Commander Tamayo was determined to incorporate the midshipmen into the ship's routine. While under way, the first class midshipmen were put into the fivesection watch rotation as conning officers. The captain trusted us with handling the ship. I drove the Fife as we navigated traffic separation schemes, during a vertical replenishment, and during an underway replenishment. I also was conning during a number of flight quarters and during a simulated chemical attack. One of the most entertaining evolutions he had us involved in was firing the .50 calibers from the bridge wings.
I saved my copy of Commander Tamayo's command philosophy memo, in which he stresses leadership by example, teamwork, combat readiness, and integrity. I will carry my experiences with Commander Tamayo with me, throughout my career.
"A Tangled Webb"
(See P. E. Roush, pp. 42-45, August 1997; R. Hegemann, C. Van Someren, H. G. Summers, R. Kuntz, V. M. Hudson, L. Marano, L. Stovall, pp. 12-22, September 1997 Proceedings)
Major General J. D. Lynch, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)— For the past few years the American military society has been in steep decline. Colonel Roush explained it all. Evidently, it's former Secretary of the Navy James Webb's fault.
Colonel Roush misses the point. He made the Naval Academy the centerpiece of the debate. It is not. The military at large is the centerpiece. To suggest that those serving in the operational forces or elsewhere "get on board or find another line of work" is absurd. They are not getting on board. They are getting out, and enlistments have fallen off.
The volunteers and the public have caught on. It is not the "Tangled Webb." The problem is the web of lies, deceit, and hypocrisy surrounding the agendas aimed at feminizing the armed forces. Colonel Roush was right about one thing-"silence will not do."
Commander Daniel E. Phillips, U.S. Navy (Retired), U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1975 —Bravo! One of the most compe]ling discourses I have read in Proceedings in the past 20 years. Colonel Roush offers articulate rebuttals to Mr. Webb's public exhortations, particularly those involved in gender-bashing and Tailhook obfuscation. He further is correct in chiding those who serve, or have served, not to remain silent on these bedrock principles.
Clearly, Mr. Webb's arguments against women in combat are disingenuous. His vitriol, in which he confines his assessment of warrior capabilities to those involved in executing ground combat, ignores decades of experience that has demonstrated that women can serve effectively in surface combatants and in tactical aircraft. It is surprising and revealing to me that Mr. Webb did not observe this firsthand as Secretary of the Navy.
Colonel Roush provides an insightful, and equally discerning, appraisal of the damage to Navy cohesion caused by Mr. Webb's cavalier trivialization of Tailhook. The injury done by Mr. Webb and his cohorts in focusing on the messenger (the media) and failing to hold accountable those responsible for a culture that not only facilitated Tailhook but emboldened the post-Tailhook conspiracy of silence is inexcusable. As a surface warfare officer, I was incensed by the arrogance of those involved, their peers, and their commanders for closing ranks; holding loyalty to their "brethren" above their loyalty to their country, Navy, and duty. In my non-abusive, pre-mixed-gender midshipman regimen, I was taught otherwise.
The influential proponents of resentment and cynicism must not go unchallenged. Thanks to Proceedings for publishing Colonel Roush's significant article.
Captain Paul S. Edwards, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)— Secretary Webb is noted for his attacks on career builders who sacrifice core beliefs for political correctness. I don't know much about stress at the Naval Academy, but if Colonel Roush didn't find Marine Corps officer-candidate training stressful, he slept through it.
Tailhook was something that should have been cleaned up years before-an example of childish, animalistic behavior excused as "letting off steam." But such behavior is not exclusive to the military. What did Colonel Roush and his contemporaries do about Tailhook while they were on active duty? Why should leaders be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates when leaders, from the President on down, are not accountable for their own actions? I quote Colonel Roush: "Tailhook is not about some number of drunken aviators; it is only peripherally about sexual assaults and other forms of sexual misconduct. Rather, it is about staggering professional deficiencies-in truth telling; in respect for persons; in military discipline; in subordination of the military to civilian control; in understanding that unit cohesion and hence combat effectiveness is incompatible with bigotry." If you add subordination of personal integrity to the advancement of career, you clearly sum up the commentary Secretary Webb has been making on the deficiencies of senior officers today-the bigotry of political correctness and the abdication of personal responsibility.
Commander Thomas M. Kastner, U.S. Navy (Retired)— I believe this article overstepped the bounds of free expression for which Proceedings long has been famous. Jim Webb most certainly has some strong views regarding the naval service, and some indeed are controversial. However, Colonel Roush struck me as having manufactured too much of his argument from his own interpretation of Mr. Webb's views. That may make for controversy—but little more. The editor should have required Colonel Roush to define his targets more accurately. As for the various issues, their resolution will depend on future circumstances.
There is a role for women in the armed services, and it ultimately will be based on capability and need. We'd do well to get those factors right and not let them be overshadowed by other considerations.
Abuse is a relative term, but does have its uses, as today's practice is very often tomorrow's abuse. We'd do well to understand its application—and purpose—and ensure that the real ends are being met. (I refuse to believe that Jim Stockdale never experienced practices that would now be regarded as abusive.)
Accountability goes with leadership. Again, our standards are something of a moving target without full agreement. Too bad John Adams didn't provide us with a list of all those dissolute and immoral practices he had in mind. I used to discourage my pilots from attending Tailhook conventions, not because I considered them immoral or dissolute, but because they seemed to feature conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, so to speak.
Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps —One can only come to one of two conclusions: Either Jim Webb is the walking embodiment of the Antichrist on earth, or Colonel Roush has written an unbalanced and unprofessional polemic. Having known Mr. Webb for nearly 30 years and having read the two articles and one book that Colonel Roush blatantly misinterprets, I am inclined to believe the latter.
For those who have not read Colonel Roush's piece, an excerpt from his first paragraph sums up his premise: "[Webb's] assault primarily is on women but it extends much further. It is is an assault on the Naval Academy and on the naval service. It is an assault on civilian control of the military and ultimately on the constitutional constraints that define the relation between the citizen and the soldier." Colonel Roush uses three of Mr. Webb's writings to make his case. The first two are nearly two decades old; they are his 1979 Washingtonian article "Women Can't Fight" and his novel A Sense of Honor, published in the early 1980s. The third is his 1997 article, "The War on the Military Culture," published in the Weekly Standard. Colonel Roush is a member of the Leadership faculty at the Naval Academy, which makes a response to his views particularly important, for professors tend to make their unchallenged drivel required reading for hostage students.
Colonel Roush goes on to list six categories of Mr. Webb's sins as he sees them. These do not correspond directly to the complaints listed in the premise, which makes answering this convoluted article an even greater challenge. Consequently, I will content myself with answering the charges made in the first paragraph of Professor Roush's piece.
First, Colonel Roush contends that Mr. Webb is anti-women and that his writings constitute an assault on women. Nothing in any of the articles cited would give this impression. Mr. Webb has openly questioned the role of women in combat, but nothing in his writings would give the impression that he is biased against the gender or against women in the military. He has questioned those who advocate women in combat, particularly in ground combat. Colonel Roush gives the impression that this debate is closed and that Mr. Webb's opposition is a dangerous and residual reaction from an unenlightened individual. That approach is entirely disingenuous. The issue of the suitability of women in ground combat just now is becoming a matter of serious academic examination, and the results are mixed at best. In a recent review in the National Review, Kate O'Beirne savagely dissects Linda Bird Franke's book Ground Zero-which lauds the role of women in combat in the Gulf-as ill-researched advocacy journalism. Ms. O'Beirne is only one of several women seriously questioning the conventional wisdom that the role of women as warriors has been validated. This is the same conventional wisdom that Colonel Roush uses arbitrarily to dismiss Mr. Webb's views on the subject.
In addition, serious studies by the Canadian armed forces and the experience of women in high-performance combat jets has yet to be fully analyzed and reported, but the initial data suggest that Mr. Webb may not be far off the mark. Before we write off Mr. Webb as being wrong, we need to get the facts. Colonel Roush takes the role of hysterical radical-feminist in launching personal attacks against the voice of anyone whose opinion contradicts his own, and he does so without providing much empirical evidence other than emotion with which to prove Mr. Webb wrong.
During an interview on Fox TV in the first week of August of this year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives called for a comprehensive examination of what he calls the social experiment of women in combat. This is the same experiment that Colonel Roush decrees nonexistent with the air of confidence reserved for the truly knowledgeable or the utterly uncomprehending.
Jim Webb is a disciplinarian. I cannot imagine him tolerating the antics of Tailhook or the disgraceful conduct of the Army drill instructors at Aberdeen in abusing their power or position. He would have dealt quickly with the abusers and those who were responsible for creating an atmosphere where such abuses could happen, had they come to his attention.
Equally ridiculous is Colonel Roush's second contention that Mr. Webb is attempting to undermine the Naval Academy and the naval service in general. He cites Mr. Webb's A Sense of Honor as an example of this. In reality, A Sense of Honor is a clear challenge to Admiral Hyman Rickover and his assertion that "leadership is bullshit" and that any good academic can manage sailors and sail ships. When Mr. Webb wrote the novel, Admiral Rickover's philosophy was on the rise, both at the Naval Academy and throughout the naval education system—despite the fact that none of the nuclear fleet had been tested in combat. Having been an instructor in the NROTC program at that time, I remember that particular period of academic fascism with no fondness. If this is disloyalty to the naval service, put my name down on the petition. Mr. Webb's argument is not with the naval service; rather it is with poor naval leaders, and we've had no dearth of those in past 20 years.
Colonel Roush's third contention, that Mr. Webb undermines civilian control of the military and the constitutional separation of military and civilian responsibilities, is patently absurd. Few civilian Secretaries of the Navy have been as assertive or direct as Mr. Webb during his brief tenure in that office. It takes considerable self-assurance and confidence in the ascendency of civilian authority for a medically retired Marine Corps captain to correct an admiral on the wearing of the uniform. Mr. Webb forced the Marine Corps to justify some of its pet programs to the chagrin of a number of Marines, particularly aviators. This hardly suggests a lackey for traditional military views and the absolute ascendancy of military judgment.
Mr. Webb's principled resignation over matters of conscience represents a model of how things should work rather than how they all too often do work in Washington. Colonel Roush is appalled by the fact that Mr. Webb counsels young military leaders to speak out when they see something being done that obviously is wrong. I am appalled that an individual who advocates unthinking obedience to all orders, such as Colonel Roush advocates in his article, is teaching at the Naval Academy. It seems as though his views would be received better by students at the North Korean War College.
As for Colonel Roush's contention that Mr. Webb is undermining the law of the land as dictated by Congress, I will place the reexamination of the role of women in combat advocated by the Speaker of the House on the evidence table as an exhibit in Mr. Webb's defense. One of the strengths of democracy is that poor legislative judgment can be challenged and changed.
What disturbs me most about Colonel Roush's portrayal of Jim Webb in the article is his contention that Mr. Webb advocates unthinking hazing of trainees. Mr. Webb clearly believes that officer training should consist of more than just education and training; he is a strong advocate of the concept that those who cannot stand mental and physical stress approximating combat and those who cannot demonstrate qualities of critical thinking and moral courage under extreme stress should not be allowed to lead in combat.
The portrayal of Mr. Webb as a brutal advocate of hazing doesn't square with my experience. In 1970, I reported to Officer Candidate School at Quantico for my senior summer training increment. Our staff platoon commander was First Lieutenant Webb, and my memories of that summer are as vivid today as they were when I graduated. Lieutenant Webb was demanding. He insisted on physical and moral courage, but he was never brutal or arbitrary. We always knew what he was trying to impart and why. It was obvious to us that as a highly decorated, recently returned Vietnam veteran, he had two objectives in mind. The first was to ensure that none of us who were unqualified to lead Marines in combat graduated; those who could not meet these standards either left of their own accord or were dropped from training. His second objective was to impart as much knowledge and field craft as he could to ensure the survival of those of us who would graduate and presumably go to war the next year. In this, he was patient and compelling. In many informal "school circles" he imparted lessons in survival and success on the battlefield with solid combat examples and easy good humor. By the end of that summer anyone in the platoon would have followed him anywhere. In the subsequent 27 years, I have had occasion to disagree with some of his views, but I have never lost my respect or my appreciation of his intellectual honesty or his moral courage.
As Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Webb showed the courage of his convictions. Believing that the ability of the Naval Academy to screen ground combat commanders effectively had been diluted by a number of influences, Mr. Webb directed that all Marine Option midshipmen attend a summer of Marine officer-candidate training, as did their NROTC counterparts. Although this decision was enormously unpopular with old-school Academy alums, we Marines in the field saw a dramatic increase in the quality of our Academy graduates. Not surprisingly, this decision has been reversed at the insistence of the old-school crowd.
James Webb is no plaster saint; he is a genuine American patriot and hero. Professor Roush's portrait of his views is an unfair and one-sided interpretation and does no credit to him or the Naval Academy, which he purports to represent. I will not presume to give the Naval Academy advice, but if I were to do so, it would be as follows: Retire Professor Roush and hire Mr. Webb. The leadership instruction will be better, and so will the quality of the writing the Leadership Department produces.
"What Kind of Marine Corps Is This?"
(See C. Dunlap, pp. 66-68, August 1997 Proceedings)
Chief Hospital Corpsman (Fleet Marine Force) Christopher M. Kramer, U.S. Navy —Colonel Dunlap's article on his firsthand experience with the Marine Corps during Operation Restore Hope is nothing unusual to those of us who provide medical, dental, religious, and other specialized support to the units of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Unfortunately, it is the actions of a few individuals, who insist that all Marine Corps standards apply to other service personnel, that give the entire group a bad name.
Most Marine Corps officers and staff noncommissioned officers are aware of the military and professional standards that naval personnel must adhere to, both while serving with the FMF and at Navy commands. Some even know the advancement requirements for a hospital corpsman or religious programs specialist. I have witnessed-on two separate occasions-a battalion commander stopping all field training so the hospital corpsmen assigned to his command could take their advancement exam at the scheduled time. This unit had a 62% advancement rate during his two-year tour of duty, the highest in the 7th Marine Regiment. The battalion commander's genuine concern and thorough interest in the professional advancement of "his docs" were constantly noted at staff meetings and battalion formations, and he always seemed to know when advancement results were about to be released. A lot of this had to do with the battalion surgeon and me keeping him aware of not only the medical readiness of the battalion but also of the specific requirements that the Navy personnel in the battalion needed to meet.
The few Marines who follow the "you're a Marine, doc," philosophy are unaware that Navy personnel have their own advancement, evaluation, and pay and administrative systems in place to take care of their needs. I was once questioned by a captain, who was demanding that the hospital corpsmen assigned to his company go "Marine Regs." During our discussion, I pointed out that both the Navy and Marine Corps Uniform Manuals stated that this was for the individual to decide and was optional. After he reviewed the Marine Corps Uniform Manual, he asked for a copy of the specific section of the Navy Uniform Manual pertaining to enlisted uniforms for his reference prior to uniform inspections.
Much of what I have learned during my tour with the FMF is that Marines need to be educated in the differences between themselves and the other services. Having personnel available to answer their questions and providing them with appropriate orders and instructions to refer to could avoid a lot of misunderstandings.
I wish to add that this is my first tour with the Marine Corps, and I have no regrets or misgivings about it. There are quite a few Marines I have worked with who have shown me that there is a very human side to being a Marine-and I will never forget them.
Captain David A. Dawson, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve —Colonel Dunlap's commentary on UNITAF Somalia raises some valid points. In Mombasa, living off the economy by sleeping in hotels and eating in restaurants was reasonable. Asking personnel stationed there to sleep in tents and eat in a mess hall simply because the troops in Somalia were living in primitive conditions would have been ridiculous. Nobody expected sailors on a ship just off shore to eat MREs and stop taking showers simply because those were the conditions on shore. But carping about per diem and living in luxury, and comparing this sum to the $160 imminent danger pay earned by men and women who were living in the harshest conditions, rubs this Marine wrong.
This is minor, however, compared to Colonel Dunlap's larger point-that the Marine Corps fosters misery for its own sake and perversely inflicts its culture on other services. On the contrary, the austere conditions endured by UNITAF during the first weeks of Operation Restore Hope were a result of the terrible infrastructure and mission requirements. I think we all would have enjoyed air conditioning, showers, and palatable food, but there was a mission to accomplish and only so much fuel, water, and transportation available.
In Mogadishu, there were some real morale issues created by the Air Force's insistence on maintaining its accustomed standards of living in the middle of nowhere. When I landed in Mogadishu on 13 December 1992, I was struck by a jury-rigged shower with a prominent sign-"Air Force Personnel Only." Later, when the joint historical team arrived, the Air Force member was offered a spot in an air-conditioned tent. Peer pressure led him to stay in the regular tent. Perhaps the most infamous example was the "air-conditioned flush toilet" at the Mogadishu airport, which I was assured was not air conditioned-although it was flush and it was only for Air Force personnel.
As a field historian, I spoke with dozens of Marines from almost every unit in Somalia. I can't recall any complaints about per diem or living conditions in Mogadishu, but complaints about the double standard in Mogadishu were numerous and bitter. Perhaps Colonel Dunlap can explain to a Marine who has patrolled violent streets, eaten nothing but MREs for 30 days, and used his meager ration of extra water to shave and wash his socks, why an Air Force mechanic needs better conditions. Marines do these jobs without the extra luxuries.
Colonel W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)-The military judge advocates with whom I work in the Pentagon-men and women from all five services, including the Air Force, who over the past decade have served in Panama, Desert Shield and Storm, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia under field conditions-got a great laugh out of Colonel Dunlap's article.
It has to be one of the best tongue-in-cheek articles Proceedings has ever published. Otherwise we would be forced to conclude that Colonel Dunlap and the Air Force personnel he purports to represent have become a bunch of pampered, whimpering brats, who can't hack the conditions that Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Coast Guard aviators-and their lawyers-accept in performing the missions assigned them.
"Battling Battery Boats"
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 30-33, June 1997; M. Klingler, p. 27, July 1997; F. Rosenius, J. P. Prisley, pp. 22-23, August 1997 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral James R. Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy, and John Benedict, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory —It's time to engage in a more open and robust debate about the requirement to maintain a superior undersea warfare capability in the U.S. Navy. ". . . From the Sea," the "Navy Operational Concept," and Network Centric Warfare require undersea superiority.
Rear Admiral Holland addresses a number of interesting points in his discussion of countering the diesel submarine. But like any good, thought-provoking discussion, it raises a number of points that need to be developed further.
Contrary to Admiral Holland's opening comment, that "most naval officers today view the diesel-electric submarine in shallow waters as an almost invincible adversary," most naval officers generally discount the diesel-electric submarine threat, rationalizing that the challengers are too few in number, are unlikely to possess adequate proficiency to obtain their mission objectives when opposed by antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces of the U.S. Navy during a crisis or conflict, and can be countered easily by operational maneuver and deception or ultimately by "bombing them at the pier."
On the other hand, Admiral Holland is correct when he states, "few officers on active duty have practiced against actual submarines, and the number of officers and the time engaged are declining." Those who have ASW experience against submarines, typically in adverse shallow acoustic conditions, usually come away with a very healthy respect for the difficulty involved in countering even moderately well-operated electric submarines-a point that is often reinforced by "green flares" that signify simulated antiship torpedo attacks by the submarine during exercises (despite extensive force countermeasures designed to locate and/or neutralize the submarine threat).
Admiral Holland understates the importance of air-independent propulsion (AIP) developments. Although it will not enhance appreciably the overall mobility of nonnuclear submarines, AIP will provide up to two to four weeks of submerged endurance. It will dramatically decrease submarine vulnerability to ASW forces by eliminating the need for frequent battery-charging "indiscretions" while on patrol. AIP also will reduce the need for the submarine captain to fixate on his battery-charge status while operating at low to moderate speeds (two to six knots), reducing the effectiveness of the tactic of "attacking the battery."
He correctly describes our ASW capabilities, noting that "when ASW is learned and practiced, the battery boat hasn't a chance." I would begin that statement with "Provided we have paced the availability of technology to anyone with a checkbook in the world today." If not, ASW operations will more likely resemble a crap shoot than a coherent, orchestrated effort.
Admiral Holland is absolutely correct in stating that "ASW is a personal skillintensive activity, a team effort that prospers when combined arms are brought to bear intelligently." However, successful combined arms ASW against nonnuclear submarines is not just a matter of dusting off lessons learned from the late 1960s against early-generation Soviet battery boats. The technology has changed on both sides, and the operational circumstances have changed as well. We aren't dealing with 30-year-old submarines. New operating concepts, doctrine, and tactics-and continuous training-are required for future littoral ASW operations.
What's the bottom line? ASW-littoral or open ocean-involves a mosaic of capabilities including intelligence, oceanography, surveillance, multiple platforms, sensors, weapons, a viable concept of operations, modern tactics, and training, training, and more training. There is no "silver bullet" for ASW; there are no easy solutions. Historically, torpedoes have been the most lethal antiship weapon, with a single ship sinking such as the Belgrano during the Falklands conflict causing as much loss of life as occurred for all U.S. military forces in the entire Gulf War. A single submarine is too lethal to ignore. We need a wide variety of sensors and weapons in our ASW toolbox to cover the diverse environments and submarine capabilities we may encounter, especially in the littorals. But even technically sound sensors and weapons won't be enough if there is inadequate knowledge of the environment and threat or if there is a lack of ASW proficiency and connectivity between ASW forces. Only a well-thought-out and coordinated science and technology and research and development effort, a prudent investment strategy, and good intelligence and tactical oceanography, coupled with adequate training, will permit the ASW team to get back in the ball game.
We must remember the old adage, painfully learned, that "Failing to prepare is preparing to fail."
"Square Peg . . . Round Hole!"
(See D. Hopkins, pp. 55-58, July 1997 Proceedings)
Commander A. G. Zgolinski, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)— Commander Hopkins's article speaks to a problem the Navy desperately needs to address and most Naval Reservists know all too well.
Naval Reservists are not the same as active-duty personnel. A reserve officer simply does not accumulate the same level of training and expertise in 12 weekends and two weeks that an active-duty officer does in the same year. The more senior the officers and sailors, the greater the disparity. As a result, the active-duty sailors view their reserve equivalents as second class. I'm sure there are examples to support this, but then I'm also sure that the active-duty Navy is not full of perfect sailors. Naval Reserve units are manned mostly by dedicated and hardworking personnel. All they ask is to be given a meaningful mission and an opportunity to show their professionalism.
The role of the Naval Reserve has evolved since its beginning. At first, they were largely social clubs, providing the Navy with warm bodies who knew how to wear uniforms and whom to salute. The 1973 Total Force Concept offered the Navy a more meaningful return on its investment. This was a significant change, but plenty of active-duty and reserve senior officers refused to take it seriously.
The readiness commands insisted on their institutional tithe. They made it clear to reserve unit commanding officers just who signed their fitness reports and who controlled selection for command. As an institution, the readiness commands clung to their role of reserve "type commander." However, the gaining commands began to discover that perhaps they had a useful asset in the reserves. Unfortunately, they often did not understand the time limitations of the reserve organization and of individual reservists. As a result, these active-duty commanders often were frustrated at their inability to use these assets as they would active-duty personnel.
The Gulf War proved quite significant. The Naval Reserve provided more support than implied in Commander Hopkins's article. Medical units manned stateside hospitals so that active-duty personnel could go to hospital ships. Inshore Undersea Warfare units conducted surveillance of harbor areas, and some Military Sealift Command units augmented active-duty staffs to support logistical operations. However, the Navy's reluctance to mobilize its reservists did not go unnoticed. Personal conversations with senior reserve officers of other service branches confirmed this. While the Gulf may not have been the perfect scenario for reserve mobilization, the Navy displayed neither aggressiveness nor imagination in using this asset.
There appear to be several reasons for this. Certainly, this was the first time in collective memory that mobilization was a viable option. In addition, using the reserves undercuts the Navy's claim to need active-duty forces to perform its missions. However, the biggest obstacle was the perception that reservists were second-class officers and sailors.
The Naval Reserve has many outstanding people who eagerly offer the Navy their talents. Their use is limited by law and time availability. The Navy has to figure out how to use them.
As Commander Hopkins noted, the Navy first needs to come to grips with the mission it wants to assign to the reserves. This mission must be executable considering the limitations that are incumbent to the organization. The readiness command structure is necessary to provide administrative support so that reservists can focus on training. However, it would be a waste of precious assets to allow it to remain a bloated "type commander" that insinuates itself between the reserve units and the gaining commands they support.
Second, the reserve organization must uncouple itself from the promotion system of the active-duty Navy. Promotions in the reserves come too quickly and do not require reservists to have the same level of experience and expertise as their active-duty counterparts. During the 1980s, the organization became very top-heavy. Many mobilization billets were established for officers senior to the active-duty commanders of the gaining command. I understand the reluctance of those active-duty officers to bring in a reserve officer who may outrank them but is less qualified.
Third, I heartily agree with Commander Hopkins's comment on the rotation policy. When a reservist follows the rotation policy of the active-duty Navy, he does not develop the same breadth of expertise. Instead, the Navy should use the Naval Reserve to develop technical skills for capabilities that the Navy maintains at only minimal levels on active duty. This would require longer tours or bringing that expertise from civilian careers. The reserves already have provided such support in areas such as computer technology, merchant marine operations, and medical skills.
Finally, the Navy must spell out its expectations of reservists and then hold them to it. This is an old tenet of leadership. Unfortunately, during my career I heard my share of complaints about the poor performance of certain reservists. I was surprised when, with a few notable exceptions, the active-duty commanders did not reflect their displeasure in fitness reports and evaluations. This not only allows the unsatisfactory performer to continue unscathed but also fails to reward the excellent performer for his efforts.
Jamming in Proceedings
Captain Douglas R. McCrimmon, U.S. Navy (Retired) —Everything I read tells me that the Navy today has serious concerns about the questionable sense of honor and morality imbued in those now entering the service. Typical of our amoral society is the idea that if you don't get caught, what you are doing is acceptable. Nothing is more indicative of that attitude than the advertisement on page 11 of the August Proceedings.
The ad, "Hate Radar?" was for a device that purportedly legally jams police radar. The ad promoted deception and dishonesty: "The optional Speed Set feature that allows you to set the speed you want the police radar to read (if you are traveling at 65 mph in a 55 mph zone you would set the Stealth Tele Radar Jammer at 55 mph which is the reading the police radar would receive), costs $49."
Although Proceedings is not an official Navy document, and I would not want it to be one, it does speak with a certain amount of authority to a largely naval audience. Is this really the message we want to send to naval personnel? Isn't it far better to send the message that people obviously don't get ticketed when they obey the law? Certainly there are many who will buy and use such devices, right or wrong. I would hope that they would have to order them elsewhere, and would not be encouraged by Proceedings.
EDITOR'S NOTE: We agree that the ad was inappropriate for Proceedings. We have canceled the contract we had with the advertiser for the remaining issues in 1997. Our general philosophy about advertising is to let our members decide what they choose to buy, rather than trying to make decisions for them. We reserve the right, of course, to keep tasteless and inappropriate ads out of the magazine: e.g., ads dealing with products of a sexual nature or for Nazi paraphernalia make for easy decisions.
"Relighting the Surface Fire"
(See J. W. Hammond III, pp. 26-30, August 1997; A. J. Krekich, p. 28, September 1997 Proceedings)
Earl B. Rubright, Science Advisor, U.S. Central Command —Major Hammond presents a series of misperceptions that hamper the evolution of surface fire support. The requirement is for fire support-not necessarily artillery support. Prior to any fires, the target-location error must be defined as coincidental to the weapons-delivery error. This implies the existence of the components of a C4I system to which Major Hammond alludes. This means that the target can be nominated with sufficient accuracy and that this accuracy/geolocation can be transferred to the shooter, and implies that a weapon can be delivered to a point where the effect of the weapons accomplishes the mission. I did not mention bursting radius because that implies that blast and shrapnel are the measures of merit in tomorrow's fire support. The measure of merit will be weapon effects, many of which will result in functional kills as opposed to disaggregation of the target.
The first questions are who and what define the target. Space-based systems can differentiate between types of howitzers and the zone charge they are firing and where they are in reasonable weather. UAV and a UGV can work under the weather, and using the same discrimination phenomenology, tell you the location of the shooter. Every shot fired at you, from Scuds to mortars, can be defined by location and caliber in real time. Importantly, as Major Hammond notes, this can be backed up by a Spy 1 tracking capability that uses an entirely different technology. Yet the capabilities of these systems pale in comparison to the efficacy of spending money on connectivity to allow the infantryman to locate targets accurately and call fires. While technology integration and acquisition are important, we need organizational reform that taps the potential of the individual.
The most important distinction between surface fires of today and tomorrow is the concept of self-referencing weapons. When a fiberoptic munition goes down range, it slices a corridor out of the fog of war. The gunner watches the terrain and all that passes under the munition as the weapon flies toward its target. If a higher-priority target presents itself, the gunner can divert the missile and engage. Each round fired adds more understanding.
The number of targets that can endanger a landing party is finite. When a conscious decision is made to maximize the lethality in support of ground operations, we can increase the footprint of the munition dramatically and reduce deployable tonnages. If the objective is to influence the enemy, the number of rounds into an area is not the appropriate metric. The metric is the effect those rounds have. One option is to increase the lethal area of the round, while reducing the weight and number of rounds required to achieve that effect. This is exactly what the mortar munitions manufacturers have done. By eschewing case fragmentation as the killing mechanism, they have reduced the weight of the 120-mm mortar round from 27 pounds to 15 pounds. The case is composite embedded with flechettes. The airburst effect of a downward-oriented munitions is the equivalent of the "beehive" round from above. If the objective is (as I suspect Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper had in mind) to deny a flank, a combination of smart and modern antipersonnel mortar rounds could do the job for a fraction of the tonnage and dollar cost of conventional artillery.
The combination of self-referencing munition (with ranges in excess of 100 kilometers) carving away at the fog of war, backed up by a modern mortar equipped with modern munitions, brings an order-of-magnitude increase in lethality. At the same time, it reduces the vulnerability of the force by drastically reducing the combat and combat systems support (CSS) manpower required.
In the Central Command's area of responsibility, the vulnerability of CSS cannot be overstated. The percentage of the required CSS handled by third-country nationals is staggering. The degree to which we can change that equation will be the degree to which we will be able to retain influence in the area in the face of asymetric threats that hold our fixed CSS sites hostage.
The arsenal ship holds such promise. If you choose to reduce your vulnerability during an initial suppression of enemy air defenses campaign, the combination of a 500-kilometer ballistic missile with precision guidance and precision signals intelligence targeting would be invaluable. If this missile were backed up by real-time warning of missile launch, a naval varient of ATACMS with a loadout of BAT submunitions would have a higher probability of killing the transporter erector launcher than any current combination of weapons. (Each BAT has an independent search radius of 4.8 kilometers; a 10 to 12 munition loadout per missile is rational.) A Tomahawk landattack missile loadout of one-fifth of the available tubes of one arsenal ship if it operates at only one-half the demonstrated effectiveness of the available submunitions would stop an armored division in its tracks.
Using the cross-service comparison of an arsenal-ship-based ballistic missile defense and ground-based missile defense, the deployable tonnages of an Army theater high-altitude air-defense (THAAD) missile places the THAAD in an unenviable position.
If, as Major Hammond believes, guns and rockets are the sine qua non of combat power, then he makes a very good point in making multiple rounds impact simultaneously. But when you compare the logistics required to field and maintain the Crusader, a 62-ton howitzer (the Army wants it on an MI tank chassis for commonality of parts), you have a battalion tonnage in excess of 5,000 tons. That is 3.3 times heavier than the M198-based towed 155-mm battalion. The Crusader (MIAI power train) consumes 30 times the fuel of a light armored vehicle. How do we compare with an arsenal ship when these factors are considered?
Yet fire-for-effect, first-round-ontarget is extremely important; the complexity of matching multiple trajectories to achieve time-on-target is not trivial. If simpler is better, it is infinitely easier to deliver a single munition with several hundred submunitions such as the APAM warhead of the ATACMS. On the other hand, if a rocket-based solution is preferable, a MLRS battalion at 2,700 tons requiring an additional 1,100 tons of munitions per launcher for a 30-day combat capability comes in at 27,000 tons.
The kinematic potential of the vertical-launch system (VLS) tube dwarfs anything that can be hauled ashore. Only the Army ATACMS is comparable, and that easily can be adapted to the VLS tube. Perhaps the "Supporting Arms Coordination Center" would look better in a light purple hue rather than green.
In a 1991 Mission Needs Statement, USCentCom asked for overlapping smart fires that ranged from the TLAM with Army "BAT" antiarmor submunitions to the 40-mm grenade going after the only thing 200 hotter than the background, that 200 deg difference being the muzzle break of the machine gun that just tried to take off the infantryman's head. The requirement was for every type of fire-support weapon to have a precision munition. More important, the seeker heads on these munitions covered a wide variety of discrimination phenomonologies as a hedge against countermeasures. The requirement was rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
"A Billion Dollar Blunder?"
(See D. S. Dees, pp. 75-77, July 1997; J. K. Hafner, pp. 26-28, September 1997 Proceedings)
Ensign Thomas Strenge, U.S. Naval Reserve —I congratulate my classmate. I, too, wrote a Capstone Essay on the arsenal ship, and I frankly admit that Ensign Dees's is the better effort.
At the risk of sounding ridiculous, I would like to offer another analogy. The famous Death Star battle station in the movie Star Wars was an attempt by the emperor to centralize overwhelming firepower. The effort cost a tremendous amount of resources, which consequently could not be spent on the fleet. Luke Skywalker, in a single X-wing fighter, blew up the Death Star.
Similarly, the arsenal ship is an attempt to centralize decisive firepower. It already is taking away resources that could be spent more effectively on the fleet, perhaps building a replacement for our frigate force. Currently, there are no X-wings, and there there is no "force" that can guide an enemy to kill. However, this floating powder keg of a ship has neither adequate self-defense capabilities nor a crew to provide proper damage control. As a future surface warfare officer, I certainly hope never to serve on an arsenal ship unless I am able to defend myself and my crew.
"Put a Coast Guard Stripe on the FFG-7s"
(See V. P. Grimes, p. 77, August 1997 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Bob Mueller, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Office of Defense Operations —Mr. Grimes has some good points about putting the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG7)-class frigates into Coast Guard service, and in fact the Coast Guard is giving serious thought to using a couple of these ships in the Caribbean. But two serious drawbacks make these ships unsuitable replacements for the Hamilton (WHEG715)-class high-endurance cutters. Endurance and manpower are problems that can't be fixed at a reasonable cost.
The Hamilton-class cutters' primary operating areas are the Gulf of Alaska, the Bering Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. Patrols often last two to three months, and fuel stops are few and far between. FFG-7s were designed to operate within a battle group, or provide escort where an oiler is available. There aren't any oilers in the Bering Sea, and the nature of the Living Marine Resources missionthe core mission for the Hamiltons-requires the cutter to remain on station for weeks at a time. Because the Coast Guard is unlikely to operate oilers in the near term, it would take two FFG-7s to remain on station the way a single Hamilton can.
Further, the current 217-person crews of the Perrys are unaffordable for the Coast Guard in the long term. The Coast Guard must find a way to do the job with crews at least half that size. People, our most expensive resource, are going to get far more expensive in the next century. Unfortunately, turning old ships into smart ships is also very expensive (the USS Yorktown [CG-48] experiment cost more than $25 million to save 60 people). Ripping old ships apart to install smart systems is not much different in cost than building new hulls around these same smart systems. Given this financial reality, ripping apart old FFG-7s wouldn't save much money over building new cutters, and with the FFG-7s we'd still have short-range ships with 1980s systems.
FFG-7s as replacements for the Reliance (WMEC-615) or Bear (WMEC901) classes would be even more expensive. These classes have fewer than 100 people on board, and their replacements also will have further-reduced crews. In short, the FFG-7s, while having some advantages, are just too expensive for the Coast Guard, and are not well suited to our missions. As a short-term fix for a cutter shortage in the Caribbean doing drug operations, they are a good fit. But as a replacement for the Hamilton-class cutters in the Pacific, FFG-7s just can't do the job.
"Strategic Attack Is No Myth"
(See G. Myers, pp. 36-39, August 1997 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Jeff Rees, U.S. Navy —Mr. Myers's article was the latest in an ongoing effort by Air Force supporters to justify the expansion of an extremely expensive B-2 strategic bomber force. That strategic bombardment is the premier mission of the Air Force is hardly in dispute. The B-2 is the premier nuclear-weapons delivery aircraft in the world, and is a cornerstone of America's nuclear strategy. Because of its tremendous capability and improved survivability, the B-2in concert with the strategic submarine force-is arguably all that America needs for strategic deterrence. It is clearly past time for the United States to consider dismantling the ICBM force and to apply the savings to the conventional forces that are in incredibly high demand for forward presence.
"The U.S. Air Force is the only service specifically prescribed by law to provide the nation's air power . . . for its own sake." Perhaps that is because the Navy and Army were mandated in the Constitution more than 200 years earlier-before airplanes existed, let alone were used as weapons of war. Where Air Force doctrine is flawed is in its proposition that air power alone is forward presence, and that air power alone can roll back invasions and win conflicts. Douhet was not vindicated in Desert Storm, despite such assertions by the Air Force. In fact, Desert Storm proved beyond a doubt that a joint air/land force is what is and what will continue to be required to win wars. What the United States needs are enough B-2 bombers to support its strategic nuclear plans, whether they include ICBMs or not. For forward presence, and to respond to regional crises, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to be America's emergency response force. In Operation Eldorado Canyon, Air Force F- 11 strike aircraft had to fly 24 hours straight to strike targets in Libya from their base in southern England because of France's lack of support for overflight.
We cannot respond to regional crises with B-52, B-lB, or B-2 bombers from bases in the United States because adversaries don't recognize assets in the United States as a deterrence. The availability of overseas bases always will be in question. As the world reorders itself along cultural lines, overseas bases will become less reliable, as demonstrated in Desert Strike 96.
Each U.S. armed force provides a unique capability to the President, which is why all four services have been preserved. The Navy/Marine Corps team is our forward presence, and has been first to respond to regional crises since our country was founded. Operating from international waters, the Navy/Marine Corps team enjoys unlimited access to all potential conflict areas in the world. Moreover, visible forward naval presence is real deterrence. Mr. Myers is correct, the Air Force is strategic attack, and "Strategic Attack Is No Myth." The problem is that the United States needs forward presence and regional crisis response, and that means more carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups—not more B-2 bombers.
The Seventh Annapolis Seminar
(See R. Seamon, p. 14, June 1997; N. Hogan, pp. 20-21, July 1997; E. B. Hontz, p. 22, September 1997 Proceedings)
Dr. John M. Keshishian —Admiral Hogan's comments were well made and well directed. But I was startled"stunned" might be a better word-to learn that two Navy admirals, Jay Johnson and Charles Larson, had indicated they would make heroic efforts to integrate women into all [Navy] combatant roles, including SEALs and submarines. To their credit, Generals Charles Krulak and Carl Mundy questioned the wisdom of this and said in effect that no women Marines would be placed in harm's way; none would be inserted into rifle platoons in direct combat operations.
One wonders whether these admirals have forgotten their history lessons orworse yet-have failed to do their homework. They should know that the integration of women into combat units has been tried many times over the years with varied degrees of success. Although the Soviets had women pilots who flew wingtip to wingtip with their male counterparts, and the Chinese and other Asiatic countries have armed women in all branches of their military services, their cultures are quite different from ours. And therein lies one key reason why such thinking may not work. It may simply not be possible-safely, and with full assurance-to retrain our men to abandon their urge to protect the women.
Recently, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) announced that women soldiers would no longer be integrated into small combat teams. Studies showed that under combat or hazardous situations, men were overly protective of their women team members. When IDF compared the efficiency of these teams, they found that mixed teams were not as effective, and were not always able to carry out a mission. Therefore, without prejudice, the IDF disbanded mixed combat teams.
At times, the Israelis appear overly concerned about fairness and equality for all. On the other hand, they temper this with common sense. This is especially true in their judicial system. A South African emigre to Israel, Lieutenant Alice Miller, took the Israeli Air Force to the highest court, demanding combat flying training. The court granted her and several other women their wish. Subsequently, these women, as well as several male trainees, washed out. They were given an opportunity to qualify but could not. Interestingly, no politically motivated modifications were made that might have allowed them to pass at a less-qualified level, to allow them to become ill-trained combat pilots. There are currently no female combat pilots in the IDF, although a few women still try. Lieutenant Miller did lead the way for combat-minded women to appeal their position, but chances for a reversal of policy appear to be slim.
This is in sharp contrast to the actions of our military leaders. Faced with the issue of women pilots unable to demonstrate acceptable flying skills, they have bowed to a storm of political and feminist pressure. As a result, at least two such female Navy pilots were allowed to continue flying; one was killed as a result of her own proven pilot error.
Israel is the only country in the world that makes military service compulsory for its women. They can rise in rank and even achieve the rank of general without having been in combat. Brigadier General Israela Oron, 44, retiring after 27 years of service, was instrumental in having women assigned to roles other than secretarial billets. Many Israeli women soldiers are tank drivers and artillery officers. They may fire from behind lines of demarcation, but do not cross over during combat. Some of these women chafe at being held from actual fighting.
While our military and administration leaders are still engaged in acrimonious discussions on the role of women in the military, the IDF has faced up to the problem and established guidelines. It might be helpful if we consulted with the IDF, particularly on their opinions on the inclusion of women in submarines and SEAL units.
I respectfully suggest that Admirals Johnson and Larson be made aware of the Israeli Defense Forces' policies concerning the status of female military personnel. The IDF believes that there is a place and a role for women in the military. However, they feel that their mission-national defense-is too important for further social experimentation. For them, the stakes are too high to use the military as a test ground for theories on working relationships between sexes.
Suggesting that women serve with the SEALs is not a well-thought-out idea. The rigorous training program quickly thins ranks of candidates. Superior upperbody strength is an important prerequisite. Women do not have the same upperbody strength as men-an anatomic, biologic, and gender-specific fact. Requirements cannot be changed because of gender, and should not be changed because of political correctness. For these same reasons, women FBI agents have not been able to pass the rigorous physical requirements for the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team.
Placing women on board submarines is an equally foolish consideration. Given the difficulties encountered by both sexes serving together on surface vessels, the situation would become intensified on board an underwater craft. Our learned admirals must be aware of the high percentage of pregnancies among shipboard women sailors, both enlisted and officer, and their ensuing problems. Imagine, then, the problems facing a submarine skipper if one or more of his crew learned that she was pregnant, while on an extended mission under the Arctic ice cap.
On a related matter, the Israelis also have addressed the problem of sexual harassment. Instead of instructing women only, both genders must attend briefing sessions.
The image of women as full-fledged side-by-side soldiers, sailors, and pilots has been fully accepted in only a few countries, and certainly not by the IDF—nor the U.S. Marine Corps. For Admirals Johnson and Larson, such a foray into previously charted dangerous waters could be a disastrous journey-read "experiment"-with the military as the ultimate loser.