Second Honorable Mention, Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest
A joint littoral supremacy ship—with a well deck, flight deck, and vertical launch tubes—that brings together the gators and the cruiser-destroyer force would extend the combat capabilities of a shrinking fleet and at less cost than separate, specialized platforms.
The end of the Cold War and publication of ". . . From the Sea" have pushed amphibious forces out of the mud and into the spotlight. Without a blue-water naval threat to challenge U.S. supremacy on the oceans—but with plenty of potential conflict and disorder in the littoral regions—the "gator Navy" and the Fleet Marine Force have been afforded the respect and attention that comes with being at the spear point of our most critical naval mission: shaping events ashore.
But even as the blue-suited gators bask in the new-found warmth of the current naval strategic vision, it may be—and should be—that the days of the traditional amphib are numbered. Similarly, the days of the rival surface community mafia—the cruiser-destroyer (CruDes) force—also should be numbered.
If we are to build an effective, affordable surface fleet, one that is capable of taking center stage in joint operations in the 21st century, it is time to break the paradigm that separates our surface Navy into the two distinct communities of amphib and CruDes. It is time to move beyond "combatants as usual" and toward the construction of what retired Admiral Bill Owens has described as a littoral supremacy ship—a vessel that combines the operational concepts of naval fires, naval maneuver, cooperative protection, and sustainment in one potent platform.
The littoral supremacy ship—as described in the admiral's 1995 book, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World—is an amphibious ship of Wasp (LHD1) size equipped with vertical launchers for offensive long range strike and combat fire support, as well as a potent self-defense system.' But whatever its actual specifications, its real value is as a design for jointness in the surface community, and as the culmination of a new operational concept for joint littoral warfare.
Genesis of a Separation
The idea of a multimission platform that would combine strike, antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine weapons with amphibious capabilities may at first glance seem revolutionary. But it is has clear historical precedents. The infamous dragon-ship design of the Dark Age Viking raiders was just such a vessel in its day—capable of fighting sea battles, laying siege to river towns, disgorging troops at the water's edge, and being landed and pulled up on a beach.
Early amphibious operations of the fledgling U.S. Navy frequently were launched from platforms that today would be considered the equivalent of CruDes combatants. The concept of specialized amphibious ships was largely a brainchild of the 1920s and 1930s Marine Corps, with its legendary strategic thinkers such as Commandant John Lejeune and Lieutenant Colonel "Pete" Ellis, supplemented by the work of some blue-water Navy converts. These specialized ships—and the naval doctrine on how to use them—were critical to our victory in the Pacific in World War II.
The lesson drawn from the Pacific War, and reinforced at Inchon, was that the Navy needed a permanent inventory of amphibious shipping to support future amphibious operations. This was codified under Title 10 U.S. Code, which lays out the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and Navy.2 From this arose within the blue-water naval establishment the separate and traditionally rival surface communities of CruDes and amphib.
Calls for a High Seas Fleet
Specialized amphibious shipping certainly makes sense as a war-winning capability, but the fact is that the U.S. Navy ended World War II with 1,307 warships. At today's funding levels, we may be unable to maintain even 300. The inevitable question is whether we can carry out the range of missions directed by the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy with a shrinking number of platforms.
Anticipating a future defense budget "train wreck," then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Owens articulated the idea of the littoral supremacy ship as "a multipurpose vessel capable of performing many of the littoral-warfare tasks and functions we currently distribute among several different kinds of ships." With almost 500 launch tubes and both a well-deck and flight deck, the ship would be limited in reach only by the capabilities of the systems flown or hovered from, into, or on to it. Capable of landing forces from over the horizon, it also would provide direct fire support for land operations, as well as long-range strike, much in the manner of the DD-21 land-attack destroyer now under development.
The value of such a ship would be to extend the combat capabilities of our shrinking fleet while providing the cost savings inherent in combining previously specialized and separate platforms. The great advantage for multiservice joint operations would be in load-carrying capability, possessed by traditional amphibs but not by cruisers-destroyers. Well decks allow for the internal reconfiguration of the littoral supremacy ship to accommodate diverse loadouts. In addition to the air-cushion landing craft (LCACs) and Marine Corps combat vehicles and support equipment normally carried by amphibs, it is conceivable that—through forward-looking design—the cargo deck could be filled by a command-and-control module capable of supporting part or all of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters. Linked by the wide-area information network envisioned in the network-centric warfare concept, several littoral supremacy ships could provide support for the entire JTF in a way that enhances both its survivability and its flexibility. By aircraft such as the V-22, LCACs, or their follow-on systems, the individual JTF elements could be transferred ashore efficiently when desired. A fleet of littoral supremacy ships could extend the physical reach of the JTF far beyond that of static land bases.
The prospect of a joint task force commander directing land operations from sea is another less-than-revolutionary idea; it has been done before—notably in the Grenada intervention. Configuring littoral supremacy ships for this command-and-control mission also has precedent. The Third Fleet flagship, USS Coronado (AGF-11), formerly an Austin (LPD-4)-class amphibious ship, has a permanent conversion of her well deck into staff spaces capable of supporting a JTF commander. This addition—a three-deck, 35,000 square-foot command facility and berthing for 220 personnel—was completed in 1997. A JTF operating from a network of ships is a unique nuance, but it does correspond with the expectations of future network-centric capabilities.
Arguments Pro
Many of the proposed functions of the littoral supremacy ship could be carried out separately by specialized platforms similar to today's fleet, so what is the incentive to develop such a multipurpose vessel?
- There are the potential cost savings, in both production and maintenance. The Navy already is reducing the number of ship classes through further procurement of DDG-51s and the new LPD-17 class, so why not go all the way and gain full benefit from it?
- It would provide greater flexibility where we need it most—in the crisis-prone littoral regions of the world. If the Marine Corps concept of the "three-block war"—where the same forces are conducting urban warfare in one block, noncombatant rescue operations in the second block, and humanitarian assistance in the third—a fleet of ships that individually could support all those missions could be widely dispersed without diluting capabilities. Through a network-centric warfare system, a single ship could be provided with the information needed to perform multiple tasks simultaneously or sequentially, and the physical reach of the fleet would be expanded.
- The Navy would get the most capability possible for the anticipated smaller number of ships in the future fleet. We use forward presence to provide both deterrence and rapidly available sustained combat power projection particularly where forward basing is not available-and the littoral supremacy ship could make the most of our numbers.
- In a crisis situation, it would provide a range of options without disclosing intent. A littoral supremacy ship off an aggressor's coast could mean a missile strike, an air-sea amphibious operation, or both.
- It would enable a significant step toward standardizing the training and development of multimission surface warfare officers. No longer strictly gator or CruDes, officers would develop expertise in both areas on the same platform.
- With its high cargo- and supply-carrying potential, it could bring the sea-basing concept of operational maneuver from the sea to life. Littoral supremacy ships could establish a sea base prior to the arrival of the Maritime Prepositioning Force ships. In addition to supporting Marine amphibious operations, they could supply logistics support to other services, such as parts, personnel, and ordnance for at least part of an air expeditionary force.
- It could be readily reconfigured for a wide variety of joint missions, with specialized payloads designed to support the specific missions of almost every service and agency, and deployed as part of the Navy's routine forward presence. Using information from network-centric systems, the joint task force commander would direct the optimal payload to the required location-while retaining considerable striking power.
Arguments Con
But like all new concepts, the proposal for a littoral supremacy ship comes with many unknowns and certain potential drawbacks.
- We don't yet know the design and construction requirements—keel depth, width, and overall displacement—needed to provide for a platform that could carry out the multiplicity of missions. Conceivably, the vessel would have a larger cross-section than traditional combatants, although stealth technology and miniaturization of internal systems might mitigate that possibility. Seakeeping also would be an obvious concern.
- Embarked troops would be exposed to a greater variety of potential threats. Given its multipurpose nature and many capabilities, the littoral supremacy ship would be expected to go in harm's way, rather than remain over the horizon—and it could be a target of particularly high value to an enemy.
- A wide span of control would be required to command simultaneous operation of all the ship's capabilities—a daunting task for any commanding officer. At the same time, if the littoral supremacy ship were to be used as the base for JTF command and control, there could be a potential conflict between the tactical requirements of the commanding officer and the operational requirements of the joint task force commander. Similarly, a nonnaval JTF commander might be hard pressed to understand and use the sea-based capabilities to their fullest.
- A multipurpose platform would—by design—be a "jack of all trades, master of none." Realistically, the weakest mission area for such a platform would be antisubmarine/ undersea warfare; however, our submarine force could perform that mission under most anticipated conflict scenarios.
- If the littoral supremacy ship were to be designed as a joint platform, what would be the impact on traditional roles and missions and command relationships? What priority would Marine amphibious requirements be given in relation to the other power projection capabilities of the JTF? Would the Army and Air Force be willing to entrust their follow-on forces and logistics, respectively, to such a sea base?
The Need for Jointness
The proposal for a littoral supremacy ship raises the question, Exactly how joint do naval platforms need to be? Frankly, many of the previous DoD programs designed to be joint—the F-111, JVX/MV-22, or A-12—either failed or never turn out joint at all. Is a warship that not only is a multipurpose hybrid but also is designed to carry joint capabilities a necessity? Or is it merely jointness for its own—or congressional support's—sake?
The answer to that question lies in one's assumptions of the 21st-century world. If the United States faces a future land war in central Eurasia, a joint littoral supremacy ship would not be the optimal investment. But if U.S. interests do indeed lie in the littorals—which contain somewhere near 75% of the world's population and most of the urban areas—then supremacy in those regions should be our prime investment.
Similarly, if one assumes availability of land bases in areas of potential crisis, then a joint sea base is a welcome capability but not an absolute necessity. But if access to land bases is taken away, the ability to use the oceans as a base is critical. And if our potential opponents intend to prevent U.S. entry into a particular region, maintaining our joint forces in the relative security of the open seas as we defeat their "anti-access" defenses makes sense.
Today, our so-called legacy fleet simply cannot provide all the sea basing requirements for such a joint littoral operations concept. Our striking power has far outstripped—in range and depth—our current assault power.
Perhaps the most significant advancement for jointness, then, would be the capability to project sea power ashore more efficiently. As the dividing line between sea and land blurs, the United States needs to maximize the land striking power of each individual ship. A littoral supremacy ship could do that in a way that today requires at least two separate platforms.
An Attractive Option
The post-Cold War world has heralded conceptual revolutions in such naval affairs as strategic employment, mission priorities, and force structure. But while new platform designs—such as LPD-17 and DD-21—have been developed primarily to support combat ashore, they perpetuate the traditional amphib/CruDes split in function. This has been reinforced by the decision not to equip the LPD-17 class with vertical launchers as previously planned. Cost considerations may have dictated such a move, but the Navy lost an opportunity to take an evolutionary step forward toward a new, truly joint platform.
The littoral supremacy ship is an attractive option. To mitigate risk, evolutionary steps could be taken to provide our amphibious forces with greater strike capability. Once evaluated, a commitment toward a littoral supremacy ship—the platform that could best fulfill our new strategic vision and deliver the most joint warfighting capability in the most critical regions of our crisis-prone world—could proceed.