In a world that nurtures the growth of both democracy and strife, nonlethal weapons offer U.S. forces a widening range of appropriate options to accomplish a lengthening list of missions.
At the beginning of this decade, the United States faced a changing world, and our leaders recognized the need for a corresponding change in policy and strategy. During the Cold War era of containment, U.S. foreign policy revolved around maintaining and protecting an alliance of friendly nations that shared our values of democracy, free enterprise, and social dignity. As we recognized the need for change, we also realized that the importance of that alliance had not diminished. The policy for America’s future revolved around maintaining a bloc of like-minded friends to enhance security and trade, while seeking to exploit new opportunities in the changing world condition.
As the Clinton administration began to control U.S. policy in 1993, a new direction emerged—a policy of enlargement that leveraged both the strengths of the past and the opportunities for the future. Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, stated, “We have the blessing of living in the world’s most powerful v and respected nation at a time when the world is embracing our ideals as never before. We can let this moment slip away. Or we can mobilize our nation in order to enlarge democracy, enlarge markets, and enlarge our future." In short, the U.S. alliance of free market democracies would expand, spreading its benefits around the globe and enlarging the domain of U.S. influence. The result would be enhanced security and new opportunities for economic growth in an increasingly competitive world.
If the world of the 1990s is more receptive to U.S. ideals and involvement, it also is a world of greater strife and conflict. This is not the environment we would prefer for pursuing our vision of enlargement. We already have seen the impact of this combination through our involvement in Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and, to a lesser extent, Rwanda. At a higher level of threat, we have seen the United States respond to actions in the Persian Gulf, incidents in Korea, and provocations in the Taiwan Straits. For the U.S. armed forces, the policy of enlargement equates to a strategy of greater engagement.
Moving from the well-defined threats of the past, we must now broaden our planning to address a multitude of developing threats and missions. Often the outgrowth of our desire to support friends and prospective friends is the need to participate in humanitarian and peace operations, which are generated by natural disasters, economic deprivation, ethnic and religious conflict, insurgencies, and an absence of democratic traditions. The threats that arise from these conditions cover the range of intensity, although they tend to be focused at the lower end.
In considering the use of military forces to address developing world conditions, there is a need for maximum flexibility in all categories of force structure, tactics, and weapon systems. Modern U.S. forces need to be capable across the entire range of conflict, and potential threats must be identified to a greater level of detail. The categories of low-intensity conflict, medium-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conflict have been helpful in the past, but we now must consider a broader continuum, as illustrated in figure 1.
The U.S. policy of enlargement has two fundamental tenets. The first is achieving an increased level of military and economic security. The second is a genuine and fundamental desire to improve the condition of people throughout the world. Humanitarian deeds are not limited to traditional relief operations. When the present administration refers to humanitarian deeds, it means the entire spectrum of activities that can be undertaken in the interest of humanity.
Applied to the military planner, this could manifest itself through involvement at any point across the intensity continuum described in figure 1. Anthony Lake referred to this level of diverse military capability when he stated, “We must seek to ensure that our forces are increasingly ready, mobile, flexible, and smart.” Implicit in this concept is not only the ability to operate at any point along the intensity continuum, but also the ability to operate appropriately at any point. It is in recognizing this range of possible missions and the importance of appropriate involvement that the rationale for using nonlethal weapons is evident.
The concept of appropriate response is not new, but the military use of nonlethal weapons creates a wider range of responses than previously has been available. Just as there is an intensity continuum across the range of warfare, there is a force continuum across the range of options for applying military force. The force continuum illustrated in figure 2 provides the commander a progressive approach for addressing a variety of situations.
The addition of nonlethal weapons not only adds a new category in the force continuum but also fortifies other categories previously regarded as having limited value. In the past, we typically would move directly from deterrence to combat, but with the addition of nonlethal weapons, we strengthen the potential for show-of-force and riot-control tactics. This is important because our adversaries found an operational niche in which they could be neither deterred nor controlled—and against which we were unwilling to apply lethal force. Some, for example, mix armed fighters with large groups of innocent civilians, especially women and children. This tactic is of particular value when there are television cameras present. Now we are able to confront such a threat with nonlethal and lethal weapons used in tandem. This capability permits us to confront a much broader range of activity. The show-of-force tactic is no longer an empty threat, because we now can escalate to the next level with the confidence that we can be effective without resorting to the use of deadly force.
The use of nonlethal weapons by U.S. Marines during the evacuation of U.N. personnel from Somalia in 1995 created a flurry of attention and discussion. It was widely recognized that these weapons—all of which have been used by police departments, prison guard forces, and various security agencies within the United States for many years—could be helpful in avoiding unnecessary death and suffering, wanton destruction of property, and needless environmental damage. But their introduction also caused some resistance. The primary objection was that U.S. forces would not be adequately protected while operating in hostile environments. In addition, there was concern that this “soft” approach would signal to our potential enemies that we were lacking in determination and unwilling to take strong and forceful actions when our national interests were at stake.
For the most part, these objections resulted from an incomplete understanding of the issues. In the case of force protection, nonlethal weapons are not employed in isolation, nor is there any intention to do so. All Marines using nonlethal weapons in Somalia, for example, also were armed with a service rifle or pistol. In addition, they always operated in conjunction with others who were designated to use deadly force whenever necessary and appropriate. The rules of engagement were devised to support this combined approach. During United Shield (withdrawal of U.N. forces from Somalia), every Marine had the right of self-protection, and every leader had the duty to protect his unit. This included the right and duty to engage in lethal combat whenever an individual or unit considered itself to be threatened. This is exactly the same whether or not we are also using nonlethal weapons. In Somalia, we also retained the ability to achieve fire superiority in any situation, should the need have arisen.
The concern about sending a wrong signal misses the point entirely. Nonlethal weapons, properly applied in support of a policy of enlargement, make the United States more formidable, not less so. With nonlethal weapons, we can address more situations effectively and have a better chance of controlling the escalation of violence in the complex environments we are most likely to encounter. Our actions thus will be more consistent with the basic humanitarian values embraced by our nation and expected by our citizens. This is crucial in maintaining the popular and political support needed to ensure success in the field.
The great military thinker Karl von Clausewitz emphasized the critical nature of such support. He concluded that only through a combination of the populace, the government, and the military working in concert could success in war be assured. The need to maintain this cohesion is no less important in military operations other than war. The failures we experienced in Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, for example, resulted from a lack of solidarity among these three elements of national power. By the same token, the successes we experienced in the Gulf War, the invasion of Haiti, and the peace operation in Bosnia are the result of a close harmony among those elements.
The use of appropriate weapons and tactics is a crucial tool in cementing these relationships, thereby ensuring that forces in the field have the maximum opportunity for success. Nonlethal weapons can play a major role in creating and maintaining such support because matching appropriate force to needs is consistent with American values.
The use of nonlethal weapons also is responsive to the teaching of the Chinese Master Sun Tzu. The China of Sun Tzu’s era (6th-5th century B.c.) was a chaotic hodgepodge of cultural entities and competing kingdoms, a society experiencing rapid change, political instability, and constant military conflict. In many ways, it was similar to our world today. His perceptions are therefore especially applicable. The most fundamental of Sun Tzu’s beliefs can be summarized as follows: “Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.” A contemporary interpretation by Li Ch’uan simply states, “Do not put a premium on killing.”
Our current policy of enlargement does not seek to “take” a state as such, but we do seek to include new states within our economic and alliance system. We seek to include them intact, and our humanitarian ideology does not now, nor has it ever, put a premium on killing. There is no value in destroying a village in order to save it. That was not appropriate in the days of the Cold War, and it has no role in the world of today. The use of widespread death and destruction is incompatible with the policy of enlargement.
The use of nonlethal weapons is an appropriate means of dealing with many of the problems we now face around the world. There are, of course, always risks in the use of U.S. forces in volatile environments, regardless of the weapons or tactics involved, and these must be weighed against policy goals and prospective benefits. The commanders must then decide on the appropriate means of applying American power, to maintain public support and accomplish the mission. None of this is easy. In the words of Sun Tzu: “Those unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so.”
General Zinni is Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command. He previously served as Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force. Colonel Ohls is the officer-in-charge of the Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees detachment at I Marine Expeditionary Force.