“Bomber Debates”
(See G. Myers, pp. 34-36, August 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Steve Davis, U.S. Navy, Executive Officer of The Sullivans (DDG-68) and former member of the OpNav Roles and Missions staff—Aircraft carriers and B-2s have fundamentally different missions. The question of which to buy is not, therefore, simply an either/or issue. If we need more long-range nuclear bombers, let the Air Force establish a need, get the money from Congress, and buy them. The bottom line is that the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of Defense, President, and most members of Congress don’t want them, and the Air Force doesn’t feel strongly enough about it to sacrifice any other programs—they want Navy money, and continue to weave specious arguments to support the case.
Global Presence, the controversial Air Force paper released in the midst of the congressionally mandated roles and missions review, is (despite Colonel Myers’ claim) a thinly veiled attempt to get at a mission not tied to the two-major-regional-conflict dicta of the Defense Planning Guide. Its release in 1994 was greeted with hoots from inside and outside of the beltway, and is widely regarded as intellectual pabulum by those who have read the document and understand the issues. Of course, all forces exert some kind of presence, but Air Force leaders have backed off from so many Global Presence claims that the document’s credibility is suspect.
We must retain the ability to project power. I do not agree, however, that there is any way to compare the B-2 to an aircraft carrier. Carriers operate every day, 365 days a year—out where crises occur. They are visible, powerful, logistically complete, and inherently sovereign. We don’t need anyone’s permission to park one 12 miles off a coast. B-2s, currently configured exclusively for nuclear bombing, are days from the fight, cannot respond as quickly as the Air Force purports, and are ineffective in most scenarios because they can’t loiter and are not seen by the guy we are trying to influence. Colonel Myers’ responsiveness estimates are outrageous; strategic bombers have never shown up as he proposes. A close examination indicates that there has not been a single conflict in the last 25 years that would have been conducted any differently if we had twenty more B-2s.
Some of the problems in this debate are philosophical. There are many in the Air Force and Navy who continue to cling to the Douhet strategic bombing myth. The only guarantee strategic bombing provides is that it will anger our enemies further and stiffen their will to resist. Bomb- related damage is often repaired quickly, and many countries, particularly in the Third World, lack the industrial infrastructure to make a counter-value campaign worthwhile. It is interesting to note that the strategic bombing studies, despite some claims, are at best inconclusive, and at worst indictments of the Douhet myth. Firebombing Dresden and Tokyo didn’t shorten World War II. Linebacker II didn’t bring the North Vietnamese to their knees. The Desert Storm bombing campaign didn’t cripple the Republican Guards, knock out the Iraqi C2 systems completely, destroy the weapons of mass destruction stockpiles, or kill the SCUDs—and these were the four explicit objectives of the air campaign. Although we need to maintain the capability to bomb strategically, we should stop deluding ourselves that bombing will accomplish as much as we want, or as much as Colonel Myers would like us to believe.
During the China crisis earlier this year, we didn’t send the strategic bombers anywhere—we moved in ships, and will continue to do so in similar circumstances in the future.
Lieutenant Commander R.K. Weaver, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Colonel Myers states “had B-2s been available, they could have attacked at night and ranged over the entire Iraqi/Kuwaiti theater, including downtown Baghdad.” Despite billions of dollars invested in the B-1 and B-2 projects, they have been “unavailable” when needed. Their actual real world capabilities are, at best, untested and unknown. Perhaps they are the wonder weapons their proponents claim they are. Then again, perhaps they are simply expensive monuments to our military procurement process. Until they get out of the hangars and are put to the test in a combat environment, such lavish assumptions are unproved hyperbole.
In any event, at $1 billion a pop, it is highly unlikely that any theater commander will get many opportunities to put the B-2 to the test.
“August Proceedings Cover”
(See Cover Box, p. 3, August 1996 Proceedings)
“Do Photos Lie?”
(See D. Brack, pp. 47-49, August 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R.N. Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I probably won’t be the first or the last to notify you that you misidentified USS George Washington (CVN-73) as CVN-69 in the cover box and again on page 49. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower is (CVN-69).
Barrett Tillman—Digital cameras? We don’t need no stinkin’ digital cameras.
But, hey, I gotta hand it to those Army ASW guys in the Blackhawk. It never would have occurred to me to hunt for a submarine amidst a herd of camels. And though I’m no great admirer of the Silent Service these days, it’s pretty dam crafty of that skipper to surface amidst a herd of camels in the first place.
“Carrier Aviation Faces an Uncertain Future”
(See P.M. Langbehn, pp. 69-71, July 1996 Proceedings)
“Naval Aviation Cannot Escape History”
(See D.E. Moore, pp. 62-63, July 1996 Proceedings
Thomas Hone, George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany—Ensign Langbehn and Commander Moore spell out the major problem facing naval aviation today: Not enough of the right kinds of aircraft are being built to fill the Navy’s aircraft carriers in the 21st century. And what really makes for bad news is that not enough can be built within the budgets now projected.
But both authors overlooked some key points. First, the Navy simply cannot abandon procurement of high-cost aircraft such as the F/A-18E/F. Too much money has been spent on the aircraft to call it quits now. Moreover, it would be dangerous to do so.
Commander Moore argues for more and cheaper aircraft. That is exactly what our enemies want. They want to fight air-superiority battles with aircraft they can buy and their pilots can be trained to fly. It is dangerous to give up a technological advantage just to save money.
However, analyst Franklin C. Spinney, whom Commander Moore cites, has a sensible point: The services cannot go on buying more and more expensive aircraft in smaller quantities. The solution, however, is not to buy less capable aircraft. The solution is to switch weapons, switch weapons and tactics, or perhaps both. Do not buy less capable fighters and fighter-bombers. Instead, buy more and cheaper cruise missiles, controlled by aircraft using satellite communications. Unmanned aircraft are also an option. Commander Moore noted the limitations of unmanned aircraft, but, as Ensign Langbehn pointed out, carrier aircraft “are losing the deep-strike mission to Tomahawk cruise missiles and Air Force bombers.” So why not place more emphasis on missile and unmanned aircraft development?
The third key point both authors missed is that carriers and their aircraft are a system together, and that the comparative cost-effectiveness of entire systems of platforms and aviation must be evaluated in considering what to invest in today. Suggesting that it might be wise to disperse aviation among a number of ships costing less to build and maintain than a large carrier is not a new idea. It has been considered for a generation, but the idea always folds in the face of costs. More smaller ships, with aviation dispersed among them, cost more over their life cycles than do a smaller number of large carriers able to strike targets with an equal amount of ordnance.
Those concerned about naval aviation must realize that aircraft today are more like ships: individually expensive and long-lived. Planning for aircraft programs must—like planning for the entire structure of the fleet—begin many years ahead of any testing of prototypes or any production of new models. The failure of any one program—like the A-12—must have long-term, drastic effects.
We are seeing those effects now. There are no easy “fixes.” In fact, things are going to get worse. Commander Moore is correct: Under present budget projections, the Navy will not be able to procure all the aircraft it needs to supply ten active wings and one reserve wing. Even if the Navy gets those aircraft eventually, it will get them at the price of something else it needs just as much.
Contrary to what Commander Moore says, there are no “tough decisions” that can be made now to save the situation. The key decision was made when a former Secretary of the Navy decided that the A-12 contract would be a fixed-price one, and a former Secretary of Defense— and their contemporaries in industry— agreed. The Navy is reaping the consequences of that decision, and no amount of maneuvering will lessen them. But other decisions were made in those years, too, and some of them—like the decision to think of Tomahawk as a conventional strike weapon—will pay dividends in the next century.
“Submarine Officer Training: A Required Shift in Focus”
(See J. R. Hindinger, pp. 57-58, July 1996 Proceedings)
Captain John P. Prisley, U.S. Navy (Retired)—A resounding Bravo Zulu to Lieutenant Hindinger for the courage and professional integrity to call a spade a spade. For perhaps the first time in public print, the critical failing of nuclear submarine officer training has been detailed. The time has long since passed to begin reinstituting serious training in warfighting and seamanship skills.
We were very lucky that in the first 20-plus years of nuclear submarines, we were drawing on officers who had been trained as naval officers (i.e., qualified underway watchstanders), then submarine warfighters, then engineers. Since these officers have left the Navy, seamanship, tactics, weapons—and anything else that occurred forward of the reactor compartment—were virtually ignored in the rigorous syllabus of the junior officer. The few fleet exercises, some battle group operations, and the unique operations of our SSNs in a real-world environment, have kept up basic operational skills, but have left little time for critical operational and tactical training of junior officers.
A further complication to advancing current tactical doctrine has been the myopic view of the nuclear-power hierarchy, which has rejected any thought that another nation could possibly present a credible threat and believes that non-nuclear submarines are irrelevant. As a result, it seems as if little thought has been given to the operational or tactical significance of Russian work in wake reduction, hydrodynamics, magnetic silencing, higher submerged speeds, advanced hull metallurgy, and a broad range of capable ASUW and ASW weapons (including 100-knot (+) torpedoes). Also ignored have been rapid advances in sensors, weapons, quieting, submerged endurance, and hull materials in the non-nuclear submarines of the rest of the world. Part of the response should be continuing intensive tactical and doctrinal research and analysis work in submarine warfighting—by both operators and intelligence personnel—to understand and meet the implications of Russian and all world progress. In Lieutenant Hindinger’s hypothetical exchange between an improved Los Angeles (SSN- 6881) class and improved Akula, the improved Los Angeles would probably have lost to Russian 100-knot (+) torpedoes.
In gauging the reaction to this fine article, it will be interesting to see whether or not our submarine leadership is willing to hear bad news and react positively instead of shooting the messenger.
Lieutenant Commander Lindsay R. Hankins, U.S. Navy—Having recently completed an engineer officer tour on a nuclear-powered attack submarine, 1 believe I am qualified to discuss the issues Lieutenant Hindinger presents in his article.
While there exists a long list of supporters and detractors of the nuclear power training program, most are in agreement that the program is one of the most successful of its kind. No other regimen inculcates its trainees with the importance of technical basics while it develops a questioning attitude and assigns such significant responsibility at so early a point in a career.
On our ship (as I suspect on all others), each trainee worked to complete forward qualifications while simultaneously working aft in an engineering division. The goal was to earn submarine qualifications within 10-12 months of checking on board. Lieutenant Hindinger’s assertion that in some way we are holding back a budding Mahan because of an inability to be “one with the reactor,” doesn’t hold water. From my experience, junior officers who succeeded aft did so forward, as well.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Hindinger views the nuclear qualification and subsequent department head selection process as a black and white, “you’re a nuke, or you’re not a nuke” situation. This couldn't be further from the truth. His assertion that a sufficiently challenging test could be developed involving memorization of ranging techniques, sound frequency calculations, weapon settings, shiphandling characteristics, and other tactical concepts is an excellent one. Unfortunately for him, it already exists. On our ship it was called the officer-of-the deck qualification exam. In addition, this knowledge was retested yearly.
Those who say we need a cadre of officers to drive the ship (like the Royal Navy) are the same ones who would be the first to complain if the officer-of-the deck gave an improper or unsafe order to maneuvering because he lacked engineering experience. It is the job of every senior leader in the wardroom to make sure their charges are technically competent and are ready to sail in harm’s way. To the lieutenant I say: “If you’re not ready to do this, GET HOT! It’s not the fault of the nuclear power program.
“Give Her All You Got”
(See K. Green, pp. 28-32, July 1996 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mark Lunde, U.S. Navy—Does Captain Green really send this three- or four-page “how to” letter to his new commanding officers? Does he truly believe a new and excited CO does not know how to inspect his ship or know when it is dirty? If I received such a letter, I would feel insulted, and would worry about micromanagement for the remainder of my command tour.
The letter I would like to receive would read: “Welcome aboard. Have fun. Keep me informed.”
“Could I Have Saved Admiral Boorda?”
(See J.G. Zumwalt, p. 10, July 1996; H. Goetch, D. Winters, p. 26, August 1996 Proceedings)
“A Letter to the Plank Owners”
(See M. Hamilton, pp. 14-15, July 1996; H. Goetch, D. Winters, p. 26, August 1996 Proceedings)
“What Price Leadership?”
(See D. Howard, pp. 8-9, July 1996; H. Goetch, D. Winters, p. 26, August 1996 Proceedings)
Scott Rye, author of Men & Ships of the Civil War—More than just another black eye in a long series of punches sustained by the Navy since Tailhook ’91, Admiral Boorda’s suicide absolutely sends the wrong message to today’s officer corps. Sailors, and Marines. Colonel Zumwalt suggests that Admiral Boorda succeeded as a “samurai warrior,” but rationalizing suicide by calling it part of the “warrior code” is a mistake. Japanese samurai may have found honor in suicide, but the U.S. Navy in the late 20th century has no need of samurai. Instead, we need leaders who can make hard decisions, solve problems, and face up to their mistakes and get past them. Suicide should never be an option for today’s young Sailors and Marines.
As tragic as the suicide of Admiral Boorda is, let us hope that Brigadier General Mark Hamilton is correct in his thesis that it will serve as a turning point for the U.S. Navy.
Roger Russell Hardy—All is surely well when one of the most profoundly moving tributes to the U.S. Navy ever put to paper is penned by a soldier. Thank you General Hamilton.
Richard Seamon, former assistant managing editor of TIME magazine—Ever the bureaucrat, Dan Howard argues that a CNO must, of necessity, be what sociologist David Riesman has described as an outer-directed personality. He must tailor his actions to other people’s expected response, and even compromise his professional integrity occasionally by bending to “the political will.” He must react to opinion polls, even “fire a life-long friend or cut off a head to satisfy that ultimate constituency—the public.” Such cynicism may have come naturally to Mr. Howard when he was Under Secretary of the Navy and Assistant Secretary of Defense. But it is not acceptable in a naval officer—and Admiral Mike Boorda knew it. Not long after he bowed to the arrogant politics of Senator David Durenberger (R-MN) and failed to stand behind Admiral Stanley Arthur’s nomination to be Commander in Chief Pacific, Admiral Boorda had the courage to state publicly that he had made the biggest mistake of his career.
Colonel Zumwalt suggests that if he had written earlier about his own attempted suicide, he might have helped Admiral Boorda deal with whatever demons drove him. Perhaps. But I do not agree that American servicemen today subscribe to some version of a samurai code. Surely, even in their darkest days, they do not believe that a false accusation of dishonor demands personal sacrifice. Colonel Zumwalt’s warm-hearted wishful thinking that he—or someone else of similar experience—might have saved Admiral Boorda is commendable. With the same sort of hindsight, one might wonder what a sensitive, perceptive psychiatrist would have thought if he had heard Admiral Boorda tell a U.S. Naval Institute audience that a good officer should know when one of his men is contemplating suicide. That was an odd insertion in an excellent, but otherwise unsurprising, speech. Was it a cry for help? If so, the good officer Admiral Boorda wanted for his Navy was not there to hear it.
Reporter Ed Offley’s story is a moving reminder that even the Navy’s medical corps can become infected with the same kind of unfeeling bureaucracy that Secretary Howard feels must be tolerated—and that Admiral Boorda knew to be utterly unacceptable. Why a good journalist chose not to report in his original story that it was the CNO who forced Navy doctors to give a sailor the treatment he deserved, I cannot say. Why a good Navy public affairs officer did not release the story is a more important question.
Perhaps the answer is that all too often “good Navy public affairs officer” is an oxymoron. Hindsight is easy, of course, but it is fair to wonder why, when the admiral removed those combat “Vs” from his ribbons more than a year before his death, the story was not publicized. Why was no straightforward statement issued to report that the CNO wore those “Vs” because he honestly thought he was entitled to wear them—but that he was removing them because his eligibility had been questioned and they were not worth further controversy? Even if that had not ended the search for scandal, surely it would have removed the sting.
The Navy must stop treating the press as an adversary. PAOs must stop thinking that their primary job is to feed reporters inconsequential handouts and fend off serious inquiries whenever possible. That there are incompetent journalists in all branches of the media is beyond argument. Recall the inane, time-wasting questions asked at press conferences during Desert Storm. But there are also competent, hard-working journalists who are anxious to do a good job. They will report trouble and failure and mistakes when they find them, but they are not out to sink the Navy, and they will be quick to print praise when it is warranted. Their editors and publishers should be challenged to send the best of them to classes at the Naval War College; they should be invited to make cruises at sea. Whenever the Blue Angels take local journalists on demonstration flights before a show, they are setting an example that never fails to pay off.
PAOs should be more than spokesmen—more than spin doctors spending their time reacting to trouble and trying to put out fires. They should be public- relations professionals capable of advising their superiors about potential problems and possibly beneficial stories. They should be active, more than reactive. They should try to serve as a conduit, not a shield between their commanders and the press. Who spoke for the Army and the Marines and the Air Force during Desert Storm and did their services proud? Almost always it was officers who served in the field. The Navy should take that lesson to heart.
In his commentary. General Hamilton had some excellent advice for the Navy in general and the Navy’s public affairs officers in particular: Be done with stand downs; “Let’s have a stand fast. Let’s have a stand for.”
“Defending the Navy’s Culture”
(See J. Webb, pp. 91-93, July 1996 Proceedings)
Commander Al Beltrami, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—During a period in our country’s history when political correctness appears to be a prerequisite for military leadership, the need to speak up for military tradition, service members, and their families is greater than ever. In his comments. Secretary Webb also correctly emphasizes the weakened military posture of this nation over the last several years and points to areas of needed resource enhancement. Is a 300-ship Navy going to be a credible force in 2000? In the face of growing anti-democratic and anti-secular regimes and movements, the logical answer appears to be “no.”
We need more capable, articulate and knowledgeable spokesmen like former Secretary Webb to expound the needs of the Navy.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Campbell, U.S. Air Force (Retired)—My sincere compliments on your July issue. I had let my membership lapse a few years ago when it seemed too often to be a forum primarily for war stories and party-line policy pronouncements, where important questions were seldom asked. Your July issue, however, was full of recognitions of and proposals for change.
Thank you for your courage in printing the full text of James Webb’s address to the Naval Institute’s members and the Brigade of Midshipmen. I never could have imagined a self-indictment so chillingly detailed. It had all the elements of the conditioning of a fundamentalist zealot, from the adolescent identification with mythic icons in Mahan’s temple to the incredible litany of his love for a “sacred” promotion system, mindless loyalty to fellow cult members, and virulent contempt for the democratic processes that he had sworn to defend.
Most important, I found no mention of professionalism.
In my military career I was often inspired by loyalty and example, but the praise I learned to value most highly in myself and others was to be a professional, a member of an honored profession, not a militant priesthood answering to a higher calling. □
“Stretched Too Thin”
(See D.A. Anderson, pp. 48-50, July 1996 Proceedings)
“The New Military Professionals”
(See J.A. Williams, pp. 42-48, May 1996; P.J. Sciabarra, p. 16, July 1996 Proceedings)
Scott M. Patterson, Rialto Unified School District—As a secondary-level teacher working exclusively with seniors, I was stunned by Major Anderson’s assessment of young people eligible for military service. He is woefully ignorant of the mindset and moral fiber of American 18-year-olds.
On average 1 have 165 high school seniors in my classroom each day. These students aren’t stupid—not by any measurement. In almost every respect they’re far sharper than the generation they’re succeeding, and far more than Major Anderson gives them credit for. They’re computer literate, well-read, well-informed, and media-savvy. They’re not fools; they’ve watched both of the region’s Marine Corps Air Stations close, three of four local Air Force bases close, one of two local Naval Air Stations close, and the only naval station and naval shipyard close. It is my observation that the majority have concluded that there is no real future for them in the U.S. Armed Forces, in any sense.
Judging from the number of essays in Proceedings whose bright visions for the future include more budget cuts, more force structure reductions, and more base closures, I believe the students’ conclusions are correct. Moreover, a recent commentary predicted as “inevitable” the full integration of homosexuals into the services. I have yet to hear from anyone who views this potential reality as anything other than anathema, and a powerful deterrent to military service.
Most, if not all, of our nation’s military leaders are totally out of touch with the hearts and minds of our military-eligible youth. They just don’t get it, and perhaps they don’t want to. What these young people want in exchange for their commitment and risk is stability and security in their future and a moral working environment. Presently, these things are being eliminated from the U.S. armed forces. The best and the brightest are out there, but empty promises, rosy talk, and catchy recruiting slogans won’t deceive them. Unless our nation’s leaders wake up and take credible action to correct the military’s crumbling image, the only individuals the services will be able to enlist will be the desperate, the immoral, and the criminal that Major Anderson bemoans.
“The Day It Became the Longest War”
(See C.G. Cooper, pp. 77-80, May 1996; C.L. Beaman, p. 24, July 1996 Proceedings)
Colonel Brooke Nihart, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—General Cooper’s article reminded me of an experience of my own, 18 months before President Johnson vehemently and crudely rejected his Joint Chiefs’ plan to conduct a massive air attack around Hanoi and to mine and blockade Haiphong. I was about to finish the State Department’s top-level school, the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy. An additional military slot in State’s Policy Planning Staff was opening and each service was told to send over a candidate to be interviewed by the staff head, noted economist Walt Whitman Rostow. The Marine Corps sent me.
The great man spent about 45 minutes reviewing my career and soliciting my opinions on pertinent matters. It was a pleasant session. Then he concluded by saying something like, “You know we are having this difficulty with North Vietnam and it might result in war. What sort of solution would you propose?” I replied, “Go for the jugular. They receive their economic and military aid from the Soviet Union and China by sea. So, close Haiphong harbor with mines, blockade the coast, and bomb their modernizing infrastructure. Vietnam isn’t of vital interest to either Communist country. The Soviets will go to war only when their vital interests are in jeopardy and they are sure they can win.” Rostow paused a moment, his eyes seemed to glaze over. That was the end of the interview.
I took some satisfaction eight years later in 1972 when Henry Kissinger’s similar proposal was followed, and it brought Hanoi to the Paris peace table. Unfortunately we didn’t repeat the dosage when North Vietnam again invaded the south in force in 1975. But failure had been ordained a decade earlier, when President Johnson evidently decided to place more confidence in the State department’s military advice than in the Pentagon’s—more’s the pity!