With the publication of “Forward . . . From the Sea” and Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), Naval Warfare, the United States has begun to define both a strategy and doctrine for using naval forces to further national security objectives. To date, the strategy has focused on using the combat power of naval forces to influence events on shore. Aspects of naval power resulting from maritime operations other than war and maritime policy are not addressed. To some extent, this may be a result of the number of different agencies responsible for maritime issues, but the absence of an overall operating doctrine for the Coast Guard makes it difficult to articulate a complete theory of U.S. naval power.
The relationship between maritime operations other than war and national security should not be underestimated. More than a third of the Coast Guard’s annual budget goes to law enforcement of all types (drug interdiction, alien migrant interdiction, fisheries law enforcement, and recreational boating regulation),1 and each of these maritime operations can have a significant influence on the well being of many Americans.
Expanding the criteria of what constitutes naval power to include maritime operations other than war requires a similar expansion in the definition of naval forces. According to Naval Warfare, naval forces are both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and when under Navy operational control, the Coast Guard.2
Considering the Coast Guard’s peacetime responsibilities for law enforcement, migrant interdiction, fisheries regulation, and merchant vessel oversight, in addition to its traditional military missions, the Coast Guard must be considered a full-time participant in exercising U.S. naval power. Because of the legal requirement to operate as part of the Navy when the President directs during times of war, the Coast Guard uses a similar rank and rate structure and has some common equipment, command-and-control systems, and logistics procedures. However, there is no common understanding or doctrine outlining the Coast Guard’s contribution to U.S. naval power, and existing naval doctrine publications do not have a broad enough scope to include the Coast Guard’s contribution.
NDP-1, Naval Warfare, describes the inherent nature and enduring principles of naval forces. The publication covers the Nature of Naval Services, Employment of Naval Forces, Naval Warfare, and Naval Warfare in the 21st Century. The operating principles included in the publication, forward presence and maneuver warfare, provide a basis for Navy and Marine Corps missions, but they have only limited applicability to the day-to- day operations of the Coast Guard. Naval operations other than war are introduced but are not discussed in depth. These limitations are not surprising since, as its title implies, the publication focuses on the warfighting roles of the Navy and Marine Corps, not the full range of naval operations.
The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for maritime operations other than war, but it does not provide a comprehensive supporting doctrine describing how its missions relate both to each other and to the national interests of the United States. The Coast Guard has a large number of publications addressing parts of its contribution to naval power—the Coast Guard Capabilities Manual; the Commandant’s Direction, Vision Statement, and Strategic Goals and Objectives-, the Executive Business Plan-, and the Capital Investment Plan—but each plan is developed separately with no overall doctrine to tie them together. In addition, a doctrine study group chartered by the Area Commanders in late 1994 identified 115 different Coast Guard publications and directives containing elements of Coast Guard operating doctrine.’ These documents ranged from providing general guidance to specific procedures for a number of mission areas, but there was no single source of doctrine addressing how maritime operations other than war contribute to national security. To develop such a doctrine, the relationship between naval warfare and maritime operations other than war needs to be understood.
Maritime operations other than war are conducted to enforce national objectives or interest—including drug interdiction; alien and migrant interdiction; enforcement of domestic laws and regulations; and treaties relating to managing natural resources, suppression of piracy, and economic blockade or quarantine of unescorted merchant vessels. Typically, the operations deal with civilians (both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals) or commercial organizations in a law- enforcement instead of military context. The dangers to personnel are not entirely absent, but the operations involve less threat than wartime operations and a less organized and developed opponent.
There are similarities between maritime operations other than war and more traditional naval operations. The fundamental operating environment remains the same; for instance, the sensors, command-and-control arrangements, and logistics required for at-sea operations apply in both cases. Maritime operations other than war occur on high seas or coastal water and can involve large- area searches or high-density sorting challenges. Operational security, electronic emission control, secure communications, electronic support measures, intelligence queuing, multi-unit command and control, and use of maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters are equally important to forces conducting maritime operations other than war as they are to traditional naval forces.
For the Coast Guard, there also is a definite relationship between its maritime operations and the tasks that would be assigned in war. For example, in peace, the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port regulates port operations and safety. During war, he also assumes responsibility for coordinating protection of military supplies and material as they transit through the port. The oil slick and burning oil wells of the 1991 Gulf War may also serve as an indication of things to come in regional conflicts with pollution becoming a regular weapon. If so, the Coast Guard’s environmental protection activities will be needed by area Commanders-in-Chief.
Beyond these similarities, there also are key differences between maritime operations other than war and traditional naval operations. Principally, many of the maritime operations are conducted in a law-enforcement environment. Beyond the prohibition on using military forces to enforce civil law, law-enforcement operations are characterized by more significant limitations on the actions of the enforcing authority. Concepts such as use of force policies requiring minimum force to compel compliance and rules on search and seizure of evidence are outside the day-to-day focus of most naval personnel. In fact, during low-threat boardings of fishing vessels in Alaska, the Coast Guard cutters attempt to limit their disruption the vessel’s fishing, and most of the boarding team members are unarmed. As a result of these differences, the Coast Guard needs specific doctrines for its own unique maritime operations.
Considering the momentum of the Naval Doctrine Command in promulgating capstone doctrine, writing and expending the concept of naval power to include maritime operations other than war will have to be a two-step process. NDP-3, Naval Operations, will follow the emphasis of NDP-1 and develop doctrine to “reaffirm the foundation of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary maritime traditions.”4 Rather than holding up completion of this volume, a joint Coast Guard and Navy team should be chartered to write NDP-3.1, Maritime Operations Other Than War. This publication would address the following topics:
- The relationship between maritime operations other than war and national security
- Essential differences between these operations and naval warfare
- Organizational and operational principals in conducting these operations
Ultimately, the discussions of maritime operations and national security could be shifted to a revised capstone document on naval power that would incorporate the concepts of both naval warfare and maritime operations other than war. During their normal review and repromulgation cycle, the supporting publications could be expanded to address maritime operations other than war.
Combining doctrines of naval warfare with maritime operations to form a doctrine of naval power would help military and civilian policy makers understand a wider variety of naval options available to support the national interest, promote coordination and unity of effort among the naval services, and give members of the Coast Guard a better understanding of the relationships between their various missions and between the missions of the Coast Guard and Navy.
1 Vincent C. Thomas, Jr., ed, The Almanac of Sea Power 1996, The Navy League of the United States. 1996, p. 219.
2 NDP-1. Naval Warfare, p. 6.
3 Report of Field Commanders’ Concept of Doctrine Study Team, March 1995, p. 15.
4 NDP-1. Naval Warfare, p. iv.
Lieutenant Rogers drills with the Coast Guard Atlantic Area Operations Division, Major Cutter Force Section. He served previously on board the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718), the USS Sample (FF-1048), and the USCGC Jarvis (WHEC-725).