on the interwar Polish Navy, this is a very useful work. It would have been beneficial to have had more coverage on river actions during the Russo-Polish War (1918-1920), and naval strategy and building plans up to 1939. The lack of maps is another problem—no naval history should assume readers are familiar with exotic waters. Still, these are minor issues that do not detract from the book's overall value. Naval, Polish, and World War 11 historians and enthusiasts alike will benefit from reading this work.