"Let me tell you where your Navy is today," the standard Navy briefing invariably begins, "and what America's Sailors are doing throughout the world." On any given day last year, the service's leaders could point to about one-third of the Navy's forces deployed overseas, with another 20% or so under way, nearby home ports. America's naval expeditionary forces were "on-scene," operating day in and day out, in each of the major deployment regions—Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Caribbean—helping to preserve regional peace and stability, and protecting U.S. citizens, interests, and friends, however they might be at risk.
Such is the reality that has continued to compete with other U.S. international and domestic needs, which, in turn, will further constrain scarce resources for research and development, acquisition, operations and maintenance, modernization, and the training and retention of highly skilled and dedicated men and woman—who the service's uniformed and civilian leaders say are "the Navy's most valuable asset."
Experiments, Operations, and More
More than 60,000 American men and women in an average of some 120 ships were continuously deployed overseas last year in support of U.S. political and military commitments, taking part in training and exercises in more than 100 countries—ready to respond with overwhelming force should it be necessary. From the Arabian Gulf in Operations Southern Watch and CVN Thrust, to the waters off western Africa in Operations Guardian Retrieval and Noble Obelisk, to counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and South American waters, the Navy and Marine Corps proved time and again that sea-based forces are the nation's "premier forward presence asset."1
From late February through mid-July, the Navy's mine countermeasures (MCM) support ship, USS Inchon (MCS-12), embarking eight MH-53E airborne MCM helicopters, two CH-46D helicopters, explosive ordnance disposal forces from EOD Mobile Unit Six, and four MCM ships—the USS Avenger (MCM-1), Devastator (MCM-6), Scout (MCM-7), and Black Hawk (MHC-58)—participated in Euro '97.2 This was the first time that Inchon had served as the MCM command ship in the biennial NATO MCM exercise Blue Harrier, and also the first time that an Osprey (MCM-51)-class minehunter self-deployed beyond U.S. regional waters. The U.S. MCM task group also participated in Olives Vertes '97, a 10-nation NATO exercise in the Gulf of Lion, and the 12-nation NATO Alcudra '97 exercise off the Spanish Balearic Islands. Major evolutions included:
- Integrated surface/airborne/diver MCM operations for rapid exploratory/reconnaissance tasks, and assessing the value of digital bottom-mapping procedures
- Precursor sweeps and lead-through operations, including evacuation operations from anchorages, using the AQS-14/14A sidescan sonar in both very shallow (10 feet) and deep (greater than 200 feet) water environments, against bottom and close-tethered mines
- Contact handoffs between minehunters and explosive ordnance disposal divers or other neutralization systems, the need for rapid identification of contacts, and the capability for "over-the-horizon" EOD operations
- MCM operations in hostile electronic warfare and air-threat environments
- Training of submarine crews in skills needed to transit mined areas
- Validation of MCS concept of operations and command-and-control procedures in a multinational environment
Off Camp Lejeune, later in the year, the Inchon, several MCM and coastal mine hunter (MHC) vessels, and marine mammal systems participated in JTFEX 97-3, which focused on multi-warfare workups for both the Guam (LPH-9) and George Washington (CVN-73) deployments. The MCM objective was to test "mainstreaming" mine warfare into fleet operations, and involved the new, Coronado-based very shallow water (VSW) MCM detachment and the use of the helicopter-based Magic Lantern Contingency Deployment System for detecting mines. Of the numerous lessons learned, the Navy's MCM community concluded that there was a compelling need to include the marine mammal systems much more frequently, as they and their VSW MCM detachment humans are the service's only capability to detect and neutralize mines in littoral operations.
Albania plunged into turmoil, with looting, chaos, and civil war in early March as various pyramid financial schemes—reportedly linked to President Sali Berisha and his cronies—tumbled, bankrupting perhaps a quarter of the population.3 Hundreds of U.S. citizens, foreign nationals, and Albanians huddled in the U.S. Embassy compound in Tirana. As the killing and violence escalated, U.S. Ambassador Mirisa Limo called for the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) on board the three-ship Nassau (LHA-4) amphibious ready group (ARG), which included the USS Nashville (LPD-13) and Pensacola (LSD-38), offshore.
Within 30 minutes of receiving the final execute order for Operation Silver Wake on 13 March, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Tarpey, 26th MEU executive officer and commander of the forward command element, was airborne with his initial team of 32 Marines in two AH-1W SuperCobras and CH-46s. Once on the ground in the embassy's housing complex, they set up a defensive perimeter and began airlifting 51 evacuees, mostly women and children, to the safety of the ships in the Adriatic. The next day, Marine helicopters increasingly came under attack as they ferried troops in and civilians out. Along a ridgeline, Albanians manning a battery of nine S-60 57-mm anti-aircraft guns and a 12.7-mm gun were taking haphazard shots at the helos. As two Cobras approached the gun positions, an Albanian armed with an SA-7 surface-to-air missile (SAM) took aim at one of the helos. Marine Captain Ron Pace piloting the other AH-1 "didn't even think about it" as he squeezed off about 30 high-explosive 20-mm rounds—the SAM-toting Albanian simply vanished without a trace. Later, naval investigators interviewing Albanian refugees learned that the word quickly spread throughout Tirana not to challenge the "thin, pointy helicopters" because they would shoot back, with deadly results.
During the night of 16 March, a fishing boat loaded with refugees capsized, and Navy and Marine Corps swimmers rescued about 50 people. The next day, the Aegis guided-missile cruiser USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55) saved another 20 Albanian refugees after their small boat became disabled. In all, the Navy and Marines would evacuate 877 Americans and other foreign nationals, most ferried to the Nassau before being flown to Brindisi, Italy, by Navy MH-53E helicopters of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 4 out of Sigonella.
The Albanian chaos continued as evacuations drew to a close on 17 March, another civil war in Zaire was prompting Navy and Marine Corps commanders embarked in the Nassau to begin another round of emergency planning for Operation Guardian Retrieval.4 The Nashville and the Pensacola remained in the Med as the Nassau headed toward Zaire on 20 March, her air wing of eight CH-46s, four CH-53s, four AH-1Ws, and six AV-8B Harrier II-Plus aircraft augmented with two MH-53Es from HC-4. About 500 Americans were living in Zaire, and the Nassau's helicopters and craft were capable of rescuing about 600 people an hour. Marine Corps Colonel Emerson Gardner, the 26th MEU(SOC)'s commanding officer, noted that "this is a real testimony to the flexibility of the MEU and the ARG . . . we can split up and cover operations 5,000 miles apart." The Pensacola, for instance, had steamed west for a two-week exercise with Spain, Destined Glory '97, only to have the exercise canceled, and returned to operate with the Nashville in the Adriatic.
"The secret to these 'split ARG' ops is the people," Colonel Gardner explained. "You have to be able to do more than one thing. Ideally, you have one Marine who can do four or five things, not four or five Marines doing one thing apiece."
As the Nassau stood sentinel duty off Zaire, the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) deployed from Norfolk on 15 April, two weeks earlier than planned, headed toward the littoral operating area off the west coast of Africa to relieve the Nassau on 2 May. The other two ships in the Kearsarge ARG—the amphibious transport dock USS Ponce (LPD-15) and the dock landing ship Carter Hall (LSD-50)—still had two weeks preparation before departing. But it was important that the Kearsarge and the Marines of the 22d MEU(SOC) get under way as quickly as possible to ensure the Nassau got home within her scheduled deployment date, so as not to violate personnel and operating tempo guidelines—important factors in sustaining morale and retention throughout the fleet.
"It's game day, and these Sailors and Marines have come to play," Navy Captain Gregory Ertl, commodore of the Kearsarge ARG exclaimed. Toward the end of May conditions in Sierre Leone had deteriorated significantly, as mutinous soldiers under Major Johnny Paul Koroma ousted the democratically elected President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, and sent him into exile.5 Fighting and looting had spread to Freetown, threatening the safety of some 300 U.S. citizens held up in a hotel guarded by Nigerian peacekeeping troops. Leaving her station off Zaire (now called the Republic of Congo in the wake of the rebel victory there), the Kearsarge steamed north at full speed to arrive off Freetown on 29 May.
Despite the coup leaders' warnings that they had closed the borders and banned all foreign aircraft, the Kearsarge's helicopters flew numerous ferry-runs without incident. More than 22 other governments asked the United States to help evacuate their civilians from Freetown. Departing civilians reported that troops had ransacked their homes, robbed them of valuables, and threatened to kill them if they resisted. Ironically, during the summer 1996, Freetown had been used as a safe haven by the 22d MEU(SOC), embarked on the USS Guam (LPH-9). when the Marines evacuated U.S. citizens and foreign nationals from Liberia.
Just completing the evacuation of some 1,200 U.S. Embassy staff on 29-30 May, American citizens, and foreign nationals from Sierra Leone, Marines from the Kearsarge were back on 1 June to rescue even more foreigners. Covered by the firepower of six light armored vehicles (LAVs) that had been ferried into Freetown by CH-53E helicopters, the follow-on action team of 300 Marines began pulling out civilians who had taken refuge in a hotel in the middle of the city. By the end of the day, another 1,261 people had been evacuated—a total of 2,500 people, including 451 Americans—in what had by then been dubbed Operation Noble Obelisk. (Nine months later, following sustained public-service and private industry strikes throughout Sierra Leone, which undermined the rebels' political base, the ousted President Kabbah returned to complete his term in office.)
Meanwhile, the Ponce and the Carter Hall were in the Mediterranean, having relieved the Nashville and the Pensacola, when fighting in Brazzaville, Congo, heated up on 5 June, threatening U.S. and foreign nationals. (The Ponce was off Albania at the request of the U.S. ambassador, to help stabilize the situation until elections were held, and the Carter Hall was participating in "Betacom," ironically enough, a joint U.S.-Spanish noncombatant evacuation exercise.) The Kearsarge had just put into the Canary Islands for liberty—the 3,200 Sailors and Marines had been under way for more than 50 days since leaving Norfolk—but was standing by to assist in the Congo evacuation, just in case the U.S. Air Force and the Army needed help.
The Navy's first Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs) were shown to be vital elements in the Navy's embrace of the technological, cultural, and operational implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) during 1997.6 These experiments are designed to explore new concepts and emerging technologies and systems to determine future needs. The first of these experiments, FBE Alpha, was conducted in March off southern California and linked to the Marine Corps Hunter Warrior exercise. Alpha focused on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and the requirements for a sea-based joint task force.
One key element of FBE Alpha was the "Ring of Fire" experiment that linked diverse land-attack platforms into a common command-and-control grid for putting ordnance on target, first time, every time. First tested "constructively" in January, "Ring of Fire" was the brainchild of Lieutenant Commander Ross Mitchell (see pp. 54-57, November 1997 Proceedings); it looks to link all in-theater "shooters"—surface ships, submarines, aircraft, artillery—in a command-and-control (C2) grid or ring that provides a common tactical picture, real-time knowledge of own-force weapons/ordnance availability, and the ability to assign platform/weapons to specific targets ashore. If successful, this will allow the Navy to mass the effects of fires without the physical need to mass forces close offshore, and will be a key element in what the CNO has described as the Navy's paradigm shift from a "platform-centric" to a "network-centric warfare" concept of operations.
In Fleet Battle Experiment Alpha, the Navy also had the services of an Air Force Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft that, from 31,000 feet, provided an unprecedented battlefield picture to Navy and Marine Corps forces. The results, according to Vice Admiral Herbert A. Browne, Commander, Third Fleet, were "awesome": "We don't know for sure where such technology would be best used—on a command ship or big deck amphib; we just don't know. But we know it would be foolish not to take advantage of the opportunity. It's awesome, simply awesome."
In another RMA-focused experiment, the Navy hosted the 1997 Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID '97), which, among numerous other tests, focused on a common network that will link the United States with its allies world wide. Called Coalition Wide Area Network (CWAN), the system performed remarkably well, according to Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Space, Electronic Warfare, and Command and Control Directorate (N6), providing real-time collaborative planning among all of America's coalition partners. The several JWID '97 objectives included:
- Real-time and seamless information exchange between multiple levels of security at the Coalition Task Force (CTF) and component level, with a special focus on command and control and collaborative planning
- Tailorable "Dominant Battlespace" awareness, including three-dimensional displays, in a CTF setting, highlighting multimodal data fusion, common operational picture tract correlation, and management
- Sensor-to-sensor and sensor-to-shooter technologies to enhance combat identification and theater missile defense in a coalition environment, and to provide targeting information for stand-off and precision-guided munitions using selected portions of the approved strike C4ISR architecture
- Technologies that enhance information superiority through the use of Information Operations/Information Warfare (IO/IW) and that provide assurance of C4ISR access, use, and integrity
In a September interview, Admiral Cebrowski was enthusiastic about the promises confirmed in last year's JWID. "We linked forces around the world—in the United Kingdom, France, Spain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—in a virtual Coalition Task Force centered on the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74)." And, like the Navy's experience during the March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, a "new level of admiralship emerged." Decision making, access to data, collaboration—all were enhanced by the new technologies at hand: "JWID '97 proved that information processes transcend geography."
Finally, Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo was held in the Pacific during August and September. Focused on the amphibious command ship USS Coronado (AGF-11), this Third Fleet experiment further tested the co-evolution of technologies, systems, organizations, and operational concepts, expanding the "Ring of Fire" concept. Tests addressed the need to integrate completely tactical aviation and strike weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and the navalized variant of the Army Tactical Missile System (NATCMS), the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies in "uncrewed" systems, and the integration of real-time intelligence from a variety of systems, from national sensors to SEALs and Marine Corps recon forces ashore. "This ethos of experimentation and innovation is critical," Admiral Cebrowski said, "as it is the only way we can be certain of success in war."
On 4 April, personnel on board the Russian cargo ship Kapitan Man reportedly fired a laser beam at a Canadian CH-124 helicopter while apparently spying on the U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine USS Ohio (SSBN-726) in waters nearby Seattle, Washington.7 The helicopter's pilot, Captain Pat Barnes, and a U.S. Navy intelligence officer, Lieutenant Jack Daly, both suffered non-permanent "eye problems" consistent with those caused by pulsed laser beams. The Kapitan Man and the Ohio both were sailing in U.S. waters through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The Canadian helicopter was dispatched under a joint U.S.-Canadian naval agreement to provide routine surveillance of Russian ships and to take digital photographs.
A U.S. Coast Guard-Navy team subsequently searched the "public areas" of the Russian ship for a hand-held laser similar to those used as range-finders, but found none. But Russian crewmen complained about the closeness of the helicopter. Intelligence sources believe that the Russians either hid the device in "non-public areas" or threw it overboard. The United States lodged a diplomatic protest and a military probe into the incident, while Representative Norm Dicks (Democrat, Washington), ranking minority member of the House Intelligence Committee, called for an independent investigation. A report by Canadian Rear Admiral R. D. Moore recommended that "all maritime surveillance teams be advised of potential hazard from possible use of lasers by vessels of interest."
The Navy showcased an innovative approach to the "final exam" at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in May.8 Although the formal title is Recruit Final Evaluation Problem, it is more aptly called "Battle Stations"—an 18-hour rite of passage patterned after the Marine Corps' 54-hour boot camp final, "The Crucible." The final evaluation—"your typical nightmare day at sea," according to Lieutenant Commander Ken Fletcher, director of training at the Recruit Training Command—is the latest in a series of changes that Navy boot camp has put in place as a result of the closing of recruit training centers in San Diego, California, and Orlando, Florida, and to ensure that after nine weeks the Navy will have the best recruits possible.
During the 18-hour Battle Stations, recruits will have to get a ship trainer "under way" in a hurricane, respond to general quarters, fight fires and rescue shipmates from smoke-filled compartments, and abandon their ship—in all 12 events that will demonstrate their capability to join the fleet. The shaft alley rescue was inspired by the experience of the survivors of the battleship Oklahoma (BB-37) during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Even "simulated" sharks have been introduced into the abandon ship/survival at sea test. "Those of us on the deckplates have wanted to do something like this for a long time," Senior Chief Sonar Technician Don Dahl, one of the architects of Battle Stations, remarked last August.
The Recruit Final Evaluation Problem forces recruits to think creatively, to work as a team, and to apply the skills they have learned during the previous eight weeks. "We learned that the fleet wants a training event that brings the training recruits receive to a point," Commander Xzana Tellis, the Training Command's executive officer remarked in a May interview. "They wanted us to give them some association with the idea that they're sailors," a view echoed by Commander Fletcher—"It will all be demanding. It will be a rite of passage."
On 21 July, Old Ironsides, the USS Constitution, set out under her own power—the first time in 116 years—on a one-hour voyage marking the ship's 200th anniversary. A 44-gun frigate, the Constitution made a modest four knots in light wind and under light sail. Launched on 21 October 1797, the Constitution then carried 36 sails and could reach a top speed of 13 knots. The oldest commissioned warship in the U.S. Navy, the Constitution was undefeated in 30 engagements during the War of 1812. The 1997 voyage—which was highlighted by flyovers by the Blue Angels and salutes from the guided-missile destroyer USS Ramage (DDG-61) and the guided-missile frigate Halyburton (FFG-40)—followed a three-year restoration effort costing $12 million.
"Those people were using me for a target!" Albert Mendiolo, captain of the 86-foot scallop trawler Divine Mercy, complained.9 Seems that five-inch shells fired by the Aegis destroyer USS Laboon (DDG-58) during a 15 July training exercise came too close for comfort as the Divine Mercy and another scalloper worked an area 62 miles off Virginia's eastern shore. The first shell hit just to the left of Mendiolo's boat, followed soon by a second close by his starboard side. As Mendiola began to broadcast a "Mayday" call, a third and fourth shell hit fore and aft, engulfing the aptly named Divine Mercy in smoke. As soon as the Laboon's crew heard the Mayday broadcast, they ceased firing and headed toward the two scallopers. The Laboon's skipper was later relieved of command.
The planned scenario for Sea Breeze '97, a U.S.-Ukrainian exercise in the Crimea in August, provoked a sharp reaction from Moscow, and highlighted the raw tensions in the former Soviet Union, nearly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.10 "It was really a case of no one stopping to think things through," a U.S. Marine Corps officer acknowledged. The Marines were to deploy from ships off the naval port of Donuzlav, to intervene in a "constructed" ethnic conflict in which rebels, aided by a neighboring power, sought to overthrow the "Orange" government. In the ethnically diverse Crimea, where a Russian minority was seething after the loss of the peninsula to Ukraine, the scenario was seen as a slightly veiled NATO warning to Russia of what might happen if it sought to reestablish control. In addition to the U.S. Navy and Marines, ships from Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Turkey took part in the Partnership for Peace exercise.
Several thousand demonstrators repeatedly took to the streets to denounce what to them seemed a show of force against ethnic Russians, U.S. imperialism, and NATO threats. Reaction in Ukraine and the Kremlin became so fierce that the scenario script was changed to have the Marines come ashore, not to quell ethnic unrest, but to bring in humanitarian aid in the wake of a "constructed earthquake." And, the land-based U.S.-Ukraine segments of the scenario were relocated to the Ukraine mainland in another attempt to sooth the wrath of the Crimean Russians.
The Kremlin's ire over the exercises proved hard to quiet, fueled by concern that what was intended to enhance Ukraine's military readiness and international interoperability would ultimately endanger security by provoking old enmities. "Military exercises are a matter of the internal affairs of any country," Captain Andrei Grachev, spokesman for the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquartered in Sevastopol, admitted. "But we perfectly well understood what was meant by the 'orange country' and the 'mass unrest' that needed to be quelled. We have to ask ourselves," he mused, "in whose interest it is to cause an 'earthquake'."
Korean Air Lines Flight 801 crashed during a heavy rain in the early morning of 6 August, slamming into Nimitz Hill, about two miles south of Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport, killing more than 200 people. Wearing night-vision goggles to cut through the gloom, Navy pilots from Combat Helicopter Squadron Five based in Guam were among the first to get to the crash site.11 Miraculously, two Navy CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters plucked 30 survivors from the wreckage, as Navy Seabees from Naval Construction Battalion 133 cut through the dense jungle to allow rescue and medical personnel to reach the scene.
During the next 24 hours, the Seabees continued to improve conditions at the site, clearing an area for a field morgue, installing electrical generators, and bringing in water. Meanwhile, HC-5's pilots transported victims to the U.S. Naval Hospital, and other Navy resources, from corpsmen, chaplains, to stretcher-bearers, provided whatever assistance was needed. "I did a lot of counseling on site," said Lieutenant Dean Hoelz, chaplain of NMCB-133. "Death on an individual level is devastating. On this magnitude, it's many times greater." So severe was the personal trauma that a seven-member special psychiatric rapid intervention team (SPRINT) was dispatched from the Naval Medical Center, San Diego, two days after the crash to provide counseling and emotional support for the rescuers.
Navy units stationed in Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Atsugi, along with Marine forces stationed in Okinawa supported several key exercises that bolstered U.S. political and diplomatic objectives in Korea and northeast Asia. Four at-sea exercises were conducted with South Korean forces—Sharem 120 included the USS Thach (FFG-43), Hewitt (DD-966), and Topeka (SSN-754) in antisubmarine warfare training; MCMEX focused on mine-clearing operations with the USS Guardian (MCM-5) and Patriot (MCM-7); Foal Eagle '97 was a large-scale exercise centered on the USS Independence (CV-62) battle group, several Third Fleet surface warships, the Coast Guard high-endurance cutter Hamilton (WHEC-715), and numerous support ships; and Ulchii Focus Lens '97, a major joint and combined command-and-control exercise centered on the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19). During Foal Eagle, the Hamilton performed plane-guard duty in direct support of the Indy's flight operations, while a Coast Guard patrol boat and port security units supported prepositioning ship and sealift ship movements.
In late October, the "operational reserve/training" carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) returned to her Mayport, Florida, home port, quieting the cassandras who believed that the Navy's only Naval Reserve Force carrier could not meet the nation's needs.12 Assigned to the reserves in September 1996, the ship saw morale plummet in the wake of a hasty and underfunded overhaul at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, the final overhaul before the Navy turned the yard over to the city. Quality-of-life issues were rampant, and were exacerbated by the ship's second change of homeport in three years—Norfolk, to Philly, to Mayport. In less than a year, however, when the John F. Kennedy deployed to the Mediterranean to relieve the nuclear carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in May 1997, morale was at an all-time high, according to the ship's skipper, Captain Edward J. Fahy. During the six-month deployment, the John F. Kennedy steamed nearly 30,000 nautical miles, her air wing flew nearly 8,300 sorties, and her crew sent about 2.3 million e-mail messages.
The e-mail system was a huge factor in keeping morale so high, according to John F. Kennedy's skipper, especially as 10% of the crew were Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR) personnel, full-time reservists who do not normally deploy. The e-mail system allowed the ship's officers and senior enlisted leaders to quell rumors and sailors to keep in close touch with their families.
In what has seemed to be an annual test of wills, in the late fall the Navy was ordered to bolster its presence in the Arabian Gulf as tensions mounted between Iraq and Iran.13 In October, Secretary of Defense William Cohen directed the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Nimitz (CVN-68) and her escorts, the guided-missile frigate Ford (FFG-54) and the attack submarine Olympia (SSN-717), to skip a planned port call in Singapore and proceed to the Gulf, two weeks earlier than planned. Cross-border attacks by Iranian aircraft against Iranian rebel forces in southern Iraq and Iraqi air force responses violated U.N. "no-fly" zones and could have triggered a U.S. military response. The escalating tensions already had prompted a run-up in energy prices, as crude oil futures on the New York Mercantile Exchange hit an eight-month high; precious-metals prices also increased as the crisis wore on.
White House advisors and National Security Council staff concluded that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would use the Iranian attacks as an excuse to challenge the "no-fly" zones that had been established in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, as well as to block U.N. weapons inspections. That turned out to be the case, as Hussein increasingly curtailed the operations of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with carrying out inspections of suspected ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—sites throughout the country. Ultimately UNSCOM left Iraq, and Byzantine diplomatic negotiations continued, albeit fortified by an impressive build-up of U.S. and British forces in the region.
Somewhat ironically, given the likely long-term nature of the Iraqi threat to regional countries, Saudi Arabia decided to constrain U.S. operations from its bases, which highlighted the operational and political flexibility of naval forces.14 Following intensive discussions between U.S. and Saudi diplomats, the United States decided not to press for active Saudi participation in any air campaign that might develop, except for permission to use Saudi bases for refueling and command-control-and-communications aircraft and to overfly Saudi air space with aircraft based elsewhere in the region.
The real muscle behind President Clinton's warnings to Hussein was the fleet in the Gulf and a burgeoning Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army presence in Kuwait and Bahrain: Marine F/A-18 strike-fighters; Air Force F-117 stealth fighter-bombers, A-10 Warthog antitank aircraft, F-15 and F-16 fighters, and even two B-1 bombers—their first real-world deployment—but not the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. "It's inconceivable they're not using the B-2," retired Air Force General Charles Horner, who ran the air war in 1991, commented, despite the fact that it had been declared operational.15 "The administration may not want to advertise its utility because it didn't support the B-2," he concluded.
Saudi recalcitrance reportedly stemmed from concerns that the United States was not willing to oust Saddam Hussein, but would focus on the unlikely task of destroying Iraq's ability to contravene international weapons sanctions.16 Unofficial Kuwaiti opinion underscored the Saudis' uncertainty, as a former Kuwait cabinet minister confided that an air campaign "might strengthen his position. If you don't hit him badly, he will be another hero." Secretary Cohen might have inadvertently strengthened this perception, when he recognized that Saddam is "very difficult to locate. . . . We have a policy against assassinations."
At the end of the year, U.S. naval forces in the region included two U.S. aircraft carriers—the Nimitz (CVN-68), and George Washington (CVN-73)—with the Independence on her way; the Aegis cruisers and destroyers Port Royal (CG-73), Normandy (CG-60), Lake Champlain (CG-57), Barry (DDG-52), and Benfold (DDG-65); the Spruance-class destoyers Kinkaid (DD-965), O'Bannon (DD-987), and Harry W. Hill (DD-986); the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigates Elrod (FFG-55), Gary (FFG-51), and Ford (FFG-54); two Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines, Olympia and Annapolis (SSN-760), with a third, Charlotte (SSN-766), en route to the Gulf; the amphibious ships Peleliu (LHA-5), Comstock (LSD-45), and Juneau (LPD-10), embarking 2,100 Marines and aircraft of the 13th MEU; the mine countermeasures ships Ardent (MCM-12) and Dextrous (MCM-13); and the fast combat support ship Sacramento (AOE-1). In addition, the Royal Navy had committed the aircraft carrier Illustrious, the destroyer Coventry, and the frigate Nottingham—in all nearly 22,000 U.S. and British sailors and Marines in support of U.N. resolutions.
When this latest Gulf crisis ended in early 1998, Iraq's deputy prime minister Tarik Aziz cavalierly brushed aside America's "saber-rattling" as having no effect on the outcome. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who brokered the memorandum of understanding on continuing and expanding the weapons inspections, knew better: "You can do a lot with diplomacy," he affirmed, "but you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up with firmness and force."17
Nagging Issues
In April the U.S. Naval Academy announced that it had tapped retired Admiral Leon "Bud" Edney to be the first holder of the Distinguished Professor of Leadership Chair. Established by a $1 million gift from John J. McMullen, a 1940 graduate who later founded a New Jersey naval architecture and marine engineering firm, the Leadership Chair follows the earlier endowment of a Chair for Ethics, held since January by Georgetown University Professor Nancy Sherman. A 1957 graduate and naval aviator, Admiral Edney flew 340 combat missions, commanded a light attack squadron and the carrier Constellation (CV-64), had tours as Commandant of Midshipmen, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet. He became one of three full professors in the institution's Department of Leadership, Ethics and Law; his responsibilities include teaching courses on leadership and ethics, serving as a special advisor on leadership to the Naval Academy's superintendent, and promoting moral development among the Brigade of Midshipmen. The need for such an enhanced leadership and ethics program was prompted by notorious and continuing incidences of cheating, sexual harassment, hazing, and stealing among midshipmen.
His announcement came on the heels of the release of a two-year study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that focused on the military academy system in general.18 Prompted by a 1991 General Accounting Office report that criticized the dollar cost for educating officers at dedicated academies instead of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at civilian schools and postgraduate officer-candidate training programs. The CSIS study, headed by former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, concluded that the academies were worth the extra cost because their graduates stay in the service longer and reach higher ranks. "To put a price on it is unreal," Lieutenant John Hopkins, a 1993 Naval Academy graduate and a nuclear plant operator on board the John C. Stennis noted in an August interview. "The Academy produces people who are proud of their country. It gives people, who would normally not have had the opportunity the chance to come to a school like this."
But doubts about the Naval Academy's course, its leadership, and handling of various scandals would not die.19 In June, an independent panel co-chaired by retired Admiral Stansfield Turner and Dr. Judy Mohraz, President of Goucher College, outlined 16 recommendations, ranging from greater oversight by the Academy's Board of Visitors to sending midshipmen to the fleet for short tours in enlisted status. "We believe this report raises the bar for the Naval Academy," Admiral Turner noted, "and recommends realistic steps to make a great institution even better."
Women naval aviators were again in focus in 1997. In April, Captain Jane Skiles O'Dea—informally the Navy's woman "grey eagle"—retired, followed later that summer by Captain Rosemary Mariner, for a short time also the Navy's senior woman aviator.20 They represented numerous "firsts" for the Navy. Both were in the first class of women to go through naval flight school, in 1973. O'Dea was the first Navy daughter to have her father pin his aviator's wings on her; the first woman C-130 pilot; and the first aviator to be pregnant—flying through her sixth month, an experience she described as "a rather dark time in my life" as a result of hostile treatment she received. Still, it took ten years of flying before she was allowed to land on a carrier, flying a C-1A. Captain Mariner was also one of the Navy's first woman jet pilots, flying A-4s, A-7s, and the first woman squadron commander, of VAQ-34. However, when combat aviation finally opened to women in 1993, both were too senior to fill jobs that may have opened paths to flag rank. Looking back, and forward, Captain O'Dea advised women aviators to "Dig and scrap for every opportunity they'll give you and be prepared to prove yourself. Women still have to work harder."
Captains O'Dea's and Mariner's careers were all the more poignant in light of the Navy Inspector General's June report about alleged discrimination against Lieutenant Carey Lohrenz, one of the Navy's first two woman combat pilots. (She and Lieutenant Kara Hultgreen were the first women to fly F-14 Tomcats from carriers; Lieutenant Hultgreen was killed in a carrier landing mishap—the result of mechanical problems and pilot error—in 1994.) Vice Admiral James Fitzgerald concluded that she had been barred from landing on carriers because she made landings that "scared everyone but her."21 Admiral Fitzgerald also noted that Lieutenant Lohrenz did not receive inflated grades or other preferential treatment that allowed her to appear qualified to fly the F-14 when she was not. The report rejected Lieutenant Lohrenz's charges that she had suffered discriminatory treatment by her commanders and colleagues in Carrier Air Wing 11. She had been grounded in 1995 and assigned duties as recycling officer at Miramar Naval Air Station, a move that Lieutenant Lohrenz contended resulted from a smear campaign to keep women from flying combat aircraft. The Navy in June 1997 decided to allow her to fly land-based aircraft—although she would continued to be barred from flying the F-14 and other carrier-based aircraft.
Global Ops . . . But Focused Inward?
"I've been consciously focused inward," Admiral Jay Johnson remarked in a September interview, "because of the fairly unique circumstances of how I came into this job, and to help me assess what the state of the Navy was, and to give the Navy a chance to get to know me, and to really make sure we put a game plan together that I felt was right for us."22 Pulled from virtual obscurity following the suicide of CNO Admiral Jeremy M. "Mike" Boorda in May 1996, Admiral Johnson's first full year of service as CNO mirrored 1997 for the service as a whole: close attention to meeting requirements and global commitments overlaying an intense reassessment of needs for today and into the 21st century.
"The tragedy of last year and the attendant introspection from that has caused us to take a real hard look at ourselves and say: Is the institution broken? Is the institution bent? No," the CNO answered. "The institution is solid. It's got great people in it. We've got a relevant mission. Let's get going."
A relative absence of negative Navy news—and burgeoning of sex-related charges and controversies in the other Armed Services—seemed to have helped, according to Ron O'Rourke, the Congressional Research Service's naval analyst. "The spotlight has shifted to the other services," O'Rourke remarked, and the "Navy has benefitted by default."
Still, as the year ended, both the CNO's and the Navy's profiles seemed to be waxing. Admiral Johnson increasingly was speaking out about the "fundamental change" in the way the Navy will do its job in the next century. Focusing on the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, Admiral Johnson's strategic vision was first publicly articulated in his article "Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century" (see pp. 48-50, November 1997 Proceedings). "We already are shaping our Navy to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The landmark 1992 white paper ". . . From the Sea" took the first steps, followed by "Forward . . . From the Sea" in 1994 and the "Navy Operating Concept" earlier this year. Each of these steps," Admiral Johnson continued, "revolved around a simple idea: the purpose of the U.S. Navy is to influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea—anytime, anywhere."
And the crisis du jour in the Arabian Gulf dramatically underscored the Navy's ability to serve this purpose—even in the face of regional host-nation political constraints, lackluster support from many U.S. allies and friends, and uncertainty at home about the need to spend billions of dollars on defense now that the United States was the sole global superpower.
Dr. Truver is Executive Director, Center for Security Strategies and Operations, TECHMATICS, Arlington, Virginia. He thanks Mr. Thomas Schoene, of the Center's Expeditionary Warfare Programs staff, who provided research assistance for this article.
1. Department of the Navy Posture Statement, Chapter III/Operational Primacy: 1997 in Review, CHINFO Webpage, pp. 1-8. back to article
2. EURO 97/JTFEX 97-3 Brief, CMCRON TWO (N3), undated (1997); Guy Toremans, "Blue Harrier Assesses Mine Warfare Forces," Jane's Military Exercise & Training Monitor, April-June 1997, pp. 10-11; and John Donnelly, "From Dolphins to Satellites—Forces Wield New Weapons to Defeat Old Foe: Mines," Defense Week, 8 September 1997, pp. 1, 8-9. back to article
3. Jon R. Anderson, "Rescue 911: On the Ground with the Marines in Albania," Navy Times, 31 March 1997, pp. 12-13; and Anderson, "Upheaval in Albania Puts Marines on Guard," Navy Times, 7 April 1997, p. 8. back to article
4. Jon R. Anderson, "Albania May Cool Down, But Zaire's Heating Up," Navy Times, 31 March 1997, p. 13; Ernest Blazar, "Far-Flung Operations Spread Navy's Might," Navy Times, 7 April 1997, p. 8; Joshua T. Cohen, "26th MEU, Nassau ARG Simultaneously Cover Two Contingencies, One Exercise," Inside the Navy, 7 April 1997, p. 18; Garry Pierre-Pierre, "Near Zaire, 'America's 911' Stands By," The New York Times, 10 April 1997, p. 12; Jon R. Anderson, "Split ARGs: Back to the Future," Navy Times, 21 April 1997, p. 4; and Chris Lawson, "Kearsarge Deploys Two Weeks Early," Navy Times, 28 April 1997, p. 4. back to article
5. "Marines Help Americans in Sierra Leone," Associated Press, 30 May 1997; Jon R. Anderson, "Kearsarge to the Rescue," Navy Times, 9 June 1997, p. 12; Anderson, "Kearsarge Marines to the Rescue Again," Navy Times, 16 June 1997, p. 26; and Anderson, "Army Takes Call to Africa," Navy Times, 23 June 1997, p. 16. back to article
6. Chris Lawson, "Test-Driving New Tactics, Technology," Navy Times, 31 March 1997, pp. 26-27; Rob Holzer, "Future Fleet Put to the Test" and Bradley Peniston, "Exercises Set through September," Navy Times, 8 September 1997, p. 3; Scott Truver, "Harnessing the C4ISR Revolution," Jane's Navy International, October 1997, pp. 29-37; Lieutenant Commander Ross Mitchell, USN, "Naval Fire Support: Ring of Fire," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1997, pp. 54-57; and Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 28-35. back to article
7. "Pentagon Is Unable to Link Russian Laser to Eye Injury," The Washington Post, 27 June 1997, p. A22; Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Didn't Do Thorough Probe of Laser 'Attack,' Lawmaker Charges," Washington Times, 28 June 1998, p. 3; Gertz, "Russians May Have Fired Laser," Washington Times, 2 July 1997, p. 4; Gertz, "House to Probe Laser Incident," Washington Times, 18 August 1997, p. 4; and Gertz, "Canada Suspects Russian Vessel Spied on U.S. Subs," Washington Times, 5 November 1997, p. 4. back to article
8. Tobias Naegele, "Trial by Water" and "Correcting the Course, Not Going Soft," Navy Times, 26 May 1997, pp. 12ff; B.J. Ramos, "Battle Stations!" Navy Times, 25 August 1997, pp. 12ff. back to article
9. "Laboon Lobs Shells near Trawler," Navy Times, 11 August 1997, p. 2. back to article
10. "NATO Exercise in Ukraine," The Washington Post, 24 August 1997, p. A20; "Marines Alter Maneuvers After Russians Oppose Scenario," The Washington Post, 30 August 1997, p. A23. back to article
11. "A Grim Rescue on Guam," Navy Times, 18 August 1997, p. 20. back to article
12. Ernest Blazar, "JFK Charts New Course," Navy Times, 14 April 1997, pp. 12-14; "Cybersea," Defense Week, 27 May 1997, p. 2; and Bradley Peniston, "JFK's 'Reserve Deployment' Earns Rave Reviews," Navy Times, 3 November 1997, p. 18. back to article
13. "Carrier Nimitz ordered to Persian Gulf," Associated Press, 4 October 1997; "Washington Heads to Persian Gulf," Navy Times, 24 November 1997, p. 2. back to article
14. "U.S. to Avoid Strikes from Saudi Bases," The Washington Post, 2 February 1998, pp. A1, A15. back to article
15. "A $2 Billion Bomber Sits in the Wings," The Washington Post, 18 February 1998, pp. A 1, A16. back to article
16. "Kuwaiti Leaders Eagerly Anticipate Strikes at Iraq," The Washington Post, 10 February 1998, p. A15. back to article
17. "Playing on the Brink," The Economist, 28 February 1998, p. 25. back to article
18. "No Uniform Assessment of Academies," The Washington Post, 12 August 1997, pp. A1, A3. back to article
19. B.J. Ramos, "Long-Awaited Report 'Raises the Bar' for Academy," Navy Times, 7 July 1997, pp. 8-9. back to article
20. Patrick Pexton, "Closing Out First-Filled Careers," Navy Times, 19 May 1997, p. 16. back to article
21. Ernest Blazar, "Navy Gives Grounded Female Pilot 2nd Chance," Navy Times, 30 June 1997; Dana Priest, "Grounded Female Navy Pilot Is Returned to Flight Status," The Washington Post, 21 June 1997, p. 2; and "Navy: No discrimination against female pilot," Associated Press, 2 July 1997, p. A2. back to article
22. "In a Sea Change, a Nearly Silent Hand Controls the Navy's Tiller," The Washington Post, 13 September 1997, p. A8. back to article