Capstone Essay Contest
In response to the changing political and military world climate, the Department of the Navy issued its joint Navy-Marine Corps white paper, “. . . From the Sea,” in 1992 to help refocus the efforts of naval personnel toward what the service saw as its future missions and goals. The paper determined that with the decline and eventual faltering of the Soviet Union and the disarray of the resulting Russian republics, the blue-water U.S. Navy was left without a high-seas opponent. As such, the Department of the Navy determined that coastal or littoral warfare was to be of more importance in the future, and that the Navy’s thinking should be adjusted to fit these new missions.
There are, however, major difficulties involved when operating in this littoral zone. One such concern raised only quite recently is the weapons and tactics of the smaller brown-water fast patrol boats. With their well-considered methods of attack and the ever-developing boon of missile technology, they pose a more serious threat to the U.S. fleet than had been imagined and require much more serious consideration in naval warfare planning.
The change in doctrine, as written in “. . .From the Sea,” caused something of an upheaval in the Navy, since all efforts had been toward effecting the defeat of a great surface force populated by large, heavily armed and armored enemy surface combatants. With these fleets much more scarce, fewer threats exist. Current threats, quite different from those that once were our primary focus, are covered by the following truisms:
► Local and regional conflicts will continue, sometimes involving the United States and its allies.
► "High-tech” weapons—especially guided missiles and high-performance aircraft—will threaten U.S. and allied operations.
► Traditional and “low-tech" naval weapons— especially mines and diesel-electric submarines— will become available to more countries.
► U.S. military forces will operate primarily in coastal/littoral areas.
The Navy also determined in “. . . From the Sea” that it must be able to be “engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.”3 To accomplish this, the forces deployed in these forward areas must be suited to handle the possibility of escalation that exists in their new theater. It then follows that the types of warfare conducted in these new theaters must be understood thoroughly; it seems that as yet some of them are not.
The smaller navies of Europe, responsible during the Cold War for defending the coastlines vital to allied interests, developed some specialized weapons and tactics for coastal defense. Predominant among the navies of countries such as Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Sweden are small fast patrol boat squadrons designed for this task. These squadrons usually consist of five to ten boats powered by as many as four 3,500-horsepower diesel engines propelling them in excess of 35 knots and armed with a surprising array of antisurface weapons. An excellent example of this type of warfare is the German Navy’s 5. Schnellbootgeschwader (Fifth Fast Patrol Boat Squadron) of the German Navy, established in 1959. The Tiger-class patrol boats used today were constructed in the mid-1970s. They have a displacement of 278 tons, a length of 47 meters (154.2 feet), and a draft of 2.1 meters (6.9 feet). Despite their small size, the aging Tigers are formidable enemies. The four diesel engines allow speeds up to 37 knots. Each boat is armed with a 76- mm multipurpose gun mount forward, a 40-mm antiaircraft cannon aft, and four of Aerospatiale’s Exocet missiles, although Harpoons and Penguins also are suited and commonly used on other, similar vessels.4 The small size of the boats enables them to disappear from radar screens in moderate seas, and they can conceal themselves in the rocky coastline using contour-hiding camouflage to avoid being spotted by lookouts.5 These weapons, combined with the boats’ wolf pack attack tactics and considerable speed, make the 5. Schnellbootgeschwader a powerful entity, despite its age. Most of the coastal nations of Europe have these or comparable squadrons, and they provide excellent defense opportunities at low cost. A U.S. Navy Operations Research team estimated that a ten-boat squadron would cost less to build than one Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer.6 This is a great economic and military advantage for emerging naval powers.
One drawback of these squadrons, however, is their lack of endurance. Patrols of more than 50 hours are rare, since crew complements are such that everyone stands watch over the whole patrol. Tenders often are detailed to allow the boats to nest following patrols, but this is not always feasible, depending on the environmental or military situation. Furthermore, the antiair capability of the boats is small, though plans are being made, in Germany especially, to equip the squadron boats with the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) as well as some sort of close- in weapons system. Data-link technology also is being examined by several of the European navies to provide better firing information for their deadly cruise missiles.7 In fact, these missiles make the squadrons deserving of consideration, especially in light of coming technologies.
Current missile technology used in the fast patrol boat squadrons generally consists of three types of missiles: the Aerospatiale Exocet, which sank HMS Sheffield and critically wounded the USS Stark; the Norwegian-made Penguin (AGM-119), and the U.S. Navy’s Harpoon (AGM-84). These three missiles currently are the mainstays of squadron tactics, and they give the boats a powerful punch from a long distance. Such weapons can penetrate ships’ defenses, especially when an entire squadron of ten boats attacks at once, releasing an overloading flurry of misses.
In addition, this technology has just gotten cheaper. The Russian military industrial complex, searching for new work following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has given up building the giant carrier-busting missiles that the Soviet fleet once used and now have unveiled a new line of compact, high-speed antiship missiles at affordable prices—and available to Third World nations. Among these new missiles is the Kh-35 (known to NATO as the SS-N-225), laughingly dubbed the “Harpoonski.” This missile is slightly smaller than its U.S. counterpart, though it has proven itself a strong and accurate alternative. Another of the Russian missiles, the Kh-15, is under modifications for ship-to-ship use. This missile uses the pop-up flight profile of the AS-4 Kitchen and attains speeds on its terminal dive of Mach 5. This reduces shipboard reaction time and causes great tracking problems. The most sobering aspect of these new missiles is their low cost and wide availability. Because of the inflated nature of the Russian economic system, the missiles may be sold at ridiculously cut-rate prices.9 Furthermore, as the Russians have had no qualms about selling to nations such as China and North Korea, soon Second and Third World nations will be putting to sea with First World technology.
In light of the U.S. Navy’s new outlook on its role for the new century, it seems wise to consider our new adversaries. The Navy sees itself conducting littoral operations to support land operations world wide, but its blue water fleet—built to combat the Soviets on the high seas—finds itself underprepared for its new job. The European navies, on the other hand, have been fighting this type of warfare for years and have developed fast patrol boat squadron tactics that allow them to defend their coastlines effectively. In addition, the low cost of these small craft and the lower cost of new missiles to outfit them make it affordable for budding powers to build their fleets.
The United States should review its goals in the littoral zone and examine the roles of its coastal surface warriors so that the vision of “. . . From the Sea” becomes closer to being achieved.
1 Naval Surface Forces: From the Sea into the 21st Century (Department of the Navy, 1993), p. 1.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Forward . . . From the Sea (Department of the Navy, 1994), p. 46.
4 “5. Schnellbootgeschwader" (German pamphlet, 1995), p. 5.
5 Lt. John P. Cordle, USN, “Welcome to Our World,” Proceedings, March 1994, p. 63.
6 LCdr. K. R. Crawford, USNR; Lt. M. T. Hatton, USN; and LCdr. A. W. Melton, USN, “Where Are the Littoral Warfare Fast-Attack Craft?,” Proceedings, April 1995, p. 87.
7 Cordle, p. 64.
8 “5. Schnellbootgeschwader,” p. 5.
Ensign Kelly was selected as a surface warfare officer and will attend the Surface Warfare Officer’s School in September.