1. Submitted for your review is this summary report of the origins of the all-electric Navy study.
2. In general, neither technical nor engineering aspects created the greatest challenges in the transition to the all-electric fleet of the mid-21st century. Rather, institutional short-sightedness proved to be the most difficult impediment to overcome.
3. I am convinced that decisions taken during the 1997-2005 period were crucial to the success of what we now know as the all-electric Navy.
The direct antecedents of today's shipboard electrical/electronic/electromagnetic systems can be traced at least as far back as the Advanced Surface Machinery Systems Project of the 1990s, if not earlier.1 By early 1999, the Navy and its industry partners had invested more than $100 million (FY 2000 dollars) into shipboard power electronic systems, but had little to show for it.2 These initiatives were frustrated by a "stovepipe" effect among what then were euphemistically called "naval warfare communities"—the artificial dichotomies among (and sometimes within) the undersea/submarine, surface, marine infantry, and aerospace elements of today's U.S. Maritime Forces. Moreover, within each of these communities there remained a strong tendency to focus on individual technology and system elements of specific undersea, surface, and aerospace (endo- as well as exo-atmospheric) "platforms"—propulsion, electrical, combat systems, and weapons—rather than address the integrated platform-system as a whole.
An example of even greater myopia was the penchant for maximizing unit capabilities and ignoring total force integrated operations—what was then called an emerging "system-of-systems of network-centric naval warfare."3 Not until the world financial crash of 2002, and the resulting inexorable demand to seek maximum economic efficiencies and warfighting effectiveness, was the Navy forced to deconstruct these arbitrary barriers to service-wide innovation and change.
Prior to the 2002 recession, the Navy and Coast Guard had been caught up in what were described as the revolutions in military and business affairs, and plans to recapitalize for the future. Within roughly the same developmental-acquisition period beginning in the mid-1990s, for example, the Navy and Coast Guard embarked upon several major programs that became the foundation for today's fleet:
- Virginia (SSN-774)-class multimission nuclear-powered submarine (40 acquired, initial operational capability [IOC] FY 2004-2024)
- Warner (CVN-78)-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (ten acquired, IOC FY 2013-2050)
- Lott (MDD-21)-class multimission maritime dominance destroyer (32 acquired, IOC FY 2011-2022)
- Gray (LHD-9)-class multimission amphibious assault ship (12 acquired, IOC FY 2010-2018)
- Stevens (WMSC-21)-class multimission deepwater maritime security cutter (35 acquired, IOC FY 2004-2016)
Although most of America's military and political leaders at the turn of the century looked to the future through the wrong end of the telescope and discounted heavily the possibilities of what "could be," visionaries within the Navy and Coast Guard began to examine seriously alternatives to business as usual, to reject conventional wisdom, and to look for areas of mutual support. Faced with daunting fiscal as well as operational challenges, both sea services began to work much more closely together—grudgingly in some instances—in a strategy focused on maximum commonality and interoperability. The 1998 proposal for a National Fleet4—which in essence was consummated finally in the Defense Reorganization Act of 20235—provided additional impetus for looking well beyond established processes and procedures. Signed out by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson and then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James M. Loy, this National Fleet concept called for the two services to coordinate "surface ship planning, information systems integration, and research and development, as well as expand joint concepts of operations, logistics, training, exercises, and deployments." This policy had a dramatic and far-reaching effect on Navy-Coast Guard plans, programs, and operations.
The Major Global War of 2025-2026 completed the transformation to an all-electric Navy, with much of our legacy forces showing critical operational shortcomings and suffering proportionately greater losses to combat than the warships that joined the fleet after 2015. As had been the case from at least the middle of the last century, it proved very difficult to allocate sufficient resources for upgrading ships in the active fleet in the late 1990s/early 2000s. For example, a much-needed "Cruiser Conversion Program" in 1999-2005, intended to provide critical warfighting upgrades to the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers, simply could not be completed fully because of funding constraints. Similarly, a follow-on program intended to address combat system baseline discontinuities in the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers and to incorporate advanced naval gun systems (the predecessors of our electromagnetic weapons) was hamstrung by fiscal austerity and competition with new acquisition programs for scarce resources.6 The lack of these upgrades severely constrained these ships' operational effectiveness in subsequent crises and conflicts.
The only naval upgrade program that was carried out completely in the 1998-2010 period was area- and theater-wide naval theater ballistic missile defense. These two closely linked programs benefited from political dynamics following the presidential election of 2000 and became the foundation for the national missile defense system that reached initial operational capability in 2012. Similar upgrade programs for in-service submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious warships were proposed, but they experienced resource shortfalls and schedule delays—exacerbated by the 2002-2005 global recession.
Critical Programs and Systems
Still, our research shows that several key existing naval electrical power-generation and distribution programs were strengthened and new initiatives put in place in 1999-2005 that ultimately enabled the United States to maintain maritime forces that are second to none today, in a world that is significantly different—and much more dangerous to U.S. vital interests—than was envisaged at the turn of the century.7 We believe that the seminal decision was taken, almost surreptitiously, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Transportation in late 1999, to develop jointly an integrated electric drive (IED) system for the CVN-78, MDD-21, and LHD-9 warships and WMSC-21 cutters. But this occurred only after Congress forced the Navy's hand by mandating a review of common IED systems.8 Responding to Congress's demand, then-Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig's report concluded that radial-gap permanent magnet motors possessed the power density, acoustic performance, and maturity of technology to be a viable propulsion motor common to the broadest range of ships. Moreover, Danzig explained that he was considering expanding integrated power systems development to a "corporate Navy program," including state-of-the-art permanent magnet motor technology across the broadest range of potential platforms.9
Indeed, a year later, the Navy decided to install IED into the Flight 2 Virginia-class submarines (beginning with SSN-782). In doing so, however, the Navy Secretary ignored one of the findings of the former Defense Science Board (DSB), which, in its July 1998 "Submarine of the Future" report, recommended that the "next generation SSN not include electric drive" because of insufficient resources. The Flight 3 and follow-on variants to the Virginia-class submarines, however, eventually did incorporate much of the DSB's warfighting recommendations; the increased internal volume and floodable weapons bay were important for enhancing these submarine's capabilities to meet the demands of the 2025-26 conflict.
The Navy and Coast Guard also took advantage of significant developments in the commercial shipping industry—especially the multinational cruise lines, which by the mid-1990s almost completely had made the transformation to shipboard electrical generation plants that supplied all ship power requirements.10 Furthermore, mechanical drive systems had become an almost exclusive preserve of naval forces, had reached technological/design limits, and were becoming significantly more costly to acquire and operate compared to commercial electric propulsion plants.
The naval integrated power system (NIPS) was much more than simply IED, as it took into account all elements of high-density electrical generation, advanced electronic switching and distribution systems, and propulsion plants that, in the words of one Navy visionary, "broke the tyranny of the propulsion shaft." At the same time that IED greatly expanded flexibility in ship design and engineering, it also ensured that sufficient power would be available for a multitude of requirements other than propulsion. At the turn of the century, about 80% of the installed power on a warship was dedicated solely to propulsion, and the remaining 20% to auxiliary machinery, communications systems, sensors and combat systems, and "hotel" and administrative needs. NIPS allowed ship designers and combat systems engineers to have available, in the form of electric power, 100% of the installed power of the ship to meet all energy requirements on demand.
These decisions—to move out on NIPS and IED and to require their initial incorporation across five Navy and Coast Guard ship programs—proved critical for the subsequent development of the electrical generation and switching, propulsion, communications, sensors, and combat systems that are commonplace today. Coupled with advances in the commercial power industry and several key science and technology research projects—particularly the development of rare-earth permanent magnets and transverse flux/radial field motors—the keel was laid for the transformation to an all-electric force.
The engineering, operational, and economic benefits to the U.S. Maritime Forces have been dramatic. A summary of these is provided here; more comprehensive and detailed information is presented in the final report.
Naval Architecture/Engineering Enhancements
- During World War II, a typical cruise electric load on a surface warship was 200 kW; by the turn of the 20th century it had grown to 12,000 kW, and visionaries were predicting significant additional growth requirements. These projections were the impetus required to expedite research and development in direct-conversion of electrical power from our new high-power density/high-power-to-flow naval nuclear reactors.
- NIPS and IED resulted in significantly enhanced design flexibility and reduced volume for ship machinery in submarines and surface ships. Although the impact has varied among ship types, since 2010 we have seen a reallocation to combat systems or other payload requirements of as much as 25% of an individual warship's internal volume that otherwise would have been devoted to propulsion machinery. IED systems proved to have low internal-volume requirements, minimal vibration and acoustic/magnetic signatures, good shock resistance, and excellent economies of operation throughout all speed regimes.
- NIPS and IED facilitated the implementation of modular architecture and standardized interfaces throughout the fleet, and enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of ship design and construction. Through open architecture and modularity, it has proved relatively easy to modernize all elements of the ship, repeatedly throughout its service life, to take advantage of emerging technologies and respond to changes in threats and operational doctrine.
- The development of small-, medium-, and large-application modular components for electric motors and integrated, podded propulsors for all ship applications (standard 5,000 SHP, 25,000 SHP, and 50,000 SHP power generation modules and associated propulsors) ensured commonality throughout the fleet, regardless of prime movers: nuclear, gas turbine, diesel, and fuel cell plants.
- One-hundred percent of the ship's power was made available for all requirements. NIPS enabled the instantaneous power switching and zonal distribution among propulsion, ship service, and combat/weapon systems without loss of loads or degradation in quality of power.
Warfighting Enhancements
- All elements of our ships' signatures—acoustic, infrared, radar cross section, magnetic, visual—have been reduced so that the total signature of today's post-2026 fleet is less than that of a single Nimitz (CVN-68)-class aircraft carrier of the 2000 era. Much of that decrease, especially acoustic, can be attributed to NIPS and IED. Survivability also has been increased through the development of smart "skins" for all ships, which allowed near-instantaneous active stealth configuration management/signature control to defeat our adversaries' sensors and weapons.
- The use of podded propulsion units and integrated stern propulsors in surface ships contributed significantly to wake reduction as well as overall propulsion efficiency and acoustic stealth. The design of the podded, rim-driven propulsion units allowed the propulsor to be vertical to the flow of water, resulting in constant loading of the blades and significantly reduced noise and cavitation. Similarly, submarine integrated stern propulsors have likewise realized significant stealth enhancements and propulsion efficiencies. The advanced mixed-flow podded propulsors now in service, for example, are more than ten decibels quieter than the turn-of-the-century propulsors in the three Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarines.
- Reactive electromagnetic armor incorporated into the passive survivability system on the CVN-78-class carrier force was a key element in allowing these ships to take several hits and fight through combat damage that doomed two of the older Nimitz-class CVNs during the 2025-2026 Major Global War.
- The electromagnetic aircraft launch (EMAL) and recovery systems incorporated into the design of the CVN-78 class and backfitted into CVN-72 through -77 proved to be much more reliable and effective than the legacy steam catapults and arresting gear.
- Electromagnetic launch systems also were incorporated into the submarine force, resulting in significantly reduced acoustic signatures during weapons and off-board systems/vehicles launch.
- Introduction of electrothermal-chemical weapons and rail/coil guns was assured once the decision was made to incorporate NIPS and IED into the fleet. Follow-ons to the 155-mm advanced gun system installed in the MDD-21 class, these weapons proved valuable for both close-in defense (rapid-fire 60-mm electrothermal-chemical and hypervelocity coil guns) and extended defense against cruise/ballistic missiles, as well as offense/land attack during the 2025-2026 war.
- A kinetic-kill hypervelocity coil weapon was introduced into the Flight 4 Virginia-class attack submarines in 2024; while only one shipset was in service during the 2025-2026 war, it nonetheless was an important factor in several critical engagements.
- Development of directed-energy weapons and electromagnetic pulse weapons for surface applications enabled fleet-wide capabilities to disrupt electronic component and electro-optical sensors as well as to detonate warheads of threat weapons. High-power microwaves, lasers, and charged particle beams were introduced into naval service between 2010 and 2020.11
- Similarly, submarine acoustic shockwave weapons proved successful in attacking threat submarines' acoustic sensors and defeating torpedoes and mines. Our development of these weapons indicated appropriate countermeasures to ensure the safety of our acoustic systems to our adversaries' systems.
- Electromagnetic and laser shields have proven effective in all surface platforms built after 2035, the need for such active-cancellation protection against our adversaries' electromagnetic pulse weapons having been clearly demonstrated in the 2025-2026 war. A proposed modification of this system seems to offer advantages as a "cloaking device" to shield naval forces from current and projected surveillance systems. We expect operational testing and evaluation to begin in 2057-2058.
Life Cycle Economic Advantages
- Acquisition and operational costs have been reduced significantly because of common components and systems. Compared to the ships of the first quarter of this century, we have seen a total ownership cost reduction of about 20% throughout the fleet—savings that have been reallocated to critical research and development and acquisition needs. Fossil fuel savings have been even more impressive: from 25% to as much as 50% cost reductions, depending on ship type. The 32-ship gas-turbine MDD-21 class, for example, with its NIPS and IED systems, on the average cost approximately $75 million (FY 2000 dollars) less per ship for fuel throughout its service life than the DDG-51 destroyer class that preceded it.
- Electrical components proved to be much more reliable than the mechanical and hydraulic components they replaced, and were much more easily instrumented allowing for automation and contributing to crew reduction.
- Crew sizes have been reduced significantly. At the turn of the century, destroyer and cruiser crews averaged about 350 people per ship; without the decision to incorporate NIPS in the MDD-21 class, for example, the goal of a 95-person crew would not have been possible. Likewise, NIPS, IED, and other innovations have enabled crew sizes to be reduced throughout the fleet.
- Training and maintenance have been facilitated and strengthened on a fleet-wide basis. It has proven easy to assign people with critical technical and engineering skills to all ship types, with little need for refresher training. Maintenance has been enhanced because of near-total commonality of components within major systems.
Conclusion
Our research into the origins of the all-electric Navy indicates that it was neither the technical nor engineering aspects that created the most daunting challenges for the Navy and Coast Guard at the beginning of the 21st century. Research and development, much of it originating in the commercial power industry and pioneered in shipboard applications by private commercial shipping operators, clearly indicated what was possible for integrated power systems and electric drive propulsion plants. Disparate projects and programs throughout the Defense Department, private industry, and in allied countries provided the seeds for a radical transformation of advanced switching and distribution systems, sensors, combat systems, and weapons that resulted in victory in the 2025-2026 war.
Instead, it was cultural and institutional impediments throughout the sea services of the 1980s and 1990s that frustrated the early development and introduction of NIPS and IED technologies. During the course of this project, we were reminded of a Navy general order in 1869 that required all naval vessels to have "full sail power" in an age of great technological progress that had already seen steam replace sail in many of the world's navies. Had similar conservatism prevailed in the first decade of this century, the U.S. Maritime Forces of today simply would not be up to the tasks ahead.
Fundamentally, what was needed most at the dawn of the 21st century was leadership and the personal courage to reject conventional wisdom, to craft a vision of innovation and change, and to inspire others in the sea services to work diligently to make that vision reality. We are fortunate that Navy and Coast Guard visionaries, with steadfast political support from key friends in Congress, were willing to assume the risk and devote the required resources at a time of fiscal austerity. We and the nation have benefited from their foresight and tenacity.
Dr. Truver is executive director of the Center for Security Strategies and Operations, Techmatics/Anteon Corporation, in Arlington, Virginia.
1. Post-World War II U.S. Navy developments focused almost completely on mechanical drive systems, until interest in integrated electric drive revived in the mid-1980s. All of the Navy's oceanographic ships at the turn of the century had diesel-electric drives, and in 1998 the Coast Guard commissioned the icebreaker Healy (WAGB-12), with diesel-electric propulsion (30,000 SHP, two shafts), which provided further impetus for close cooperation between the two sea services. back to article
2. In 1999 the Senate directed the Secretary of the Navy to study the prospects for installing a common integrated electric drive system for future Navy ships. Competing approaches, both relying on radial gap permanent magnet motors, were championed by teams from General Dynamics Electric Boat Corporation and Newport News Shipbuilding. A third competitor was the Navy itself, with the Office of Naval Research developing an integrated power system based on power electronic building blocks. Finally, a fourth alternative—high temperature superconducting motors—was instrumental in making the leap to the future. back to article
3. Materials published at the turn of the last century provided insight into what was intended. See Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, and John H. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare—Its Origins and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 28-35; and Vision . . . Presence . . . Power: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1998), pp. 21-23. back to article
4. National Fleet—A Joint U.S. Navy/U.S. Coast Guard Policy Statement, 21 September 1998. back to article
5. One of the most far-reaching aspects of the 2023 Act was the establishment of the U.S. Maritime Forces—the merger of the Coast Guard with the Navy and Marine Corps, and the assignment of Air Force land-based tactical endo-atmospheric vehicles, as well as maneuver-forces of the Army, to the Marine Corps. The rump Air Force was rechristened U.S. Aerospace Force, and given responsibilities for continental U.S.-based long-range endo-atmospheric vehicles as well as most U.S. exo-atmospheric forces and systems. back to article
6. The 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, commissioned between 1983 and 1994, were the first ships to field the Aegis combat system, a revolutionary antiair warfare system for its time. Several of these ships did receive some mid-life upgrades in the first decade of this century, and all—along with the 57 follow-on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers—have been retired (the last DDG in 2047) or were lost in combat in 2025-26. A significant portion of the warship losses, including one of two aircraft carriers during the war, were the result of our adversaries' use of highly sophisticated, very-low-observable mobile and rocket-propelled naval mines. back to article
7. The reports of the various and numerous national defense panels, defense reviews, and strategic assessments during the 1992-2015 period indicate an almost universal inability to anticipate true "worst-case" scenarios such as what we faced in 2025, the rise of essentially state and non-state feudal fiefdoms, with antagonists armed with a broad spectrum of lethal precision weapons of mass destruction, and guerrilla warfare on an global scale. back to article
8. The Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Conference Report (105-746) required the Navy to evaluate the installation of a common IED into all new-construction ships then under consideration. The IED decision delayed for about two years the introduction of the lead ship of each new class, and generated strong criticism at the time. It proved relatively easy, however, to extend the service lives of in-service ships to maintain minimum-essential force levels while IED was integrated into the new-acquisition ships' designs. back to article
9. "A Report to Congress on Navy Common Integrated Electric Drive Systems," U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA, 1 March 1999. back to article
10. In spring 1998, for example, the Navy carried out evaluations of the Carnival Cruise Lines' Elation, an 850-foot long, 70,000-ton luxury cruise ship, powered by twin 14 MW motors housed in external "Azipods." Although this was mature technology for the late 20th century, and did not meet warfighting needs then anticipated, the tests provided good insight, particularly about podded propulsion systems. back to article
11. The Navy benefited from parallel research and development conducted by the U.S. Air Force at the turn of the century, as part of that service's directed-energy application in tactical airborne combat programs. These addressed high-power microwave and laser "shields" to protect aircraft from missile threats; electric gun systems and high-energy lasers; proximity high-powered microwave weapons for aerial combat vehicles; directed-energy systems for detection, neutralization, and destruction of chemical and biological weapons; and target detection and discrimination using directed-energy systems. back to article