Faced with the block obsolescence of its low-end escort force, the Navy is focusing on high-end replacements. Unable to produce the needed numbers of ships, this course could make tomorrow’s seas very busy and very lonely for our sailors.
Released in August 1995, the Surface Combatant Force Level Study should have been a storm warning to Navy planners. According to the study, our Navy will require a force level of 145-160 combatants to meet future mission requirements out to the year 2010.1 This is much greater than the 110-116 combatants originally assumed under previous reviews, before the end-of-the-Cold-War buzz had worn off. To maintain this higher level in the short term, we need only to refrain from cutting back any more of our escort force, but continuing anything like this force structure beyond 2010 will mean doubling the planned building rate of new-construction surface combatants, from two or three per year to five.
After several years of alleged “peace,” we are beginning to get a better idea of what our long-term needs will be. Unfortunately, figuring out how best to fulfill those needs could prove to be even more difficult.
Beginning in 2005 and 2007, respectively, the first of the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates will reach 30 years of age. Because of modular construction techniques and bulk buying, 54 of these surface combatants—half of our originally projected escort force—will reach the end of their design lifetimes between 2008 and 2013. In addition, these DDs and FFGs are being compelled to fill the void left by the sudden retirement of their steam-driven sisters, which is wearing them down at a much faster rate than initially expected. This will increase the expense and reduce the benefits of any service life extension program.
In the early 1990s, block obsolescence concerned few people. First, it was assumed that the end of the Soviet Union would mean that the Navy’s operational tempo could be reduced significantly—an idea that has since proved grossly optimistic. Second, it was assumed that the greater capabilities of replacement ships, such as the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers, would mean fewer ships would be needed to complete the same tasks. This is only true in two warfare areas—area air defense against high-altitude threats and strike warfare. In all other areas, from defense against supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles, to antisubmarine warfare, to showing the flag, there is no substitute for numbers.2
The Navy’s future funding situation—and thus its ability to procure warships—gives little cause for hope. As the nation attempts to balance the federal budget by 2002, there is no foreseeable way that the Department of Defense will receive substantially increased funding. In fiscal year 1996, under a relatively pro-defense. Republican Congress, under deficit spending conditions that certainly will not continue, and with few big-ticket items in production, the Navy received full funding for two surface combatants. In the early 2000s, the Navy will see the ramp-up to production of several large, very expensive weapon systems such as the F/A-18E/F, the V-22, the New Attack Submarine, and the Joint Strike Fighter; how it will pay for these programs remains to be seen.
Recipe for Disaster?
The Navy’s current hopes for a replacement ship rest in the SC-21, the surface combatant for the 21st century. Variously described as one or more classes of ship, from 5,000 to 20,000 tons displacement, with priority given to cost effectiveness, the original SC-21 concept looked extremely promising. It should be easy to tailor a ship to our needs based on a compromise among capability, cost, and the required number of hulls.3
Unfortunately, this does not appear to be happening. The SC-21 Mission Needs Statement seems to be focused on a much larger ship with at least Aegis capabilities, including over-the-horizon fire support and the ability to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles. The SC-21 Mission and Threat Analysis states that “the mission is to carry the war to the enemy through offensive operations: (a) by being able to launch and support precision strike weapons and to provide firepower support for amphibious and other ground forces, and (b) by protection of friendly forces from enemy attack through the establishment and maintenance of battlespace dominance against theater missile, air, surface, and subsurface threats.”4 It is difficult to envision a frigate replacement emerging from this language.
In fact, early reports indicated that both the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Navy hierarchy favored a concept for the SC-21 known as the “Littoral Warfare Supremacy Ship.”5 This ship would be a large, stealthy, littoral strike cruiser of at least 10,000-tons displacement, armed with a minimum of 200 vertical-launch tubes and an advanced version of the Aegis radar and combat system. It would have an all-new turbine-electric-drive propulsion system and possibly a revolutionary hull form, such as the Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) design. Vast improvements in automation would allow a significant reduction in manning. Some concepts even consider adding an air wing of eight to ten attack and antisubmarine helicopters.
The SC-21 would be able to dominate the suborbital, air, surface, subsurface, and possibly even the land battlespace in the littoral environment. It would be the most technologically advanced and capable surface combatant ever designed. It also would be prohibitively expensive, probably costing more than both of the Aegis destroyers funded in the fiscal year 1996 budget. The Navy should be prepared to build five surface combatants per year in the early 21st century. Instead, with the direction the SC-21 program appears to be headed, it will be lucky to get one ship per year.
A Proven Concept
The Navy faced a similar dilemma in the early 1970s. It needed a large number of new-construction hulls to replace World War II-vintage cruisers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts. Funding was seen as improbable because of the costs of the Vietnam War and the perception that the public would not support a large military budget once U.S. involvement in that conflict ended. In choosing between an exceedingly small fleet of highly capable ships that would not be able to fill the Navy’s presence requirements and a larger, less-capable fleet that might not survive a third world war, naval planners split the difference—and the high/low concept was born.
The high end became the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruiser, which took advantage of the latest that technology had to offer in the Aegis weapon-control system. The low end became the Oliver Hazard Ferry-class frigate, which could be produced in great numbers to accomplish a large portion of the surface combatant workload.
We must adopt a similar policy today. The SC-21 should be divided into two distinct classes of warship, the SC-2010 and the SC-2020. Any large, “littoral supremacy” ship concept is better suited to replacing our Aegis cruisers, the last of which was commissioned two years ago. The Littoral Warfare Supremacy Ship therefore should be shelved for time being, emerging later as the SC-2020. The high-end SC-2020 would employ the latest hull form, propulsion, and weapon technology. The extra ten years would allow for the maturing of the cutting-edge technologies needed to maintain U.S. naval superiority through the middle of the next century. Our most immediate requirement, the need to replace our destroyer and frigate force, should be addressed first—with the SC-2010.
The SC-2010
The SC-2010 will form the backbone of our low-end escort force through the first half of the 21st century. It should be multimission capable yet inexpensive enough for mass production. Taking a cue from the Spruance-class destroyers, the SC-2010 should be constructed with a basic, yet effective, self-defense capability (possibly based on the Integrated Ship Self-Defense System), medium-caliber gun and helicopter facilities, but little else. Space and weight allowances in the initial design would allow for weapon and sensor system improvements, which could be purchased as the budget permits. Depending on fiscal constraints, it may be necessary to buy a minimum number of systems and shift them between deploying ships, as was done with early Tomahawk missiles, 25-mm Bushmaster cannons, and the first submarine towed arrays. Contemporary vertical launchers and programmable display terminals should make this easier than it has been in the past.
With cost being an overriding concern, several advanced technologies should be avoided. For example, advanced hull forms and automation systems could increase efficiency and reduce manning levels, but these technologies are still in their infancy and will be expensive to develop. They may not yield enough improvement to warrant their expense.6 The ill-fated 3,000-ton Surface Effect Ship of the early 1980s is a good example of this.
Because it will need to accept significant upgrades during its life, the SC-2010 should be large, by frigate standards. One design flaw of the Oliver Hazard Perry was the limited growth potential of the ship’s basic structure. This mistake should not be repeated. Building a ship with the ability to grow almost always will be the cheaper path. A larger ship also is inherently more damage resistant.
For survivability, the SC-2010 should have a fair degree of radar and infrared stealth and quieting. Quick acceleration and a high burst speed—to avoid torpedoes— also should be basic requirements. To be cost effective, it should be based on an existing hull.
Given these general goals, the most obvious choice would be to base the SC-2010 on a slightly modified Arleigh Burke Flight IIA hull and propulsion system. The IIA will be produced in number during the early part of the next century, and meaningful cost savings could be incurred by simultaneously building the SC-2010 on the same basic design. The Arleigh Burkes are quiet and fast and were the first warships to benefit from the Sea Shadow stealth tests, with a notable reduction in radar cross section. The design includes nuclear, biological, and chemical overpressure protection and a high degree of damage resistance. Their General Electric LM-2500 gas turbine engines have set the standard for naval propulsion systems. In addition, standardizing a large portion of our escort force on a single hull/propulsion design would lead to significant savings in both training and logistics.
Sensor systems should be based on current—albeit upgraded—designs, with a focus on self-defense:
- A long-range, air-search radar in the SPS-49 category, possibly including a non-cooperative identification feature. A strengthened, or perhaps a second, mast would be required to support this large sensor.
- A high-frequency, horizon-searching, missile detection radar; an improved Mk 23 TAS or perhaps a High Frequency Surface Wave Radar, currently in the experimental stage.
- A surface-search radar in the SPS-67 class, as well as a commercial navigation radar, useful for certain emission control conditions.
- A low-frequency sonar, most likely a variant of the SQS-53 already on board the Arleigh Burke class.
- An electronic warfare suite with electronic support and countermeasures capability, possibly the Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System currently under development.
- Chaff and flare launchers (two sets): Mk 36 Super RBOC or an improved system.
- A towed torpedo decoy: SLQ-25 Nixie or a similar system with the capability to decoy wake-homing torpedoes.
Space, weight, and power should be reserved for the following sensor upgrades:
- An outboard signal collection and classification system, an important intelligence tool currently piggybacked on Spruance-class destroyers and some older cruisers.
- An active, multi-frequency towed array sonar for detection of the small, shallow, ultra-quiet diesel-electric/air independent submarine threat. Several companies are working on destroyer-sized designs.
- A high-frequency, mine-hunting sonar such as the Kingfisher, which already is set to become standard equipment on the IIA.
The SC-2010 should carry an initial weapons fit to complete most basic escort tasks, with special emphasis on a high-confidence self-protection capability:
- One 5-inch Mk 45 gun mount. An upgraded system with a range of 63 miles is in development for the gunfire support role.
- Two Mk 15 Vulcan Phalanx close-in weapon systems, possibly to be up-gunned to 25mm or 30mm
- Two Mk 41, 32-cell Vertical Launch Systems (VLS), initially carrying only Evolved Sea Sparrow antiair missiles (two fire control directors with three channels of fire each) and Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rockets.
- Two Mk 49, 21-cell launchers for Rolling Airframe Missiles.
- Two triple Mk 32 torpedo tubes for launching both antisubmarine torpedoes and the hard-kill element of our current Surface Ship Torpedo Defense program.
- One large helicopter hanger, to allow one V-22-type Special Operations aircraft to be carried in place of the normal two SH-60R Seahawks.
Space and weight should be kept available for the following weapon system improvements:
- A Tomahawk fire-control system, to take advantage of the versatility of the VLS and allow low-end ships to become strike warfare players.
- A naval fire-control system for the Army Tactical Missile System, possibly to be fired from the VLS, to fortify the Navy’s anemic gunfire support capability.
- A Cooperative Engagement Capability, to allow the SC-2010 to be used as a forward-deployed Standard missile magazine or sensor for Aegis combatants.
- Two Mk 141 rack launchers for Harpoon missiles, along with associated fire control equipment. The antiship Harpoon eventually should be supplemented by a ship- launched version of the land attack SLAM.
- An unmanned aerial vehicle launch and control capability.
In its most elemental form, the SC-2010 will be able to accomplish all of the basic tasks currently assigned to our guided missile frigates, with the exception of the FFG’s limited area air-defense role. It will do so on a platform that is stealthier, more heavily defended, and able to take a hit and keep fighting. Capabilities in certain warfare specialties, such as covert intelligence gathering, Special Forces insertion and recovery, gunfire support, and close-in defense of high-value units, would be improved dramatically. With sensor and weapon control upgrades, these ships could become potent strike or antisubmarine platforms, easily exceeding the capabilities of our current destroyer force. Fully outfitted, the SC2010 would be more capable than anything short of an Aegis warship and would be a force multiplier when operating with such high-end combatants.
1 Executive Summary, Surface Combatant Force Level Study, Director, Surface Warfare (N86), August 1995, p. ES-15.
2 Technologies such as Cooperative Engagement will improve the ability of dispersed combatants to detect low-flying, over-the-horizon threats such as antiship missiles (ASMs). But destroying an extremely fast ASM before it strikes still will require the defender to be in close proximity to the target ship. Many newer Russian ASMs now are faster than the antiair missiles used to shoot them down.
3 The SC-21 Milestone I Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis Guidance (18 January 1995) suggested studying several low- and mid-cost design options, including some similar to the one suggested here.
4 SC-21 Mission Needs Statement (Unclassified), NavSea, 22 June 1995, part 2a.
5 “JROC to Weigh Anchor on new USN Warship,” Janes Defense Weekly, 17 “September 1994, p. 3.
6 Reducing manning levels is appealing, but how a much smaller crew would accomplish everything from preventive maintenance to damage control remains to be seen. See also Lt. Chuck Good, USN, “Who’s Left to Paint?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1996, p. 48.
Gregg Smith is a free-lance naval writer and a field representative for Congressman Robert K. Dornan (R-CA). During the late 1980s, he served in the enlisted ranks on board the Missouri (BB-63).