"Parting with the Prowler"
(See L. Bonzo, pp. 36-38, August 1999 Proceedings)
Brian F. Hussey, Sr.—The Prowler has proven to be an exceptionally good asset, even beyond Marine usage, but on a very old airframe. Few people outside the services understand how valuable it truly is and how many other planes and lives it has protected and saved on numerous occasions. Its own crews, and the planes, are much better protected now.
Sadly, I am able to identify the plane pictured (tail number 160786). It belonged to Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron One. It crashed in the Arizona desert at 1000 on 23 August 1996 during a low-altitude tactics flight. The four crew members perished. Our son Brian was the electronic countermeasures officer in seat three. The following day was his mother's birthday.
"The Growing Threat of Modern Piracy"
(See T. Hunter, pp. 72-74, July 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Derek D.J. Williams, Royal Australian Naval Reserve—It is unfortunate that the article did not comment on recent initiatives in preventing piracy, including the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) regional seminars in South America, Singapore, and Nigeria; the IMO's recommendations for the timely reporting of piracy; the IMO's assistance in formulating guidance notes to seafarers and draft joint patrol agreements for littoral governments; the continuing monitoring and reporting by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and its Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur; and the recent endeavors by the Japanese Nippon Foundation to encourage Japanese ship owners to report piracy activity in a timely manner and its plans to disseminate such data in a timely manner.
The article also included some minor errors and diminution of the scale and ferocity of the incidents. The MV Anna Sierra, for example, was hijacked in the Gulf of Thailand on 13 September 1995, not 1996. The ship was hijacked by 30 pirates wielding automatic weapons. The crew was handcuffed and imprisoned below for two days until they were eventually cast adrift in rough seas 60 nautical miles off the southern coast of Vietnam, where they were later rescued by fishermen. Fourteen hijackers remained on board as crew and were arrested in Beihai, China (12 Indonesian nationals and two carrying Malaysian passports). On 17 February 1997, Lloyd's List Australian Weekly carried a report from the IMB stating that the Chinese authorities had released ten of the hijackers. In a 1999 report on piracy, the IMB stated that although the hijackers had long since been repatriated, MV Anna Sierra and her cargo was still being held by Chinese authorities who were reportedly demanding payment of $400,000 to release the vessel to her owners. It has been subsequently reported that two members of the gang who hijacked MV Anna Sierra were arrested again by Chinese authorities for the hijacking of MV Tenyu in the South China Sea in late September 1998—the 15 members of Tenyu's crew are presumed murdered. Press reports in late July 1999 stated that the Chinese authorities have repatriated the 16 Indonesians arrested in that hijacking.
"Thou Shalt Not Fly"
(See J. Huber, pp. 26-28, August 1999 Proceedings)
Commander Robert E. Bublitz, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Huber has demonstrated that he shoots at the Expert Level in the ancient and honorable art of satirical criticism. In a perfect world, this article would not only be required reading for policy makers, but comprehensive testing on the subject matter would follow. I nominate Commander Huber for the 1999 Art Buchwald Award.
"Response Is Assured"
(T.R. Bendel and W.S. Murray, pp.34-37, June 1999; P.J. Madden, p. 22, July 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mitch Houchin, U.S. Navy, Executive to the Director, Operations and Logistics, United States Strategic Command—I applaud the authors in their effort to raise the nuclear warfare strategy debate. They do, however, make a number of references to our nation's nuclear posture strategy that erroneously describe how the United States Strategic Command currently prepares for deterring and fighting nuclear war.
I offer that the concept of "assured response" already exists as part of our nuclear deterrence strategy and is not a new paradigm in any way. Assured response is alive and well as the cornerstone for various retaliatory options from immediate response on a massive scale to that of a limited or delayed attack. There are no specific requirements for reaction time. Within assured response, a rapid or immediate response is only one option available for retaliation to a nuclear attack on the United States. Depending on the type of attack, numbers of weapons, country of origin, and intended targets, the National Command Authority may direct one or more of several pre-planned or notional responses. Any option may be initiated immediately upon being attacked or at a later time as deemed appropriate, but only after close scrutiny and confirmation of an actual attack. We want a potential aggressor to be assured that we will respond at a time, place, and magnitude of our choosing.
The authors suggest that the current planned use of nuclear weapons is strategic in nature. On the contrary, options considered for use of nuclear weapons span the spectrum from classical strategic warfare through operational and even tactical applications. Tactical nuclear weapons exist and have been part of our nuclear weapon inventory for quite some time. Nuclear weapons are but one tool in the nation's war chest and cannot be solely assumed to have application only in a strategic level of war.
As for the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) having a revolutionary new mode of operation allowing for a delayed response option—it already exists. The SSBN force, as the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, has no requirement to respond only to launch orders resulting from attack warning. The SSBN force is capable of attacking targets chosen from real-time crisis planning resulting from any type of nuclear attack. There is no stipulation that this must be accomplished immediately upon warning of nuclear attack, even though that capability exists as well. The timeline for response is indefinite and the responses are available for execution at a time, place, and magnitude of our choosing.
The requirements for the employment of each leg of our nuclear triad will likely be debated as long as there is a triad. Regardless of free thought on how our nation's nuclear forces should be postured for employment, assured response is alive and well in our strategies of nuclear deterrence and warfighting. Rest assured that we maintain the ability to apply nuclear forces at any point across the spectrum of time and level of warfare.