With sophisticated technology and small, oceangoing speedboats, smugglers have changed the drug war to a tactical-level struggle. The next step for law enforcement must be to create a permanent joint tactical organization that draws on a wide variety of joint assets—here, a Coast Guard HH-60J—to perform its mission.
In the early hours of 15 March 1998, the Coast Guard buoy tender Laurel (WLB-291), operating south of Haiti as part of Operation Frontier Lance, detected a small contact crossing her bow at 30 knots and heading to shore. Holding contact for only moments, the Laurel quickly alerted nearby law enforcement forces; the Coast Guard cutter Dallas (WHEC-716), 40 miles away, came up on turbines to close the beach, and the patrol craft Wrangell (WPB-1332), ten miles from the contact, came up to full bell for a coordinated intercept. Coast Guard HH-60 helicopters on alert in Haiti launched and closed the position; Haitian and Dominican forces were notified ashore for land intercept at possible landing sites. The cutter Legare (WMEC-912), operating far to sea, closed the position to prevent a possible escape to seaward.
Hours passed; searching the shoreline proved fruitless. Then a break: the Dallas's embarked helo, flying a final pass, flushed the contact—a go-fast speeding along the shore. As the helo gave chase, the Wrangell and her small boat closed, soon to be joined by the small boats from the Dallas. Surrounded by blue lights and with the helo overhead, the go-fast began dumping bales into the water and turned to shore, grounding in the surf. Net result: 200 kilograms of cocaine seized and the boat recovered, the suspect smugglers fading into the dark Haitian countryside.
The seizure of 15 March was significant, not only for the interdiction of contraband, but also because it represents in a microcosm new methods for countering smugglers in an increasingly organized and sophisticated conflict. The so-called war on drugs has evolved from a game of random smuggling to a highly controlled, organized chess match with phenomenally high stakes. Today, drug smugglers employ flexible, high-tech tactics to deliver increasingly large amounts of contraband by means undreamed of in the past. As they improve their methods, we too must adapt. This means developing a flexible response that can meet all tactical possibilities—approaching the drug war from a joint focus that will maximize our capabilities and deny smugglers the tactical flexibility they currently enjoy.
The Changing Threat
In a strategic sense, the drug war is arguably one of the most joint operations ever conducted by the U.S. military, and certainly one of the longest. Originally waged by Coast Guard and Navy assets, it reached a new level of jointness in 1990, with the formation of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), a compilation of all services and law enforcement agencies unified by the common goals of detection, monitoring, and interception of drug smuggling. Using a unique strategic focus, JIATF has done its job well, forcing smugglers to adapt their tactics. But as we approach the millennium, we find that the game has changed, and our proved methods increasingly are confounded. Strategically, the ocean may be ours, but tactically, the war is being lost.
It is difficult to overemphasize how much the drug war has changed in a relatively short period. From the early days of random, slow, and easy to catch bulk shipments of marijuana, the drug trade has evolved into a sophisticated smuggling operation fueled by immense profits and a growing global appetite for cocaine. Using superior military technology, U.S. ships and aircraft operating under JIATF control were the perfect counter to the smugglers' low, slow-flying aircraft and containerized bulk shipments. Unfortunately, this no longer is the threat faced in the Caribbean.
Today the maritime smuggling method of choice is the small, oceangoing speedboat, or go-fast, possibly the most serious challenge ever faced by maritime law enforcement. As a design, the go-fast is uniquely suited to defeat modern military and law enforcement surveillance systems. Small—20 to 30 feet—and made of fiberglass or wood, it is extremely difficult to detect and track on ultrasophisticated radar systems designed for combat. Smugglers improve the go-fast's stealth with tactics designed to foil detection systems, such as "sprint and drift" tactics to counter Doppler radars and camouflage to reduce visual signature from the air. Using hand-held global positioning systems and off-the-shelf secure communications systems, go-fasts navigate with minimum difficulty, coordinating with accomplices ashore for fast turnaround landings or receiving information regarding the locations of law enforcement forces.
Speed is the go-fast's greatest asset. It carries enough fuel to run the length of the Caribbean in 40 hours, making the window of detection for law enforcement units extremely small. If detected, the go-fast runs, and there are few units in the military inventory that can intercept it. Even assets that can give chase successfully—i.e., pursuit aircraft and helicopters—are limited by fuel consumption. Too often, the go-fast is lost in the chase during aircraft turnover or growing twilight.
The success of the go-fast and these counterdetection tactics are telling. In analysis of the seizure of 15 March, it was determined that at one point the seized go-fast had been overflown by a helo at a distance of 100 yards and remained undetected. The Laurel's radar hit—held only for a moment—was on an antiquated SPS-64 radar; more sophisticated radars searching along the go-fast track saw nothing. Night vision searching proved fruitless; only through the massive application of force, the use of surprise, and an extremely lucky guess regarding the enemy's location was the go-fast flushed and ultimately apprehended. The seizure was a victory, but in the larger operational sense, the chase for one go-fast diverted a significant number of assets from the operating area, leaving large coverage gaps in the remainder of the threat zone. These lessons would not be lost on a potential opponent.
It is on the tactical level where the drug war can be won or lost—and also where we are the most vulnerable. It is here we must focus our efforts, and here where jointness, when properly applied, can be the most effective.
The Joint Tactical Law Enforcement Command
Several years ago the Coast Guard introduced the Commander Task Unit (CTU) concept to coordinate law enforcement operations among multiple units at sea. Loosely based on a battle group organization, the CTU has met with considerable success, notably during surge or pulse operations both on a smaller scale and during larger, joint multiagency operations such as the recently concluded Frontier Shield and Frontier Lance. These operations were, of course, short term; the Coast Guard simply did not have the financial resources to continue them beyond a pulse period, and the significant number of joint assets used were merely on loan for a short period.
Nevertheless, Frontier Shield and Frontier Lance did generate two important lessons for future counterdrug operations. First, the CTU tactic, with its ability to adapt to joint operations, is extremely effective against a fast, evolving threat, and second, this effectiveness can only be guaranteed using a proper mix of joint assets for prolonged periods. To ensure continued success, the next logical step in the drug war is to evolve these surge operations into a permanent tactical organization, drawing on a wide variety of joint assets to perform its mission on a tactical level. This new permanent CTU could be the Joint Tactical Law Enforcement Command (JTLEC).
The JTLEC would include several features to help overcome the current difficulties in strategic counterdrug operations. As a tactical organization, the JTLEC would be small, specialized, and focused to a specific operations area. Flexibility in command and control, speed of assets, and a single mission focus would reduce the inevitable inertia encountered when coordinating counterdrug operations on a strategic scale.
Above all, the JTLEC would be truly joint, optimizing individual service assets and abilities that are uniquely suited to combat the go-fast threat. Alone, these assets are of limited effectiveness, but together they form a powerful counter to the threat. A quick examination of service capabilities demonstrates this point:
- Coast Guard: Delegated authority to conduct law enforcement operations, wide-ranging and deep-rooted expertise in counterdrug operations. Possesses small, fast assets (patrol boats) capable of go-fast interception, and larger cutters with organic boarding teams for 24-hour, 7-days-a-week operations.
- Navy: Large, fast assets for sustained operations, helicopters for go-fast intercept, and excellent at-sea command and control. P-3 Orion aircraft are among the best long-range surveillance assets available in the Caribbean. Smaller assets such as patrol craft and special boat units perhaps the only units in the DoD inventory capable of direct go-fast intercept.
- Army: Landing craft capable of patrol-craft fuel and logistics support at sea. Mobile communications teams provide excellent connectivity for deployed assets. Excellent reputation for joint training opportunities for host-nation land forces.
- Air Force: Best all-around surveillance capability.
By controlling local, tactical assets in a limited operations area, the JTLEC would drive the intercept process in a timely manner not currently possible when conducting counterdrug operations on a strategic level. Its organization is designed around the intercept process itself; using a layered defense concept, the JTLEC would use its assets in the following phases:
- Surveillance. Early, covert detection is the key to successful go-fast intercept. Today, patrol assets are tasked with strategic missions, e.g., patrolling the Caribbean. Assigned directly to a JTLEC, surveillance aircraft (Navy P-3s and Air Force planes) can focus on a smaller operating area, detecting and—more important—maintaining a continuous covert lock on the target. This information would be passed directly to the JTLEC for planned, phased intercept.
- Intercept. Tactical intercept is based on two key factors: continuous tracking of the enemy target and speed. The distances involved in an intercept make this extremely difficult over a wide operations area. A JTLEC, operating in a limited operations area (roughly 100 nautical miles from its command center), would be able to direct fast, maneuverable assets on scene. Staging intercept units throughout its operations area, the JTLEC would remain in constant communication directly with those assets (Coast Guard and Navy patrol craft and special boat units).
- Support. Interceptors are limited in both range and duration, making support crucial during a prolonged intercept. The JTLEC would prestage these assets throughout its operating area, using at-sea support from tenders (U.S. Army landing craft) or ashore in host-nation ports. These tactics were tested with considerable success during Frontier Lance.
By limiting its operations to a refined, tactical operating area, the JTLEC would be able to apply the principle of overwhelming force in a coordinated endgame. By directing the intercept from scene rather than from a strategic center located outside of the area, the JTLEC would maximize the principle of delegation to lowest level of tactical command.
The ability to conduct a fast, efficient tactical intercept is not the only advantage a JTLEC would bring to counterdrug operations. The joint tactical nature of the JTLEC would reduce a number of significant command difficulties inherent in strategic law enforcement operations, notably in:
- Command and control. Today, counterdrug deployers use a cumbersome chain of command directly to the strategic command center (the JIATF), whose responsibility stretches over a vast area. During Frontier Shield and Frontier Lance, the Coast Guard learned that by delegating tactical control to a command element on scene, the time required for counterdrug intercepts can be shortened significantly—and in the world of high-speed intercept, time is all-important. The seizure of 15 March, under the control of a tactical command element, demonstrated what can be done with proper assets and authority. Delegation of authority to "chop" assets to Coast Guard control for law enforcement, to fire warning shots and disabling fire, etc., can be used effectively at the tactical level, as can quick assignment of nearby assets.
- Basing. As a permanent command, the JTLEC should be located forward, in the operating area with assigned assets. The recently downsized Guantanamo Bay and Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, both of which have ample support and command-and-control facilities already in place and are centrally located in the counterdrug area, would be excellent candidates for JTLEC operations. Use of these facilities as permanent supply points would have the additional benefit of reducing the costs associated with establishing supply points during surge operations.
- Area specialization. A significant opportunity cost of counterdrug surge operations is the ramp-up time for personnel to relearn the lessons of their particular operating area. Local area knowledge, correct assessment of smuggling routes, etc., often are only fully realized at the end of a given surge operation. A permanent JTLEC, in the operating area, would solve this by acting as a continuous source of live, real-time intelligence information.
- International cooperation. Frontier Lance was unprecedented in terms of international cooperation for counterdrug operations. Working through diplomatic and military channels, the Coast Guard obtained permission to operate from shore sites in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and sailed with liaison officers from both nations for joint counternarcotic operations. The success of this initiative cannot be overstated. A permanent JTLEC in the area could continue this spirit of international cooperation by working directly with liaison officers from respective Caribbean nations, aiding in the conduct of joint international operations.
- Training. Counterdrug operations are unique in the military. Their temporary nature and the training required to conduct them effectively are perhaps the greatest tactical challenges faced by deploying assets, for although many joint assets are assigned to counterdrug operations, few have the time or inclination to become specialists in the unique elements of international law enforcement. DoD assets on counterdrug deployments must maintain proficiency in a wide variety of warfare qualifications; it is understandable that much of the time they spend on counterdrug deployments is used to conduct the myriad of other exercises they require to maintain expertise in other areas.
A JTLEC would establish and administer training requirements for units deploying for counterdrug operations to ensure a proper level of expertise. In addition, assignment to a JTLEC would be semipermanent, reducing the need for units to maintain other qualifications. It should be noted that simply creating additional training requirements will not improve readiness for counterdrug operations unless the requirements for other proficiencies are relaxed.
Experiment, Innovate, Improve
The war on drugs shows no signs of lessening; if anything, drug smuggling is increasing with profits and global demand. What was a relatively unsophisticated threat has become a significant challenge to military forces as narcotraffikers use new technology with a sophistication that rapidly approaches and in some cases surpasses our own. If we are to win this conflict—or even hold our own—we must act now to use our capabilities in a truly joint, tactical environment. Our past strategies are not enough; like the enemy, we must continually experiment, innovate, and improve. It is only through working together that we can achieve this goal.
Commander Watts, a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, is executive officer of the USCGC Decisive (WMEC-629). He has served on board the Dallas (WHEC-716), Josephus Daniels (CG-27), and Tampa (WMEC-902), and as operations officer for Coast Guard Squadron 42, where he participated in Frontier Shield and Frontier Lance. He has a master's in history from Old Dominion University and is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College. He has had several articles on Coast Guard-Navy relations published in Proceedings.