Patrol boat squadrons are the best solution to the problems created by the current fragmented command structure.
The Coast Guard's 110-foot Island-class patrol boats (WPBs) consistently have demonstrated their value in protecting fisheries, combating drug smuggling, interdicting illegal migrants, and saving lives at sea. Unfortunately, the current organization under which patrol boats operate has been unable to resolve some major fleet wide problems. These obstacles include:
- Little or no specific employment doctrine
- Excessive spare parts inventory
- Administrative workload on a par with a medium endurance cutter
- Sporadic outside maintenance support
- Conflicting operational and maintenance schedules
- Regular tasking of hulls beyond Commandant standards
- Command chains with limited patrol boat experience
- Support systems unable to meet personnel shortages
- Slow incorporation of new technologies
- Inadequate pipeline training system
The only way to address these problems is to change the way the Coast Guard manages and operates its patrol boat fleet.
Patrol boats currently are assigned to home ports scattered throughout each district. In the past, this was acceptable because the Coast Guard primarily was facing an inshore threat. In addition, the seakeeping constraints of the 82-foot Point-class and the 95-foot Cape-class patrol boats kept operations within the same geographic area as their home port. With the adoption of the 200nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone and the increased high seas drug trade, the Coast Guard needed a patrol boat that could operate within the deep-water region on a regular basis. The resulting Island-class boats have the ability to be at any location within district waters in 24 hours, and have demonstrated repeatedly their ability to deploy to other districts to support surge operations.
Instead of changing the command structure to meet the operational capabilities of the new patrol boats, the Coast Guard continued to manage them in the same way as the boats they replaced. In general, administrative control for a WPB rests with a group; operational control is loosely assumed by the district; and tactical control while under way is shifted either to a high/medium endurance cutter serving as task unit commander offshore, or to a group for near-shore operations. Maintenance support also is handled by several different commands. Depending on the scope of the work, a patrol boat will deal directly either with its group, the local naval engineering support unit, or the area maintenance and logistic command.
The main drawback to this fragmented command structure is that no command has complete ownership. Each element deals with the WPBs only when it is in its own interest. Otherwise, it leaves the problem for the commanding officer of the patrol boat to solve. These elements lack the horsepower and experience that come with more senior rank and simply do not have enough time to effect the major changes that are needed.
These boats need a command organization that is willing to look out for all facets of WPB operations for the entire fleet. The solution lies in collocating four to six Island-class WPBs in strategic home ports within each district, and placing them under the direction of a squadron commander. Individuals assigned to these billets would need to have total responsibility for all administration, maintenance, scheduling, and operational tasking for the patrol boats under their command.
The formation of patrol boat squadrons would provide these benefits:
Financial savings: All current WPBs (with the exception of some in District Seven) maintain a tractor trailer loaded with spare parts. Forming squadrons would allow for consolidation of these parts, to produce significant savings. Collocation would reduce costs by providing onestop shopping for inspection, training, and maintenance teams.
Improved readiness: A fully manned patrol boat can quickly seem minimally manned when as few as two crew members are absent. The personnel-management system cannot respond quickly enough to provide a fully trained individual to support these boats when emergencies arise. Formation of squadrons would allow for a manpower pool that could be tapped to provide immediate assistance.
Standardization: If you visit 15 patrol boats you will find 15 different ways to launch the small boat, conduct navigation detail, and cook chow. With patrol boats under one command, the best practices soon would be standardized for nearly all shipboard evolutions. This would lead in turn to development of standard doctrine that could be incorporated throughout the fleet.
Best operational use of hulls: According to the Cutter Employment Standards, the Island-class patrol boats theoretically are capable of 232 operational days each year, after maintenance. To provide these crews with adequate time with their families, the Commandant has established a limit of 150 days away from homeport during non-dry dock years, and 185 days away from homeport when scheduled for a dry-dock period. Implementation of squadrons and the corresponding standardization would allow for multi-crewing of hulls to maximize their operational capability.
Reduced administration: Patrol boats are manned only by 16 people, but they have nearly all the administrative requirements of a medium endurance cutter. By establishing squadrons, crews would be free to focus on operations and training, while the staff assumed a large part of the administrative burden. For example, instead of having five boats maintain five sets of publications or complete five commissary reports—many such reports would be consolidated into a single one for the entire squadron.
Improved maintenance support: The Operational Logistic Support Plan states that patrol boat crews will be responsible for 80% of preventive maintenance, with the remainder provided by outside sources. Specific WPB maintenance-support billets exist at the various groups, but a recent study found that some were being used for other support activities, instead of providing adequate assistance to the WPBs.' In addition, the individuals assigned to these support billets often lack WPB experience and have not received any advanced training, which limits them to providing basic support only. Because the squadron would exist solely to support the patrol boats, individuals in maintenance-support billets would become totally dedicated to the patrol boat crews. Collocation of WPBs also may allow for more intermediate-level maintenance to be completed at the local level.
Defense operations: Patrol boat squadrons were used both during World War 11 and the Vietnam War. As recently as the Persian Gulf War, rumors ran up and down the waterfront about the need for patrol boats. While in that case no boats deployed, at some point a conflict will take place requiring coastal patrol boats. With squadrons in place, the Coast Guard would be able to respond immediately to nearly any trouble spot in the world.
Reduced Group/District staff workload: The great misconception within the surface community is that the shore staff is filled to the gills with people. The truth is that the Coast Guard is as lean shoreside as it is on the waterfront. The staff does not have time to focus on its primary jobs and oversee the patrol boats. Establishing squadrons would provide these individuals with time to focus on operations in their areas of responsibility.
More mentoring: The current patrol boat structure has senior and master chiefs, chief warrant officers, lieutenants junior grade, and mid-level lieutenants expected to perform the same tasks as a commander on a medium endurance cutter without having the benefit of an experienced executive officer, operations officer, or chief s mess to back them up. If the commanding officer is looking for specific advice on patrol boat operations, there may be no one at group level with patrol boat experience—and only a select few at the district level. Establishing of squadrons would allow for experienced WPB operators to provide much-needed mentoring to the commanding officers and crews of these vessels.
One need only to look at the various Coast Guard air stations to determine that the squadron concept could work effectively. Within an air station, one command is completely responsible for administration, maintenance, scheduling, and operations. It is small wonder that the aviation community has a reputation for excellence in operations and being able to take care of its people, while cuttermen are worked hard under way and even harder in port. The aviation community does not function smoothly because it has better people—but because it has a better organizational structure. Establishing patrol boat squadrons would allow the Coast Guard to make similar improvements in surface operations.
Commander Tabor is assigned to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. He most recently served as commanding officer of CGC Adak (WPB-1333).