The MV-22 requires an attached escort platform capable of immediate close air support that can match its speed and range in all flight regimes—in other words, another V-22.
The MV-22 has been called revolutionary. General Terrence R. Dake, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, while serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, said the MV-22 "is on the cutting edge of aviation technology" and represents "an important first step in modernizing Marine Corps aviation for the battlefields of the 21st century."1 John W. Douglass, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) called it "the highest priority for Marine Corps aviation."2 No other aircraft with the ability to hover comes close to matching its capabilities. When compared to the Marine Corps' current medium- lift fleet, the MV-22 "provides twice the speed, four times the range, nearly three and one half times the survivability, . . . a dramatic increase in the combat power buildup rate."3
The MV-22 is the medium-lift aircraft the Marine Corps is planning to use for the next 30 years as a cornerstone for new doctrinal concepts, such as operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to-objective maneuver. Why, then, have we taken so little action to ensure that the MV-22 and its passengers are protected during the missions they will begin flying in just a few years? What aircraft will fly escort for the MV-22?
The Need for an Escort
One of the first items we should consider is whether the MV-22 actually needs an escort. There are several considerations:
- There exists a significant threat to the MV-22. Patrick Neary, senior executive analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, noted in a conference on 12 January 1999 that "shoulder-fired air defense missiles will remain the gravest threat to Marine Corps . . . helicopter forces for the foreseeable future. . . . Man-portable air defense systems [manpads] are available to almost every organized military force on the planet and several disorganized military forces, such as terrorists and narcotraffickers."4 The "Threat" section of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Medium-Lift Replacement Aircraft (MLR) also states that "advanced integrated air defense systems pose the greatest threat to the MLR."5 In addition, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft capable of interdicting the MV-22 can be found in almost every military organization that U.S. forces potentially could face.
Obviously, the surest way to defeat these systems is through meticulous intelligence gathering and threat detection, identification, and location—the ultimate goal being avoidance of the threat. As evidenced by the apparent shootdown of an F-117 on 28 March 1999 outside of Belgrade, however, today's intelligence systems and electronic warfare platforms cannot guarantee a threat-free route for unescorted aircraft.6 Until they can, weapon-based aircraft will have to provide the means to deal with undetected and unsuppressed threats.
- Assuming that the MV-22 will fly in this threat environment, it should have at least a limited self-defense capability. In fact, the MV-22 ORD requires the aircraft to "have the capability to employ a variety of defensive air-to-ground and air-to-air weapon systems."7 Despite this, there has been considerable debate, for affordability reasons, on whether the MV-22 would be fitted with a gun system. Whatever the outcome, the gun system should not be considered a substitute for an escort aircraft's firepower.
- The Marines transported by MV-22s deserve the protection of a dedicated escort until they are able to protect themselves. The "warm and fuzzy" a Marine gets when he knows that he is not being sent out alone and unsupported is sometimes the difference between staying in a fighting hole and moving out to complete his mission. One Marine told the following story:
I was a brand-new second lieutenant, going on my first deployment and was on the first helicopter to set down in Grenada. It was loud in that CH-46, then it landed, and we all ran out and hit the dirt in a circle around the helo. After it took off, it was quiet except for some gunfire. I kept my face in the dirt; too scared to move. Then I heard Cobras fly overhead and begin shooting the 20-mm gun. Then I didn't feel so alone, so I got up and led the platoon to our objective.8
In his review of a draft of the Initial Deployment/Employment Concept for the MV-22 Osprey, Colonel F. X. Chambers stated, "The discussion of armed escort was not well focused . . . the study is best served by its omission."9 Considering that the tactics manuals for the CH-46E and CH-53A/D (the aircraft that the MV-22 will be replacing) have entire chapters that address the escort topic, this omission is troubling. It is past time to focus on the very important subject of an escort for the MV-22.
Current Escort Possibilities
The ORD lists several mission profiles the MV-22 will be required to fly. One calls for the MV-22 to fly "from an aircapable ship . . . transit at best cruise airspeed [about 240 knots] at or below 500 feet AGL [above ground level] for 200 nautical miles (nm) to a confined area landing zone . . . make a vertical landing . . . then transit at best cruise airspeed at or below 500 feet AGL for 200 nm to return to the ship."10 Other profiles are similar but replace "aircapable ship" with "confined area landing zone"; they vary the range from 50 nm to the stated 200 nm, but maintain the 500-foot above ground level altitude stipulation.
To escort the MV-22, the Marine Corps has two airframes in its inventory assigned to assault support escort missions on a regular basis: the AH-1W Cobra and the AV-8B Harrier. (The UH-1N Iroquois and F/A-18 Hornet also can fill this role, but as a secondary, rather than primary, mission.) These platforms, alone and in combination, can fly four different profiles when assigned an escort mission: fixed-wing detached escort with fixed-wing preparation of the landing zone; fixed-wing detached escort with rotary-wing preparation of the landing zone; rotary-wing detached escort with rotary-wing preparation of the landing zone; and rotary-wing attached escort with rotary-wing preparation of the landing zone. The first four columns in Table 1 show how these profiles support several aspects of the armed escort mission for the MV-22.
The benefits of the attached rotary-wing escort scenario outnumber those of the detached fixed-wing and detached rotary-wing escort. One of the most significant areas in which the Cobra surpasses the Harrier is in the response time required to engage a threat along a route or in a landing zone. The Harrier normally is within one minute of being on station for close air support, but the Cobras are on station within seconds and have the advantage of increased situational awareness (reference the Scott OiGrady rescue mission). Cobras also will be able to provide this decreased response time while maintaining a reduced radar signature through nap-of-the-earth flight. Harriers, escorting MV-22s from a higher altitude, might avoid the small arms and manpad threat but will not necessarily avoid detection.
Despite these praises for Cobra escort, the attached rotary-wing profile fails in the principal areas in which the MV-22 excels—speed and range. The Cobra does not come close to matching the 240 knots and 200-nm combat radius of the Osprey. If we cannot take advantage of the speed and range of the MV-22, it is little more than a high-priced CH-46. The option of attached rotary-wing escort, therefore, should be totally discounted.
The other two escort options in which rotary-wing aircraft would play a role (rotary-wing detached escort and fixed-wing detached escort with rotary-wing preparation of the landing zone) also have intrinsic problems. The greatest of these is that the Cobras would require a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) if they were operating farther out than approximately 100 nautical miles. The FARP itself would not be the problem, but the number of aircraft required to support a "simple" reconnaissance team insert and the time required to set up the FARP would be considerable.
The last of these escort options, consisting solely of fixed-wing aircraft, is the least desirable, especially when low ceilings and low visibility are factors. If the MV-22s were flying at or below 500 feet above ground level, the Harriers would not be able to see the MV-22s or the landing zone they would occupy. A solution might be to have the MV-22s deviate from the mission profile and take advantage of another one of their valuable attributes—high-altitude flight. At 20,000-25,000 feet mean sea level (MSL), all mission aircraft could stay out of small-arms range and out of many low-altitude surface-to-air missile envelopes (although becoming more vulnerable to medium- and high-altitude missiles). This higher altitude also would allow the aircraft to stay above much of the weather causing the low ceiling and low visibility problems.
In support of high-altitude flight, the ORD requires the MV-22 to "be capable of sustained operations above 10,000 feet MSL with adequate provisions for primary aircrew and minimum additional required personnel."11 I assume this means that provisions such as oxygen would be supplied only to the flight crew and a limited number of passengers. What about the combat-ready Marines being carried in the backs of MV-22s? Will some type of portable oxygen system be provided for their use? What if that system fails? Hypoxia can be incapacitating, and a hypoxic Marine with a loaded weapon in the back of an aircraft can be just as dangerous as the threat systems that aircraft is flying at altitude to avoid. High-altitude ingress and egress might be feasible, but the support procedures and equipment needed must be looked at very carefully.
Having exhausted the available escort possibilities without finding an adequate airframe and flight profile, we must ask ourselves: Should we sacrifice the benefits of the MV-22 to maintain our current escort capabilities or should we sacrifice the safety of the MV-22 and its passengers by assigning detached escort missions? The answer is neither.
A Long-term Solution
The Marine Corps needs to invest in an attached escort platform capable of immediate close air support during the entire flight profile of the MV-22. This platform must be able to match the MV-22's speed and range in all flight regimes. It must be fitted with a flexible gun system, precision-guided munitions, and the option of carrying air-to-air missiles to provide immediate suppression of point and area targets. It must be able to maintain a position in or around a landing zone to provide close air support to ground forces exiting the MV-22s. It also must be able to operate in low ceilings, low visibility, and nap-of-the-earth conditions. In the near future, the only aircraft that could be developed with these capabilities would be the AV-22—an attack variant of the V-22.
John Everett-Heath, in Soviet Helicopters Design, Development and Tactics, notes, "Only a helicopter can match the speed, range, maneuverability and firepower of another helicopter."12 The same thing is true with tilt-rotor aircraft. When the AV-22 escort scenario is added (see column five in Table 1), that option surpasses all other fixed-wing and rotary-wing scenarios.
The AV-22's response time would be immediate; it would possess situational awareness, would not affect the speed and range of the MV-22, would be able to mask from enemy radar, and would be able to operate in low-ceiling, low-visibility, and nap-of-the-earth conditions. In addition, the AV-22 would be able to execute immediate tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) missions—with a limited personnel-carrying capacity of six to eight individuals—and continue to the original objective with minimal loss of time. Without a doubt, an armed V-22 would be an excellent escort for the MV-22.
Given the lengthy acquisition process, now is the time to decide to develop the AV-22 and to allocate funding. First, the Marine Corps should go to Congress, make the case for the AV-22 (and the implications of operating without it), and ask for additional funding. Second, we should request that the Navy look into increasing our current aviation budget. And last, we should look at our use of the aviation funding we have been allocated. Programs such as the C-130J, AV-8B engine upgrade, Joint Strike Fighter, and AH-1Z/UH-1Y—although each important to the future of Marine aviation—may have to be curtailed or postponed to divert funding to this essential, and immediate, need.
The bottom line is this: today's threat is as prominent as it ever has been, and we must protect our MV-22 and those who will fly in it. If we accept that the way to do this is through dedicated attached escort assets, then we must find a way to fund the needed airframes and weapon systems. General Al Grey, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, once called the MV-22 a "national asset" but noted, "It's an expensive airplane and this is one hell of a time to have an expensive program."13 The funding was found then. It must be found now—for the AV-22.
Captain Tucker, a 1999 graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, has served as AH-1W flight officer for Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 and AH-1W NATOPS officer for Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Rein) 164.
1. Loren Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the Future," Sea Power, November 1997, p. 44. back to article
2. Statement of The Honorable John W. Douglass, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tactical Aviation Programs, 25 March 1998. back to article
3. Major Timothy G. Hanifen, USMC, "V-22 Osprey: There Is No Alternative," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1995, p. 35. back to article
4. Sean D. Naylor, "Future Threats Include Old, New Technologies," Navy/Marine Corps Times, 2 February 1999. back to article
5. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Center, Revised Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft (MLR) (No. AAS 34.4), 27 May 1992, p. 3. back to article
6. David A. Fulghum and William B. Scott, "Pentagon Mum About F-117 Loss," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 5 April 1999, p. 31. back to article
7. Fulghum and Scott, "Pentagon Mum," p. 4. back to article
8. Major John P. DeHart, USMC, "Beyond Firepower . . . The Role of the AH-1W," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1995, p. 39. back to article
9. Headquarters USMC, Initial Deployment/Employment Concept For The MV-22 Osprey During The Period 1995-2015 (Draft), (Osprey Study) Study, 7 April 1986. back to article
10. Fulghum and Scott, "Pentagon Mum," p. 7. back to article
11. Fulghum and Scott, "Pentagon Mum," p. 12. back to article
12. John Everett-Heath, Soviet Helicopters Design Development and Tactics (London: Janeis, 1983), p. 133. back to article
13. "Washington Roundup," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 May 1989, p. 15. back to article