NATO has lots of mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), and most of them are in the European navies. This is not surprising, since the concept of North American forces coming across the Atlantic to buttress the security of Europe still lies within the core of NATO's mission. During the Cold War, it was reasonable that the European allies should keep the seaward access to the continent mine free—and, in the last resort, it still is. For Britain and France another continuing and fundamental MCM task is to safeguard the deployment of the national strategic deterrent in the ballistic missile submarines. Yet another is to maintain general safe access to ports and anchorages, and transit through restricted channels and choke points.
Today the expectation for naval warfare is that it will happen as part of joint expeditions, where allies will venture forth and deal with a crisis where it occurs. In the 1991 Gulf War, both combat and post-conflict MCM operations were needed. The 1999 Kosovo naval operation was smaller scale, and the MCM task turned out to be clearing ordnance ditched by aircraft returning from attacks over Serbia. Things could have been worse. In the Gulf, comparatively few mines were laid, and only in the eastern and northern Gulf. Off Kosovo, the Yugoslav Navy had a capability to lay mines, which could have made life very difficult for ships operating in the Adriatic.
Mine laying is straightforward and can be carried out from a variety of anonymous or non-attributable platforms. Mine technology can range from the very basic to sophisticated counter-countermeasures, proliferation is rampant, and organizations can buy a capability commensurate with their objectives and cash. This calculus makes mining doubly attractive to those who wish NATO and Western allies ill. First, it offers a direct response to a military threat, particularly if the allies are seen to be risk averse. Second, it offers an asymmetric response that can be deployed for maximum disruption. And for both of these, the mine layers—disguised as they may be—can hold the initiative.
Because the threat essentially is coastal, there is a sense in which every nation with a coastline will want to look after it. The U.S. Navy's Avenger (MCM-1) and Osprey (MHC-51) classes are well suited to this. In addition the United States has some 43 Sea Dragon MH-53E minesweeping helicopters that are, by their nature, deployable and have a superior mine reconnaissance capability that complements the surface vessels. Of course, the U.S. Navy's MCMVs also have deployed recently, but the question to the Europeans is, Should they have to? Following on is a second question: Is the European capability strong enough, ready enough, and sustainable enough to do the tasks that may crop up, not only in the coastal waters of the individual nations, but also collectively and further afield?
As so often with NATO, the answer does not come simply. Among NATO allies, Hungary has the greatest number of mine countermeasures craft—although the 45 AN-2 vessels are old, laid up for half the year, limited to riverine operations, and have to double as patrol craft. The point is that with the breadth of alliance operations, both quality and quantity of countermeasures are required. A similar point may be made about the versatile Danish Flyvefisken class, which can change roles for patrol duties, mine laying, MCM, and attack. But they can do only one job at a time, and for the 14 vessels in the class, only 6 MCM modules are available.
The German Navy is strong in MCMVs, with 10 Masse 343 minesweepers and 12 Masse 332 coastal mine hunters, both modem classes. They also have 18 Troika minesweeping drones, and an upgraded drone is being developed with the Netherlands. At a time of constrained resources, drones may give good value for the money and point the way forward. The Netherlands Navy is one of three NATO forces operating variants of the Tripartite class mine hunters, with 15 Alkmaar class. The others are Belgium, with 7 Flower class, and France, with 13 Eridan class. Belgium also is introducing a small new class of mine sweepers in a cooperative program from which the original partners, the Netherlands and Portugal, have opted out.
Britain has ploughed a rather lonely furrow, albeit a quality one, with 12 Sandown-class mine hunters fitted with variable depth sonars (VDS) and 13 Hunt-class hunter/sweepers. The long-awaited mid-life updates to the Hunts have been descoped and delayed substantially, doubtless because of conflicting budgetary priorities. Spain also has built its VDS-fitted Segura class with a Sandown technology transfer from Britain, and the Sandowns themselves have been exported to Saudi Arabia.
The Turkish, Greek, and Spanish navies also enjoy some mutual commonality with variants of the Adjutant class that have emerged from the United States. Poland, Norway, and Italy also have modem MCM forces.
The NATO-European navies have healthy force levels of reasonably capable and modem MCMVs. Experience shows that the Europeans can work together in MCM, and that they can deploy (albeit in smallish numbers) where needed. The answer to whether the Americans should have to deploy MCMVs for the security of Europe probably is no, but only if the answer to the second question—whether the European capability is up to it—is yes, and will continue to be so. This would require substantial investment, to be expressed in research, development, production, support, training, and operations. Role specialization is not a vehicle for reducing defense budgets, but is a challenge and a specific responsibility. It also carries some increased political commitment that may not always be comfortable for politicians on either side of the Atlantic. So the real answer is maybe, and that may not be good enough.