General Lee Butler, the former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently held a press conference in which he called for complete nuclear disarmament by the world's nuclear powers. On a theoretical plane, I couldn't agree more. If there were a single gift that I, as a military officer, could give to the generations that follow me, it would be to remove—magically—the specter of nuclear holocaust that has hung over my own generation and that of my parents.
And to produce such a gift would take magic.
Unfortunately, nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved while continuing to ensure the safety of the country we are sworn to defend. Our oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, means defense against all levels of attack-from a massive, coordinated nuclear attack to a single uncoordinated strike by a rogue nation. The notion of mutually assured destruction—for all its MADness—got us through the Cold War, and still may be valid as long as the arsenals of the world's major nuclear powers remain. The challenge of the 1990s and beyond will be to defend against an asymmetric attack from a country or organization that has developed a nuclear capability.
Asymmetric warfare—a military buzzword of the 1990s—means attacking a stronger force's weaknesses with unexpected or innovative means, while avoiding its strengths. How can a future foe hold the United States at bay? Certainly not by going head-to-head with the world's dominant military power. Planners can see the disastrous results of such an ill-conceived strategy in the Gulf War. Future foes will resort to tactics in which political objectives are obtained through indefensible—or difficult to defend—acts, or by the threat of such acts. This is where the difficulty lies in General Butler's proposal for nuclear disarmament. Total nuclear disarmament by the United States would lay the groundwork for a future foe to gain an asymmetric advantage that would be almost impossible to defend against.
Beyond the risk of a present nuclear state failing to comply with a total-disarmament agreement—could a future foe develop a nuclear capability? Is the technology available? Is there an accessible supply of weapons-grade plutonium? Could a small country—or country-sponsored terrorist organization—construct a nuclear weapon? Unfortunately, the answer to all of these questions is "Yes." Therefore, the United States has no choice but to maintain a proportionate-response capability.
A proportionate capability is not a panacea that will deter all nuclear attacks. The likelihood of such an attack occurring would increase dramatically, however, if a proportionate capability did not exist. Should the United States continue to push for ratification of nuclear reduction treaties such as START II—and its possible follow-on, START III? Absolutely. But the United States also must maintain a credible nuclear option, to deter rogue nations from the development and use of nuclear weapons.
Commander Keiler is a senior military fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National War College, Washington, D.C. He recently served in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff.