Facing many of the same missions as its Caribbean counterparts, the U.S. Coast Guard—here, training with the Grenada Coast Guard—is this nation's best tool for building partnerships in the Caribbean.
The end of the Cold War and the continuing globalization of the world economy have greatly enhanced the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States. The relationship between the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, articulated in the beginning of the 19th century by President James Monroe, often has been characterized by an imperial hubris that has placed the concerns of Washington over those of Western Hemispheric nations themselves. Moreover, the justification for questionable policies, such as repeated military interventions and political manipulation, rested largely on the overall interests and perceptions of the United States. Yet, as scholars herald the "end of history" and the apparent death of the great ideological battles (those between monarchism and republicanism, conservatism and liberalism, capitalism and socialism, and democracy and authoritarianism), it is now more possible than ever before to forge a greater sense of hemispheric community.1
For much of the Cold War, the United States focused on the security of the European continent, while encouraging greater economic and political integration of European states. Today, however, as the Euro stands to challenge the U.S. dollar in the next century, U.S. policy makers realize that neglecting the Western Hemisphere, with its 800 million consumers and more than $10 trillion in national product per year, could prove disastrous. In the 1990s, U. S. policy evolved slowly, but it did begin to adapt to this growing shift in global priorities.
It was only in the last few years, coinciding with Peter F. Romero's appointment as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, that the rhetoric of U.S. policy changed accordingly. Romero has been outspoken as to the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean for U.S. interests. As Romero has stated on numerous occasions, at long last a "new partnership" among the many nations of the Western Hemisphere is possible with the hope of bringing about a heightened "sense of community."2 With this new strategic vision, U.S. policy makers must find ways to foster cooperative ties. Implementing such a vision is infinitely complex, but small steps along the way can prove monumental in attaining greater hemispheric cooperation. A bold new commitment and imaginative diplomatic measures are required for this partnership to become reality.
The U.S. Coast Guard can serve these goals effectively and help build a genuine partnership, while solidifying its role as a unique and valued instrument of national security. Caribbean nations are highlighted in this discussion because the Coast Guard can play its greatest role in the development and support of smaller nations that pursue "inshore territorial defense navies" or "brown-water" maritime forces.3
From Soft Power to Hard Power
The Coast Guard can enhance the sovereignty and independence of the smaller Caribbean nations for several reasons, many of which reinforce one another. First, Caribbean nations look to the United States as a powerful and successful nation. In the past, this power has been exercised in ways that often undermined the sovereignty of Caribbean nations. Nonetheless, the allure of U.S. power remains quite compelling. The political scientist Joseph Nye coined the phrase "soft power" to describe the cultural allure of the United States, arguing that this was the primary characteristic that made the United States "bound to lead" in the world.4 This is the case in the Caribbean since no other world power is as active in or important to the region as the United States.
Organizational theorists argue that new organizations often look to other well-established and successful organizations during their development. In the process, new organizations begin to look more and more like other organizations before them, a process called isomorphism. The logic is simple—new organizations find it prudent to adopt procedures and structures that have proved successful. To ignore the lessons learned by others would place younger organizations in jeopardy of replicating past failures. In this regard many Caribbean nations look to the United States for guidance, realizing that the institutional success of the Coast Guard can serve as a blueprint for their maritime development. The Coast Guard, for instance, remains the lead U.S. service for the Haiti Multi-Agency Maritime Initiative, which focuses on improving Haiti's maritime infrastructure and security.
Second, the Coast Guard makes a less intimidating military force than other branches of the armed services. Hands-on personal training, a reputation for humanitarian service, and the versatility to assist in any way possible are all characteristics that set it apart from the conventional military. Coast Guard ships are warmly received in most Caribbean ports because they do not represent U.S. power the same way Navy vessels do. As one senior Coast Guard officer stated, "in particular our humanitarian nature as lifesavers, protectors of the environment, and the ability to help develop stronger economies make us a trusted partner. But, it is our people who develop this trust by training, working, and operating alongside foreign partners."5
The Coast Guard is also a more relevant model for developing maritime services in the Caribbean because of its relative numbers, size of vessels, multi-mission character, and humanitarian nature.6 Many of the missions the Coast Guard faces are of paramount concern for the smaller Caribbean nations: fisheries and resource law enforcement, search and rescue, maritime interdiction, river and waterways management, port activities and maritime transportation safety, environmental safety and pollution control, and emergency response. The transnational character of threats in the Western Hemisphere further strengthens these mutual interests. Prominent among these threats are drug smuggling, illicit migration, gunrunning, illegal fishing, and environmental degradation. As Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Kramek noted shortly after the May 1997 Caribbean Summit in Barbados, "we know the people, we know the geography, and, most importantly, we understand the maritime challenges that the Caribbean nations face."7
Beyond this convergence, the Coast Guard is often the most appropriate organization to lead international engagements with Caribbean nations. Panama is a case in point. Since all Panamanian armed forces were outlawed after the 1989 invasion, the U.S. military does not have a reciprocal organization with which to coordinate policy. The two most important organizations in Panama are the Panamanian National Police and the Servicio Maritimo Nacional (SMN)—the Panamanian Coast Guard. The police force works closely with U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials to curb drug trafficking, while the SMN seeks both skilled training and technical advice from its U.S. counterpart. The utility of Coast Guard engagement is further enhanced in Panama given the transfer of the Canal on 31 December 1999 and the reluctance of the Panamanian government to allow a continued U.S. military presence in its country. There was hope in Washington that a Multilateral Counternarcotics Center could be established at Howard Air Force Base allowing the deployment of limited U.S. troops, but the Panamanian government's decision to back away from the original agreement in the summer of 1998 makes this prospect unlikely. This raises the relative importance of the Coast Guard because it is an organization that is welcomed and not shunned.
The allure of U.S. power, its successes and its organizational professionalism, can allow the United States to play a formidable role in the development of Caribbean maritime services. As Caribbean nations look more and more to the United States in general, and the Coast Guard in particular, for training and support, this soft power can translate into hard power, or more effective reciprocal organizations capable of handling their own national security interests. This cultivation of indigenous pride and energy allows the Caribbean nations to gain a heightened sense of independence and sovereignty.
The Multi-Dimensional Coast Guard
The Coast Guard can play a powerful role in ensuring the security of Caribbean nations into the next millennium, but this cannot be accomplished unilaterally. In fact, the Coast Guard is most effective within the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) framework, which integrates the assets and operations of several U.S. agencies, including the Department of Defense, U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is a vital cog in this framework since it is the primary maritime law enforcement agency of the United States, the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction, and shares the lead for air interdiction with U.S. Customs.8 Many of the very assets, however, which allow the Coast Guard to play a strong role in the Caribbean—relative numbers and size of vessels—limit how wide reaching engagement can be. Thus, the Coast Guard complements and helps support these other agencies, which are all concerned with strengthening hemispheric security in varying ways. It is this multi-agency approach which facilitates Coast Guard engagement, allowing the organization to reach its interdiction potential.
This approach to Caribbean security is furthered by a strong commitment to multilateral and multinational engagement. Whenever possible, operations and training exercises incorporate all the interested parties that are willing to cooperate. For example, during a recent Tradewinds exercise at the end of April 1999, British, Dutch, and Regional Security Service (Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) assets joined U.S. forces. This multinational operation and others like it seek to incorporate a diverse number of actors who face similar security problems. In the process, nations better their own readiness and find that cooperating with their neighbors strengthens regional solidarity and enhances communication among nations and organizations. Most important for this discussion, however, is the increasing role of multi-mission engagement.
The Coast Guard's engagement with Caribbean nations has focused primarily on counter-drug operations, despite the wide array of missions possible. This preoccupation with narcotics interdiction produced a widespread perception among many Caribbean nations that the only reason for the United States to be actively involved was to address its own security challenges, with little concern for the security priorities of Caribbean nations themselves.9 Recently, however, Caribbean nations have begun to accept the growing pervasiveness of the drug trade, which has placed national "sovereignty under siege."10 Intense diplomatic efforts by the State Department have capitalized on this sentiment and brought about 20 maritime counter-drug agreements with Caribbean nations. These bilateral agreements enhance the overall effectiveness of counter-drug operations, because they provide a number of functions that help nations cooperate in their interdiction efforts.
Yet as one Coast Guard officer in the international branch of Atlantic Area Operations commented, "the greatest danger for Coast Guard engagement with Caribbean nations is that counter-drug operations are overemphasized to the detriment of other more pressing missions, often more desired by the nations themselves."11 This growing awareness as to the importance of multi-mission engagement is critical if the security concerns of the Caribbean nations themselves are to be met.
Caribbean leaders are increasingly concerned with environmental protection. The ecological disasters of the Exxon Valdez and other pollution incidents have raised the visibility of environmental problems from 20 years ago. Island nations need to protect their environment not only for their own citizens but also to protect their vital tourism trade. Likewise, marine inspection of vessels helps prevent potential oil spills. Thus, during a Tradewinds Exercise near Puerto Plata in April 1999, the Coast Guard and the Dominican Republic Navy trained heavily on oil pollution response exercises.
Similarly, the search-and-rescue mission of the Coast Guard is consistently part of training exercises. Earlier this year, exercises with the coast guard of Trinidad & Tobago rested heavily on search-and-rescue techniques and helo-hoist maneuvers with an indigenous rescue coordination center based in Port-of-Spain. Search-and-rescue operations also have been a mainstay of interaction with the Dominican Republic Navy during Operation Halcon, which has taken place eight times over the past four years, with the most recent operation occurring in January 1999. While counter-drug interdiction has been enhanced, other security interests continue to be of the utmost importance in the Caribbean. Fortunately, the Coast Guard has begun to appreciate this broadening interest and has pursued a more multi-mission approach that caters to the security needs of Caribbean nations.
Planning for the Next Millennium
The Coast Guard also has strengthened its position in the Caribbean through two complementary programs. Once Coast Guard cutters are decommissioned, many have been and will continue to be transferred to countries in the Western Hemisphere through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. The Inter-Agency Excess Defense Articles Coordination Committee may allocate more than ten decommissioned cutters a year through 2001. The class of cutters transferred—primarily 82-foot patrol boats and 157 to 180-foot buoy tenders—are better suited for the "brown-water" mission objectives of Caribbean nations. These countries find the program of paramount importance, for this is the easiest way to build the foundation for a maritime force. This program significantly increases the level of operability for smaller nations as well. Four EDA transfers, for instance, provided Trinidad & Tobago, St. Lucia, and Antigua the opportunity to participate in exercises this past April. Other recipients of EDA transfers include Panama, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic.
The transfer of vessels to Caribbean nations does not translate into instant success. A follow-up program is often needed to help maintain the transferred vessels. The Haitian Coast Guard is one such example. Recently, three Haitian ships were sent to the Integrated Support Command in Miami for rehabilitation. Once the vessels were brought up to speed, they were returned to Haiti where they could then be used for future operations. It is this common story that prompted the creation of a new Caribbean Support Tender (CST), which was commissioned on 27 September, 1999.
The CGC Gentian, a 180-foot buoy tender, is the first Coast Guard cutter to equipped with an international crew from eight different nations. The multinational crew helps to develop further credibility and bridge gaps across the region. It will soon become the cornerstone of Coast Guard engagement in the Caribbean and will professionalize the training and maintenance assistance programs. The Gentian will support a number of programs including engine repair, small boat handling, and law enforcement training as well as carrying some spare parts and basic machinery used to make such parts. While cutters do have professional and enthusiastic trainers today, they cannot build lasting relationships and training expertise, because they conduct no more than two or three missions each year. Continuity and better operational planning will also emerge as the Gentian crew learns about the region, develops improved programs, and learns from past visits. Thus, the crew of the Gentian will become expert trainers. "The CST is the most significant advancement in Coast Guard capability internationally to date," noted Captain James Underwood, Chief of Operations for the Atlantic Area. "We will not only help our partners but significantly improve U.S. and multinational operations as well."12
Toward New Partnership
Forging a new partnership with the Western Hemisphere will be no easy task. If U.S. policy is to achieve its pursuit of greater hemispheric partnership, it should be more attuned to the concerns of Bridgetown and Port-au-Prince than Washington. The Coast Guard is one organization that has the ability to contribute to a sincere and long-lasting partnership between the United States and the Caribbean. As Caribbean nations continue to look to the successful model of the Coast Guard for training and support in their maritime development, the softer side of U.S. power will translate into more effective indigenous organizations, capable of providing for their own national security interests. In the future, Caribbean nations increasingly will share the burden of interdiction, enhance their own sense of independence and sovereignty, and in the process embrace a more permanent sense of hemispheric community.
More importantly, U.S. policy must continue to address the transnational security threats within the hemisphere that require multinational solutions. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted, "the Coast Guard is the perfect weapon for the post-Cold War world." Thus, as the keys of the Canal are passed to Panama, perhaps the keys to the 21st-century can be passed to the U.S. Coast Guard, since its capabilities present an ideal solution to the challenges of the Western Hemisphere.
Mr. Miller is a doctoral candidate in the Graduate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominion University. From 1998-99 he was an international affairs specialist with the U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area Operations and Oversight (International Branch) with the Commander, Atlantic Area, Portsmouth, Virginia.
1. For this thesis concerning the triumph of "liberal democracy" see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992). back to article
2. See for example, Romero's remarks at the Miami Herald Conference on the Americas on 18 September 1998 and his remarks to the U.S. Air Force Academy on 23 February 1999 available on the Department of State webpage <<http://www.state.gov>>. back to article
3. This study builds on the naval classifications outlined in Edmundo Gonzalez, "Redefining U.S. Hemispheric Interests: A Bold Naval Agenda for the Twenty-First Century," Naval War College Review (Summer, 1998), pp. 37-54, esp. Table 2. back to article
4. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). back to article
5. Author's interview with senior Coast Guard officer at the Commander, Atlantic Area, Portsmouth, Virginia on 27 May 1999. back to article
6. For a good overview see Admiral James M. Loy, "The Coast Guard Is Maritime Security," Naval Institute Proceedings (December, 1998), pp. 26-29. back to article
7. Cited in Scott C. Truver, "The World Is Our Coastline!" Proceedings (June, 1998), pp. 45-49. back to article
8. See Lieutenant Michele Bouziane, "The Coast Guard, National Security, and Fisheries Law Enforcement," Naval War College Review (Winter, 1997), pp. 125-33. back to article
9. Author's interview with senior foreign policy official at Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 28 May 1999. back to article
10.See Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege (University Park, Penn.: Penn State Press, 1997). back to article
11. Author's interview with Coast Guard officer at the Commander of the Atlantic Area, Portsmouth, Virginia,18 May 1999. back to article
12. Author's interview at the Commander, Atlantic Area, Portsmouth, Virginia, 25 May 1999. back to article