First Honorable Mention Marine Corps Essay Contest
It will if Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak can bring all Marines on board, to share his vision of change and to champion innovation.
On the day he took office, General Charles C. Krulak published The 31st Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), which delineates where the Marine Corps is going and why. Described as an engine for change, it states that “innovation and improvisation [are] the foundation upon which we will continue to build our institutional objectives and translate them into a vision for the Marine Corps of the 21st century.”1 Sea Dragon, a series of advanced-concepts experiments being embarked on by the newly formed Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory (CWL), is the embodiment of this commitment to experimentation and change.
Riding the dragon will not be easy. Military innovation is, at best, a difficult process and, at worst, a process that consumes scarce resources, with little payoff. To be successful, the Commandant and all Marine officers must address three related questions: Why will some Marine Corps officers resist innovation and change? What must the Corps do to embrace innovation? Why should the Corps expect success?
Challenges to Change
All people who are affected by change experience some emotional turmoil, even when the change appears to be positive.2 It is natural, therefore, that some Marine Corps officers will resist—passively or aggressively—the changes that Sea Dragon represents. Understanding and recognizing the four most common reasons for such resistance are the first steps toward eliminating them.3
- Parochial self-interest results when officers put their own best interests before those of the Corps. Resistance based on parochial self-interest normally will result in political behavior—overt bickering within the officers corps or more subtle dissension occurring under the surface of public dialogue.4 Because it could produce significant changes in the structure of each of the major combat elements, Sea Dragon has the potential to create such resistance from many communities.
- Misunderstanding the change and its implications is a second possible reason for resistance. When a new leader comes on board, there is always a period of transition and uncertainty for members of the organization, when it is easy for unfounded rumors to begin or spread. In this case, the "change agent"—General Krulak—may become the target of resistance rather than the changes themselves.5 Combine nervous uncertainty with a misunderstanding of the implications of a change program and resistance can spread rapidly.
- If Marines do not believe that the change makes sense for the Corps, they also will resist its implementation. Many well-educated, experienced officers have different assessments of the required direction and speed of innovation in the Marine Corps. As John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger noted, “The difference in information that groups work with often leads to differences in analyses, which in turn can lead to resistance.”6
- Resistance to Sea Dragon may result from a low tolerance for change. At boot camp, officer candidate school, and other professional schools, Marines are indoctrinated into the culture of the Corps, which may have negative consequences when dealing with change. A. J. Bacevich writes that “military culture can provide a reservoir of institutional strength and continuity. Yet it can become a source of rigidity, inflexibility and resistance to change.”7 Officers who have practiced the profession of war fighting for 10 or 15 years may view embracing change as an admission that some of their previous decisions or beliefs were wrong.8
In addition to the four forms of resistance, Sea Dragon faces the catch-22 of organizational change: innovation will not receive support without demonstrating that it can be successful, but it cannot demonstrate success without receiving sufficient support.'' Part of this problem is eliminated because the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory has received initial support as a result of the Commandant’s sponsorship, but if it does not produce short-term results, broader support may fizzle.
There also is a potential problem in the fact that the Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory has taken the form of a “skunk works,” a generally small, semi-autonomous unit that promotes innovation within a large organization. There are two obstacles that could arise with this approach.
First, the relationship between the CWL and the divisions of the existing organizations at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command previously responsible for doctrine and technology development is not well defined. There is a potential for friction and conflict if each organization does not completely understand its role.
Second, if the CWL becomes too isolated, failing to adopt an approach to development that is integrated with the Fleet Marine Force, its ideas will have little practical use and will be rejected by those who are supposed to benefit from them. It must maintain a delicate balance between isolation and interaction, to promote uninhibited exploration of new ideas but also remain relevant.
Embracing Innovation
What must the Marine Corps do to encourage officers to embrace Sea Dragon? Promoting change in the face of bureaucratic resistance requires a detailed plan of action and consensus building—a change strategy. The first step in a change strategy is developing a shared vision. Author Peter M. Senge writes:
When you look carefully you find that most “visions” are one person’s (or one group’s) vision imposed on an organization. Such visions, at best, command compliance—not commitment. A shared vision is a vision that many people are truly committed to, because it reflects their own personal vision.10
The general character of the change strategy is determined by the urgency of change to be undertaken. There are three types of change based on urgency: anticipatory, reactionary, and crisis. In anticipatory change situations the focus is on long-term change, to adjust to threats that are expected to materialize in the future. Reactive change involves a response to a threat that is increasingly tangible, and crisis change comes in response to a compelling threat that may already be affecting the organization." Whether the Marine Corps faces a time of anticipatory, reactive, or crisis change will help determine the character of its change strategy. For example, dealing with the spread of weapons of mass destruction may be more urgent than the need to change the infantry battalion.
The fundamental elements12 of the Marine Corps’ change strategy should include:
- Establishing an environment that supports innovation. A supportive change environment is characterized by open communication, cooperation, and support. Because most good ideas build on the thoughts of others, information flow must be open and dynamic to promote positive interaction. Cooperation and support can help expand ideas beyond familiar solutions. Being open to positive ideas from outside the Marine Corps—from the Army, Navy, and even civilian corporations—will increase the likelihood of developing new methods and technologies.
- Involving and educating Marines and gaining commitment. Senior officers must project and promote a high degree of acceptance for the CWL and Sea Dragon. The next step is to involve as many Marines as possible in Sea Dragon; research has demonstrated that, in general, participation leads to commitment.13 Marines are more likely to be supportive if they have helped determine the scope and dimensions of change. They must be encouraged to speak out about what works and what does not.
Educating Marines on the goals and objectives of change will be an ongoing and time-consuming process, but it will help gain commitment for innovation. The Commandant and his staff must present the issues of innovation, explaining why certain changes are important. This is important to developing momentum for change.
- Gaining external support. The Marine Corps must gain external support from the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and other branches of government for its innovation concepts without binding itself to precise methods, timetables, or objectives.
- Monitoring implementation and ensuring integration. To ensure integration of change within the Marine Corps, there must be a system to encourage and reward those officers who actively participate in the process of innovation. Stephen Peter Rosen suggests that in the military:
innovations occurred when senior military officers were convinced that structural changes in the security environment had created the need. These senior officers, who had established themselves by satisfying the traditional criteria for performance had the necessary power to champion innovations, and they did so by creating new career paths along which younger officers specializing in the new tasks could be promoted.14
The augmentation, promotion, and command screening boards must reward those committed to innovation, especially if, as the Commandant says, “our policies must be based on a long-range view . . . without regard to the tenure of any one Commandant.”15
Anticipating Success
Marines have a habit of recognizing the need for change and innovation. That does not mean that past changes were made quickly or easily. The requirements for successful amphibious warfare, for example, were described in 1921. Years later, General Holland Smith complained of a lack of enthusiasm for the new form of warfare. After an exercise in 1932, he wrote of a “total lack of equipment for such an undertaking, our inadequate training, and the lack of coordination” necessary for a successful amphibious assault. The first successful, full-scale amphibious exercises did not take place until 1940.16
Nevertheless, today’s Marine Corps exhibits the characteristics of a successful learning organization, skilled at “systematic problem solving, experimentation with new approaches, learning from their own experience and past history, learning from the experiences and best practices of others, and transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the organization.”17
On top of this, the Marine Corps has the advantage of strong leadership, which is essential for communicating and developing the shared vision that turns compliance into commitment. The list of visionary leaders who have inspired the Marines of yesterday and today could go on and on, but as James Collins of Stanford University has said, “What a great organization needs is not someone who can always tell you the time. It needs someone who can build a great clock, a machine that will continue to tell the time after they are gone.”18 As the clock ticks on, the leaders of today’s Marine Corps must refine the strategy that will ensure the success of Sea Dragon by accomplishing three immediate tasks:
- The Commandant must make an all-out effort to ensure that his personal vision is shared by all Marine Corps officers. He must articulate a detailed change strategy that focuses on reducing resistance to change, creating an innovative environment, and developing a cadre of sponsors in the senior officer ranks.
- The Sea Dragon education process must begin immediately at the Marine Corps University. The theories of innovation should be taught at the career, intermediate, and top-level Marine Corps schools. Officers in the ranks of major to colonel can be very effective champions of innovation when armed with the right tools.19
- The Commandant must build on the innovative climate already established. Full and open debate must be encouraged, to build shared commitment. If Sea Dragon is sound, it will hold up under criticism.
1 MGen. Michael Williams, USMCThe Commandant’s Planning Guidance: Where We Are Today,” Marine Corps Gazette 79 (December 1995): p. 37. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, The 31st Commandant’s Planning Guidance: A Marine Corps for the 21st Century (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, July 1995), p. A-2.
2 John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change,” Harvard Business Review 57 (March-April 1979): p. 107.
3 Kotter and Schlesinger, p. 107.
4 Kotter and Schlesinger, p. 108.
5 William E. Turcotte, Col. Frederic M. Anderson, USAF, and Andrew E. Gibson, Innovation and Change (Newport, RI: National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College), p. 5.
6 Kotter and Schlesinger, p. 108
7 A. J. Bacevich, “Military Culture and Institutional Change,” unpublished working papers from the Roles and Missions Commission, December 1994, pp. 1-2.
8 Kotter and Schlesinger, p. 109.
9 Michael J. Meese, “Institutionalizing Maneuver Warfare: The Process of Organizational Change,” in Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), pp. 201-2.
10 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday, 1990), p. 206.
11 J. Peter Killing and Joseph N. Fry, “Delivering the Vision,” Business Quarterly (Summer 1990), 49-50.
12 Turcotte, Anderson, and Gibson, pp. 2-3, 9-10.
13 Kotter and Schlesinger, p. 110.
14 Stephen Peter Rosen, Innovation and the Modern Military: Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 76.
15 Commandant’s Planning Guidance, p. A-l.
16 Rosen, p. 81.
17 David A. Garvin, "Building a Learning Organization,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 1993, p. 79.
18 Joe Flower, “Building a Visionary Organization Is a Do-It Yourself Project: A Conversation With James C. Collins,” The Healthcare Forum Journal 38 (No. 5, 1995): p. 4.
19 Meese, p. 214.
Major Damren, a CH-46 pilot and 1996 graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, is assigned to the Aviation Plans, Programs, and Budget Branch, Department of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman during the research and writing of this paper.